PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

IN FIFTEEN VOLUMES

VOLUME VI

439A—523B

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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PLUTARCH'S

MORALIA

VI

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PREFACE

In proceeding with this edition of the *Moralia* a few changes have been made from the standard created and maintained by Professor Babbitt. The spelling *μίγνυμι* has been adopted, and *γίνομαι* and *γινώσκω* have been preferred. But variation of *ττ* and *σσ* has been allowed. Elsewhere the orthography adopted by Mr. Pohlenz in the Teubner edition has been followed, or not abandoned without reason.

The expert assistance of Professor F. H. Fobes of Amherst College and that of Professor L. C. Barret and Mr. J. A. Notopoulos of Trinity College must be gratefully acknowledged. All three read the proof, and the two last, parts of the manuscripts. They removed innumerable errors and inconsistencies, but for blemishes that may yet remain they are not responsible.

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CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT?
(AN VIRTUS DOCERI POSSIT)

INTRODUCTION

THIS slight and possibly fragmentary essay, or declamation, makes no considerable addition to the theory of knowledge. Virtue is assumed to be an "art"; since the practice of all other arts is unsuccessful without instruction, Virtue (ἀρετή), or the Good Life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν), or Prudence (φρόνησις)—for Plutarch appears to equate the three—must be learned, if we are to be successful in the dependent arts. Plutarch appeals as usual to common sense, but does not take the trouble to prove any of his assumptions; yet the work, even in its present mutilated state, is a graceful exercise in popular philosophy.

While Plutarch's slipshod and half-defined position is not directly contrary to that of Plato (*e.g.* in the *Meno*), it must be observed that two pupils of Socrates, Crito and Simon, wrote works with the titles, Ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μαθεῖν οἱ ἀγαθοί (*That Men are not made Good by Instruction*) and Περὶ ἀρετῆς ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν (*That Virtue cannot be Taught*), respectively.[a] Whether these books differed radically from the Platonic or Socratic position, as developed in the *Meno* and the *Republic*, cannot be argued here.

We must note in passing that G. Siefert (*Commentationes Ienenses*, 1896, pp. 102-105) held that Plutarch

[a] Diogenes Laertius, ii. 121, 122.

wrote this work in connexion with the *De Fortuna* (see the parallels recorded in the notes) and that it is not mutilated, but unfinished.[a] This is quite possible.[b]

The text is very uncertain, for although the essay appears in several important classes of MSS., they differ considerably among themselves. The text which must serve as the basis of the present translation is only presented with the greatest hesitation.

The work appears as No. 180 in the Lamprias catalogue, where it bears the title Περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰ διδακτέον[c] ἢ ἀρετή.

[a] "Ne hic quidem liber fragmentum est, sed schedula tantum a Plutarcho in suum usum obiter composita."

[b] Xylander's supposition, recently repeated without argument by Hartman, that this is not a work of Plutarch, seems untenable.

[c] Bernardakis would rightly emend to διδακτόν.

1. Περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς βουλευόμεθα καὶ διαποροῦμεν, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστι τὸ φρονεῖν τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἶτα[1] θαυμάζομεν, εἰ ῥητόρων μὲν ἔργα καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἁρμονικῶν καὶ οἰκοδόμων καὶ
B γεωργῶν μυρί'[2] ἐστίν, ἀγαθοὶ δ' ἄνδρες ὀνομάζονται καὶ λέγονται μόνον, ὡς ἱπποκένταυροι καὶ γίγαντες καὶ κύκλωπες. ἔργον δ' ἀμεμφὲς εἰς ἀρετὴν[3] οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν οὐδὲ πάθους ἀκέραιον ἦθος οὐδ'[4] ἄθικτον αἰσχροῦ βίον[5]· ἀλλ' εἰ καί τι καλὸν ἡ φύσις αὐτομάτως ἐκφέρει, τοῦτο πολλῷ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ, καθάπερ ὕλῃ καρπὸς ἀγρίᾳ καὶ ἀκαθάρτῳ μιγνύμενος, ἐξαμαυροῦται. ψάλλειν μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν γράμματα καὶ γεωργεῖν καὶ ἱππεύειν[6]· ὑποδεῖσθαι μανθάνουσι, περιβάλλεσθαι[7]· οἰνοχοεῖν διδάσκουσιν ὀψοποιεῖν. ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ μαθεῖν οὐκ ἔστι χρησίμως ποιεῖν, δι' ὃ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα, τὸ εὖ βιοῦν, ἀδίδακτον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἄτεχνον καὶ αὐτόματον;

2. Ὦ ἄνθρωποι, τί τὴν ἀρετὴν λέγοντες ἀδί-

[1] εἶτα] εἶτ' οὐ Reiske.
[2] μυρί' Wyttenbach, confirmed by one MS.: μυρία δ'.
[3] καὶ ἀκέραιον after ἀρετὴν deleted by Wyttenbach.
[4] οὐδ'] καὶ in some MSS.
[5] βίον Pohlenz: βίου or βίου καὶ ἀκέραιον.

1. When we discuss Virtue we debate the question whether Prudence, Justice, and the Good Life can be taught; then we are surprised that the achievements of orators, pilots, musicians, architects, and farmers are past counting, whereas "good men" is only a name and a mere term, like "Centaurs," "Giants," or "Cyclopes"! And it is impossible to find any deed that is faultless as regards its virtue, or any character undefiled by passion, or any life untouched by dishonour; but even if Nature does spontaneously produce something that is excellent, this excellence is obscured by much that is foreign to it, like wheat mixed with wild and impure stuff.[a] Men learn to play the harp, to dance and to read, to farm and to ride the horse; they learn to put on shoes and to don garments, they are taught to pour wine and to bake meat. All these things it is impossible to do properly without instruction; but shall that for the attainment of which all these things are done, that is, the Good Life, be unteachable, irrational, requiring no skill, and fortuitous?

2. O mortal men! Why do we assert that virtue

[a] *i.e.* tares; *cf. Moralia*, 51 A.

[6] After ἱππεύειν some MSS. add καὶ τί δεινόν;
[7] περιβάλλεσθαι] καὶ ἀλείφεσθαι added in some MSS.

(439) δακτον εἶναι ποιοῦμεν ἀνύπαρκτον; εἰ γὰρ ἡ μάθησις γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ τοῦ μαθεῖν κώλυσις ἀναίρεσις. καίτοι γ', ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ποδὸς[1] πρὸς τὴν λύραν ἀμετρίαν καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν οὔτ' ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ πολεμεῖ οὔτε φίλος φίλῳ διαφέρεται, οὔτε πόλεις πόλεσι δι' ἀπεχθείας γινόμεναι τὰ ἔσχατα κακὰ[2] δρῶσί τε καὶ πά-
D σχουσιν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὐδὲ περὶ προσῳδίας ἔχει τις εἰπεῖν στάσιν ἐν πόλει γενομένην,[3] πότερον Τελχῖνας[4] ἢ Τέλχινας ἀναγνωστέον· οὐδ' ἐν οἰκίᾳ διαφορὰν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ὑπὲρ κρόκης ἢ στήμονος. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτ' ἂν ἱστὸν οὔτε βιβλίον ἢ λύραν ὁ μὴ μαθὼν μεταχειρίσαιτο, καίπερ εἰς οὐδὲν μέγα βλαβησόμενος, ἀλλ' αἰδεῖται γενέσθαι καταγέλαστος ("ἀμαθίην" γάρ, Ἡράκλειτός φησι, "κρύπτειν ἄμεινον"), οἶκον δὲ καὶ γάμον καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀρχὴν οἴεται καλῶς μεταχειρίσεσθαι[5] μὴ γυναικὶ μαθὼν συμφέρεσθαι[6] μὴ θεράποντι μὴ πολίτῃ μὴ ἀρχομένῳ μὴ ἄρχοντι;

Παιδὸς ὀψοφαγοῦντος ὁ Διογένης τῷ παιδαγωγῷ κόνδυλον ἔδωκεν, ὀρθῶς οὐ τοῦ μὴ μαθόντος
E ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὴ διδάξαντος τὸ ἁμάρτημα ποιήσας. εἶτα παροψίδος μὲν ἢ κύλικος οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνεῖν

[1] τοῦ ποδὸς] ἐν τῷ ποδὶ Plato.
[2] ἔσχατα κακὰ] ἔσχατα Plato.
[3] γενομένην Emperius and a few MSS.: γινομένην.
[4] ἢ Τέλχινας added by Xylander.
[5] μεταχειρίσεσθαι] most MSS. have -σασθαι or -ζεσθαι.
[6] μαθὼν συμφέρεσθαι added by W.C.H. after Pohlenz.

is unteachable, and thus make it non-existent? For if learning begets virtue, the prevention of learning destroys it. Yet truly, as Plato[a] says, just because a foot of verse is out of measure with the lyre and fails to harmonize with it, brother does not war with brother, nor does friend quarrel with friend, nor do states conceive hatred toward other states and wreak upon each other the most extreme injuries and suffer them as well; nor can anyone say that civil strife has ever broken out in a state over a question of accent, as, for instance, whether we should read Télchines or Telchínes,[b] nor that a quarrel has ever arisen in a household between husband and wife as to which is the warp and which the woof. Yet, for all that, no one, unless he has received instruction, would attempt to handle a loom or a book or a lyre, though he would suffer no great harm if he did so, but he is merely afraid of becoming ridiculous (for, as Heracleitus[c] says, "It is better to conceal ignorance"); but everyone thinks that without instruction he will handle successfully a home, a marriage, a commonwealth, a magistracy—though he has not learned how to get along with wife, or servant, or fellow-citizen, or subject, or ruler!

Diogenes, when he saw a child eating sweet-meats, gave the boy's tutor a cuff, rightly judging the fault to be, not that of him who had not learned, but of him who had not taught. Then, when it is impossible

[a] *Cleitophon*, 407 C; *cf. Moralia*, 534 F.
[b] The latter, according to Herodianus Technicus, i. p. 17 (ed. Lentz).
[c] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], i. p. 172, Frag. 95; the fragment is given more fully in *Moralia*, 644 F and in a different form in Frag. 1 of *That Women Also Should be Educated* (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 125).

ἐπιδεξίως, ἂν μὴ μάθῃ τις εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀρξάμενος, ὡς Ἀριστοφάνης,[1]

μὴ κιχλίζειν μηδ' ὀψοφαγεῖν μηδ' ἴσχειν τὼ πόδ' ἐπαλλάξ[2].

οἴκου δὲ καὶ πόλεως καὶ γάμου καὶ βίου καὶ ἀρχῆς κοινωνίαν ἀνέγκλητον ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι, μὴ μαθόντων ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ἀλλήλοις συμφέρεσθαι; ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, "πανταχοῦ σὺ ἄρ' εἶ;" γελάσας, "οὐκοῦν," ἔφη, "παραπόλλυμι τὸ ναῦλον, εἴ γε πανταχοῦ εἰμι." τί οὖν; οὐκ ἂν εἴποις καὶ αὐτός, "εἰ μὴ γίνονται μαθήσει βελτίονες ἄνθρωποι, παραπόλλυται ὁ μισθὸς τῶν παιδαγωγῶν"; πρῶτοι[3] γὰρ οὗτοι παραλαμβάνοντες ἐκ γάλακτος, ὥσπερ αἱ τίτθαι ταῖς χερσὶ τὸ σῶμα πλάττουσιν, οὕτω τὸ ἦθος ῥυθμίζουσι τοῖς ἔθεσιν, εἰς ἴχνος τι πρῶτον ἀρετῆς καθιστάντες. καὶ ὁ Λάκων ἐρωτηθεὶς τί παρέχει παιδαγωγῶν, "τὰ καλά," ἔφη, "τοῖς παισὶν ἡδέα ποιῶ." καίτοι[4] τί[5] διδάσκουσιν οἱ παιδαγωγοί; κεκυφότας ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς περιπατεῖν, ἑνὶ δακτύλῳ τοῦ ταρίχους ἅψασθαι, δυσὶ τοῦ ἰχθύος, σίτου, κρέως,[6] οὕτω καθῆσθαι, τὸ ἱμάτιον οὕτως ἀναλαβεῖν.

[1] Wyttenbach would add φησίν.
[2] ἐναλλάξ mss. of Aristophanes.
[3] πρῶτοι Reiske: πρῶτον.
[4] καίτοι Emperius: καὶ αὐτοῖν.
[5] τί added by Pohlenz.
[6] W.C.H.: τὸ τάριχον ἅψασθαι δυσὶ τὸν ἰχθὺν σῖτον κρέας.

[a] Adapted from *Clouds*, 983.
[b] *Cf.* Juvenal, viii. 97: furor est post omnia perdere naulum, which indicates the proverbial character of the

to eat and drink politely in company if one has not learned from childhood, as Aristophanes[a] says,

Not to laugh like a clown, nor dainties gulp down, nor to cross one leg on the other;

yet can men enter without censure the fellowship of a household, a city, a marriage, a way of life, a magistracy, if they have not learned how they should get along with fellow-beings? When Aristippus was asked by someone, "So you are everywhere, it seems, aren't you?" "Well then," he replied with a laugh, "I am wasting my fare,[b] if indeed I am everywhere." Why, then, would you also not say, "If men do not become better by teaching, the fee given to their tutors is wasted"? For these are the first to receive the child when it has been weaned and, just as nurses mould its body with their hands,[c] so tutors by the habits they inculcate train the child's character to take a first step, as it were, on the path of virtue. So the Spartan,[d] when he was asked what he effected by his teaching, said, "I make honourable things pleasant to children." And yet what do tutors teach? To walk in the public streets with lowered head; to touch salt-fish with but one finger, but fresh fish, bread, and meat with two[e]; to sit in such and such a posture; in such and such a way to wear their cloaks.[f]

expression. Aristippus, having the *entrée* everywhere, need waste no money in transit.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 3 E; Plato, *Republic*, 377 C.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 452 D, *infra*.
[e] The point is obscure and the text corrupt.
[f] *Cf. Moralia*, 5 A and 99 D. See Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 973 ff., for the way good boys should sit and walk in public; *Birds*, 1568, for the proper way to wear a cloak.

(440) 3. Τί οὖν; ὁ λέγων λειχῆνος ἰατρικὴν εἶναι καὶ παρωνυχίας, πλευρίτιδος δὲ καὶ πυρετοῦ καὶ φρενίτιδος μὴ εἶναι, τί διαφέρει τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι τῶν μικρῶν καὶ παιδικῶν καθηκόντων[1] εἰσὶ διδασκαλεῖα καὶ λόγοι καὶ ὑποθῆκαι, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων καὶ τελείων ἄλογος τριβὴ καὶ περίπτωσίς ἐστιν; ὡς γὰρ ὁ λέγων ὅτι δεῖ κώπην ἐλαύνειν μαθόντα κυβερνᾶν δὲ καὶ μὴ μαθόντα[2] γελοῖός ἐστιν, οὕτως ὁ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολείπων τεχνῶν μάθησιν, ἀρετῆς δ' ἀναιρῶν τοὐναντίον ἔοικε τοῖς Σκύθαις ποιεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γάρ, ὥς φησιν Ἡρόδοτος, τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐκτυφλοῦσιν ὅπως πῦαρ[3]
B παραδιδῶσιν[4] αὐτοῖς· οὗτος δὲ ταῖς δούλαις καὶ ὑπηρέτισι τέχναις ὥσπερ ὄμμα τὸν λόγον ἐντιθεὶς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφαιρεῖ.

Καίτοι γ' ὁ στρατηγὸς Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Καλλίαν τὸν Χαρίου[5] ἐρωτῶντα καὶ λέγοντα, "τίς εἶ; τοξότης; πελταστής; ἱππεύς; ὁπλίτης;" "οὐδείς," ἔφη, "τούτων, ἀλλ' ὁ τούτοις πᾶσιν ἐπιτάττων." γελοῖος οὖν ὁ λέγων ὅτι τοξικὴ καὶ ὁπλιτικὴ καὶ τὸ σφενδονᾶν καὶ τὸ ἱππεύειν διδακτόν ἐστι, στρατηγικὴ[6] δὲ καὶ τὸ στρατηγεῖν ὡς ἔτυχε παραγίνεται καὶ οἷς ἔτυχε μὴ μαθοῦσιν. οὐκοῦν ἔτι γελοιότερος ὁ μόνην τὴν φρόνησιν μὴ

[1] καθηκόντων] καθηκόντως in most MSS.
[2] κυβερνᾶν δὲ καὶ μὴ μαθόντα added by Iannotius.
[3] πῦαρ added by Capps; *cf.* Solon *apud* Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, xii. 5: πῦαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα.
[4] παραδιδῶσιν W.C.H.; γάλα δῶσιν Salmasius; παραμένωσιν Canter; γάλα δονῶσιν Stephanus: παραδῶσιν.
[5] Καλλίαν τὸν Χαρίου Dittenberger: τὸν Χαβρίου Καλλίαν.
[6] στρατηγικὴ Wyttenbach: στρατηγία.

[a] Herodotus, iv. 2, which passage is not at all explicit, but

3. What then? He who says that the physician's art concerns itself with rashes and hang-nails, but not with pleurisy or fever or inflammation of the brain, in what does he differ from one who says that schools and lectures and precepts are for instruction in trifling and childish duties, but that for the great and supreme duties there is only brute knocking about and accident? For just as he is ridiculous who declares that one must be taught before pulling at the oar, but may steer the boat even without having learned; so one who grants that the other arts are acquired by learning, but deprives virtue of this, appears to be acting directly contrary to the practice of the Scythians. For the Scythians, as Herodotus [a] says, blind their slaves that these may hand over the cream to themselves; but such a man as this gives Reason, like an eye, as it were, to the subservient and ancillary arts, while denying it to virtue.

Yet when Callias, son of Charias, asked the general Iphicrates,[b] "Who are you? Bowman, targeteer, horseman, or hoplite?" Iphicrates replied, "None of these, but the one who commands them all." Ridiculous, therefore, is the man who declares that the art of using the bow, or of fighting in heavy armour, or of manipulating the sling, or of riding a horse may be taught, but that the art of commanding and leading an army comes as it chances and to whom it chances without previous instruction! Surely he is yet more ridiculous who affirms that prudence alone cannot be taught, for without pru-

appears to mean that the slaves are blinded to prevent their stealing that part of the milk considered most valuable by their masters.

[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 99 E, 187 B.

(440) διδακτὴν ἀποφαίνων, ἧς ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὄφελος οὐδὲν οὐδ' ὄνησίς ἐστιν. εἰ δ'[1] ἡγεμὼν αὕτη καὶ κόσμος οὖσα πασῶν καὶ τάξις εἰς τὸ χρήσιμον ἕκαστον καθίστησιν, αὐτίκα τίς δείπνου C χάρις, ἠσκημένων καὶ μεμαθηκότων παίδων

δαιτρεῦσαι καὶ[2] ὀπτῆσαι καὶ οἰνοχοῆσαι,

εἰ μὴ διάθεσις μηδὲ τάξις εἴη περὶ[3] τοὺς διακονοῦντας;

[1] εἰ δ'] εἴ γε Stephanus.
[2] καὶ] τε καὶ Homer.
[3] περὶ Wyttenbach: πρὸς.

dence there can be no gain or profit from the other arts. But if prudence is in command, the principle which orders all the arts, which assigns each person to a place of usefulness,[a] what joy, for instance, can one have at a banquet, though the servants are well-trained and have learned to

Carve the meat and roast it well and pour the wine,[b]

if there be no system nor order in the servitors?[c]

[a] There is, perhaps, a lacuna at this point, as indicated by Pohlenz, who supplies "how, then, must one not pay even more heed to prudence than to the other arts?"
[b] Homer, *Od.* xv., 323.
[c] Possibly a large part of the essay is missing.

ON MORAL VIRTUE
(DE VIRTUTE MORALI)

INTRODUCTION

If the present essay is the work of Plutarch,[a] we may, perhaps, be surprised at the diffuseness with which the author permits himself to wander at leisure over the preserves of Aristotelian psychology, while almost completely neglecting the promises made in such high-sounding terms in his first sentence. The purpose of the essay is apparently to refute certain tenets of Stoic psychology, and these are, to be sure, attacked with some spirit, but at such length and with so little attention to logic or to their intended meaning, that complete success is not to be expected. The point which is continually belaboured is that there *are* two parts of the soul, the Rational and the Irrational; for Moral Virtue to arise, the Rational must control the Irrational. So much our author has gleaned from Aristotle and to this he adds very little; nor can he apply his vast reading in poetry and philosophy with much effect to the demolition of Stoic dogma, which he appears in several points to have misunderstood. On the whole,

[a] The only recent attempt, that of Hartman, to show that it is not, relies on the looseness of the reasoning, the tediousness of the argumentation, and the absence of anything that might be called structure. But all three of these are by no means unusual in admittedly genuine works. The language and phraseology appear to the present editor, at any rate, to be Plutarchean.

whether from the standpoint of popular or from that of serious philosophy, this is one of the least successful of Plutarch's works.[a]

A word on the terminology is necessary: Aristotelian usage is probably intended throughout the greater part of the work. I have, therefore, followed most English Aristotelians in my rendering of many terms, with δύναμις "capacity" or "faculty" or "power," φρόνησις "prudence," and the like. ἕξις I have rendered "acquired state," but πάθος and its forms and derivatives I have translated "emotions," "passions," "experiences," according to my interpretation of the context.[b]

It is interesting to notice that Pope in the *Essay on Man* (ii. 51 ff.) has apparently drawn his philosophy from Plutarch's diluted Aristotelianism rather than from the fountain head.[c]

The MS. tradition is fairly good. The work has been well edited by Mr. Pohlenz in the Teubner series; from this edition most of the critical notes and the parallel passages have been taken.

The work is No. 72 in Lamprias's catalogue of Plutarch's writings.

[a] But Hartman's words are no doubt too harsh: "Multo . . . Chaeronensi indignior hic libellus, quem, ut ad finem perlegas quantum tibi est taedii devorandum!"

[b] See Mr. H. Rackham's very just remarks in the preface to his recent (L.C.L., 1935) edition of the *Atheniensium Respublica*.

[c] *Cf.* T. Sinko (*Eos*, xv. 1909, pp. 119-122), who further holds this essay to be the product of Plutarch's youth, comparing the more mature attitude toward the passions to be found in *De Cohibenda Ira* and *De Tranquillitate Animi*.

D 1. Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς λεγομένης ἀρετῆς καὶ δοκούσης, ᾧ δὴ μάλιστα τῆς θεωρητικῆς διαφέρει τῷ τὸ μὲν πάθος ὕλην ἔχειν τὸν δὲ λόγον εἶδος, εἰπεῖν πρόκειται τίνα τ' οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ πῶς ὑφίστασθαι πέφυκε· καὶ πότερον οἰκείῳ λόγῳ κεκόσμηται τὸ δεδεγμένον αὐτὴν μόριον[1] τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ μετέσχηκεν ἀλλοτρίου· καὶ εἰ μετέσχηκε, πότερον ὡς τὰ μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπιστασίᾳ τινὶ χρώμενον καὶ ἀρχῇ μετέχειν λέγεται τῆς τοῦ ἄρχοντος δυνάμεως. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δύναται καὶ ἀρετὴ γεγονέναι καὶ μένειν παντάE πασιν ἄυλος καὶ ἄκρατος,[2] οἶμαι δῆλον εἶναι. βέλτιον δὲ βραχέως ἐπιδραμεῖν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων, οὐχ ἱστορίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ σαφέστερα γενέσθαι τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ βεβαιότερα, προεκτεθέντων ἐκείνων.

2. Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας ἀνῄρει τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης καὶ χρωμένης πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ

[1] αὐτὴν μόριον Sieveking: μόριον αὐτήν.
[2] ἄυλος καὶ ἄκρατος Pohlenz: ἄυλον (or ἄλογον) καὶ ἄκρατον.

1. It is my purpose to speak of that virtue which is called "moral" and reputed to be so, which differs from contemplative virtue chiefly in that it has as its material the emotions of the soul and as its form reason, and to inquire what its essential nature is and how, by its nature, it subsists; whether, also, that part of the soul which receives it is equipped with its own reason, or does but share in the reason of some other part; and if the latter, whether it does this after the manner of elements that are mingled with what is better than themselves, or rather, whether this portion of the soul is guided and governed by another part and in this sense may be said to share in that governing part's power. For that it is possible for virtue also to have come into being and to remain entirely independent of matter and free from all admixture with it, I think is quite obvious. It is better, however, to run summarily through the opinions of the philosophers holding opposing views, not so much for the sake of inquiring into them as that my own opinions may become clearer and more firmly established when those of the philosophers in question have been presented.

2. In the first place, Menedemus of Eretria deprived the virtues of both plurality and differences by asserting that virtue is but one, though it goes under

σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον. Ἀρίστων δ' ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει
F καὶ ὑγίειαν[1] ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τί πως διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν[2] ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ
441 κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα σωφροσύνη, κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους δικαιοσύνη· καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μέν ἐστιν ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλο διαιρεῖ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων εἰς τοῦτό πως ὑποφέρεσθαι ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, ἐν δ' αἱρετέοις[3] σωφροσύνην, ἐν δ' ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρείαν· ἀπολογούμενοι δ' ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὠνομάσθαι.
B Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ[4] ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων, ἔλαθεν αὑτὸν κατὰ τὸν

[1] *ὑγίειαν*] *ὑγείαν* in most MSS.
[2] *μελανθέαν*] *μελανοθέαν* in two MSS.
[3] *αἱρετέοις* Wyttenbach, confirmed by G: *διαιρετέοις*.
[4] *ἰδίᾳ*] *ἰδίαν* in some MSS.

[a] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. p. 86.
[b] *Cf.* for example, Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, vi. 6. 1: prudence is "concerned only with things which admit of variation."

many names: the same thing is meant by temperance and courage and justice, as is the case with "mortal" and "man." And Ariston of Chios[a] himself also made virtue but one in its essential nature and called it health; but in its relative aspect he made certain distinctions and multiplied virtues, just as though one should wish to call our sight "white-sight" when it is applied to white objects, or "black-sight" when applied to black objects, or anything else of the sort. For instance virtue, when it considers what we must do or avoid, is called prudence[b]; when it controls our desires and lays down for them the limitations of moderation and seasonableness in our pleasures, it is called temperance; when it has to do with men's relations to one another and their commercial dealings, it is called justice—just as a knife is one and the same knife, though it cuts now one thing, now another, or as a fire retains its single nature though it operates upon different substances. Moreover it appears likely that Zeno[c] of Citium also inclines in some measure to this opinion, for he defines prudence as justice when it is concerned with what must be rendered to others as their due, as temperance when concerned with what must be chosen or avoided, as fortitude when concerned with what must be endured; and those who defend Zeno postulate that in these definitions he uses the word prudence in the sense of knowledge. Chrysippus,[d] however, by his opinion that corresponding to each several quality a virtue is formed by its own distinctive attribute of quality, unwittingly stirred up a "swarm of virtues,"

[c] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. p. 48; *cf.* also *Moralia*, 97 E and 1034 C.
[d] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 59.

(441) Πλάτωνα σμῆνος ἀρετῶν οὐ συνηθῶν οὐδὲ γνωρίμων[1] ἐγείρας· ὡς γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ἀνδρείαν καὶ παρὰ τὸν πρᾶον πραότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην παρὰ τὸν δίκαιον, οὕτω παρὰ τὸν χαρίεντα χαριεντότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐσθλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν μέγαν μεγαλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν καλὸν καλότητας, ἑτέρας τε τοιαύτας ἐπιδεξιότητας, εὐαπαντησίας, εὐτραπελίας ἀρετὰς τιθέμενος, πολλῶν καὶ ἀτόπων ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν δεομένην ἐμπέπληκε τὴν[2] φιλοσοφίαν.

3. Κοινῶς δ' ἅπαντες οὗτοι τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ C ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσίν τινα καὶ δύναμιν γεγενημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται· καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει[3] τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, δι' ὅλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς καθ' ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, λέγεσθαι δ' ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ D τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ

[1] *συνηθῶν οὐδὲ γνωρίμων* Capps; *σύνηθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον.*
[2] *τὴν* added by Hartman.
[3] *ψυχῆς* before *τοῦ* deleted by Hartman.

[a] *Meno*, 72 A; *cf. Moralia*, 93 B.

as Plato[a] has it, which were not familiar nor even known; for as from the adjective "brave" he derived "bravery," from "mild" "mildness," and "justice" from "just," so from "charming" he derived "charmingnesses," from "virtuous" "virtuousnesses," from "great" "greatnesses," from "honourable" "honourablenesses," postulating also the other qualities of the same sort, dexterousnesses, approachablenesses, adroitnesses, as virtues, and thus filled philosophy, which needed nothing of the sort, with many uncouth names.

3. Yet all of these men agree[b] in supposing virtue to be a certain disposition of the governing portion of the soul and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.[c] Passion, in fact, according to them, is a vicious and intemperate reason, formed from an evil

[b] *Cf.* von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. pp. 49, 50: iii. p. 111.
[c] For the phrase *cf.* Plato, *Parmenides*, 141 D: Marcus Aurelius, ii. 5.

(441) διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβούσης.[1]

Ἔοικε δὲ λαθεῖν τούτους ἅπαντας, ἢ διττὸς ἡμῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕκαστός ἐστι καὶ σύνθετος· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν διπλόην οὐ κατεῖδον, ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος μῖξιν ἐμφανεστέραν οὖσαν· ὅτι δ' αὐτῆς ἔστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ σύνθετόν τι καὶ διφυὲς καὶ ἀνόμοιον, ὥσπερ ἑτέρου σώματος τοῦ ἀλόγου πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀνάγκῃ τινὶ καὶ φύσει συμμιγέντος
E καὶ συναρμοσθέντος, εἰκὸς μέν ἐστι μηδὲ Πυθαγόραν ἀγνοῆσαι, τεκμαιρομένοις τῇ περὶ μουσικὴν σπουδῇ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἣν ἐπηγάγετο τῇ ψυχῇ κηλήσεως ἕνεκα καὶ παραμυθίας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν ἐχούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ μαθήμασιν ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ λόγῳ μεταβλητὸν ἐκ κακίας, ἀλλά τινος ἑτέρας πειθοῦς συνεργοῦ καὶ πλάσεως καὶ τιθασεύσεως δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι μέλλοι φιλοσοφίᾳ δυσμεταχείριστον εἶναι καὶ ἀπειθές.

Ἐμφανῶς μέντοι καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀναμφιδόξως Πλάτων συνεῖδεν, ὅτι τούτου τε[2] τοῦ κόσμου τὸ
F ἔμψυχον οὐχ ἁπλοῦν οὐδ' ἀσύνθετον οὐδὲ μονοειδές ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου μεμιγμένον δυνάμεως[3] πῇ μὲν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ κοσμεῖται καὶ περιπολεῖ μιᾷ τάξει κράτος ἐχούσῃ χρώμενον, πῇ δ' εἴς τε κινήσεις καὶ κύκλους σχιζόμενον ὑπεναντίους καὶ πλανητοὺς ἀρχὴν δια-

[1] προσλαβούσης] προσλαβόντα in many MSS.
[2] τε Pohlenz: γε.
[3] δυνάμεως] φύσεως Plato and *Moralia*, 1012 C.

[a] *Cf.* *Moralia*, 943 A and 1083 C.

and perverse judgement which has acquired additional violence and strength.

But it seems to have eluded all these philosophers in what way each of us is truly two-fold and composite.[a] For that other two-fold nature of ours they have not discerned, but merely the more obvious one, the blend of soul and body. But that there is some element of composition, some two-fold nature and dissimilarity of the very soul within itself, since the irrational, as though it were another substance, is mingled and joined with reason by some compulsion of Nature—this, it is likely, was not unknown even to Pythagoras, if we may judge by the man's enthusiasm for the study of music, which he introduced to enchant and assuage the soul,[b] perceiving that the soul has not every part of itself in subjection to discipline and study, and that not every part can be changed from vice by reason, but that the several parts have need of some other kind of persuasion to co-operate with them, to mould them, and to tame them, if they are not to be utterly intractable and obstinate to the teaching of philosophy.

Plato,[c] however, comprehended clearly, firmly, and without reservation both that the soul of this universe of ours is not simple nor uncompounded nor uniform, but that, being compounded of the potentialities of sameness and otherness, in one part it is ever governed in uniformity and revolves in but one and the same order, which maintains control, yet in another part it is split into movements and circles which go in contrariety to each other and wander about, thus giving

[b] *Cf.* Plato, *Euthydemus*, 290 A.
[c] *Timaeus*, 35 A ff.: *cf.* also the treatise *De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo* (*Moralia*, 1012 B ff.).

φορᾶς καὶ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀνομοιότητος ἐνδίδωσι ταῖς περὶ γῆν φθοραῖς[1] καὶ γενέσεσιν· ἥ τ' ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ μέρος τι ἢ[2] μίμημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὖσα καὶ συνηρμοσμένη κατὰ λόγους καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ἐοικότας
442 ἐκείνοις οὐχ ἁπλῆ τίς ἐστιν οὐδ' ὁμοιοπαθής, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, ᾧ κρατεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄρχειν προσῆκόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ πολυπλανὲς καὶ ἄτακτον ἐξεταστοῦ[3] δεόμενον. οὗ πάλιν διχῆ μεριζομένου, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ σώματι βούλεσθαι συνεῖναι καὶ σῶμα θεραπεύειν πεφυκὸς ἐπιθυμητικὸν κέκληται, τὸ δ' ἔστι μὲν ᾗ τούτῳ προστιθέμενον, ἔστι δ' ᾗ τῷ λογισμῷ παρέχον ἰσχὺν καὶ[4] δύναμιν, θυμοειδές. ἀποδείκνυσι δὲ τὴν διαφορὰν μάλιστα τῇ τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ φρονοῦντος ἀντιβάσει πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ τὸ[5] θυμούμενον, ὡς τῷ[6] ἕτερ' εἶναι πολλάκις ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ δυσ-
B μαχοῦντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον.[7]

Ταύταις ἐχρήσατο ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον[8] Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν· ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένειμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ

[1] καὶ μεταβολῆς . . . φθοραῖς omitted in most MSS.
[2] τι ἢ W.C.H.: ἤ τι.
[3] ἐξεταστοῦ van Herwerden; ἐξηγητοῦ Apelt: ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ.
[4] ἐπὶ τοῦτο before καὶ deleted by Hartman.
[5] τὸ added by Hartman.
[6] ὡς τῷ Apelt: ὥστε.
[7] βέλτιον] βέλτιστον in all MSS. but Λ.
[8] πλεῖστον] πλέον in most MSS., perhaps rightly.

rise to the beginnings of differentiation and change and dissimilarity in those things which come into being and pass away on earth; and also that the soul of man,[a] since it is a portion or a copy of the soul of the Universe and is joined together on principles and in proportions corresponding to those which govern the Universe,[b] is not simple nor subject to similar emotions, but has as one part the intelligent and rational, whose natural duty it is to govern and rule the individual, and as another part the passionate and irrational, the variable and disorderly, which has need of a director. This second part is again subdivided into two parts, one of which, by nature ever willing to consort with the body and to serve the body, is called the appetitive; the other, which sometimes joins forces with this part and sometimes lends strength and vigour to reason, is called the spirited part. And Plato[c] shows this differentiation chiefly by the opposition of the reasoning and intelligent part to the appetitive part and the spirited part, since it is by the very fact that these last are different that they are frequently disobedient and quarrel with the better part.

Aristotle[d] at first made use of these principles to a very great extent, as is obvious from his writings. But later[e] he assigned the spirited to the appetitive part, on the ground that anger is a sort of appetite

[a] *Cf. Timaeus*, 69 c ff.
[b] *Cf.* Themistius, *Paraphrasis Aristotelis de Anima*, i. 5 (p. 59 ed. Spengel).
[c] *Republic*, 435 A ff.
[d] *Cf.* 448 A, *infra*, and the note.
[e] *Cf. De Anima*, iii. 9 (432 a 25); *Magna Moralia*, i. 1 (1182 a 24); *Ethica Eudemia*, ii. 1. 15 (1219 b 28); *Ethica Nicomachea*, i. 13. 9 (1102 a 29); Iamblichus, *Protrepticus*, 7 (p. 41 ed. Pistelli).

(442) ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως. τῷ μέντοι παθητικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ μέχρι παντὸς ὡς διαφέροντι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ χρώμενος διετέλεσεν, οὐχ ὅτι παντελῶς ἄλογόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ φυτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὅλως ἀνήκοα λόγου καὶ κωφὰ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκβεβλάστηκε καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παντελῶς κατα-
C πέφυκε) τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν οἰκείου λόγου στέρεται καὶ ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ φρονοῦντος εἰσακούειν καὶ τρέπεσθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὑπείκειν καὶ κατασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἐὰν μὴ τέλεον ᾖ διεφθαρμένον ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἀμαθοῦς καὶ ἀκολάστου διαίτης.

4. Οἱ δὲ θαυμάζοντες ὅπως ἄλογον μέν ἐστι λόγῳ δ' ὑπήκοον, οὔ μοι δοκοῦσι τοῦ λόγου περινοεῖν τὴν δύναμιν

ὅση πέφυκε κἀφ'[1] ὅσον διέρχεται

τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ ἄγειν οὐ σκληραῖς οὐδ' ἀντιτύποις ἀγωγαῖς, ἀλλὰ τυπικαῖς καὶ τὸ ἐνδόσιμον καὶ πειθήνιον ἁπάσης ἀνάγκης καὶ βίας ἐχούσαις ἀνυσιμώτερον. ἐπεὶ καὶ πνεῦμα δήπου καὶ νεῦρα καὶ
D ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἄλογ' ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντος ὥσπερ ἡνίας τοῦ λογισμοῦ, πάντα τέταται[2] καὶ συνῆκται καὶ ὑπακούει· καὶ πόδες τε θεῖν διανοηθέντος εὔτονοι[3] καὶ χεῖρες εἰς ἔργον καθίστανται βαλεῖν ἢ λαβεῖν

[1] κἀφ' Dübner: καὶ ἐφ'.
[2] τέταται] τέτακται in many MSS.
[3] εὔτονοι] ἔπονται in some MSS.

and desire to cause pain in requital[a]; to the end, however, he continued to treat the passionate and irrational part as distinct from the rational, not because this part is wholly irrational, as is the perceptive part of the soul, or the nutritive and vegetative part (for these parts are completely unsubmissive and deaf to reason and, so to speak, mere off-shoots of our flesh and wholly attached to the body), but though the passionate part is wanting in reason and has no reason of its own, yet otherwise it is by nature fitted to heed the rational and intelligent part, to turn toward it, to yield to it, to conform itself thereto, if it is not completely corrupted by foolish pleasure and a life of no restraint.

4. Those who wonder how it is that this part is irrational, yet subservient to reason, do not seem to me to reflect thoroughly upon the power of reason,

How great it is, how far it penetrates,[b]

through its mastery and guidance, not by harsh and inflexible methods, but by flexible ones, which have a quality of yielding and submitting to the rein which is more effective than any possible constraint or violence. For, to be sure, even our breathing, our sinews and bones, and the other parts of the body, though they are irrational, yet when an impulse comes, with reason shaking the reins, as it were, they all grow taut and are drawn together in ready obedience. So, when a man purposes to run, his feet are keyed for action; if he purposes to throw or to grasp, his hands fall to their business. And most

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Anima*, i. 1 (403 a 30); Seneca, *De Ira*, i. 3. 3.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 648, Euripides, Frag. 898.

ὁρμήσαντος. ἄριστα δ' ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ συμπαθοῦν καὶ συγκατασχηματιζόμενον τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ἀλόγου παρίστησι διὰ τούτων·

ὣς τῆς τήκετο καλὰ παρήια δάκρυχεούσης,
κλαιούσης ἑὸν ἄνδρα παρήμενον· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς
θυμῷ μὲν γοόωσαν ἐὴν ἐλέαιρε γυναῖκα,
E ὀφθαλμοὶ δ' ὡς εἰ κέρα ἔστασαν ἠὲ σίδηρος
ἀτρέμας ἐν βλεφάροισι, δόλῳ δ' ὅ γε[1] δάκρυα κεῦθεν.

οὕτω κατήκοον εἶχε τῆς κρίσεως καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸ δάκρυον.

Δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ παρὰ καλαῖς καὶ καλοῖς, οἷων[2] οὐκ ἐᾷ λόγος οὐδὲ νόμος θιγεῖν, αἰδοίων φυγαὶ καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων καὶ ἀτρεμούντων. ὃ μάλιστα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἐρῶσιν, εἶτ' ἀκούσασιν ὡς ἀδελφῆς ἐρῶντες ἢ θυγατρὸς ἠγνοήκασιν· ἅμα[3] γὰρ ἔπτηξε τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἁψαμένου τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰ μέρη[4] συνενσχημονοῦντα τῇ κρίσει
F παρέσχε. σιτίοις γε μὴν πολλάκις καὶ ὄψοις μάλ' ἡδέως προσενεχθέντες ἂν αἴσθωνται καὶ μάθωσιν αὐτοὺς τῶν μὴ καθαρῶν τι μηδὲ νομίμων ἐδηδοκότας, οὐ τῇ κρίσει μόνον ἕπεται[5] τὸ λυποῦν καὶ δάκνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ δόξῃ συνδιατρεπόμενον καὶ ἀναπιμπλάμενον ἔμετοι καὶ διατροπαὶ ναυτιώδεις ἴσχουσι.

Δέδοικα δὲ μὴ δόξαιμι παντάπασιν ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ
443 νεαρὰ τῷ λόγῳ περαίνειν, ψαλτήρια διεξιὼν καὶ

[1] δ' ὅ γε] δέ γε in all MSS. but G. [2] οἷων Capps: ὧν.
[3] ἅμα Reiske: ἀλλὰ. [4] μέρη] μέλη? Bernardakis.
[5] ἕπεται Naber; ἐπιτίθεται Reiske: ἐπιτίθενται.

excellently does the Poet[a] portray in the following words the sympathy and conformity of the irrational with reason:

Thus were her fair cheeks wet with tears, as she
Wept for her lord, though he sat by. In heart
Odysseus pitied his lamenting wife,
But kept his eyes firm-fixed within their lids
Like horn or iron: with guile he hid his tears.

Under such subjection to his judgement did he keep his breathing and his blood and his tears.

An evident proof of this is also the shrinking and withdrawal of the private parts, which hold their peace and remain quiet in the presence of such beautiful maidens and youths as neither reason nor law allows us to touch. This is particularly the case with those who first fall in love and then hear that they have unwittingly become enamoured of a sister or a daughter; for lust cowers as reason asserts itself and, at the same time, the body brings its parts into decent conformity with the judgement. Indeed, very often with foods and meat, when men have partaken of them with gusto, if they then perceive or come to know that they have eaten something unclean or unlawful, not only is this judgement of theirs attended by displeasure and remorse, but the body itself, revolted and sharing the mind's disgust, falls a prey to the retchings and vomitings of nausea.

But I fear that I shall be thought to be rounding out my discourse with instances which are altogether seductive and exotic, if I recount in full how harps and

[a] Homer, *Od.*, xix. 208-212; *cf.* *Moralia*, 475 A, 506 A-B, and *De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 135 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 409).

(443) λύρας καὶ πηκτίδας καὶ αὐλούς, καὶ ὅσα μουσικῆς προσῳδὰ καὶ προσήγορα μηχανησαμένης ἀνθρωπίνοις πάθεσιν ἄψυχα συνήδεται[1] καὶ συνεπιθρηνεῖ καὶ συνᾴδει καὶ συνακολασταίνει, τὰς κρίσεις ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἤθη τῶν χρωμένων. καίτοι καὶ Ζήνωνά φασιν εἰς θέατρον ἀνιόντα κιθαρῳδοῦντος Ἀμοιβέως πρὸς τοὺς μαθητάς, "ἴωμεν," εἰπεῖν, "ὅπως καταμάθωμεν οἵαν ἔντερα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὀστᾶ λόγου καὶ ῥυθμοῦ[2] μετασχόντα καὶ τάξεως ἐμμέλειαν καὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησιν."

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐάσας, ἡδέως ἂν αὐτῶν πυθοίμην, εἰ
B κύνας καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὄρνιθας οἰκουροὺς ὁρῶντες ἔθει καὶ τροφῇ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ φωνάς τε συνετὰς καὶ πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν ἐχούσας, Ὁμήρου τ'[3] ἀκούοντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα λέγοντος

ὀτρύνειν ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας

ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην, ἔτι θαυμάζουσι καὶ διαποροῦσιν εἰ τὸ θυμούμενον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον ὑπακούειν τε τῷ φρονοῦντι καὶ
C πάσχειν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ συνδιατίθεσθαι πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἀποικοῦν οὐδ' ἀπεσχισμένον[4] οὐδὲ πλασσόμενον ἔξωθεν οὐδὲ τυπούμενον ἀνάγκαις τισὶν ἢ πληγαῖς,

[1] συνήδεται Reiske: συνῆλθε.
[2] ῥυθμοῦ] ἀριθμοῦ in all MSS. but two.
[3] τ' Reiske: δ'.
[4] ἀπεσχισμένον] ἀπεσχοινισμένον in some MSS.

lyres, pipes and flutes, and all the other harmonious and consonant instruments which musical art has devised, void of soul though they be, accord in songs of both joy and grief, in stately measures and dissolute tunes, with human experiences, reproducing the judgements, the experiences, and the morals of those who use them. And yet they say that even Zeno [a] on his way to the theatre when Amoebeus [b] was singing to the lyre, remarked to his pupils, "Come, let us observe what harmony and music gut and sinew, wood and bone, send forth when they partake of reason, proportion, and order."

But, letting these subjects pass, I would gladly learn from my opponents whether, when they see dogs, horses, and domestic birds, through habituation, breeding, and teaching, uttering intelligible sounds and moving and assuming postures in subordination to reason, and acting in a manner conformable to due proportion and our advantage; and when they hear Homer declaring that Achilles

Urged on both horses and men [c]

to battle—whether, I say, they still wonder and are in doubt that the element in us which is spirited and appetitive and experiences pain and pleasure, does, by its very nature, harken to the intelligence, and is affected and harmoniously disposed by its agency, and does not dwell apart from the intelligence, nor is it separated therefrom, nor moulded from without the body, nor formed by any extraneous violence or

[a] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. p. 67; *cf.* also *Moralia*, 1029 E.
[b] *Cf. Life of Aratus*, xvii. (1034 E); Athenaeus, xiv. 623 d; Aelian, *Varia Historia*, iii. 30.
[c] Adapted from *Il.*, xvi. 167.

(443) ἀλλὰ φύσει μὲν ἐξηρτημένον ἀεὶ δ' ὁμιλοῦν καὶ συντρεφόμενον καὶ ἀναπιμπλάμενον ὑπὸ συνηθείας.

Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ὠνόμασται τὸ ἦθος· ἔστι μὲν γάρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἦθος· ὠνόμασται δ' ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον, οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτ' ἄμεινον), ἀλλ' ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας ἀλλὰ συμ-
D μετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας, ἐμποιοῦντος· ἐμποιεῖ δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἕξιν ἀστείαν καθιστάς. τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά φασι περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν πάθος ἕξιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχὴ καὶ ὕλη τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργιλότης αἰσχυντηλία θαρραλεότης· τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησίς τις ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον ὀργὴ αἰδὼς[1] θάρσος· ἡ δ' ἕξις ἰσχὺς καὶ κατασκευὴ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγενομένη, κακία μὲν ἂν φαύλως, ἀρετὴ δ' ἂν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῇ τὸ πάθος.

5. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν μεσότητα ποιοῦσιν
E οὐδ' ἠθικὴν καλοῦσι, λεκτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀρξαμένοις ἄνωθεν. ἔστι τοίνυν τῶν

[1] *θράσος* or *θάρσος* before *αἰδὼς* deleted by Bernardakis after Reiske.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 3 A, 551 E; Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ii. 1. 1 (1103 a 17).

[b] *Cf.* 452 B, *infra*.

[c] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ii. 5 (1105 b 19); Stobaeus, *Eclogae*, ii. 7. 20 (vol. ii. p. 139 ed. Wachsmuth).

[d] "The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable

blows, but that by its nature it is dependent upon the intelligence and is always in association with it and nurtured together with it and influenced by familiar intercourse.

Therefore, also, ethical, or moral, virtue (*ēthos*) is well named,[a] for ethical virtue is, to but sketch the subject, a quality of the irrational, and it is so named because the irrational, being formed by reason, acquires this quality and differentiation by habit (*ĕthos*), since reason does not wish to eradicate passion completely (for that would be neither possible[b] nor expedient), but puts upon it some limitation and order and implants the ethical virtues, which are not the absence of passion but a due proportion and measure therein; and reason implants them by using prudence to develop the capacity for passion into a good acquired disposition. For these three things the soul is said to possess[c]: capacity, passion, acquired state. Now capacity[d] is the starting-point, or raw material, of passion, as, for instance, irascibility, bashfulness, temerity. And passion is a kind of stirring or movement of the capacity, as anger, shame, boldness. And finally, the acquired state is a settled force and condition of the capacity of the irrational, this settled condition being bred by habit and becoming on the one hand vice, if the passion has been educated badly, but virtue, if educated excellently by reason.

5. But inasmuch as philosophers do not make virtue as a whole a mean nor apply to it the term "moral," we must discuss the difference, starting with first principles. Now in this world things

of feeling anger or fear [MSS. read pain] or pity." (Aristotle, *l.c.*, Rackham's translation adapted.)

πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς[1] ἔχοντα τὰ δὲ πῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἁπλῶς[1] μὲν οὖν ἔχοντα, γῆ οὐρανὸς ἄστρα θάλασσα· πῶς δ' ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, αἱρετὸν φευκτόν, ἡδὺ ἀλγεινόν· ἄμφω δὲ τοῦ λόγου θεωροῦντος,[2] τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς[3] ἔχοντα μόνον ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ θεωρητικόν ἐστι, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς πως ἔχουσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς βουλευτικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν· ἀρετὴ δὲ τούτου μὲν ἡ φρόνησις, ἐκείνου δ' ἡ σοφία. διαφέρει δὲ σοφίας φρόνησις
F ἢ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ πρὸς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ σχέσεώς τινος γενομένης ὑφίσταται κατὰ λόγον ἡ φρόνησις. διὸ φρόνησις μὲν τύχης δεῖται, σοφία δ' οὐ δεῖται πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος οὐδὲ βουλῆς· ἔστι γὰρ περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ[4] καὶ[5] ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα. καὶ καθάπερ
444 ὁ γεωμέτρης οὐ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ τριγώνου, εἰ δυεῖν ὀρθαῖς[6] ἴσας ἔχει τὰς ἐντὸς γωνίας ἀλλ' οἶδεν (αἱ γὰρ βουλαὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως ἐχόντων, οὐ περὶ τῶν βεβαίων καὶ ἀμεταπτώτων), οὕτως ὁ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς περὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μόνιμα καὶ μίαν ἀεὶ φύσιν ἔχοντα μὴ δεχομένην μεταβολὰς ἐνεργῶν, ἀπήλλακται τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι. τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν εἰς πράγματα πλάνης μεστὰ καὶ ταραχῆς καθιεῖσαν ἐπιμίγνυσθαι τοῖς τυχηροῖς πολλάκις

[1] ἁπλῶς Gesner's "Stobaeus": ὅπως.
[2] ἄμφω . . . θεωροῦντος W.C.H.: ἀμφοῖν . . . θεωρητικοῦ ὄντος.
[3] ἁπλῶς "Stobaeus": πῶς or ὅπως.
[4] κατὰ ταὐτὰ Wyttenbach, *cf.* Plato, *Phaedo*, 78 c, for example: καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ.
[5] καὶ added by Wyttenbach.
[6] ὀρθαῖς] ὀρθαῖν Reiske.

are of two sorts, some of them existing absolutely, others in some relation to us. Things that exist absolutely are earth, heavens, stars, sea; things that exist in relation to us are good and evil, things desirable and to be avoided, things pleasant and painful. Now reason [a] contemplates both of these, but when it is concerned merely with things which exist absolutely, it is called scientific and contemplative; and when it is engaged with those things which exist in relation to us, it is called deliberative and practical. The virtue of the latter activity is called prudence, that of the former wisdom; and prudence differs from wisdom in that when the contemplative faculty is occupied in a certain active relationship with the practical and passionate, prudence comes to subsist in accordance with reason. Therefore prudence [b] has need of chance, but wisdom has no need of it, nor yet of deliberation, to attain its proper end; for wisdom is concerned with things that remain ever the same and unchanging. And just as the geometer does not deliberate whether the triangle has its internal angles equal to two right angles, but knows it to be true (for deliberation concerns matters that are now one way, now another, not things that are sure and immutable), just so the contemplative mind has its activity concerning first principles, things that are permanent and have ever one nature incapable of mutation, and so has no occasion for deliberation. But prudence must often come down among things that are material and are full of error and confusion; it has to move in the realm of chance; to deliberate where

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, vi. 1. 5 (1139 a 7).
[b] *Ibid.* iii. 3. 4-9 (1112 a 21); vi. 5. 3-6 (1140 a 31); contrast also *Moralia*, 97 E-F.

(444) ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ τῷ βουλευτικῷ χρῆσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδηλοτέρων, τῷ δὲ πρακτικῷ τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐκδεχομένην ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου συμπαρ-
B όντος καὶ συνεφελκομένου ταῖς κρίσεσιν· ὁρμῆς γὰρ δέονται. τὴν δ' ὁρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος, λόγου δεομένην ὁρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία παρῇ καὶ μήθ' ὑπερβάλλῃ μήτ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τὸν καιρόν. τὸ γὰρ δὴ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον κινήσεσι χρῆται ταῖς μὲν ἄγαν σφοδραῖς καὶ ὀξείαις ταῖς δὲ μαλακωτέραις ἢ προσήκει καὶ ἀργοτέραις. ὅθεν ἕκαστον ὧν πράττομεν ἀεὶ μοναχῶς μὲν κατορθοῦται πλεοναχῶς δ' ἁμαρτάνεται[1]· τὸ γὰρ βαλεῖν τὸν
C σκοπὸν ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν, ἀστοχοῦσι δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως, ὑπερβάλλοντες τὸ μέτριον ἢ προαπολείποντες. τοῦτ' οὖν τοῦ πρακτικοῦ λόγου κατὰ φύσιν ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ ἐξαιρεῖν τὰς ἀμετρίας τῶν παθῶν καὶ πλημμελείας. ὅπου μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' ἀρρωστίας καὶ μαλακίας ἢ δέους καὶ ὄκνου προενδίδωσιν[2] ἡ ὁρμὴ καὶ προαπολείπει τὸ καλόν, ἐνταῦθα πάρεστιν ἐξεγείρων καὶ ἀναρριπίζων· ὅπου δὲ πάλιν ἐκφέρεται ῥυεῖσα πολλὴ καὶ ἄτακτος, ἐκεῖ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἵστησιν. οὕτω δ' ὁρίζων τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν, ἐμποιεῖ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς μεσότητας οὔσας. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ἀρετὴν μεσότητι γίνεσθαι ῥητέον· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀπροσδεὴς τοῦ ἀλόγου

[1] ἁμαρτάνεται Emperius: ἁμαρτάνει.
[2] προενδίδωσιν Turnebus: προσενδίδωσιν.

the case is doubtful; and then at last to reduce deliberation to practice in activities in which decisions are both accompanied by and influenced by the irrational, whose impulsion they, as a matter of fact, need. The impulsion of passion springs from moral virtue; but it needs reason to keep it within moderate bounds and to prevent its exceeding or falling short of its proper season. For it is indeed true that the passionate and irrational moves sometimes too violently and swiftly, at other times more weakly and slothfully than the case demands. Therefore everything that we ever do can succeed but in one way, while it may fail in many ways[a]: for to hit the mark there is but one single, uncomplicated, way, yet it can be missed in several ways, according to whether we exceed the mean, or fall short of it. This, then, is the natural task of practical reason: to eliminate both the defects and the excesses of the passions. For wherever, through infirmity and weakness, or fear and hesitation, the impulsion yields too soon and prematurely forsakes the good,[b] there practical reason comes on the scene to incite and rekindle the impulsion; and where, again, the impulsion is borne beyond proper bounds, flowing powerfully and in disorder, there practical reason removes its violence and checks it. And thus by limiting the movement of the passions reason implants in the irrational the moral virtues, which are means between deficiency and excess. For we must not declare that every virtue comes into being by the observance of a mean, but, on the one hand, wisdom, being without any

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ii. 6. 14 (1106 b 28).
[b] The good is the mean.

(444) καὶ περὶ τὸν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ νοῦν συνισταμένη
D σοφία[1] αὐτοτελής τίς ἐστιν ἀκρότης τοῦ λόγου καὶ δύναμις, ᾗ τὸ θειότατον ἐγγίνεται τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ μακαριώτατον· ἡ δ' ἀναγκαία διὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ δεομένη νὴ Δία[2] τῆς παθητικῆς ὥσπερ ὀργανικῆς ὑπηρεσίας ἐπὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, οὐκ οὖσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδ' ἀναίρεσις ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις, ἀκρότης μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσότης γίνεται τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐξαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.

6. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλαχῶς τὸ μέσον (καὶ γὰρ τὸ κεκραμένον τῶν ἀκράτων μέσον, ὡς λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιόν· καὶ τὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχό-
E μενον τοῦ περιεχομένου καὶ περιέχοντος, ὡς τῶν δώδεκα καὶ τεττάρων τὰ ὀκτώ· καὶ τὸ μηδετέρου τῶν ἄκρων μετέχον, ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὸ ἀδιάφορον), τούτων μὲν οὐδενὶ τῶν τρόπων ἡ ἀρετὴ προσρητέα[3] μεσότης· οὔτε γὰρ μῖγμα τῶν κακιῶν ἐστιν οὔτ' ἐμπεριέχουσα τοὔλαττον ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ πλεονάζοντι τοῦ προσήκοντος, οὔτ' ἀπήλλακται παντάπασι τῶν παθητικῶν ὁρμῶν, ἐν αἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἔστι. γίνεται δὲ μεσότης καὶ λέγεται μάλιστα τῇ περὶ φθόγγους καὶ ἁρμονίας ὁμοίως· ἐκείνη τε γὰρ ἐμμελὴς οὖσα φωνή, καθάπερ ἡ νήτη

[1] καὶ φρόνησις after σοφία deleted by W.C.H. (Patzig would write συνισταμένη νοῦν, deleting σοφία καὶ φρόνησις.)
[2] νὴ Δία Reiske: διὰ.
[3] προσρητέα] εἴη ἂν in many MSS.

[a] Some would render, more naturally, "extreme and potentiality"; but, in Plutarch's view, neither "extreme" nor "potentiality" could be called "self-sufficing."

need of the irrational and arising in the activity of the mind, pure and uncontaminated by passion, is, as it were, a self-sufficing perfection and power[a] of reason, by which the most divine and blessed element of knowledge becomes possible for us; on the other hand, that virtue which is necessary to us because of our physical limitations, and needs, by Heaven, for its practical ends the service of the passions as its instrument, so to speak, and is not a destruction nor abolition of the irrational in the soul, but an ordering and regulation thereof, is an extreme as regards its power and quality, but as regards its quantity it is a mean, since it does away with what is excessive and deficient.

6. But since a "mean"[b] is capable of various interpretations (for that which is a compound is a mean between the simple uncompounded substances, as grey is of white and black; and that which contains and is contained is a mean between the contained and the container, as eight of twelve and four; and that which partakes of neither of the extremes is a mean, as the indifferent is a mean between good and bad), in none of these ways can virtue be called a mean, for it is not a mixture of the vices, nor, encompassing what falls short of due measure, is it encompassed by that which is in excess of it; nor is it entirely exempt from the impulses of the passions, wherein are found excess and deficiency. But it is a mean, and is said to be so, in a sense very like that which obtains in musical sounds and harmonies. For there the mean or *mesê*, a properly-pitched note[c] like the *nêtê* and

[b] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ii. 6. 4-9 (1106 a 24).
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 1007 E ff., 1014 C, and 451 F, *infra*.

καὶ ὑπάτη, τῆς μὲν τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς δὲ τὴν
F βαρύτητα τὴν ἄγαν διαπέφευγεν· αὕτη[1] τε κίνησις
οὖσα καὶ δύναμις περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, τὰς ἐκλύσεις καὶ
τὰς ἐπιτάσεις καὶ ὅλως τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον
445 ἐξαιρεῖ τῆς ὁρμῆς, εἰς τὸ μέτριον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον
καθιστᾶσα τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον. αὐτίκα τὴν μὲν
ἀνδρείαν μεσότητά φασιν εἶναι δειλίας καὶ θρα-
σύτητος, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ
θυμοειδοῦς ἐστι· τὴν δ' ἐλευθεριότητα μικρολογίας
καὶ ἀσωτίας, πραότητα δ' ἀναλγησίας καὶ ὠμότη-
τος· αὐτήν τε σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, τὴν
μὲν περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια μήτε πλέον νέμουσαν αὑτῇ
τοῦ προσήκοντος μήτ' ἔλαττον, τὴν δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον[2]
ἀναισθησίας καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀεὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
καθιστᾶσαν.

Ἐν ᾧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκεῖ τὸ ἄλογον τῆς πρὸς
B τὸ λογικὸν διαφορᾶς αὑτοῦ[3] παρέχειν κατανόησιν,
καὶ δεικνύειν τὸ πάθος ὡς ἕτερόν τι κομιδῇ τοῦ
λόγου ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν διέφερε σωφροσύνης ἐγ-
κράτεια καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀκρασία περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ ἐπι-
θυμεῖν ᾧ[4] τε κρίνειν πέφυκε. νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνη
μέν ἐστιν οὗ τὸ παθητικὸν ὥσπερ εὐήνιον θρέμμα
καὶ πρᾶον ὁ λογισμὸς ἡνιοχεῖ καὶ μεταχειρίζεται,
περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας χρώμενος ὑπείκοντι καὶ δεχο-
μένῳ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὔσχημον ἑκουσίως· ὁ δ'

[1] αὕτη Reiske: αὐτὴ.
[2] ἀπαθείας after μέσον deleted by Pohlenz.
[3] αὑτοῦ Dübner: αὐτοῦ.
[4] ᾧ . . . ᾧ Wyttenbach, confirmed by MSS.: ὃ . . . ὅ.

[a] The highest and lowest sounds of the heptachord; presumably the *mesê* is the fourth note of a scale of seven.

the *hypatê*,[a] escapes the sharp highness of the one and the heavy deepness of the other; so virtue, being an activity and faculty concerned with the irrational, does away with the remissions and overstrainings of the impulse and its excesses and defects altogether, and reduces each passion to moderation and faultlessness. So, for instance, they declare courage [b] to be a mean between cowardice and rashness, of which the former is a defect, the latter an excess, of the spirited part of the soul; so, likewise, liberality is a mean between parsimony and prodigality, and gentleness between insensibility and cruelty; and temperance itself and justice are means, the latter distributing to itself in contracts neither more nor less than what is due, the former ever regulating the desires to a mean between lack of feeling and intemperance.

In this last instance, indeed, the irrational seems, with particular clearness, to allow us to observe the difference between itself and the rational, and to show that passion is essentially quite a different thing from reason. For self-control [c] would not differ from temperance, nor incontinence from intemperance, as regards the pleasures and desires, if it were the same part of the soul that we naturally use for desiring as for forming judgements. But the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere where reason guides and manages the passionate element, like a gentle animal obedient to the reins, making it yielding in its desires and willingly receptive of moderation and propriety;

Thus A (*mesê*) is to D above (*nêtê*) as A is to E below (*hypatê*).

[b] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ii. 7. 2-4 (1107 a 33); Stobaeus, *Eclogae*, ii. 7. 20 (vol. ii. p. 141 ed. Wachsmuth).

[c] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, vii. 9. 6 (1151 b 33).

(445) ἐγκρατὴς ἄγει μὲν ἐρρωμένῳ[1] τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ κρατοῦντι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ἄγει δ' οὐκ ἀλύπως οὐδὲ πειθομένην ἀλλὰ πλαγίαν καὶ ἀντιτείνουσαν οἷον
C ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινοῦ καταβιαζόμενος καὶ ἀνακρούων, ἀγῶνος ὢν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ θορύβου μεστός· οἷον ὁ Πλάτων ἐξεικονίζει περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποζύγια, τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ζυγομαχοῦντος ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἡνίοχον διαταράττοντος, ἀντέχειν ὀπίσω καὶ κατατείνειν ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀεὶ

μὴ βάλῃ[2] φοίνικας ἐκ χειρῶν ἱμάντας

κατὰ Σιμωνίδην. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοτελῆ[3] τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀλλ' ἔλαττον[4] ἀρετῆς εἶναι· μεσότης γὰρ οὐ γέγονεν ἐκ συμφωνίας τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον οὐδ' ἀνῄρηται τοῦ πάθους τὸ ὑπερβάλλον, οὐδὲ πειθόμενον οὐδ' ὁμολογοῦν τῷ
D φρονοῦντι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἀλλὰ λυποῦν καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ καθειργόμενον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ ἐν στάσει δυσμενὲς καὶ πολέμιον συνοικεῖ·

πόλις δ' ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει,
ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων·

ἡ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς ψυχὴ διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ τὴν διαφοράν. κατὰ ταὐτὰ δ' οἴονται καὶ τὴν ἀκρασίαν

[1] *τὸ μέτριον . . . ἐρρωμένῳ*] omitted in almost all MSS.
[2] *βάλῃ*] *ποβάλῃ* Edmonds.
[3] *αὐτοτελῆ ἀξιοῦσι* all MSS. except G.
[4] *ἔλαττον*] *ἐλαττόν τι* Fāsi.

[a] *Phaedrus*, 253 c ff.
[b] Frag. 17 (ed. Bergk and ed. Diehl); Frag. 48 (ed. Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, ii. p. 311).

but the self-controlled man, while he does indeed direct his desire by the strength and mastery of reason, yet does so not without pain, nor by persuasion, but as it plunges sideways and resists, as though with blow and curb, he forcibly subdues it and holds it in, being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil. Such a conflict Plato[a] portrays in his simile of the horses of the soul, where the worse horse struggles against his better yoke-fellow and at the same time disconcerts the charioteer, who is ever forced to hold out against him and with might and main to rein him in,

Lest he let fall from his hands the crimson thongs,

as Simonides[b] has it. That is the reason why they do not account self-control even a virtue[c] in the absolute sense, but less than virtue. For it is not a mean which has been produced by the harmony of the worse with the better, nor has the excess of passion in it been eliminated, nor has the desiderative part of the soul become obedient and compliant to the intelligent part, but is vexed and causes vexation and is confined by compulsion and, though living with reason, lives as in a state of rebellion against it, hostile and inimical:

The city reeks with burning incense, rings
Alike with prayers for health and cries of woe[d]

even so is the soul of the self-controlled man because of its lack of consistency and its conflict. And on the same grounds they hold that incontinence also is

[c] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, iv. 9. 8 (1128 b 33): it is rather "a mixture of virtue and vice."
[d] Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 4-5; quoted also in *Moralia*, 95 c, 169 D, 623 C.

ἔλαττόν τι κακίας εἶναι παντελῆ δὲ κακίαν τὴν ἀκολασίαν. αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος φαῦλον καὶ λόγον, ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ἐξάγεται τῷ[1] ἐπιθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν, ὑφ' οὗ δὲ τῷ κακῶς κρίνειν προστιθεμένου ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ τὴν
E αἴσθησιν ἀποβάλλει τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων. ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τῷ μὲν λόγῳ σῴζει τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθὴν οὖσαν, τῷ δὲ πάθει φέρεται παρὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἰσχύοντι τοῦ λόγου μᾶλλον. ὅθεν διαφέρει τῆς ἀκολασίας· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ ἡττᾶται τοῦ πάθους ὁ λογισμὸς ὅπου δ' οὐδὲ μάχεται, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἀντιλέγων ἕπεται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὅπου δ' ὑφηγεῖται συναγορεύων, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἡδομένῳ κοινωνεῖν ὑπάρχει τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων ὅπου δ' ἀχθομένῳ, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἑκὼν φέρεται πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὅπου δὲ προδίδωσιν ἄκων τὸ καλόν.

Ὡς τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἔνεστιν ἡ διαφορὰ κατάδηλος·
F ἀκολάστων μὲν γὰρ αἵδε φωναί·

τίς δὲ χάρις,[2] τί δὲ τερπνὸν ἄνευ[3] χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης;
τεθναίην ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλει.[4]

καὶ ἕτερος

τὸ φαγεῖν τὸ πιεῖν τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τυγχάνειν,
τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκας ἅπαντ' ἐγὼ καλῶ

[1] τῷ] τὸ in most MSS. [2] χάρις] βίος Stobaeus.
[3] ἄνευ] ἄτερ Stobaeus. [4] μέλει] μέλοι Stobaeus.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 705 C-E.
[b] Mimnermus, Frag. 1, vv. 1-2 (ed. Bergk and ed. Diehl); Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambic*, i. p. 89.

something less than a vice, but that intemperance is a full-fledged vice. For intemperance possesses both an evil passion and an evil reason; under the influence of the former, it is incited by desire to shameful conduct; under the influence of the latter, which, since its judgement is evil, is enlisted with the desires, intemperance loses even the perception of its errors. But incontinence,[a] with the aid of reason, preserves its power of judgement intact, yet by its passions, which are stronger than its reason, it is swept along against its judgement. That is why incontinence differs from intemperance, for in it reason is worsted by passion, whereas with intemperance reason does not even fight; in the case of incontinence reason argues against the desires as it follows them, whereas with intemperance reason guides them and is their advocate; it is characteristic of intemperance that its reason shares joyfully in the sins committed, whereas with incontinence the reason shares in them, but with reluctance; with intemperance, reason is willingly swept along into shameful conduct, whereas with incontinence, it betrays honour unwillingly.

So also the difference between them is not less manifest in their words than in their actions. These are, for instance, the sayings of intemperate persons:

> What pleasure can there be, what joy, without
> The golden Aphroditê? May I die
> When things like these no longer comfort me.[b]

And another says,

> To eat, to drink, to have one's way in love[c]:
> All other things I call accessory,

[c] Alexis, Frag. 271 ed. Kock, vv. 4-5; the whole fragment is quoted in *Moralia*, 21 D.

446 φησίν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς συνεπινεύων ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὑπερειπόμενος. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτων ὁ εἰπὼν

ἔα μ' ἀπολέσθαι· τοῦτο γάρ μοι συμφέρει

τὴν κρίσιν ἔχει τῷ πάθει συννοσοῦσαν.

Αἱ δὲ τῆς ἀκρασίας ἕτεραι καὶ διαφέρουσαι

γνώμην ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται·

καὶ

αἰαῖ, τόδ' ἤδη[1] θεῖον ἀνθρώποις κακόν,
ὅταν τις εἰδῇ τἀγαθὸν χρῆται δὲ μή·

καὶ

εἴκει[2] γὰρ ἤδη θυμὸς οὐδ' ἔτ' ἀντέχει,
θινῶδες ὡς ἄγκιστρον ἀγκύρας σάλῳ·

θινῶδες ἄγκιστρον οὐ φαύλως λέγων τὸ μὴ κάτοχον τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδ' ἀραρός, ἀλλὰ μανότητι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μαλακίᾳ προϊέμενον τὴν κρίσιν. οὐ
B πόρρω δὲ τῆς εἰκόνος ταύτης κἀκεῖνα εἴρηται

ναῦς ὥς τις ἐκ μὲν γῆς ἀνήρτημαι[3] βρόχοις,
πνεῖ δ' οὖρος, ἡμῖν δ' οὐ[4] κρατεῖ τὰ πείσματα·

πείσματα γὰρ λέγει τὰς ἀντεχούσας κρίσεις πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν, εἶθ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πνεύματος πολλοῦ

[1] τόδ' ἤδη *Moralia*, 33 E: τὸ δὴ.
[2] εἴκει F. G. Schmidt: ἕλκει.
[3] ἀνήρτημαι] ἀνήρτηται in all MSS. but G.
[4] δ' οὐ Turnebus: δ' εὖ.

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 450, ades. 217.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 634, Euripides, Frag. 840 = Aeschylus, Frag. 262 ed. Smyth (L.C.L.).

as though with all his soul he were acquiescing in pleasures and were being subverted thereby. Not less than these does he [a] who says

Leave me to die, for that is best for me,

have his judgement suffering with the same ailment as his passions.

But the sayings of incontinence are otherwise and different:

A mind I have, but Nature forces me [b];

and

Alas! from God this evil comes to men
When, knowing what is good, they do it not [c];

and

The spirit yields and can resist no more,
Like anchor-hook in sand amid the surge.[d]

Here not inaptly the poet terms "an anchor-hook in sand" that which is not under the control of reason, nor firmly fixed, but surrenders its judgement to the loose and soft part of the soul. Very close to this imagery are also those famous lines [e]:

I, like some ship, am tied by ropes to shore,
And when winds blow, our cables do not hold.

For here the poet calls "cables" the judgements which resist shameful conduct and then are broken

[c] Euripides, Frag. 841; quoted also in *Moralia*, 33 E. *Cf.* St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*, vii. 19, in the King James Version; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, vii. 21: video meliora proboque, | deteriora sequor.
[d] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 911, ades. 379; quoted also in *Moralia*, 782 D. Some ascribe this and the following quotation to Euripides.
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 911, ades. 380.

(446) ῥηγνυμένας τοῦ πάθους. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πλησίστιος μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν φέρεται καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν καὶ συγκατευθύνει· πλάγιος δ' ὁ ἀκρατής, οἷον ἐξαναφέρειν γλιχόμενος καὶ διωθεῖσθαι τὸ πάθος, ὑποσύρεται[1] καὶ περιπίπτει περὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν· ὡς Ἀνάξαρχον ἐσίλλαινε Τίμων

ἐν δὲ τὸ θαρσαλέον τε καὶ ἐμμενὲς[2] ὅππη ὀρούσαι
φαίνετ' Ἀναξάρχου κύνεον μένος· ὅς[3] ῥα καὶ εἰδώς,
C ὡς φάσαν, ἄθλιος ἔσκε, φύσις δέ μιν ἔμπαλιν ἦγεν
ἡδονοπλήξ,[4] ἣν πλεῖστοι ὑποτρείουσι[5] σοφιστῶν.

οὔτε γὰρ ὁ σοφὸς ἐγκρατὴς ἀλλὰ σώφρων, οὔθ' ὁ ἀμαθὴς ἀκρατὴς ἀλλ' ἀκόλαστος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεται τοῖς καλοῖς ὁ δ' οὐκ ἄχθεται τοῖς αἰσχροῖς. σοφιστικῆς οὖν ψυχῆς ἡ ἀκρασία λόγον ἐχούσης οἷς ἔγνωκεν ὀρθῶς ἐμμένειν μὴ δυνάμενον.

7. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία τοιαύτας[6] ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια πρὸς τὴν σωφροσύνην αὖθις αὖ τὰς ἀντιστρόφους ἀναλόγως. τὸ γὰρ δάκνον καὶ τὸ λυποῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτοῦν οὔπω τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀπολέλοιπε· τῆς δὲ σώφρονος
D ψυχῆς τὸ πανταχόθεν ὁμαλὲς καὶ ἄσφυκτον καὶ ὑγιαῖνον, ᾧ συνήρμοσται καὶ συγκέκραται τὸ

[1] ὑποσύρεται Reiske, confirmed by three MSS.: ὑποσύρει.
[2] ἐμμενὲς] ἐμμανὲς in some MSS.
[3] ὅς Xylander from 705 D: ὅν.
[4] ἡδονοπλήξ] ἡδονοπλῆγ' ?
[5] ὑποτρείουσι] ὑποτρομέουσι Nauck.
[6] τοιαύτας Reiske: ταύτας.

[a] Frag. 9 (ed. Wachsmuth, p. 106); portions are quoted

by passion, as by a great gust of wind. Truly the intemperate man is swept along to his pleasures by his desires with sails full-spread and delivers himself over to them and steers his course directly thither; whereas the course of the incontinent man zigzags here and there, as he strives to emerge from his passion and to stave it off and is yet swept down and shipwrecked on the reef of shameful conduct. Just as Timon [a] used to lampoon Anaxarchus:

The Cynic might of Anaxarchus seemed
Steadfast and bold, wherever he wished, to spring;
Well did he know the truth, they say, and yet
Was bad: for Nature smote him with desire
And led him back from truth—'twas Nature's dart,
Before whom trembles many a Sophist heart.

For neither is the wise man continent, though he is temperate, nor is the fool incontinent, though he is intemperate. For the wise man takes pleasure in what is honourable, but the fool is not vexed by shamefulness. Incontinence, therefore, is the mark of a sophistic soul, which has, indeed, reason, but reason which cannot stand firm by its own just decisions.

7. Such, then, are the differences between incontinence and intemperance; and again between continence and temperance, these differences being the counterpart of the former. For continence is not yet free from remorse and pain and indignation; but in the soul of the temperate man there is serenity on all occasions, freedom from violent changes, and sanity, by which the irrational is harmonized and blended

again in *Moralia*, 529 A and 705 D; *cf.* also Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], ii. p. 238.

(446) ἄλογον πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν εὐπειθείᾳ καὶ πραότητι θαυμαστῇ κεκοσμημένον. εἴποις δ'[1] ἂν ἐπιβλέψας

δὴ τότ'[2] ἔπειτ' ἄνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο, ἡ δὲ γαλήνη ἔπλετο νηνεμίη, κοίμησε[3] δὲ κύματα δαίμων·

τὰ σφοδρὰ καὶ περιμανῆ καὶ οἰστρώδη κινήματα τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τοῦ λόγου κατασβέσαντος, ὧν δ' ἡ φύσις ἀναγκαίως δεῖται, ταῦθ' ὁμοπαθῆ[4] καὶ ὑπήκοα καὶ φίλα καὶ συνεργὰ πεποιημένου ταῖς πρακτικαῖς προαιρέσεσιν· ὥστε μὴ προεκθεῖν τοῦ
E λογισμοῦ μηδ' ὑπενδιδόναι μηδ' ἀτακτεῖν μηδ' ἀπειθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν εὐάγωγον οὖσαν

ἄθηλον ἵππῳ πῶλον ὡς ἅμα τρέχειν,

ἐπιβεβαιοῦσαν τὸν Ξενοκράτους λόγον, ὃν ἐκεῖνος εἶπε περὶ τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφούντων, ὅτι μόνοι ποιοῦσιν ἑκουσίως ἃ ποιοῦσιν ἄκοντες οἱ λοιποὶ διὰ τὸν νόμον, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πληγῆς κύνες ἢ γαλαῖ[5] ψόφῳ[6] τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀποτρεπόμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ δεινὸν ὑποβλέποντες.[7]

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνεταί τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιαύτης ἑτερότητος[8] αἴσθησις καὶ διαφορᾶς[9] περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥς τινος μαχομένου καὶ τἀναντία λέγοντος
F αὐταῖς, οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. ἔνιοι δέ φασιν οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυεῖν διαφορὰν

[1] δ' added by Capps. [2] δή τότ'] αὐτίκ' Homer.
[3] κοίμησε] κοίμισε in most MSS.
[4] ὁμοπαθῆ] ὁμοιοπαθῆ in all MSS. but G.
[5] κύνες ἢ γαλαῖ Bernardakis, confirmed by G (κύνες iam Reiske): κυνὸς ἢ γαλῆς).
[6] ψόφῳ] most MSS. have ψόφου or φόβῳ.
[7] ὑποβλέποντες] ἀποβλέποντες in all MSS. but G.
[8] ἑτερότητος Wyttenbach, confirmed by G: στερρότητος.
[9] διαφορᾶς Reiske: διαφορὰ.

with reason, when this is equipped with great persuasion and a wonderful gentleness. And you would say, as you looked at the man,

> Then, indeed, ceased the gale; a windless calm
> Arose; some god had laid the waves to rest,[a]

since by reason the violent, raging, and furious movements of the desires had been quenched and those movements which Nature absolutely requires had been made sympathetic, submissive, friendly, and, when the man chose a course of action, willing to co-operate, so that they did not outstrip the dictates of reason, nor fall short of them, nor misbehave, nor disobey, but so that every impulse was easily led

> As new-weaned foal beside his mother runs,[b]

and confirmed the remark of Xenocrates[c] about true philosophers, that they alone do willingly what all others do unwillingly because of the law, even as dogs by a blow and cats by a noise are turned from their pleasures and regard with suspicion the danger that threatens them.

It is quite obvious, then, that there is in the soul a perception of some such distinction and difference as regards the desires, as though some force were fighting against them and contradicting them. But some affirm[d] that passion is not essentially different from reason, nor is there quarrelling between the

[a] Homer, *Od.*, xii. 168.
[b] Semonides, Frag. 5; *cf.* *Moralia*, 84 D, 136 A, 790 F, 997 D; Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 150 (=Stobaeus, vol. v. p. 1024 ed. Hense).
[c] Frag. 3; *cf.* *Moralia*, 1124 E.
[d] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 111.

καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ' ἀμφότερα,
447 λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς, οὐ συνορῶντας[1] ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ[2] πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι, φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς καὶ φερομένης πάλιν αὐτῆς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα δόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηράς, οὐ περὶ ἕν τι γινομένας τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὅλου τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ῥοπὰς καὶ εἴξεις καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ὁρμάς, καὶ ὅλως ἐνεργείας τινὰς οὔσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ μεταπτωτάς, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν παίδων ἐπιδρομαὶ τὸ ῥαγδαῖον καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐπισφαλὲς ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀβέβαιον ἔχουσι.

Ταῦτα δὲ πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειάν[3] ἐστι
B καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος αἰσθάνεται μεταβολὴν εἰς τὸ κρῖνον οὐδὲ τοῦ κρίνοντος αὖ πάλιν εἰς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐδὲ παύεται μὲν ἐρῶν, ὅτε λογίζεται καθεκτέον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ διαμαχετέον πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐξίσταται δὲ πάλιν τοῦ λογίζεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, ὅταν ἐνδιδῷ μαλασσόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὸ πάθος ἀντιβαίνων ἐν τῷ πάθει ἐστὶν ἔτι, καὶ πάλιν κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους διορᾷ τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον· καὶ οὔτε τῷ πάθει τὸν λόγον ἀνῄρηκεν οὔτε τῷ λογίζεσθαι τοῦ πάθους ἀπήλλακται, φερόμενος δ' ἑκατέρωσε μέσος

[1] *συνορῶντας* Iannotius, confirmed by a few MSS.: *συνορῶντες*.
[2] *ᾧ*] *ὃ* in many MSS.
[3] *ἐνάργειαν*] *ἐνέργειαν* in many MSS.

two and factious strife, but only a conversion of one and the same reason to its two aspects; this escapes our notice by reason of the suddenness and swiftness of the change, for we do not perceive that it is the same part of the soul with which we naturally desire and change to aversion, are angry and afraid, are swept along by pleasure to shameful conduct, and then, when the soul itself is being swept away, recover ourselves again. In fact, they say, desire and anger and fear and all such things are but perverse opinions and judgements, which do not arise in one certain part of the soul, but are inclinations and yieldings, assents and impulses of the whole directive faculty and, in a word, certain activities which may in a moment be changed this way or that, just as the sudden assaults of children [a] have an impetuosity and violence that is precarious and inconstant because of children's weakness.

But this doctrine is, in the first place, contrary to the clear evidence of our perceptions. For no one ever perceives in himself a change from desiring to judging, nor again a change from judging to desiring; nor does the lover cease loving when he reasons that he must restrain his love and fight against it, and then give up again the process of reasoning and judging when he is softened by desire and yields to love; but both while by reason he still continues to oppose passion, he continues in the passion, and again, when mastered by passion, he plainly sees his error by the light of reason: and neither through passion has he done away with reason, nor through reason is he rid of passion, but being borne back and forth from one to the other he lies between them and

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 458 D, *infra*.

(447) ἀμφοῖν καὶ κοινός ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ νῦν μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν
C γίνεσθαι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, νῦν δὲ τὸν ἀντιταττόμενον
τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ λογισμὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, οὐδὲν
ἀπέχουσι τῶν μὴ δύο τὸν κυνηγὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ
θηρίον ὑπολαμβανόντων, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ σῶμα χρώ-
μενον μεταβολῇ νῦν μὲν εἶναι θηρίον νῦν δὲ
γίνεσθαι κυνηγόν. ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ ἐμφανές τι
παρορῶσιν οὗτοί τε πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀντιμαρ-
τυροῦσιν, οὐχ ἑνός τινος μεταβολῆς ἀλλὰ δυεῖν ἅμα
μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς[1] αἰσθανομένην.[2]

"Τί οὖν;" φασίν, "οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλάκις διχοφορεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἐναν-
τίας ἀνθέλκεται δόξας περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀλλ'
D ἕν ἐστι;" "πάνυ μὲν οὖν," φήσομεν, "ἀλλὰ τὸ
συμβαῖνον οὐχ ὅμοιον"· οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ
τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φρονοῦν, ἀλλὰ μιᾷ χρώμενον δυνάμει
διαφόρων ἐφάπτεται λογισμῶν· μᾶλλον δ' εἷς
λογισμὸς ἔστιν ἐν πράγμασι γινόμενος ἑτέροις
ὥσπερ ὕλαις διαφερούσαις. ὅθεν οὔτε λύπη τοῖς
ἄνευ πάθους λογισμοῖς ἔνεστιν, οὔθ' ὥσπερ ἐκβια-
ζόμενοι παρὰ γνώμην αἱροῦνται θάτερον, ἂν μὴ νὴ
Δία λανθάνῃ πάθος τι προσηρτημένον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
ζυγοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο συμβαίνει πολλάκις, οὐ
λογισμοῦ τινος πρὸς λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ φιλοτιμίας ἢ
φιλονεικίας ἢ χάριτος ἢ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ δέους ἀντι-

[1] αὐτοῖς] all MSS. but G have ἑαυτοῖς.
[2] αἰσθανομένην] some MSS. have αἰσθανόμενοι or -όμεθα.

participates in both. For those who assume now that desire becomes the controlling faculty, now that it is reason which arrays itself against desire, are in the same position as those who assume the hunter and the beast to be not two,[a] but one and the same body which, by a change, is now the beast, and now becomes the hunter. For just as those persons overlook something quite plain, so these testify against the evidence of perception, which tells us that we have in these cases, not a changing of some one thing, but two things struggling and fighting against one another.

"What then?" they object. "Is it not true that man's deliberative faculty also is often divided and distracted toward contrary opinions regarding what is expedient, but that it is yet one and the same?" "Quite so," we shall say, "but the process is not parallel." For the intellectual part of the soul does not here oppose itself, but, using one and the same faculty, applies itself to different lines of reasoning; or rather, there is but one single reason, which functions on things essentially different, as though on different matters. Therefore neither is pain present in reasoning where passion is absent, nor are men forced, as it were, to choose a course contrary to reason, unless indeed some emotion is furtively attached, as it were, to one pan of the balances. This, in fact, happens often: when it is not reasoning that opposes reasoning, but ambition or contentiousness or the pursuit of

[a] *Cf.* Emerson, *Brahma*:

If the red slayer think he slays,
Or if the slain think he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again.

E βαίνοντος, οἴεσθαι λόγων[1] εἶναι δυεῖν διαφοράν· ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις·

αἴδεσθεν μὲν ἀνήνασθαι, δεῖσαν δ' ὑποδέχθαι·

καὶ

τὸ μὲν σφαγῆναι δεινὸν εὔκλειαν δ' ἔχει,
τὸ μὴ θανεῖν δὲ δειλὸν ἡδονὴ δ' ἔνι.

καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις τῶν[2] συμβολαίων ὑποτρέχοντα τὰ πάθη τὴν πλείστην ἐμποιεῖ διατριβήν· καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβούλια τῶν βασιλέων οἱ πρὸς χάριν λέγοντες οὐ δυεῖν κρίσεων τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συναγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ πάθει τινὶ προστίθενται παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συμφέροντος λογισμόν. διὸ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις οἱ ἄρχοντες οὐκ ἐῶσι παθαίνεσθαι· ῥέπει γὰρ
F εὐθεῖαν ῥοπὴν ὁ ἀπαθὴς λογισμὸς ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἂν δὲ πάθος ἐγγένηται, μάχην ποιεῖ καὶ διαφορὰν τὸ ἡδόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀλγοῦν πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον. ἐπεὶ διὰ τί τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ σκέμμασιν οὐ πρόσεστι τὸ μετὰ λύπης ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ἄγεσθαι καὶ μετατίθεσθαι πολλάκις, ἀλλ' αὐτός τ'
448 Ἀριστοτέλης Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἔνια τῶν πρόσθεν αὐτοῖς ἀρεσκόντων ἀθορύβως καὶ ἀδήκτως καὶ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀφεῖσαν; ὅτι τῷ θεωρητικῷ καὶ μαθηματικῷ[3] τῆς ψυχῆς πάθος οὐδὲν ἀνθέστηκεν ἀλλ' ἀτρεμεῖ καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ τὸ

[1] λόγων Bernardakis, confirmed by G : διὰ λόγων.
[2] τῶν] some mss. have δὲ τῶν, perhaps rightly.
[3] μαθηματικῷ] μαθητικῷ Jaeger, perhaps rightly.

[a] Homer, *Il.*, vii. 93.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 638, Euripides, Frag. 854.
[c] *Cf.* W. Jaeger, *Hermes*, lxiv. 22 f. ; Eusebius, *Praepar.*

favour or jealousy or fear that opposes, we think it is a difference between two reasons, as in the verse [a] :

To refuse they were ashamed, but feared to accept;

and this :

To die is dreadful, yet it brings fair fame ;
Not to die is craven, yet there's pleasure there.[b]

And in the judgement of suits concerning business affairs the passions rush in unawares and cause the greatest waste of time. So also in the councils of kings those who speak to obtain favour are not advocating one or the other of two decisions, but are submitting to some emotion which is contrary to their calculation of what is expedient. Therefore in aristocratic states the magistrates do not allow political speakers to make passionate harangues, for reason, if not influenced by passion, inclines to a just balance toward what is right ; but if passion intervenes, the part of the soul that feels pleasure and pain fights and opposes the part which forms judgements and deliberates. Otherwise, why is it that in philosophical speculations no feeling of pain is present when, under the influence of those who hold different opinions, we change our views again and again, but that Aristotle [c] himself and Democritus and Chrysippus have recanted without any dismay or pain, and even with pleasure, some of the dogmas they previously held ? It is because passion has set up no opposition to the contemplative and scientific part of the soul and the irrational part remains quiet and

Evang., xiv. 6. 9, where Cephisodorus attacks the young Aristotle by an onslaught on the Platonic Ideas, *οἰηθεὶς κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφεῖν*. See also 442 B, *supra*.

(448) ἄλογον ἐν τούτοις. διὸ πρὸς[1] τἀληθὲς ὁ λογισμός, ὅταν φανῇ,[2] προέμενος τὸ ψεῦδος ἀσμένως ἀπέκλινεν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐν θατέρῳ[3] τὸ πειθόμενον καὶ μεταπειθόμενον. αἱ δὲ πραγματικαὶ βουλαὶ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ δίαιται τῶν πολλῶν ἐμπαθεῖς οὖσαι δυσοδίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχουσι καὶ δυσκολίαν, ἐνισχομένῳ καὶ ταραττομένῳ περὶ τὸ
B ἄλογον, ἀνταῖρον αὐτῷ μεθ' ἡδονῆς τινος ἢ δέους ἢ λύπης ἢ ἐπιθυμίας. καὶ τούτων κριτήριον ἡ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ γὰρ ἂν περιγένηται θάτερον, οὐκ ἀνῄρηκε θάτερον, ἀλλ' ἐφέλκεται καταβιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτεῖνον. ὁ γὰρ νουθετῶν αὑτὸν ἐρῶντα χρῆται τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ πάθος, ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐνόντων ἅμα τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ χειρὶ φλεγμαῖνον ἕτερον μέρος πιέζων καὶ δυεῖν ὄντων καὶ διαφερόντων ἐπαισθανόμενος. ἐν μέντοι ταῖς ἀπαθέσι βουλαῖς καὶ σκέψεσιν, οἷας ἔχει μάλιστα τὸ θεωρητικόν, ἂν μὲν ἴσαι μένωσιν,
C οὐ γέγονε κρίσις ἀλλ' ἀπορία, στάσις οὖσα καὶ μονὴ[4] διανοίας ὑπ' ἐναντίων πιθανῶν[5]· ἂν δὲ ῥοπὴ γένηται πρὸς θάτερον, ἡ κρατήσασα τὴν ἑτέραν λέλυκεν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν μηδ' ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. ὅλως δὲ λογισμοῦ μὲν ἀντικεῖσθαι λογισμῷ δοκοῦντος, οὐ γίνεται δυεῖν καὶ ἑτέρων

[1] διὸ πρὸς] διόπερ in most MSS.
[2] φανῇ] φαίνῃ in most MSS.
[3] θατέρῳ W.C.H.: ἑτέρῳ.
μονὴ Basel ed. of 1542, confirmed by G: μόνῃ.
[5] πιθανῶν Wyttenbach, confirmed by G: παθῶν.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 71 A, and Euripides, Frag. 665 there cited.

does not meddle with these matters. Therefore reason, as soon as the truth appears, dismisses the false and gladly inclines toward the truth; for it is in reason, not in its opposite, that the faculty resides which yields to persuasion and, through persuasion, changes opinion. But with most people, their deliberations, judgements, and decisions which are to be converted into action are in a state of emotion and therefore offer obstructions and difficulties to the path of reason, for reason is checked and confused by the irrational, which, with some emotion of pleasure or fear, pain or desire, rises up to oppose it. In such cases the senses make the decision, since they have contact with both; and if, in fact, one gains the mastery, it does not destroy the other, but forces it to comply and drags it along resisting. For the lover who admonishes himself[a] uses reason against his passion, since they both exist at the same time in his soul, as it were pressing with his hand the other member, which is inflamed, and clearly perceiving that there are two distinct forces and that they are at variance. On the other hand, in those deliberations and speculations where passion is absent (and these are the sort in which the contemplative faculty most commonly engages), if they be equally balanced, no judgement has taken place, but merely a perplexity has arisen, which is a rest or suspension of intellectual activity brought about by opposing probabilities; but if the inclination falls to either side, the winning opinion has cancelled the other, with the result that there is no pain nor any opposition left. In general, when it appears that reason is opposing reason, there is no perception of them as two distinct things, but as a single thing

(448) αἴσθησις ἀλλ' ἑνός τινος ἐν διαφόροις γινομένου φαντασίαις· ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἄλογον μάχηται τῷ λογισμῷ, μήτε κρατεῖν ἀλύπως μήτε κρατεῖσθαι πεφυκὸς εὐθὺς εἰς[1] δύο διίστησι τῇ μάχῃ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν διαφορὰν πρόδηλον.

8. Οὐ μόνον τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης ἀλλ' οὐδὲν D ἧττον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκολουθίας κατίδοι τις ἂν τὴν παθητικὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λογιστικῆς[2] ἑτέραν οὖσαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἐρᾶν εὐφυοῦς πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ γενναίου παιδὸς ἔστι δὲ φαύλου καὶ ἀκολάστου, συμβαίνει δὲ θυμῷ χρῆσθαι μὲν ἀλόγως πρὸς παῖδας αὐτοῦ καὶ γονεῖς χρῆσθαι δ' ὑπὲρ γονέων καὶ παίδων δικαίως πρὸς πολεμίους καὶ τυράννους· ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν αἴσθησις ἔστιν, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα πειθοῦς καὶ ἀκολουθίας, οἷον ἐπιρρέποντος[3] καὶ συνεπιδιδόντος. ἔτι[4] τοίνυν καὶ γυναῖκα γήμας E κατὰ νόμους ἀνὴρ ἐπιεικὴς διανοεῖται περιέπειν καὶ συνεῖναι δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως, χρόνῳ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐντεκούσης πάθος αἰσθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτεινόμενον. ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ νέοι διδασκάλοις ἐπιτυχόντες ἀστείοις ὑπὸ χρείας τὸ πρῶτον ἕπονται καὶ ζηλοῦσιν, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ φιλοῦσιν ἀντὶ γνωρίμων καὶ μαθητῶν ἐρασταὶ καλούμενοι καὶ ὄντες. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἐν πόλεσι χρηστοὺς καὶ γείτονας καὶ κηδεστάς· ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ

[1] εἰς Reiske: ὡς.
[2] λογιστικῆς] λογικῆς in most mss.
[3] ἐπιρρέποντος Wyttenbach: ἐπιρρέοντος.
[4] ἔτι Reiske: ἐπεί.

which arises in different impressions made upon the senses. Yet when there is a struggle against reason on the part of the irrational, which, by its very nature, can neither conquer nor be conquered without pain, straightway the irrational splits the soul in two by its battling and makes the distinction between the two perfectly obvious.

8. It is not only from their dissension, however, but no less from their agreement, that one can perceive that the source of passion is essentially different from that of reason. For since it is equally possible to love a noble youth, well-formed by nature for virtue, and to love an evil and profligate one, and since it happens that one both becomes angry irrationally against one's own children or parents, and angry justly on behalf of parents and children against enemies and despots; just as in the one case there is perception of struggle and dissension of passion against reason, so in the other there is perception of persuasion and agreement on the part of passion, which inclines the scales, as it were, in favour of reason and increases its power. Yet again, when a good man has lawfully married a wife, his intention is to treat her respectfully and consort with her honourably and soberly; but as time goes on, his intimacy with her has given birth to passion, when he perceives that his love and affection increases by the exercise of his reason. So again, when young men happen upon cultivated teachers, they follow them and admire them at first because of their usefulness; but later they come to feel affection for them also, and in place of familiar companions and pupils they are called lovers and are actually so. The same thing happens also in people's relations to good magistrates in cities and good neighbours and

ὑπὸ χρείας τινὸς καθηκόντως[1] ἀλλήλοις ὁμιλεῖν, ἔπειτα λανθάνουσιν εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν ὑποφερόμενοι,
F συνεπισπασαμένου τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ συναναπείσαντος τὸ παθητικόν. ὁ δ' εἰπὼν

αἰδώς τε· δισσαὶ δ' εἰσίν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακὴ
ἡ δ' ἄχθος οἴκων·

ἆρ' οὐ δῆλός ἐστι συνῃσθημένος ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πολλάκις μὲν ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ συγκατακοσμούμενον, πολλάκις δὲ[2] παρὰ τὸν λόγον
449 ὄκνοις καὶ μελλήσεσι καιροὺς καὶ πράγματα λυμαινόμενον;

9. Οἷς καὶ αὐτοὶ[3] τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν[4] ὑπείκοντες, αἰδεῖσθαι τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καλοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι χαίρειν καὶ τοὺς φόβους εὐλαβείας· ταύτην μὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν αἰτιασαμένου τὴν εὐφημίαν, εἰ ταὐτὰ πάθη προστιθέμενα μὲν τῷ λογισμῷ τούτοις καλοῦσι τοῖς ὀνόμασι, μαχόμενα δὲ καὶ βιαζόμενα τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκείνοις. ὅταν δὲ δακρύοις ἐλεγχόμενοι καὶ τρόμοις καὶ χρόας μεταβολαῖς ἀντὶ λύπης καὶ φόβου δηγμούς τινας καὶ συνθροήσεις[5] λέγωσι καὶ προθυμίας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὑποκορίζωνται, σοφιστικὰς δοκοῦσιν οὐ φιλοσό-
B φους διακρούσεις[6] καὶ ἀποδράσεις ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων μηχανᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

Καίτοι πάλιν αὐτοὶ τάς τε χαρὰς ἐκείνας καὶ τὰς βουλήσεις καὶ τὰς εὐλαβείας εὐπαθείας καλοῦσιν

[1] καθηκόντως] καθήκοντος in most MSS.
[2] μὲν . . . δὲ] omitted in most MSS.
[3] οἷς καὶ αὐτοὶ Turnebus: οἱ καὶ αὐτοῖς.
[4] ἐνάργειαν] ἐνέργειαν in all MSS. but G and E.
[5] συνθροήσεις Haupt: συνεόρσεις.
[6] διακρούσεις Xylander: διακαύσεις.

relatives by marriage; for in the beginning they dutifully associate with one another from some consideration of usefulness, but later they are carried unconsciously into genuine affection, reason drawing along, and aiding in the persuasion of, the passionate element. Is it not obvious that he[a] who said,

> And modesty. Two kinds there are: the one
> Not bad, the other burdening our homes,

has perceived in himself that this emotion often follows the lead of reason and is arrayed at reason's side, but often, contrary to reason, by hesitations and delays ruins opportunities and actions?

9. But my opponents, though forced to concede in a manner these arguments because of their obvious truth, yet persist in calling shame "modesty,"[b] pleasure "joy," and fears "precautions." No one would blame them for this euphemism if they would but call these same emotions by these soft names when they attach themselves to reason, and call them by those harsher names when the emotions oppose and offer violence to reason. But when, convicted by their tears and tremblings and changes of colour, in place of grief and fear they call these emotions "compunctions" and "perplexities" and gloss over the desires with the term "eagernesses," they seem to be devising casuistic, not philosophic, shifts and escapes from reality through the medium of fancy names.

And yet these very men,[c] to cite another instance, call those "joys," "volitions," and "precautions" of

[a] Phaedra is the speaker: Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 385-386.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 529 D; von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 107.
[c] *Ibid.* iii. pp. 105-108.

(449) οὐκ ἀπαθείας, ὀρθῶς ἐνταῦθα χρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασι. γίνεται γὰρ εὐπάθεια τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντος ἀλλὰ κοσμοῦντος καὶ τάττοντος ἐν τοῖς σωφρονοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς τί πάσχουσιν, ὅταν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα κρίναντες φιλεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου καὶ τῆς ἐρωμένης μὴ δύνωνται, τὴν δ' ἑταίραν καὶ τὸν κόλακα κρίναντες, εὐθὺς καὶ φιλῶσιν; εἰ γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἦν κρίσις, ἔδει τῇ τοῦ φιλεῖν χρῆναι καὶ μισεῖν κρί-
C σει τὸ φιλεῖν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ[1] μισεῖν· νυνὶ δὲ συμβαίνει τἀναντία, ταῖς μὲν προστιθεμένου τοῦ πάθους κρίσεσι ταῖς δ' ἀπειθοῦντος. ᾗ καί φασιν αὐτοί, τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκβιαζομένων, οὐ πᾶσαν εἶναι κρίσιν πάθος ἀλλὰ τὴν κινητικὴν ὁρμῆς βιαίου καὶ πλεοναζούσης, ὁμολογοῦντες ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. αὐτός τε Χρύσιππος, ἐν πολλοῖς ὁριζόμενος τὴν καρτερίαν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἕξεις ἀκολουθητικὰς τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς ἕτερόν
D ἐστι τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ πειθόμενον ἢ πάλιν μάχεται μὴ πειθόμενον.

10. Ἴσα τοίνυν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα πάντα καὶ πάσας τιθέμενοι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, εἰ μὲν ἄλλῃ πῃ παρορῶσι τἀληθές, οὐκ ἔστι καιρὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι διελέγχειν·

[1] καὶ τὸ] Sieveking would delete τὸ.

[a] *Cf.* von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 93.
[b] *Ibid.* iii. p. 119.

theirs " right sensibilities to emotion," not " insensibilities," in this case using the terms correctly. For a " right sensibility " arises when reason does not destroy the emotion, but composes and sets it in order in the souls of temperate persons. But what it is that happens in the case of evil and incontinent persons when, though their judgement tells them to love father and mother in place of a favourite or mistress, they cannot do this; yet when their judgement bids them to love courtesan and flatterer, they immediately do that very thing? For if emotion and judgement were one, love and hate would follow upon our judgement of what we ought to love and hate; but as it is, the contrary happens: with some judgements the emotion joins forces, others it disregards. Therefore even these very men[a] affirm, since the evidence forces them to do so, that not every judgement is an emotion, but only that which sets in motion a violent and excessive impulse, thereby acknowledging that in us the faculty of judging and the faculty of feeling emotion are different, in the sense that the one is that which sets in motion, the other that which is moved. And Chrysippus himself in many places, by defining endurance and continence as states which follow the convictions of reason, is obviously forced by the evidence to acknowledge that that within us which follows is different from that which it follows when persuaded, or, on the other hand, fights against when it is not persuaded.

10. Now if, by positing[b] that all errors and faults are equal, they are in some other way overlooking the truth, this present discourse is not the proper occasion to confute them; but in the case of the

(449) ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάθεσι[1] φαίνονται κομιδῇ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἐνιστάμενοι τῷ λόγῳ. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ' αὐτούς ἐστι, καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει· μεγάλαι δὲ τῶν παθῶν διαφοραὶ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ὁρῶνται. τίς γὰρ ἂν φαίη τὸν Δόλωνος φόβον ἴσον εἶναι τῷ Αἴαντος " ἐντροπαλιζομένου " καὶ βάδην ἀπιόντος ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων
E " ὀλίγον γόνυ γουνὸς ἀμείβοντος "; ἢ τῇ Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Σωκράτει τελευτήσαντι λύπῃ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ Κλεῖτον, αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν ὁρμήσαντος; ἐπιτείνονται γὰρ οὐ μετρίως καὶ τῷ παρὰ λόγον[2] αἱ λῦπαι, καὶ τὸ παρ' ἐλπίδα σύμπτωμα τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ὀδυνηρότερον· εἰ προσδοκῶν εὐημεροῦντά τινα[3] καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὄψεσθαι πύθοιτο[4] κατεστρεβλωμένον, ὡς Φιλώταν Παρμενίων. θυμῷ δὲ τίς ἂν εἴποι πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον ἴσῳ κεχρῆσθαι Νικοκρέοντα καὶ πρὸς Φιλήμονα Μάγαν ἀμφοτέρους λοιδορηθέντας ὑπ' αὐτῶν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέροις σιδηροῖς κατέπτισε καὶ κατέκοψεν[5] ἐκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ τῷ Φιλήμονι τὸν δήμιον ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸν
F τράχηλον ἐπιθεῖναι γυμνὴν τὴν μάχαιραν εἶτ'

[1] *πάθεσι* Reiske: *πλείοσι*.
[2] *παρὰ λόγον*] *παραλόγῳ* or *παράλογον* in most MSS.
[3] *τινα* added by W.C.H. [4] *πύθοιο* Madvig.
[5] *κατέπτισε καὶ κατέκοψεν*] *κατέπτισσε* and *κατέκοπτεν* in almost all MSS.

[a] *Cf.* Homer, *Il.*, x. 374 ff.; *Moralia*, 76 A.
[b] *Cf. Il.*, xi. 547; *De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 135 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 409).
[c] *Cf.* for the slaying of Cleitus by Alexander Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, li.; and for Alexander's grief *ibid.* lii. (694 D-E).

emotions they certainly appear to be in opposition to reason and contrary to plain evidence. For, according to them, every emotion is an error, and every one who grieves or fears or desires is guilty of error. Yet there are seen to be great differences in the emotions according to their greater or lesser intensity. For who would declare that Dolon's[a] fear was no greater than that of Ajax,[b] who " often faced about " and departed slowly from the midst of his enemies, " scarcely changing knee for knee " ? Or that the grief of Alexander,[c] who attempted to kill himself because of Cleitus, was equal to Plato's grief for the death of Socrates ? For griefs are increased immoderately by unpredictable circumstances,[d] and an unexpected occurrence is more painful than one quite likely to happen; if, for instance, one should expect to see someone in prosperity and honour and then should learn that he had been cruelly tortured, as Parmenion[e] did of Philotas. And who would affirm that the rage of Nicocreon against Anaxarchus[f] was equal to that of Magas[g] against Philemon, though they had both been reviled by their opponents ? For Nicocreon with iron pestles ground Anaxarchus to powder, but Magas merely ordered the public executioner to place his naked blade on Philemon's neck and then to let him go. That is the

[d] *Cf.* 463 D, *infra*; 474 E-F, *infra* (Carneades).
[e] Philotas, the son of Alexander's general Parmenion, was suddenly executed on suspicion of conspiracy; *cf. Life of Alexander*, xlix. (693 B).
[f] A friend of Alexander who insulted Nicocreon, tyrant of Cyprus, so markedly that the latter took his revenge after Alexander's death: *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, ix. 58-59.
[g] *Cf.* 458 A, *infra*: see Hartman, *De Plutarcho*, p. 205, for the absurdity of this comparison.

ἀφεῖναι. διὸ καὶ νεῦρα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν θυμὸν ὁ Πλάτων προσεῖπεν ὡς ἐπιτεινόμενόν τε πικρίᾳ καὶ πραότητι χαλώμενον.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διακρουόμενοι τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι
450 γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δήξεις[1] καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὰς διαχύσεις εἶναι τὰς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ[2] δεχομένας. καίτοι καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις φαίνονται γινόμεναι διαφοραί· τήν τε γὰρ πενίαν οἱ μὲν οὐ κακὸν οἱ δὲ καὶ μέγα κρίνουσι κακόν, οἱ δέ γε καὶ μέγιστον, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τῶν πετρῶν καὶ κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ὠθεῖν ἑαυτούς· τόν τε θάνατον οἱ μὲν ἀγαθῶν στερήσει μόνον οἱ δὲ καὶ τιμωρίαις αἰωνίοις ὑπὸ γῆν καὶ κολασμοῖς φρικώδεσι κακὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν· ἥ τε τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια[3] τοῖς μὲν ὡς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ χρήσιμον ἀγαπᾶται, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ὄντων δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν· οὔτε γὰρ

B πλούτου χάρις[4] ἢ τεκέων

οὔτε

τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς,[5]

τελευτῶντες δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνωφελῆ καὶ ἀνόνητον ἡγοῦνται, τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν μὴ παρόντος· ὥστε

[1] δήξεις Amyot, confirmed by G: λήξεις.
[2] ἀλόγῳ Meziriacus, confirmed by G: λόγῳ.
[3] ὑγίεια Bernardakis, confirmed by G: ὑγεία.
[4] χάρις Pohlenz: χάριν.
[5] τᾶς . . . ἀρχᾶς Aldine ed.: τὰς . . . ἀρχάς.

[a] *Republic*, 411 B; contrast *Moralia*, 457 B-C, *infra*.

reason why Plato[a] also called anger "sinews of the soul" on the ground that it is intensified by harshness and relaxed by gentleness.

So to elude these and similar difficulties my opponents[b] deny that these intensities and violences of the emotions come into existence in accordance with the judgement, in which lies the liability to error; but maintain that the irritations, contractions, and diffusions admit of increase and diminution through the operations of the irrational element. Yet there obviously are differences in judgements also; for some adjudge poverty not to be an evil, others to be a great evil, still others to be the greatest evil, so that they even hurl themselves down from precipices[c] or throw themselves into the sea. Some think death to be an evil merely because it deprives them of the good things of life, others because there are eternal torments and horrible punishments beneath the earth. By some the health of the body is cherished because it is in accordance with Nature and useful, to others it appears the greatest good in the world; for neither do they value

Joy in wealth or children,

nor

In that kingly rule that makes man like to gods[d]

in comparison therewith; and finally they think even virtue to be useless and unprofitable if health be not

[b] The Stoics, as generally throughout the essay; *cf.* von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 119.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 165 A, 1039 F, 1069 D; Theognis, 173-178, and the references cited by Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, i. p. 249, note 5.
[d] Ariphron, *Paean to Health*, vv. 3-4 (Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.*, iii. p. 597, or Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, iii. p. 401); *cf. Moralia*, 497 A, *infra*.

(450) φαίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοὺς δ' ἧττον ἁμαρτάνοντας.

Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο νῦν διελεγκτέον,[1] ἐκεῖνο δ' ἐκ τούτου ληπτέον, ὅτι συγχωροῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ἄλογον, καθ' ὃ φασι γίνεσθαι τὸ πάθος σφοδρότερον καὶ μεῖζον, ἐρίζοντες πρὸς τοὔνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα, τὰ δὲ πράγματα διδόντες τοῖς διαφέρειν τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ κρίνοντος ἀποφαινομένοις. ἐν C δὲ τοῖς περὶ Ἀνομολογίας[2] ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰπὼν ὅτι "τυφλόν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἐκφανῆ πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ," μικρὸν προελθών, "τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγινόμενα," φησί, "πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμούς, καὶ τὰ ὡς ἑτέρως φαινόμενα, βιαίως προωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις". εἶτα χρῆται μάρτυρι τῷ Μενάνδρῳ λέγοντι,

οἴμοι τάλας ἔγωγε, ποῦ ποθ' αἱ[3] φρένες
ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνον ἦσαν ἐν τῷ σώματι
τὸν χρόνον, ὅτ'[4] οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλ' ἐκεῖν' ἠρούμεθα;[5]

D καὶ πάλιν ὁ Χρύσιππος προελθών, "τοῦ λογικοῦ," φησί, "ζῴου φύσιν ἔχοντος προσχρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κυβερνᾶσθαι, πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὸν ἡμᾶς ἄλλη βιαιο-

[1] διελεγκτέον] διαλεκτέον in some MSS.
[2] ἀνομολογίας] Ἀνωμαλίας Reiske, *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii. 192.
[3] ποθ' αἱ Grotius: ποτε.
[4] ὅτ' added by Xylander; ὃν Reiske.
[5] ἐκεῖν' ἠρούμεθα Xylander: ἐκεῖνα αἱρούμεθα.

present. Hence it plainly appears that some make a greater, some a lesser, error in their judgements also.

This doctrine, however, need not be confuted at present, but that other point may be assumed from this discussion: that my opponents themselves also concede that the irrational part is essentially different from judgement, the irrational, in accordance with which they say that emotion becomes greater and more violent; their contention is concerning the name and the expression, but they really surrender the point at issue to those who assert that the passionate and irrational element is different from the reasoning and judging. In his book *On the Failure to Lead a Consistent Life* Chrysippus[a] has said, "Anger is a blind thing: often it prevents our seeing obvious matters, and often it obscures matters which are already apprehended"; and, proceeding a little further, he says, "For the passions, when once raised, drive out the processes of reasoning and all things that appear otherwise than they would have them be, and push forward with violence to actions contrary to reason." He then uses as evidence the words of Menander[b]:

> Ah woe, alas for me! Where ever were
> My wits awandering in my body then
> When I made choice to do not this, but that?

And again, Chrysippus proceeds to say that every rational creature is so disposed by nature as to use reason in all things and to be governed by it; yet often reason is rejected when we are under the impulse of some other more violent force. Thus in this

[a] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 94; the title was interpreted by Xylander as *De Dissensione Partium Animi.*
[b] Frag. 567, Kock, *Comic. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 173 (Allinson, p. 497).

(450) τέρᾳ φορᾷ χρωμένους," ὁμολογῶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦ πάθους διαφορᾶς.

Ἐπεὶ καὶ γελοῖόν ἐστιν, ᾗ φησι Πλάτων, αὐτόν τινα λέγειν αὑτοῦ κρείττονα καὶ πάλιν χείρονα, καὶ τὸν μὲν κρατοῦνθ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν δὲ μὴ κρατοῦντα. (11.) πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ κρείττον' εἶναι καὶ χείρονα ἢ κρατεῖν ἅμα καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ τρόπον τινὰ διττοῦ πεφυκότος ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ
E μὲν χεῖρον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ δὲ βέλτιον ἔχοντος; οὕτως γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπηκόῳ τῷ χείρονι χρώμενος ἐγκρατὴς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κρείττων ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ καὶ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἑπόμενον περιορῶν καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν τὸ κρεῖττον ἧττων ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται καὶ παρὰ φύσιν διακείμενος.

Φύσει γὰρ προσήκει θεῖον ὄντα τὸν λογισμὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀλόγου τοῦ[1] τὴν γένεσιν αὐτόθεν ἔχοντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος· ᾧ καὶ συνεξομοιοῦσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν παθῶν καὶ ἀναπίμπλασθαι πέφυκεν, ἐνδεδυκὸς αὐτῷ καὶ καταμεμιγμένον, ὡς δηλοῦσιν αἱ ὁρμαὶ πρὸς τὰ σωματικὰ κινούμεναι καὶ ἱστάμεναι καὶ σφοδρότητας ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώ-
F ματος μεταβολαῖς καὶ ἀνέσεις λαμβάνουσαι. διὸ νέοι μὲν[2] ὀξεῖς καὶ ἰταμοὶ περί τε τὰς ὀρέξεις διάπυροι καὶ οἰστρώδεις αἵματος πλήθει καὶ θερμότητι, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτῶν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κατασβέννυται καὶ γίνεται μικρὰ

[1] τοῦ] καὶ in most MSS.
[2] καὶ after μὲν deleted by Pohlenz.

[a] *Republic*, 430 E.
[b] *Cf.* Plato, *Timaeus*, 86 B.
[c] *Ibid.* 71 A.

passage he plainly acknowledges what conclusion is to be drawn from the difference which exists between passion and reason.

Why, it would be ridiculous, as Plato[a] says, for a man to say that he is now better than himself and again worse than himself, and sometimes master of himself and sometimes not. (11.) For how is it possible for the same man to be both better and worse than himself, or to be master of himself and at the same time be mastered, if in some way or other each man were not by nature double and had not both the worse and the better within himself? This being the case, he who holds the worse in subjection to the better is self-controlled and better than himself, but he who permits the better part to follow and be in subjection to the intemperate and irrational part of his soul is called worse than himself and incontinent and in a state contrary to Nature.

For, in accordance with Nature, it is proper that reason, which is divine, should lead and rule the irrational, which derives its origin directly from the body to which Nature has designed that it should bear a resemblance and share in the body's passions and be contaminated by it, since it has entered into the body and has become merged with it; that this is so is shown by our impulses,[b] which arise and are set in motion toward corporeal objects and become violent or relax in keeping with the changes of the body. For this reason young men are swift and impetuous and fiery in their appetites, and stung by madness, as it were, through the abundance and heat of their blood; but in old men the source of desire, which is seated about the liver,[c] is in the process of being extinguished and becoming small and weak, whereas

καὶ ἀσθενής· ἰσχύει δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῷ σώματι συναπομαραινομένου. τοῦτο δ' ἀμέλει καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων ἠθοποιεῖ πρὸς τὰ
451 πάθη φύσεις· οὐ γὰρ ὀρθότητι δοξῶν οὐδὲ φαυλότητι δήπου τοῖς μὲν ἀλκαὶ καὶ ὁρμαὶ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα δεινὰ παρίστανται, τοῖς δ' ἀμήχανοι πτοῖαι καὶ φόβοι[1] τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' αἱ περὶ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμεις τὰς τῶν παθῶν διαφορὰς ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ ῥίζης τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀναβλαστάνοντος καὶ συναναφέροντος τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὴν κρᾶσιν.[2] τοῦ δ' ἀνθρώπου ταῖς μὲν παθητικαῖς ὁρμαῖς τὸ σῶμα συμπαθοῦν καὶ συγκινούμενον ἐλέγχουσιν ὠχρότητες ἐρυθήματα τρόμοι πηδήσεις καρδίας, διαχύσεις
B αὖ πάλιν ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἡδονῶν καὶ προσδοκίαις· ὅταν δὲ μὴ μετὰ πάθους ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ κινῆται τὸ διανοητικόν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγει τὸ σῶμα καὶ καθέστηκεν οὔτε κοινωνοῦν οὔτε μετέχον αὐτὸ[3] τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ φρονοῦντος, εἰ τοῦ παθητικοῦ μὴ[4] συνεφάπτοιτο μηδὲ συμπαραλαμβάνοι τὸ ἄλογον· ὥστε καὶ τούτῳ δύ' ὄντα δηλοῦσθαι καὶ διαφέροντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀλλήλων.

12. Καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων αὐτοί τέ φασι καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται, τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δ' ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ

[1] *φόβοι*] *φυγαὶ* in two MSS. is perhaps right.
[2] *κρᾶσιν* Camerarius: *κρίσιν*.
[3] *μετέχον αὐτὸ*] *μετὸν αὐτῷ* or *μεστὸν αὐτῷ* in some MSS.
[4] *παθητικοῦ μὴ* Reiske, confirmed by a few MSS.: *μαθηματικοῦ*.

reason increases more and more in vigour as the passionate element fades away together with the body. And this, of course, is what determines the natures of wild beasts also as regards the passions. For it is not, I presume, by the rightness or wrongness of their opinions that some of them oppose apparent dangers with valour and impetuousness whereas others have helpless flutterings and fears in their souls; but the faculties which control the blood, the breath, and the body in general cause the difference in their affections, since the emotional part springs up from the flesh as from a root and carries with it its quality and composition. But that in man his body is affected and moved together with the impulses of his passions is proved by his paleness[a] and blushing, his trembling and palpitations of the heart, and again by his cheerful and relaxed expression when in hope and expectation of pleasures. But whenever the intellect acts, not accompanied by emotion but by itself alone, the body remains in repose and at rest, neither sharing nor partaking in the activity of the mind, so long as the body does not have to deal with the emotional element or include the irrational in such activity. Consequently, this fact also makes it plain that there are two parts within us which differ from each other in their faculties.

12. And in general, both as my opponents[b] themselves admit and as is quite obvious, in this world some things are governed by an acquired disposition, others by a natural one, some by an irrational soul, others by a rational and intellectual one; and in practically

[a] *Cf. De Libidine et Aegritudine*, 6 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 5).
[b] The Stoics; *cf.* von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, ii. p. 150.

(451) διάνοιαν· ὧν ὁμοῦ τι πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος μετ-
ἔσχηκε καὶ γέγονεν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς εἰρημέναις δια-
C φοραῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἕξει συνέχεται καὶ φύσει τρέφεται
καὶ λόγῳ χρῆται καὶ διανοίᾳ. μέτεστιν οὖν αὐτῷ
καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους
ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν, οὐδ'
ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδ-
αγωγίας δεομένην. ὅθεν οὐ Θράκιον οὐδὲ Λυκούρ-
γειον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον ἐστί, συνεκκόπτειν καὶ
συνδιαφθείρειν τὰ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς βλαβεροῖς τοῦ
πάθους, ἀλλ' ἥπερ ὁ φυτάλμιος θεὸς καὶ ὁ[1] ἡμε-
ρίδης, τὸ ἄγριον κολοῦσαι καὶ ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀμε-
τρίαν, εἶτα τιθασεύειν καὶ παρίστασθαι[2] τὸ χρήσιμον.
οὔτε γὰρ οἶνον οἱ φοβούμενοι τὸ μεθύειν ἐκχέουσιν
D οὔτε πάθος οἱ δεδιότες τὸ ταρακτικὸν ἀναιροῦσιν
ἀλλὰ κεραννύουσι. καὶ γὰρ βοῶν καὶ ἵππων τὰ
πηδήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀφηνιασμοὺς οὐ τὰς κινήσεις
οὐδὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀφαιροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς πάθεσ
δεδαμασμένοις χρῆται καὶ χειροήθεσιν ὁ λογισμός,
οὐκ ἐκνευρίσας οὐδ' ἐκτεμὼν παντάπασι τῆς ψυχῆς
τὸ ὑπηρετικόν·

[1] ὁ added by W.C.H.
[2] *παρίστασθαι*, *cf.* 451 A, *supra*] *περιίστασθαι* in most MSS., *παριστάναι* in one.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 15 D-E. Lycurgus, king of Thrace, angered with Dionysus, cut down the vines; *cf.* Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca*, iii. 5. 1, with Frazer's notes (L.C.L., vol. i. pp. 327 ff.).
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 529 B-C.
[c] Poseidon: *cf. Moralia*, 158 D, 730 D.
[d] Dionysus: *cf. Moralia*, 994 A; both Poseidon and Dionysus are said to be lords of *τῆς ὑγρᾶς καὶ γονίμου ἀρχῆς* in

all these things man participates and he is subject to all the differences I have mentioned. For he is controlled by his acquired disposition, nurtured by his natural disposition, and makes use of reason and intellect. He has, therefore, some portion of the irrational also and has innate within him the mainspring of emotion, not as an adventitious accessory, but as a necessary part of his being, which should never be done away with entirely, but must needs have careful tending and education. Therefore the work of reason is not Thracian, not like that of Lycurgus[a]—to cut down[b] and destroy the helpful elements of emotion together with the harmful, but to do as the god[c] who watches over crops and the god[d] who guards the vine do—to lop off the wild growth and to clip away excessive luxuriance, and then to cultivate and to dispose for use the serviceable remainder. For neither do those who fear drunkenness pour out their wine upon the ground,[e] nor do those who fear passion eradicate the disturbing element, but both temper[f] what they fear. It is, in fact, the rebellious kicking and plunging of oxen and horses that men do away with, not their movements and activities; even so reason makes use of the emotions when they have been subdued and are tame, and does not hamstring[g] nor altogether excise that part of the soul which should be its servant. For

Moralia, 675 F. Poseidon's functions as a god of vegetation are perhaps to be derived from his position as god of fresh streams and fountains; see Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, iv. p. 6.
[e] *Cf.* Plato, *Laws*, 773 D.
[f] See Hartman, *De Plutarcho*, pp. 203 f., for criticism of the ellipsis. Plutarch's meaning is, of course, that wine is tempered by water, and passion by reason.
[g] *Cf.* 449 F, *supra*.

(451) *"ὑφ' ἅρμασι" γὰρ "ἵππος,"*

ὥς φησι Πίνδαρος,

ἐν δ' ἀρότρῳ βοῦς·
κάπρῳ δὲ βουλεύοντα[1] *φόνον κύνα χρὴ τλάθυμον*
ἐξευρεῖν.

ὧν πολὺ χρησιμώτερα τὰ τῶν παθῶν θρέμματα τῷ λογισμῷ συμπαρόντα καὶ συνεντείνοντα[2] *ταῖς ἀρε-*
E *ταῖς· ὁ θυμὸς τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ μέτριος ὤν, ἡ μισοπονηρία τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, καὶ ἡ νέμεσις ἐπὶ τοὺς παρ' ἀξίαν εὐτυχοῦντας, ὅταν ἅμ' ἀνοίᾳ καὶ ὕβρει φλεγόμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπισχέσεως δέωνται. φιλίας δὲ φιλοστοργίαν ἢ φιλανθρωπίας ἔλεον ἢ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν εὐνοίας ἀληθινῆς οὐδὲ βουλόμενος ἄν τις ἀποσπάσειεν οὐδ' ἀπορρήξειεν.*[3] *εἰ δ' οἱ τὸν ἔρωτα τῇ ἐρωτομανίᾳ συνεκβάλλοντες ἁμαρτάνουσιν, οὐδ'*
οἱ τὴν ἐμπορίαν[4] *διὰ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ψέγοντες*
F *κατορθοῦσιν· ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν τι πράττουσι τοῖς τὸ τρέχειν διὰ τὸ προσπταίειν καὶ τὸ βάλλειν διὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἀναιροῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ᾄδειν τὸ παράπαν διὰ τὸ ἀπᾴδειν ἀπεχθῶς ἔχουσιν. οἷον γὰρ ἐν φθόγγοις μουσικὴ τὸ ἐμμελὲς οὐκ ἀναιρέσει βαρύτητος καὶ ὀξύτητος, ἐν δὲ σώμασιν ἰατρικὴ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ φθορᾷ θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίαις καὶ ποσότησι κραθεισῶν ἀπερ-*

[1] *βουλεύοντα*] *βουλεύοντι* in some MSS.
[2] *συνεντείνοντα*] *συνεπιτείνοντα* in most MSS.
[3] *ἀπορρήξειεν* Reiske: *ἀποτήξειεν*.
[4] *ἐμπορίαν* Madvig: *ἐπιθυμίαν*.

The horse is meet for the chariot,

as Pindar[a] says,

the ox for the plough;
But if you think to slay a boar, you must find a stout-hearted hound.

Yet much more useful than these beasts are the whole brood of passions when they are present in the service of reason and help to intensify the virtues: anger, if it be moderate, will assist courage, and hatred of evil will aid justice, and righteous indignation[b] will oppose those who are prosperous beyond their deserts when their souls are inflamed with folly and insolence[c] and they need to be checked. For who, even if he so wished, could separate or sever from friendship a natural propensity toward affection, from humaneness pity, and from true benevolence the mutual participation in joy and grief? And if those err who discard love entirely because love may bring madness, neither are they right who blame commerce because it may beget covetousness; on the contrary, what they do is somewhat like the action of those who would abolish running because one may chance to stumble, or shooting[d] because one may overshoot the mark, and dislike any singing at all because some sing off key. For as in the realm of sound musical art produces consonance, not by doing away with the deep low and the shrill high notes[e]; and in the case of the body, medical art produces health, not by the removal of heat and coldness, but by the proportionately quantitative

[a] Frag. 234 ed. Bergk; 258 ed. Boeckh (p. 611 ed. Sandys); the quotation is given more fully in 472 C, *infra*.
[b] *Cf.* von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 100, l. 37.
[c] *Cf.* Plato, *Laws*, 716 A.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 459 D, *infra*.
[e] *Cf.* 444 E-F, *supra*.

γάζεται, τοιοῦτον ἐν ψυχῇ τὸ ἠθικὸν[1] ἐγγενομένης
ὑπὸ λόγου ταῖς παθητικαῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ κινήσεσιν
452 ἐπιεικείας καὶ μετριότητος. οἰδοῦντι[2] γὰρ ἔοικε
καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι σώματι τὸ περιαλγοῦν καὶ περι-
χαρὲς καὶ περίφοβον[3] τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ τὸ χαῖρον οὐδὲ
τὸ λυπούμενον οὐδὲ τὸ φοβούμενον. καὶ καλῶς
Ὅμηρος εἰπὼν

τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτ' ἄρ τρέπεται χρὼς οὔτε[4] τι λίην
ταρβεῖ

τὸν φόβον οὐκ ἀφεῖλεν ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄγαν φόβον, ὅπως
ἀνδρεία μὴ ἀπόνοια καὶ θαρραλεότης μὴ θρασύτης
γένηται. διὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν ἄγαν
ἀφαιρετέον ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀμύνας τὴν ἄγαν
μισοπονηρίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάλγητος ἀλλὰ
σώφρων, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ[5] ὠμὸς οὐδὲ πικρὸς ἔσται.
B τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάπασιν ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ
δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργότερος ὁ λόγος καὶ
ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλεί-
ποντος. ταῦτα δ' ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συν-
ιδόντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας[6] φιλοτιμίαν
καὶ ζῆλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους
σάλπιγξι[7] καὶ αὐλοῖς ἐπεγείρουσι καὶ αὔξουσι τὸ
θυμοειδὲς καὶ μάχιμον. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν ποιήμασιν,
ᾗ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ διηκριβωμένον
ὁ μουσόληπτος καὶ κατάσχετος ἀποδείκνυσι γε-

[1] ἠθικὸν Camerarius, confirmed by G; οἰκεῖον Wyttenbach: νικῶν or οἶκον.
[2] οἰδοῦντι Bernardakis, confirmed by MSS.: οἰδῶντι.
[3] περίφοβον Turnebus: περίλυπον.
[4] οὔτε Homer: οὐδέ. [5] οὐκ] ἀλλ' οὐκ Reiske.
[6] πολιτείας] πολιτείας καὶ in all MSS. but one.
[7] καὶ before σάλπιγξι deleted by Sieveking.

admixture of the two; so in the soul moral virtue is produced when equity and moderation are engendered by reason in the emotional faculties and activities. For a soul possessed of excessive pain or joy or fear is like a swollen and feverish body; it is not so, however, if the joy or pain or fear be moderate. And Homer [a] in his admirable words,

> A valiant man will never change his hue,
> Nor will his fear be over-great,

does not abolish fear, but excessive fear, in order that the valiant man may have not foolhardiness but courage, not audacity but daring. In his pleasures, therefore, a man must rid himself of excessive desire, and in punishing wrong, of excessive hatred of evil: for in this way he will be, in the former case, not insensible but temperate, and in the latter case, just, not savage nor cruel. But if the passions could in reality be entirely done away with,[b] in many persons reason would be too inactive and dulled, like a pilot when the wind dies down. It is surely this truth that the legislators also have perceived when they try to put into their constitutions the emotions of ambition and emulation as regards the citizens' relations to each other, but in relation to the enemy try to rouse and increase their spirited and fighting qualities with trumpets and pipes.[c] For it is not in poetry only that, as Plato [d] says, he who is inspired and possessed by the Muses renders ridiculous the

[a] *Il.*, xiii. 284; *cf. De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 135 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 408).
[b] *Cf.* 443 c, *supra*.
[c] Contrast 458 E, *infra*.
[d] *Phaedrus*, 245 A; *cf. Ion*, 533 A ff.

(452) λοῖον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς μάχας τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ[1]
C ἐνθουσιῶδες ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητον· ὃ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς Ὅμηρος ἐμποιεῖν φησι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις·

ὣς εἰπὼν ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα ποιμένι λαῶν·

καὶ

οὐχ ὅ γ' ἄνευθε θεοῦ τάδε μαίνεται·

καθάπερ ὅρμημα τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ὄχημα τὸ πάθος προστιθέντας.

Αὐτούς γε μὴν τούτους ὁρᾶν ἔστι πολλάκις μὲν ἐπαίνοις τοὺς νέους παρορμῶντας πολλάκις δὲ νουθεσίαις κολάζοντας· ὧν τῷ μὲν ἕπεται τὸ ἥδεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ νουθεσία καὶ ὁ ψόγος ἐμποιεῖ μετάνοιαν καὶ αἰσχύνην, ὧν τὸ μὲν λύπη τῷ γένει τὸ δὲ φόβος ἐστί· καὶ τούτοις μάλιστα χρῶνται πρὸς τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις. ᾗ καὶ
D Διογένης, ἐπαινουμένου Πλάτωνος, "τί δ' ἐκεῖνος," εἶπεν, "ἔχει σεμνόν, ὃς τοσοῦτον χρόνον φιλοσοφῶν οὐδένα λελύπηκεν;" οὐ γὰρ οὕτως τὰ μαθήματα φαίη τις ἄν, ὡς ἔλεγε Ξενοκράτης,[2] λαβὰς εἶναι φιλοσοφίας, ὡς τὰ πάθη τῶν νέων, αἰσχύνην ἐπιθυμίαν μετάνοιαν ἡδονὴν λύπην φιλοτιμίαν· ὧν ἐμμελῆ καὶ σωτήριον ἁφὴν ἁπτόμενος ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ νόμος εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν ὁδὸν ἀνυσίμως καθίστησι τὸν νέον. ὥστε μὴ κακῶς

[1] καὶ] καὶ τὸ in most MSS.
[2] Ξενοκράτης] ὁ κράτης in some MSS.; ὁ σωκράτης B.

[a] *Il.*, xv. 262 : Apollo to Hector.

man who is an artist equipped with exact knowledge of technique, but in battles also the passionate and inspired is irresistible and invincible. This quality it is that Homer says the gods instil into men :

So did he speak and breathed great might
Into the shepherd of the people [a] ;

and

Not without some god does he
These deeds of madness [b];

as though the gods were adding passion as an incitement or a vehicle to reason.

Indeed we may see these very opponents of mine often inciting young men with praise and often chastising them with admonitions; and of these, in the first case pleasure is the consequence, in the second pain (in fact, admonition and rebuke engender repentance and shame, of which the first is a kind of pain, the second a kind of fear [c]) ; and of these methods they make particular use to improve their charges. As Diogenes [d] also remarked, when Plato was being praised, " What is there so august about one who has spent so much time talking philosophy, yet has never caused anyone pain ? " For surely studies could not so properly be called, to use Xenocrates' [e] words, the " grips of philosophy," as could the emotions of young men : shame, desire, repentance, pleasure, pain, ambition. On these if reason and law obtain a suitable and salutary grip, they efficaciously set the young man upon the path that he should take. Therefore the

[b] *Il.*, v. 185 ; of Diomedes.
[c] *Cf.* von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. pp. 98 f.
[d] *Cf.* Archidamus's remark on Charillus, *Moralia*, 55 E, 218 B, 537 D.
[e] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, iv. 10.

(452) εἰπεῖν τὸν Λάκωνα παιδαγωγόν, ὅτι ποιήσει τὸν παῖδα τοῖς καλοῖς ἥδεσθαι καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς αἰσχροῖς, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν ἔστιν οὐδὲ κάλλιον ἀποφῆναι τέλος ἐλευθέρῳ προσηκούσης παιδείας.

[a] *Cf.* 439 F, *supra*; Plato, *Laws*, 653 B-C.

Spartan [a] tutor was not wide of the mark when he said that he intended to make a boy entrusted to him delight in honourable and be vexed at dishonourable things. Than this saying there can be shown no greater nor fairer end of such education as befits a free-born child.

ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER
(DE COHIBENDA IRA)

INTRODUCTION

THE subject of this essay is not the emotion of anger itself, but the cure best applicable to the passion. In form it is a dialogue, but, apart from the beginning and the end, it is as undramatic as the later works of Plato. The principal speaker, Fundanus, treats the subject in a manner partly general and partly specific, and concludes with a pleasant history of his own cure. Hirzel (*Der Dialog*, ii. p. 170) has described the work as a monument (*Ehrendenkmal*) to the memory of Fundanus, dedicated to Sulla.

Scholars concerned in the investigation of the sources used by Plutarch for this discourse have arrived at varying results: some [a] have imagined that Stoic writers were used, others [b] that the Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes was Plutarch's principal authority. The numerous parallels to Seneca's *De Ira* have been used by both parties to substantiate their theories, but it is more likely that Plutarch, while borrowing numerous *loci communes* and examples

[a] Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, xxix. 152; Schlemm, *Hermes*, xxxviii. 587 ff.

[b] Allers, *De Senecae Librorum de Ira Fontibus*, p. 9; Pohlenz, *Hermes*, xxxi. 321 ff.; accepted by Daebritz, *RE*, i. 8. 1562. In *Hermes*, xl. 292, note 1, Pohlenz attempts to refute Schlemm's arguments.

from earlier writers,[a] constructed for himself the main features of the dialogue. The self-portrayal of Fundanus and his cure, the frame-work of the whole discourse, is clearly Plutarch's own device. The author's debt to preceding literature is, as always, immense, yet the creation of such a work as this is by selection and arrangement; and for that Plutarch is alone responsible.

The essay was known to Aulus Gellius (i. 26), who relates a pleasant anecdote of Plutarch and a rascally slave who ventured to reprove the philosopher for his anger. Among English writers Jeremy Taylor has made admirable use of the essay by paraphrase and even translation, in his *Holy Living*, iv. 8.

The MS. tradition is good.[b] The work is apparently missing in the Lamprias catalogue, since Περὶ ὀργῆς[c] (No. 93) almost certainly refers to a different work from which Stobaeus has preserved a fragment (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 138).

[a] Books on "Anger" were very plentiful in Cicero's day (*Epp. ad Quint. Frat.*, i. 1. 37).

[b] There is extant also a free Syriac translation (ed. Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca*, Leipzig, 1858) which helps occasionally in the constitution of the text.

[c] *Cf.* Patzig, *Quaest. Plut.*, p. 42.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΟΡΓΗΣΙΑΣ

ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ

ΣΥΛΛΑΣ, ΦΟΥΝΔΑΝΟΣ[1]

F 1. ΣΥΛΛΑΣ. Καλῶς μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Φουνδάνε, ποιεῖν οἱ ζωγράφοι διὰ χρόνου τὰ ἔργα πρὶν ἢ συντελεῖν ἐπισκοποῦντες· ὅτι τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῶν ἀφιστάντες τῇ πολλάκις κρίσει ποιοῦσι καινὴν καὶ μᾶλλον ἁπτομένην τῆς παρὰ μικρὸν διαφορᾶς, ἣν
453 ἀποκρύπτει τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ τὸ σύνηθες. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ διὰ χρόνου προσελθεῖν χωρὶς γενόμενον καὶ διαστήσαντα τῆς συνεχείας τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ μάλιστα ποιοῦν ἕκαστον αὑτοῦ φαυλότερον κριτὴν ἢ ἑτέρων· δεύτερον ἂν εἴη τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἐφορᾶν διὰ χρόνου καὶ παρέχειν ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις ἑαυτόν, οὐκ εἰ γέρων γέγονε ταχὺ καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον ἔσχηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴ τι χρηστὸν ὁ χρόνος προστέθεικεν ἢ τῶν φαύλων ἀφῄρηκεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν ἐνιαυτῷ μὲν ἀφιγμένος εἰς Ῥώμην δευτέρῳ, συνὼν δέ σοι μῆνα τουτονὶ πέμπτον, τὸ μὲν ἐξ ὑπαρχόντων δι' εὐφυΐαν

[1] ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ . . . ΦΟΥΝΔΑΝΟΣ] not in the MSS.

[a] Sextius Sulla, a friend of Plutarch (*cf. Moralia*, 636 A, and *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, iii. p. 239).

ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER

(Speakers in the Dialogue: Sulla and Fundanus)

1. SULLA.[a] A good plan, as it seems to me, Fundanus,[b] is that which painters follow: they scrutinize their productions from time to time before they finish them. They do this because, by withdrawing their gaze and by inspecting their work often, they are able to form a fresh judgement, and one which is more likely to seize upon any slight discrepancy, such as the familiarity of uninterrupted contemplation will conceal. Since, therefore, it is impossible for a man to contemplate himself from time to time by getting apart from himself and interrupting his consciousness of himself by breaking its continuity (and this is what, more than anything else, makes every man a poorer judge of himself than of others), the next best course would be for him to inspect his friends from time to time and likewise to offer himself to them, not to see if he is grown old suddenly or if his body is better or worse, but for them to examine both his behaviour and his character to learn whether time has added some excellence or taken away some vice. As for me, since I have returned to Rome after a year's absence and this is now the fifth month that I have been with you constantly, I do not

[b] C. Minicius Fundanus, a friend of Pliny (*Epp.*, v. 16); *cf. Pros. Imp. Rom.*, ii. p. 377.

B ἀγαθῶν ἐπίδοσιν γεγονέναι τοσαύτην καὶ αὔξησιν
(453) οὐ πάνυ θαυμαστὸν ἡγοῦμαι· τὸ δὲ σφοδρὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ διάπυρον πρὸς ὀργὴν ὁρῶντί μοι πρᾶον οὕτως καὶ χειρόηθες τῷ λογισμῷ γεγενημένον ἐπέρχεται πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν εἰπεῖν

ὦ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ μαλακώτερος.

αὕτη δ' ἡ μαλακότης οὐκ ἀργίαν οὐδ' ἔκλυσιν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ κατειργασμένη γῆ λειότητα καὶ βάθος ἐνεργὸν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔσχηκεν ἀντὶ τῆς φορᾶς ἐκείνης καὶ τῆς ὀξύτητος. διὸ καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν οὐ παρακμῇ τινι δι' ἡλικίαν τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐδ' αὐτομάτως ἀπομαραινόμενον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ λόγων τινῶν χρηστῶν θεραπευόμενον. καίτοι (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰρήσεται πρὸς σέ) ταῦθ' ἡμῖν Ἔρως ὁ ἑταῖρος
C ἀπαγγέλλων ὕποπτος ἦν τὰ μὴ προσόντα πρέποντα δὲ προσεῖναι τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς δι' εὔνοιαν ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν, καίπερ, ὡς οἶσθα, οὐδαμῇ πιθανὸς ὢν τῷ πρὸς χάριν ὑφίεσθαι τοῦ δοκοῦντος. ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐκεῖνός τε τῶν ψευδομαρτυριῶν ἀφεῖται, καὶ σύ, τῆς ὁδοιπορίας σχολὴν διδούσης, δίελθ' ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἰατρείαν τινὰ σεαυτοῦ, ᾗ χρησάμενος οὕτως εὐήνιον καὶ ἁπαλὸν[1] καὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρᾶον καὶ ὑπήκοον ἐποιήσω τὸν θυμόν.

ΦΟΥΝΔΑΝΟΣ. Εἶτ' οὐ σκοπεῖς, ὦ προθυμότατε Σύλλα, μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς εὐνοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς

[1] ἁπαλὸν Hartman and Pohlenz: ἁπλοῦν.

[a] Homer, *Il.*, xxii. 373.
[b] This friend of Plutarch is mentioned again in connexion with Fundanus in 464 E, *infra*.
[c] See Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, ii. p. 168, note 4.

find it altogether surprising that, of the virtues which were already yours by gift of Nature, there has been so great an increment and increase; but when I see that that violent and fiery tendency of yours toward anger has become so gentle and submissive to reason, it occurs to me to say with reference to your temper

O wonder, how much milder has it grown![a]

Yet this mildness has brought about no inactivity or feebleness in you, but, like the earth when it has been subdued by cultivation, it has received a smoothness and depth conducive to fruitful action in place of that impetuousness of yours and quickness of temper. For that reason it is evident that the spirited part of your soul is not withering away through any abatement of vigour caused by age, nor yet spontaneously, but that it is receiving the skilful treatment of some excellent precepts. And yet—for I shall tell you the plain truth—when our friend Eros[b] told me all this, I suspected that he was bearing witness, by reason of his goodwill, to qualities that were not actually present in you, yet should be so in men of breeding, although, as you know, he is by no means the sort of man to surrender his own opinion as a favour to anyone. But as things are, Eros stands acquitted of the charge of bearing false witness, and do you, since our journey[c] gives us leisure for conversation, tell me, as though you were recounting some medical treatment, what remedy you used that you have made your temper so obedient to the rein and tender-mouthed, so mild and subservient to reason.

FUNDANUS. Well, what about you, my generous friend Sulla? Are you careful not to let your

(453) παροράς τι τῶν ἡμετέρων; Ἔρωτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδ'
D αὐτῷ πολλάκις ἔχοντι κατὰ χώραν ἐν τῇ Ὁμηρικῇ
πείσῃ μένοντα τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ τραχύτερον ὑπὸ
μισοπονηρίας, εἰκός ἐστι πραοτέρους ἡμᾶς φανῆναι,
καθάπερ ἐν διαγραμμάτων μεταβολαῖς νῆταί τινες
πρὸς ἑτέρας νήτας τάξιν ὑπατῶν[1] λαμβάνουσιν.

ΣΥΛΛ. Οὐδέτερα τούτων ἔστιν, ὦ Φουνδάνε· ποίει δ' ὡς λέγω, χαριζόμενος ἡμῖν.

2. ΦΟΥΝΔ. Καὶ μὴν ὧν γε μεμνήμεθα Μουσωνίου καλῶν ἕν ἐστιν, ὦ Σύλλα, τὸ δεῖν ἀεὶ θεραπευομένους βιοῦν τοὺς σώζεσθαι μέλλοντας. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐλλέβορον, οἶμαι, δεῖ θεραπεύσαντα συνεκφέρεσθαι[2] τῷ νοσήματι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντα τῇ
E ψυχῇ συνέχειν τὰς κρίσεις καὶ φυλάσσειν. φαρμάκοις γὰρ οὐκ ἔοικεν ἀλλὰ σιτίοις ὑγιεινοῖς ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ, μετ' εὐτονίας[3] ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσα χρηστὴν οἷς ἂν γένηται συνήθης· αἱ δὲ πρὸς ἀκμάζοντα τὰ πάθη καὶ οἰδοῦντα παραινέσεις καὶ νουθεσίαι σχολῇ μὲν ἀνύτουσι καὶ μόλις, οὐδὲν[4] δὲ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν διαφέρουσιν, ἃ τοὺς ἐπιληπτικοὺς ἐγείροντα πίπτοντας οὐκ ἀπαλλάττει τοῦ νοσήματος. ὅμως δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ παρ' ὃν ἀκμάζει καιρὸν ἀμωσγέπως ὑπείκει καὶ παρίησι

[1] ὑπατῶν Hatzidakis: ὑπάτων.
[2] συνεκφέρεσθαι Pohlenz; συνεκρεῖν Madvig: συνεκφέρειν.
[3] εὐτονίας Pohlenz and Kronenberg; ἐννοίας Apelt: εὐγενείας or εὐνοίας.
[4] οὐδὲν] οὐδενὶ most mss.

goodwill and friendship for me make you overlook some of my real qualities? For since on many occasions not even Eros himself can keep his temper in its place in that Homeric[a] obedience, but when it becomes too exasperated through hatred of evil, it is reasonable to suppose that I appear more gentle to him, just as in changes of key certain high notes assume the position of low notes in contrast with other high notes.

SULLA. Neither of these suppositions is true, Fundanus. Please do as I ask.

2. FUNDANUS. One of those excellent precepts of Musonius[b] which I remember, Sulla, is: "He that wishes to come through life safe and sound must continue throughout his life to be under treatment." For I do not think that reason should be used in one's cure as we use hellebore, and be washed out of the body together with the disease, but it must remain in the soul and keep watch and ward over the judgements. For the power of reason is not like drugs, but like wholesome food, engendering an excellent state, together with great vigour, in those who become accustomed to it; but exhortations and admonitions, if applied to the passions when they are at their height and swollen, can scarcely accomplish anything at all, and that with difficulty. They are no better than those aromatic preparations which rouse epileptics when they lie prostrate, but do not rid them of the disease. Yet the other passions, even at their height, do in some sort yield and admit reason, when it comes from without to the rescue,

[a] *Od.*, xx. 23, cited in full 506 B, *infra*.
[b] Frag. 36 ed. Hense.

βοηθοῦντα λόγον ἔξωθεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς οὐχ ἧ φησιν ὁ Μελάνθιος

τὰ δεινὰ πράσσει τὰς φρένας μετοικίσας,

ἀλλ' ἐξοικίσας τελείως καὶ ἀποκλείσας, ὥσπερ οἱ
F συνεμπιπράντες ἑαυτοὺς ταῖς οἰκίαις, πάντα ταραχῆς καὶ καπνοῦ καὶ ψόφου μεστὰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐντός, ὥστε μήτ' ἰδεῖν μήτ' ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ὠφελούντων. διὸ μᾶλλον ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ πελάγει ναῦς ἔρημος ἀνα-
454 λήψεται κυβερνήτην ἔξωθεν ἢ προσδέξεται λόγον ἀλλότριον ἄνθρωπος ἐν θυμῷ καὶ ὀργῇ σαλεύων, ἂν μὴ παρεσκευασμένον ἔχῃ τὸν οἰκεῖον λογισμόν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολιορκίαν προσδεχόμενοι συνάγουσι καὶ παρατίθενται τὰ χρήσιμα[1] τὰς ἔξωθεν ἐλπίδας ἀπεγνωκότες, οὕτω μάλιστα δεῖ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν βοηθήματα πόρρωθεν λαμβάνοντας ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κατακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς, ὅταν ὁ τῆς χρείας ἀφίκηται καιρός, μὴ ῥᾳδίως παρεισάγειν δυνησομένους. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκούει τῶν ἐκτὸς ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τὸν θόρυβον, ἐὰν μὴ καθάπερ κελευστὴν ἔνδοθεν ἔχῃ
B τὸν αὑτῆς λόγον ὀξέως δεχόμενον καὶ συνιέντα τῶν παραγγελλομένων ἕκαστον· ἀκούσασα δὲ τῶν μὲν ἠρέμα καὶ πράως λεγομένων καταφρονεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐνισταμένους τραχύτερον ἐρεθίζεται. καὶ γὰρ ὑπερήφανος καὶ αὐθάδης καὶ ὅλως ὑφ' ἑτέρου[2] ὁ θυμὸς δυσκίνητος ὤν, ὥσπερ ὀχυρὰ τυραννὶς ἐξ

[1] χρήσιμα] some MSS. have χρήματα or ἐπιτήδεια.
[2] ἑτέρου] ἑτέρων Schellens.

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 760; quoted again in *Moralia*, 551 A. The poet is not the Athenian tragic poet, but Melanthius of Rhodes (*circa* 150 B.C.), according to Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, xxix. 150 ff.

into the soul; but temper does not, as Melanthius[a] says,

Shunt off the mind, and then do dreadful deeds,

but on the contrary, it shuts out sense completely and locks it out, and just like those who burn themselves up in their own homes, it makes everything within full of confusion and smoke and noise, so that the soul can neither see nor hear anything that might help it. For this reason a ship deserted by her crew in the midst of a storm far out at sea[b] will more easily be able to take on a pilot from the outside, than will a man who is being tossed upon the billows of passion and anger admit the reasoning of another, unless he has his own powers of reason prepared to receive it. But just as those who expect a siege collect and store up all that is useful to them if they despair of relief from without, so it is most important that we should acquire far in advance the reinforcements which philosophy provides against temper and convey them into the soul in the knowledge that, when the occasion for using them comes, it will not be possible to introduce them with ease. For the soul hears nothing from the outside because of its tumult unless it has its own reason within, which, like a boatswain who directs the rowers, will promptly catch and understand every order given. Yet if the soul has heard words of advice which have been quietly and mildly spoken, it despises them; and toward any who insist in a rougher fashion, it grows exasperated. In fact, temper is overbearing and stubborn and altogether difficult for anyone other than itself to move, and, like a well-fortified tyranny,

[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 1103 C.

(454) ἑαυτῆς[1] ἔχειν ὀφείλει σύνοικον καὶ συγγενὲς τὸ καταλῦον.[2]

3. Ἡ μὲν οὖν συνέχεια τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ τὸ προσκρούειν πολλάκις ἕξιν ἐμποιεῖ πονηρὰν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἣν ὀργιλότητα καλοῦσιν, εἰς ἀκραχολίαν καὶ πικρίαν καὶ δυσκολίαν τελευτῶσαν, ὅταν ἑλκώδης καὶ C μικρόλυπος ὁ θυμὸς γένηται καὶ φιλαίτιος ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ὡς σίδηρος ἀσθενὴς καὶ λεπτὸς ἀναχαρασσόμενος· ἡ δὲ παραχρῆμα ταῖς ὀργαῖς ἐνισταμένη καὶ πιέζουσα κρίσις οὐ τὸ παρὸν ἰᾶται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν εὔτονον ποιεῖ καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐμοὶ γοῦν συνέβη δὶς ἢ τρὶς ἐνστάντι πρὸς ὀργὴν τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων παθεῖν, οἳ τὸ πρῶτον ὠσάμενοι Λακεδαιμονίους ἀηττήτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας, οὐδεμίαν ὕστερον ἡττήθησαν ὑπ' αὐτῶν μάχην· φρόνημα γὰρ ἔσχον ὡς κρατεῖν ἔστι τῷ λογισμῷ. ἑώρων δ' οὐ μόνον ψυχροῦ κατασκεδαννυμένου λήγουσαν ὀργήν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστόρησεν, ἀλλὰ D καὶ φόβου προσαχθέντος ἀποσβεννυμένην· καὶ νὴ Δία χαρᾶς ἐπιγενομένης ἄφνω καθ' Ὅμηρον "ἰάνθη" καὶ διεχύθη πολλοῖς ὁ θυμός. ὥστε μοι παρίστατο μὴ παντελῶς ἀβοήθητον εἶναι τοῖς γε βουλομένοις τὸ πάθος.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἔχει μεγάλας ἀεὶ καὶ ἰσχυράς, ἀλλὰ καὶ σκῶμμα καὶ παιδιὰ καὶ τὸ γελάσαι τινὰ

[1] ἑαυτῆς] ἑαυτοῦ Reiske. [2] καταλῦον] καταλῦσον W.C.H.

[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Republic*, 411 B-C.

[b] At the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.

[c] This is apparently from a lost work, though not included in Rose's collection of fragments. In *Problemata*, x. 60 (898 a 4), however, Aristotle observes that fear is a process of cooling; *cf.* also *De Partibus Animalium*, ii. 4 (651 a 8 ff.).

must have its destroyer born and bred in the same household.

3. To be sure, when anger persists and its outbursts are frequent, there is created in the soul an evil state which is called irascibility,[a] and this usually results in sudden outbursts of rage, moroseness, and peevishness when the temper becomes ulcerated, easily offended, and liable to find fault for even trivial offences, like a weak, thin piece of iron which is always getting scratched. But if judgement at once opposes the fits of anger and represses them, it not only cures them for the present, but for the future also it renders the soul firm and difficult for passion to attack. In my own case, at any rate, when I had opposed anger two or three times, it came about that I experienced what the Thebans did, who, when they had for the first time[b] repulsed the Spartans, who had the reputation of being invincible, were never thereafter defeated by them in any battle; for I acquired the proud consciousness that it is possible for reason to conquer. Not only did I see that anger ceases when cold water is sprinkled on it, as Aristotle[c] says, but that it is also extinguished when a poultice of fear is applied to it. And, by Heaven, if joy comes on the scene, in the case of many the temper has been quickly "warmed," as Homer[d] says, or dissipated. Consequently I came to the opinion that this passion is not altogether incurable, for those, at least, who wish to cure it.

For anger does not always have great and powerful beginnings; on the contrary, even a jest, a playful

[d] *Il.*, xxiii. 598, 600, *al.*; for Plutarch's interpretation of ἰαίνεσθαι see *Moralia*, 947 D: ἀλέαν τῷ σώματι μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὅπερ Ὅμηρος ἰαίνεσθαι κέκληκεν; see also *Moralia*, 735 F.

(454) καὶ τὸ διανεῦσαι καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα πολλοὺς εἰς ὀργὴν καθίστησιν, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἑλένη τὴν ἀδελφιδῆν προσαγορεύσασα,

παρθένε μακρὸν δὴ μῆκος Ἠλέκτρα χρόνου,

παρώξυνεν εἰπεῖν,

ὀψέ γε φρονεῖς εὖ, τότε λιποῦσ' αἰσχρῶς δόμους·

καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὁ Καλλισθένης εἰπών, τῆς
E μεγάλης κύλικος περιφερομένης, "οὐ βούλομαι πιὼν Ἀλεξάνδρου[1] Ἀσκληπιοῦ δεῖσθαι."

4. Καθάπερ οὖν τὴν φλόγα θριξὶ λαγῴαις ἀναπτομένην καὶ θρυαλλίσι καὶ συρφετῷ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐπισχεῖν· ἐὰν δ' ἐπιλάβηται τῶν στερεῶν καὶ βάθος ἐχόντων, ταχὺ διέφθειρε καὶ συνεῖλεν

ὑψηλὸν ἡβήσασα[2] τεκτόνων πόνον

ὥς φησιν Αἰσχύλος· οὕτως ὁ τῷ θυμῷ προσέχων ἐν
F ἀρχῇ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἔκ τινος λαλιᾶς καὶ βωμολοχίας συρφετώδους ὁρῶν καπνιῶντα[3] καὶ διακαιόμενον οὐ μεγάλης δεῖται πραγματείας, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις αὐτῷ τῷ σιωπῆσαι καὶ καταμελῆσαι κατέπαυσε. καὶ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ὁ μὴ παρασχὼν ὕλην ἔσβεσε, καὶ ὀργὴν ὁ μὴ θρέψας ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ μὴ φυσήσας ἑαυτὸν ἐφυλάξατο καὶ καθεῖλεν. οὐκ ἤρεσκεν[4] οὖν μοι, καίπερ ἄλλα χρήσιμα λέγων καὶ

[1] Ἀλεξάνδρου Xylander from *Mor.*, 624 A: ἀλέξανδρε.
[2] ἡβήσασα Salmasius: ἡβάσασα.
[3] καπνιῶντα] καπνίοντα or καπνίζοντα in some MSS.
[4] ἤρεσκεν] ἤρκεσεν in some MSS.

[a] Euripides, *Orestes*, 72, 99.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 623 F—624 A; Athenaeus, X. 434 D.
[c] A jibe at Alexander's assumed divinity, "Alexander"

word, a burst of laughter or a nod on the part of somebody, and many things of the kind, rouse many persons to anger; just as Helen, by thus addressing her niece,

Electra, virgin for so long a time,

provoked her to reply,

Too late you're wise; but once you left your home
Disgraced.[a]

And so was Alexander provoked by Callisthenes,[b] who said, when the great bowl was going its rounds, "I do not care to have a drink of Alexander and then have to call in Asclepius."[c]

4. And so, just as it is an easy matter to check a flame which is being kindled in hare's fur[d] or candle-wicks or rubbish, but if it ever takes hold of solid bodies having depth, it quickly destroys and consumes

With youthful vigour lofty craftsmen's work,[e]

as Aeschylus has it; so the man who at the beginning gives heed to his temper and observes it while it is still smoking and catching flame little by little from some gossip or rubbishy scurrility need have no great concern about it; on the contrary, he has often succeeded in extinguishing it merely by keeping silent and ignoring it. For he who gives no fuel to fire puts it out, and likewise he who does not in the beginning nurse his wrath and does not puff himself up with anger takes precautions against it and destroys it. I was therefore not satisfied with what

taking the place of Dionysus, the wine god, until the physician god, Asclepius, would have to be called in: on the authenticity of the story see Macurdy, *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, l. (1930), 294-297.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 138 F
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 107, Frag. 357.

παραινῶν, ὁ Ἱερώνυμος, ἐν οἷς οὔ φησι γινομένης ἀλλὰ γεγενημένης καὶ οὔσης αἴσθησιν ὀργῆς εἶναι διὰ τὸ τάχος. οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτω τῶν παθῶν συλλεγόμενον καὶ διακινούμενον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν ἐμφανῆ
455 καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν. ὡς δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐμπείρως διδάσκει, λυπηθέντα μὲν εὐθὺς ἐξαίφνης ποιῶν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τοῦ λόγου προσπεσόντος, ἐν οἷς λέγει

ὣς φάτο· τὸν δ' ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα·

θυμούμενον δὲ βραδέως τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ διὰ λόγων πολλῶν ἐκκαιόμενον· οὓς εἴ τις ὑφεῖλεν αὐτῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ διεκώλυσεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔσχεν αὔξησιν ἡ διαφορὰ τηλικαύτην καὶ μέγεθος. ὅθεν ὁ Σωκράτης ὁσάκις αἴσθοιτο κινουμένου τραχύτερον αὑτοῦ πρός τινα τῶν φίλων,

πρὸ χείματος[1] ὥστ' ἀνὰ[2] ποντίαν ἄκραν

Β στελλόμενος ἐνεδίδου τε τῇ φωνῇ καὶ διεμειδία τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τὸ βλέμμα πραότερον παρεῖχε, τῷ ῥέπειν ἐπὶ θάτερα καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀντικινεῖσθαι τῷ πάθει διαφυλάττων ἑαυτὸν ἀπτῶτα καὶ ἀήττητον.

5. Ἔστι γάρ τις, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρώτη καθάπερ τυ-

[1] χείματος *Mor.*, 129 A, 503 A, *infra*: κύματος.
[2] ὥστ' ἀνὰ *ibid.*: ὥς τινα.

[a] Of Rhodes, Peripatetic philosopher of the third century B.C.

[b] But *cf.* Plutarch, *De Amore*, 4 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 134).

[c] Of Patroclus's death, brought by Antilochus: *Il.*, xviii. 22.

[d] *Il.*, i. 101 ff. [e] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 13. 3.

[f] Author unknown: Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.*, iii. p. 721; Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica*, ii. p. 163; Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, iii. p. 473; quoted more fully in *Moralia*, 129 A, 503 A.

Hieronymus[a] says—although he contributes other useful remarks and advice—in the passage where he declares that we have no perception of anger when it comes into being, but only when it has already come into being and exists, the reason being the swiftness with which it acts. For the truth is that none of the emotions, at the time when they are gathering and beginning to move, has a birth and increase so easy to perceive.[b] Indeed Homer also skilfully teaches us this lesson when he causes Achilles to be suddenly overwhelmed by grief on receiving the report,[c] in the passage where the poet says:

> He spoke, and a black cloud of grief closed round Achilles;

but Homer portrays Achilles as being slow to lose his temper with Agamemnon[d] and as becoming inflamed only when many words had been spoken. Yet if either one of the men had held back their words at the beginning and prevented their utterance, the quarrel would not have had so great a growth or have reached such magnitude. That is the reason why Socrates,[e] as often as he perceived himself being moved to too great harshness against any of his friends, betaking himself to coast

> Before the storm along some promontory,[f]

would lower his voice, cause a smile to spread over his face, and make the expression of his eyes more gentle, preserving himself from fault and defeat by setting up within himself an influence to counteract his passion.

5. For the first way, my friend, to dethrone temper

(455) ῥάννου κατάλυσις τοῦ θυμοῦ, μὴ πείθεσθαι μηδ' ὑπακούειν προστάττοντος αὐτοῦ μέγα βοᾶν καὶ δεινὸν βλέπειν καὶ κόπτειν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάζειν καὶ μὴ συνεπιτείνειν ὥσπερ νόσημα ῥιπτασμῷ καὶ διαβοήσει τὸ πάθος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐρωτικαὶ πράξεις, οἷον ἐπικωμάσαι καὶ ᾆσαι καὶ στεφανῶσαι θύραν, ἔχουσιν ἀμωσγέπως κουφισμὸν οὐκ ἄχαριν οὐδ' ἄμουσον·

ἐλθὼν δ' οὐκ ἐβόησα τίς ἢ τίνος, ἀλλ' ἐφίλησα
C τὴν φλιήν. εἰ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀδίκημ', ἀδικῶ,

αἵ τε τοῖς πενθοῦσιν ἐφέσεις τοῦ ἀποκλαῦσαι καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι πολύ τι τῆς λύπης ἅμα τῷ δακρύῳ συνεξάγουσιν· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ἐκριπίζεται μᾶλλον οἷς πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ καθεστῶτες.

Ἀτρεμεῖν οὖν κράτιστον ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ἀποκρύπτειν καὶ καθορμίζειν ἑαυτοὺς[1] εἰς ἡσυχίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπιληψίας ἀρχομένης συναισθανομένους, ἵνα μὴ πέσωμεν μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιπέσωμεν· ἐπιπίπτομεν δὲ τοῖς φίλοις μάλιστά γε καὶ πλειστάκις. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἐρῶμεν οὐδὲ πᾶσι φθονοῦμεν οὐδὲ πάντας φοβούμεθα, θυμῷ δ' ἄθικτον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀνεπι-
D χείρητον· ἀλλ' ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ πολεμίοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ θεοῖς νὴ Δία καὶ θηρίοις καὶ ἀψύχοις σκεύεσιν, ὡς ὁ Θάμυρις[2]

ῥῆγνυς χρυσόδετον κέρας,
ῥῆγνυς[3] ἁρμονίαν χορδοτόνου λύρας·

[1] ἑαυτοὺς Bernardakis: ἑαυτὸν.
[2] Θάμυρις] θαμύρας G.
[3] ῥῆγνυς] ῥῆγνυς δ' van Herwerden.

[a] Callimachus, *Epigram* 43 (42), vv. 5, 6 (*Anth. Pal.*, xii. 118). *Cf.* Propertius, ii. 30. 24: Hoc si crimen erit, crimen amoris erit.

as you would a tyrant, is not to obey or hearken when it bids us cry aloud and look fierce and beat our breasts, but to keep quiet and not intensify the passion, as we would a disease, by tossing about and making a clamour. It is quite true that lovers' practices, such as serenading in concert or alone and crowning the beloved's door with garlands, do in some way or other bring an alleviation that is not without charm or grace:

I came, but did not shout your name or race;
I merely kissed the door. If this be sin,
Then I have sinned.[a]

So too the surrender of mourners to weeping and wailing carries away much of their grief together with their tears. But temper is the more readily fanned into flame by what people in that state do and say.

The best course, therefore, is for us to compose ourselves, or else to run away and conceal ourselves, and anchor ourselves in a calm harbour, as though we perceived a fit of epilepsy coming on,[b] so that we may not fall, or rather may not fall upon others; and we are especially likely to fall most often upon our friends. For we do not love or envy or fear everyone indiscriminately, but there is nothing that temper will not touch and assail: we grow angry with enemies and friends, with children and parents, yes, even with the gods, with wild beasts and soulless implements, as Thamyris did:

Breaking the lyre-arms, overlaid with gold,
Breaking his melodious, taut-strung lyre[c];

[b] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 10. 3.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 183, Sophocles, Frag. 223 (Frag. 244 ed. Pearson). *Cf.* Homer, *Il.*, ii. 594-600.

(455) καὶ ὁ Πάνδαρος αὐτῷ καταρώμενος, εἰ μὴ τὰ τόξα καταπρήσειε " χερσὶ διακλάσσας." ὁ δὲ Ξέρξης καὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ στίγματα καὶ πληγὰς ἐνέβαλλε καὶ
E πρὸς τὸ ὄρος ἐξέπεμπεν ἐπιστολάς, " Ἄθω δαιμόνιε οὐρανόμηκες,[1] μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ἐμοῖς ἔργοις λίθους μεγάλους καὶ δυσκατεργάστους· εἰ δὲ μή, τεμὼν ῥίψω σὲ[2] εἰς[3] θάλασσαν." πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ θυμοῦ φοβερά, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ γελοῖα· διὸ καὶ μισεῖται καὶ καταφρονεῖται μάλιστα τῶν παθῶν. ἀμφότερα δ' ἐσκέφθαι χρήσιμον.

6. Ἐγὼ γοῦν, εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς οὐκ οἶδα, ταύτην δὲ τῆς ἰατρείας[4] ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες ἐν τοῖς εἵλωσι τὸ μεθύειν οἷόν ἐστι, κατεμάνθανον τὴν ὀργὴν ἐν ἑτέροις. καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ἣ
F φησιν Ἱπποκράτης χαλεπωτάτην εἶναι νόσον ἐν ᾗ[5] τοῦ νοσοῦντος ἀνομοιότατον αὐτῷ γίνεται τὸ πρόσωπον, οὕτως ὁρῶν ὑπ' ὀργῆς ἐξισταμένους μάλιστα καὶ μεταβάλλοντας ὄψιν χρόαν βάδισμα φωνήν, οἷον εἰκόνα τοῦ πάθους ἀπεματτόμην ἐμαυτῷ, πάνυ δυσχεραίνων εἰ φοβερὸς οὕτως καὶ παρακεκινηκὼς ὁρῶμαί ποτε τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ τοῖς θυγατρίοις, οὐ μόνον ἰδεῖν ἄγριος καὶ ἀσυνήθης ἀλλὰ καὶ φωνὴν ἀπηνῆ καὶ τραχεῖαν ἀφιείς, ὥσπερ ἑτέροις[6] τῶν συνήθων ἐνετύγχανον, οὐκ ἦθος οὐ μορφὴν οὐ λόγου χάριν οὐ τὸ πιθανὸν καὶ προσηνὲς ἐν ὁμιλίᾳ δυναμένοις ὑπ' ὀργῆς δια-

[1] οὐρανόμηκες Emperius: οὐρανομήκη.
[2] σὲ] σαυτὸν some MSS. [3] εἰς] εἰς τὴν some MSS.
[4] τῆς ἰατρείας Reiske, confirmed by MSS.: τὴν ἰατρείαν.
[5] ᾗ early editors: ἣν.
[6] ἑτέροις] ἑνίοις Wyttenbach.

[a] *Il.*, v. 216.

and Pandarus, who invoked a curse on himself if he did not " break with his hands " [a] his bow and burn it. And Xerxes not only branded and lashed the sea,[b] but also sent a letter to Mount Athos[c]: " Noble Athos, whose summit reaches heaven, do not put in the way of my deeds great stones difficult to work. Else I shall hew you down and cast you into the sea." For temper can do many terrible things, and likewise many that are ridiculous; therefore it is both the most hated and the most despised of the passions. It will be useful to consider it in both of these aspects.

6. As for me—whether rightly I do not know—I made this start in the treatment of my anger: I began to observe the passion in others, just as the Spartans used to observe in the Helots [d] what a thing drunkenness is. And first, as Hippocrates [e] says that the most severe disease is that in which the countenance of the sufferer is most unlike itself, so I observed that those who are transported by anger also change most in countenance, colour, gait, and voice,[f] and thus formed for myself a picture of that passion and was exceedingly uncomfortable to think that I should ever appear so terrible and deranged to my friends and my wife and daughters, not merely savage and unfamiliar to their sight, but also speaking with so harsh and rough a voice as were others of my intimate friends whom I used to meet at times when anger had made them unable to preserve their character or bearing or grace of speech or their

[b] *Cf.* Herodotus, vii. 35.
[c] Contrast *ibid.* vii. 24.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 239 A, and the note.
Prognosticon, 2 (vol. i. p. 79 ed. Kühlewein).
[f] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 35.

456 φυλάττειν. Γαΐῳ μὲν οὖν Γράκχῳ τῷ ῥήτορι καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὄντι χαλεπῷ καὶ περιπαθέστερον λέγοντι διηρμοσμένον ἦν συρίγγιον, ᾧ τὴν φωνὴν οἱ ἁρμονικοὶ σχέδην[1] ἐπ' ἀμφότερα διὰ τῶν τόνων ἄγουσι· καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχων οἰκέτης αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὄπισθεν ἑστὼς ἐνεδίδου τόνον ἐπιεικῆ καὶ πρᾶον, ᾧ τὴν κραυγὴν ἀνεκαλεῖτο καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ θυμικὸν ἀφῄρει τῆς φωνῆς, ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν βουκόλων

κηρόπλαστος ὀτοβεῖ δόναξ ·
ἀχέτας ὑπνοδόταν νόμον,

ἐπιθέλγων καὶ καθιστὰς τὴν ὀργὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος. ἐμοὶ δ' εἴ τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ κομψὸς ἀκόλουθος ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἠχθόμην αὐτοῦ προσφέροντος ἐπὶ ταῖς
B ὀργαῖς ἔσοπτρον, ὥσπερ ἐνίοις προσφέρουσι λουσαμένοις ἐπ' οὐδενὶ χρησίμῳ. τὸ γὰρ[2] αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν παρὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα καὶ συντεταραγμένον οὐ μικρόν ἐστιν εἰς διαβολὴν τοῦ πάθους. καὶ γὰρ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν λέγουσιν οἱ παίζοντες αὐλοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ σατύρου νουθετεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ προσέχειν·

οὔ τοι πρέπει τὸ σχῆμα· τοὺς αὐλοὺς μέθες
καὶ θῶπλα[3] λάζευ καὶ γνάθους εὐθημόνει·

θεασαμένην δὲ τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ὄψιν ἐν ποταμῷ τινι δυσχεραῖναι καὶ προέσθαι τοὺς αὐλούς. καίτοι

[1] σχέδην Canter, confirmed by MSS.: σχολήν.
[2] τὸ γὰρ] τὸ δ' most MSS.
[3] καὶ θῶπλα Meineke, confirmed by MSS.: καί θ' ὅπλα.

[a] *Cf. Life of the Gracchi*, ii. (825 B), and Ziegler's references *ad loc.*
[b] Aeschylus, *Prometheus*, 574-575: Io speaks with reference to the piping of Argus as he guards her.

winning and affable manners. The case of Gaius Gracchus[a] the orator will serve as illustration. He was not only severe in his disposition, but spoke too passionately; so he caused a pitch-pipe to be made of the sort which musicians use to lead the voice up and down the scales to the proper note; with this in hand his servant used to stand behind him as he spoke and give him a decorous and gentle tone which enabled Gracchus to remit his loud cries and remove from his voice the harsh and passionate element; just as the shepherds'

Wax-joined pipe, clear sounding,
Drones a slumberous strain,[b]

so did he charm and lay to rest the rage of the orator. But as for me, if I had some attentive and clever companion, I should not be vexed if he held a mirror[c] up to me during my moments of rage, as they do for some persons after bathing, though to no useful purpose. For to see oneself in a state which nature did not intend, with one's features all distorted, contributes in no small degree toward discrediting that passion. In fact, those who delight in pleasant fables tell us that when Athena[d] played on the pipes, she was rebuked by the satyr and would give no heed:

That look becomes you not; lay by your pipes
And take your arms and put your cheeks to rights[e];

but when she saw her face in a river, she was vexed and threw her pipes away. Yet art makes melody

[c] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 36. 1-3.
[d] *Cf. Life of Alcibiades*, ii. (192 E); Ovid, *Ars Amatoria*, iii. 505 ff.: *Fasti*, vi. 699 ff.; Athenaeus, xiv. 616 e ff.; Tzetzes, *Chiliades*, i. 364 ff.
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 911, ades. 381.

(456) παραμυθίαν ἡ τέχνη τῆς ἀμορφίας ἔχει τὴν ἐμμέλειαν.[1] καὶ ὁ Μαρσύας, ὡς ἔοικε, φορβειᾷ τινι καὶ περιστομίοις τοῦ[2] πνεύματος τὸ ῥαγδαῖον ἐγκαθ-
C εἶρξε καὶ τοῦ προσώπου κατεκόσμησε καὶ ἀπέκρυψε τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν,

χρυσῷ δ' αἰγλήεντι συνήρμοσεν[3] ἀμφιδασείας
κόρσας, καὶ στόμα λάβρον ὀπισθοδέτοισιν ἱμᾶσιν·

ἡ δ' ὀργὴ φυσῶσα καὶ διατείνουσα τὸ πρόσωπον ἀπρεπῶς, ἔτι μᾶλλον αἰσχρὰν ἀφίησι καὶ ἀτερπῆ φωνὴν

κινοῦσα χορδὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους φρενῶν.

τὴν μὲν γὰρ θάλασσαν, ὅταν ἐκταραχθεῖσα τοῖς πνεύμασι τὰ βρύα καὶ τὸ φῦκος ἀναβάλλῃ, καθαίρεσθαι λέγουσιν· ἃ δ' ὁ θυμὸς ἐκβράσσει τῆς ψυχῆς περιτρεπομένης ἀκόλαστα καὶ πικρὰ καὶ σπερμολόγα ῥήματα, τοὺς λέγοντας πρώτους καταρρυπαί-
D νει καὶ καταπίμπλησιν ἀδοξίας, ὡς ἀεὶ μὲν ἔχοντας ἐν αὑτοῖς[4] ταῦτα καὶ πλήρεις ὄντας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνακαλυπτομένους. διὸ κουφοτάτου πράγματος, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, λόγου[5] βαρυτάτην ζημίαν τίνουσιν, ἐχθροὶ καὶ κακολόγοι καὶ κακοήθεις δοκοῦντες εἶναι.

7. Ταῦτ' οὖν ὁρῶντί μοι καὶ παραφυλάττοντι συμβαίνει τίθεσθαι καὶ διαμνημονεύειν ἐπιεικῶς πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ὡς ἀγαθὸν μέν ἐστιν ἐν πυρετῷ

[1] ἐμμέλειαν] εὐμέλειαν most mss.
[2] βίᾳ before τοῦ deleted by Dübner.
[3] συνήρμοσεν] προσήρμοσεν Tzetzes.
[4] αὑτοῖς Hartman: αὐτοῖς.
[5] λόγου here and *Mor.*, 90 c] λόγων Plato and *Mor.*, 505 c, *infra*, 634 F.

some consolation for unsightliness. And Marsyas,[a] it seems, by a mouthpiece and cheek-bands repressed the violence of his breath and tricked up and concealed the distortion of his face:

He fitted the fringe of his temples with gleaming gold
And his greedy mouth he fitted with thongs bound behind[b];

but anger, which puffs up and distends the face in an unbecoming way, utters a voice still more ugly and unpleasant,

Stirring the heart-strings never stirred before.[c]

For when the sea is disturbed by the winds and casts up tangle and seaweed, they say that it is being cleansed; but the intemperate, bitter, and vulgar words which temper casts forth when the soul is disturbed defile the speakers of them first of all and fill them with disrepute, the implication being that they have always had these traits inside of them and are full of them, but that their inner nature is now laid bare by their anger. Hence for a mere word, the "lightest of things," as Plato[d] says, they incur the "heaviest of punishments," being esteemed as hostile, slanderous, and malicious.

7. When I, accordingly, observe these things, and store them carefully away, it occurs to me to lay up and quite thoroughly remember for my own use that,

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 713 D.
[b] Simonides, according to Tzetzes, *Chiliades*, i. 372 (Frag. 177 Bergk, 160 Diehl, 115 Edmonds); attributed by Schneidewin to Simias Rhodius (*cf.* Powell, *Coll. Alex.*, p. 111).
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 907, ades. 361; quoted again in *Moralia*, 43 D; 501 A, 502 D, *infra*; 657 C.
[d] A combination of *Laws*, 935 A and 717 D, as in *Moralia*, 90 C, 505 C, 634 F; *cf.* also Schlemm, *Hermes*, xxxviii. 596.

(456) κρεῖττον δ' ἐν ὀργῇ τὴν γλῶτταν ἁπαλὴν ἔχειν καὶ λείαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πυρεττόντων ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχῃ, σημεῖόν ἐστι πονηρὸν οὐκ αἴτιον· ἡ δὲ τῶν θυμουμένων τραχεῖα καὶ ῥυπαρὰ γενομένη[1] καὶ
E ῥυεῖσα πρὸς λόγους ἀτόπους ἔχθρας ἀνηκέστου δημιουργὸν ὕβριν ἐκφέρει καὶ δυσμενείας ὑπούλου κατήγορον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁ ἄκρατος ἀκόλαστον οὕτω καὶ δυσχερὲς ὡς ὁ θυμὸς ἀναδίδωσι[2]· κἀκεῖνα μὲν γέλωτι καὶ παιδιᾷ μέλει,[3] ταῦτα δὲ χολῇ κέκραται· καὶ παρὰ πότον μὲν ὁ σιωπῶν ἐπαχθὴς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ φορτικός, ἐν ὀργῇ δὲ σεμνότερον οὐδὲν ἡσυχίας, ὡς ἡ Σαπφὼ παραινεῖ

σκιδναμένας ἐν στήθεσιν ὄργας[4]
μαψυλάκαν γλῶσσαν πεφύλαχθαι.[5]

8. Οὐ ταῦτα δὲ μόνον ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δίδωσι τὸ προσέχειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις ὑπ' ὀργῆς, ἀλλὰ
F καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ θυμοῦ κατανοεῖν φύσιν, ὡς οὐκ εὐγενὴς οὐδ' ἀνδρώδης οὐδ' ἔχουσα φρόνημα καὶ μέγεθός ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ τρακτικὸν αὐτοῦ πρακτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπειλητικὸν εὐθαρσὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀπειθὲς ἰσχυρόν· ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὠμότητα μεγαλουργίαν καὶ τὸ δυσπαραίτητον εὐτονίαν καὶ μισοπονηρίαν τὸ δύσκολον οὐκ ὀρθῶς τίθενται· τὰ γὰρ ἔργα καὶ τὰ κινήματα καὶ τὰ

[1] γενομένη] γινομένη most MSS.
[2] ἀναδίδωσι] ἀναδείκνυσι most MSS.
[3] παιδιᾷ μέλει] παιδιᾷ καὶ μέλει Madvig.
[4] σκιδναμένας . . . ὄργας G. Hermann and Bergk: σκιδναμένης . . . ὀργῆς.
[5] μαψυλάκαν γλῶσσαν πεφύλαχθαι G. Hermann: πεφυλάχθαι γλῶσσαν μαψυλάκαν (or μαψυλάκταν).

just as it is a good thing in a fever, so it is an even better thing in anger, to keep the tongue soft and smooth. For if the tongue of men who are sick of a fever is in an unnatural state, it is a bad symptom, but not the cause of their malady; but when the tongue of angry men becomes rough and foul and breaks out in unseemly speeches, it brings forth insolence which creates irremediable enmity and argues a festering malevolence within. For unmixed wine produces nothing so intemperate and odious as anger does: words flown with wine go well with laughter and sport, but those which spring from anger are mixed with gall; and whereas the man who keeps silent at a drinking-bout is disagreeable and irksome to the company, there is nothing more dignified, if one is angry, than holding one's peace, as Sappho[a] advises:

When anger swells within the breast,
Restrain the idly barking tongue.

8. But it is not these considerations only that constant watching of those who are in the grip of anger furnishes us, but also an understanding of the general nature of ill temper—that it is not well-bred, nor manly, nor possessing any quality of pride or greatness. Yet most people think its turbulence to be activity, its blustering to be confident boldness, its obstinacy force of character; and some claim that even its cruelty is magnificence in action and its implacability firmness in resolution and its moroseness hatred of evil,[b] but they are wrong in this.

[a] Frag. 27 ed. Bergk, 126 ed. Diehl, 137 ed. Edmonds; it is unlikely that Plutarch wrote the Aeolic accents which are here restored.
[b] *Cf.* 462 E, 482 C, *infra*.

σχήματα μικρότητα πολλὴν καὶ ἀσθένειαν κατη-
457 γορεῖ, οὐ[1] μόνον ἐν οἷς παιδάρια σπαράττουσι καὶ
πρὸς γύναια διαπικραίνονται καὶ κύνας καὶ ἵππους
καὶ ἡμιόνους οἴονται δεῖν κολάζειν, ὡς Κτησιφῶν ὁ
παγκρατιαστὴς ἀντιλακτίσαι τὴν ἡμίονον ἀξιῶν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννικὰς μιαιφονίας τῷ πικρῷ
τὸ μικρόψυχον αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ δρῶντι τὸ πεπονθὸς
ἐνορώμενον ἔοικε τοῖς δήγμασι τῶν ἑρπετῶν, ὅταν
διακαῇ καὶ περιώδυνα γένηται, τὴν φλεγμονὴν
ἀπερειδομένων σφοδρὰν[2] τοῖς λελυπηκόσιν. ὡς γὰρ
οἴδημα μεγάλης ἐστὶν ἐν σαρκὶ πληγῆς πάθος,
οὕτως ἐν ταῖς μαλακωτάταις ψυχαῖς ἡ πρὸς τὸ
B λυπῆσαι ἔνδοσις ἐκφέρει μείζονα θυμὸν ἀπὸ μεί-
ζονος ἀσθενείας. διὸ καὶ γυναῖκες ἀνδρῶν ὀργιλώ-
τεραι, καὶ νοσοῦντες ὑγιαινόντων καὶ γέροντες
ἀκμαζόντων καὶ κακῶς πράττοντες εὐτυχούντων.
ὀργιλώτατος γὰρ ὁ φιλάργυρος πρὸς τὸν οἰκονόμον,
ὁ γαστρίμαργος πρὸς τὸν ὀψοποιόν, ὁ ζηλότυπος
πρὸς τὸ γύναιον, ὁ κενόδοξος κακῶς ἀκούσας·
χαλεπώτατοι δ'

ἄγαν φιλοτιμίαν
μνώμενοι ἐν πολίεσσιν[3] ἄνδρες·
ἱστᾶσιν[4] ἄλγος ἐμφανὲς

κατὰ Πίνδαρον. οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ λυπουμένου τῆς[5]
ψυχῆς καὶ πάσχοντος ἀνίσταται μάλιστα δι' ἀσθέ-
C νειαν ὁ θυμός, οὐχὶ νεύροις, ὥς τις εἶπε, τῆς ψυχῆς

[1] οὐ] οὐ γὰρ Reiske.
[2] σφοδρὰν] σφόδρα most MSS.: σφόδρ' ἐν Reiske.
[3] πολίεσσιν Boeckh: πόλεσιν.
[4] ἱστᾶσιν] ἢ στάσιν most MSS.: ἔστασαν Schneidewin.
[5] μάλιστα before τῆς deleted by W.C.H.

For the actions and the motions and the whole demeanour of angry persons declare their utter littleness and weakness, not only when they rend little children and rage bitterly against women and think it proper to punish dogs and horses and mules, as Ctesiphon the pancratiast did, who thought it right to kick back at his mule; but also in the butcheries that tyrants perpetrate, their meanness of soul is apparent in their cruelty and their perverted state in their action, and is like the bites of vipers, which, when thoroughly inflamed with rage and pain, eject their excessive fiery passion upon those who have hurt them. For just as with the flesh a swelling results from a great blow, so with the weakest souls the inclination to inflict a hurt produces a flaring up of temper as great as the soul's infirmity is great.[a] That is also the reason why women are more prone to anger than men, and sick persons than healthy, and old men than men in their prime, and the unfortunate than the prosperous. Most prone to anger, for instance, are the miser with his steward, the glutton with his cook, the jealous man with his wife, the conceited man when he has been maligned; but worst of all are

Men who court too eagerly
Ambition in the towns:
Manifest is the pain they bring,

as Pindar[b] has it. In like manner from the pain and suffering of the soul, caused generally by weakness, there arises the outburst of passion[c] which is not, as

[a] The cruel tyrant, like the viper, indulges in rages as a sort of defence-reaction, a proof of inherent weakness.
[b] Frag. 210 ed. Bergk, 229 ed. Boeckh; p. 609 ed. Sandys.
[c] *Cf. Life of Coriolanus*, xv. (220 E).

(457) ἐοικώς, ἀλλ' ἐπιτάμασι καὶ σπάσμασιν ἐν ταῖς ἀμυντικαῖς ὁρμαῖς σφοδρότερον ἐξανισταμένης.

9. Τὰ μὲν οὖν φαῦλα παραδείγματα τὴν θέαν οὐκ εὔχαριν ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν μόνον εἶχε· τοὺς δ' ἠπίως καὶ λείως ὁμιλοῦντας ὀργαῖς κάλλιστα μὲν ἀκούσματα κάλλιστα δὲ θεάματα ποιούμενος, ἄρχομαι καταφρονεῖν τῶν λεγόντων·

ἄνδρ' ἠδίκησας· ἄνδρ'[1] ἀνεκτέον τόδε;

καὶ

βαῖνε λάξ, ἐπὶ τραχήλου βαῖνε, καὶ πέλα χθονι,

καὶ τἄλλα παροξυντικά, δι' ὧν ἔνιοι τὸν θυμὸν ἐκ τῆς γυναικωνίτιδος εἰς τὴν ἀνδρωνῖτιν οὐκ εὖ
D μετοικίζουσιν. ἡ γὰρ[2] ἀνδρεία κατὰ τἄλλα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ συμφερομένη περὶ μόνης μοι δοκεῖ διαμάχεσθαι τῆς πραότητος, ὡς αὐτῇ[3] μᾶλλον προσηκούσης. ἀνθρώπων μὲν γὰρ κρατῆσαι καὶ χείροσι βελτιόνων ὑπῆρξε, τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ[4] ψυχῇ στῆσαι κατὰ θυμοῦ τρόπαιον (ᾧ χαλεπὸν εἶναι μάχεσθαι[5] φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος· "ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται") μεγάλης ἐστὶ καὶ νικητικῆς

[1] That is, ἄνδρα, not ἀνδρί.
[2] γὰρ Reiske, confirmed by MSS.: μέν.
[3] αὐτῇ Capps: αὐτῇ.
[4] τῇ] omitted in most MSS.
[5] μάχεσθαι] διαμάχεσθαι most MSS.

[a] Plato, *Republic*, 411 B; contrast *Moralia*, 449 F, *supra*. Plutarch seems to be unwilling to name Plato when he is forced to contradict him. But see Pohlenz, *Hermes*, xxxi. 332 (on Philodemus, *De Ira*, xxxi. 24).
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 912, ades. 382.

someone [a] has said, like "sinews of the soul," but like the strainings and convulsions of the soul when it is stirred too vehemently in its impulse to defend itself.

9. These base examples, to be sure, were not pleasant to observe, but merely unavoidable; but in discussing those who deal with transports of rage in a mild and gentle way I offer instances which are very beautiful both to hear and to witness, and I begin with a word of scorn for those who say,

It was a man you wronged: should a man bear this? [b]

and

Trample him underfoot, tread on his neck,
And bring him to the ground! [c]

and other provocative expressions, by using which some err in transferring anger from the women's quarters to the men's. For although courage gets along well with justice in all other respects, yet, as it seems to me, it fights for the possession of gentleness alone, as belonging rather to itself. But although cases do occur in which even baser men gain the mastery over their betters, yet to erect in the soul a trophy of victory over anger (which Heracleitus [d] says it is difficult to contend against: "for whatever it wishes, it buys at the price of the soul") is proof of a great and victorious strength which

[c] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.*, iii. p. 694; Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica*, i. p. 265; Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, ii. p. 304: an anonymous tetrameter attributed by Meineke to Archilochus.
[d] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*³, i. p. 170, Frag. 85; *cf. Life of Coriolanus*, xxii. (224 C), and *Moralia*, 755 D. But Heracleitus's meaning is probably that it is Love, not Anger, which it is difficult to contend against.

(457) ἰσχύος, ὥσπερ νεῦρα καὶ τόνους ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη τὰς κρίσεις ἐχούσης.

Διὸ καὶ συνάγειν ἀεὶ πειρῶμαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν οὐ ταῦτα δὴ μόνον[1] τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οὓς φασι χολὴν οὐκ ἔχειν οἱ νοῦν οὐκ[2] ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
E τὰ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων· οἷον Ἀντιγόνου τὸ πρὸς τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς[3] παρὰ τὴν σκηνὴν λοιδοροῦντας αὐτὸν ὡς οὐκ ἀκούοντα· τὴν γὰρ[4] βακτηρίαν ὑποβαλὼν ἔξω, "παπαί," εἶπεν, "οὐ πορρωτέρω ποι τραπόμενοι κακῶς ἐρεῖθ' ἡμᾶς;" Ἀρκαδίωνος δὲ τοῦ Ἀχαιοῦ τὸν Φίλιππον ἀεὶ κακῶς λέγοντος καὶ φεύγειν παραινοῦντος

εἰσόκε τοὺς ἀφίκηται οἳ οὐκ ἴσασι Φίλιππον·

εἶτά πως ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ φανέντος, ᾤοντο δεῖν οἱ φίλοι κολάσαι καὶ μὴ περιδεῖν· ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐντυχὼν αὐτῷ φιλανθρώπως καὶ ξένια καὶ δῶρα πέμψας ἐκέλευσεν ὕστερον πυνθάνεσθαι τίνας λό-
F γους ἀπαγγέλλοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας· ὡς δὲ πάντες ἐμαρτύρουν ἐπαινέτην αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσιον, "ἐγὼ τοίνυν," ἔφη, "βελτίων ἰατρὸς ὑμῶν." ἐν Ὀλυμπίοις δὲ βλασφημίας περὶ αὐτοῦ γενομένης καί τινων λεγόντων ὡς οἰμῶξαι προσήκει τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὅτι εὖ πάσχοντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου

[1] μόνον] μόνα most MSS.
[2] οὐκ added by Reiske.
[3] τοὺς] most MSS. have ὅτι τοὺς.
[4] γὰρ] omitted in some MSS.

[a] Perhaps a correction (as 457 C, *supra*) of Plato, *Republic*, 411 B (*cf.* also *Moralia*, 449 F, *supra*).

possesses against the passions the weapons of its judgements, as in very truth its nerves and sinews.[a]

For this reason I always strive to collect and to peruse, not only these sayings and deeds of the philosophers, who are said by fools to have no bile,[b] but even more those of kings and despots. There is, for instance, the remark of Antigonus[c] to his soldiers who were reviling him near his tent in the belief that he could not hear them: he merely thrust out his staff and cried, "Good heavens! will you not go somewhere farther off to abuse me?" And there is the case of Arcadion[d] the Achaean who was always railing against Philip and advising flight

Until one comes to men who know not Philip[e];

when Arcadion later visited Macedonia on some chance or other, Philip's friends thought that he should not be let off but punished. Yet Philip, when he met him, treated him kindly and sent him friendly presents and gifts; and later bade his friends inquire how Arcadion now spoke of him to the Greeks. When all testified that the fellow had become a wonderful eulogist of the king, Philip said, "Then I am a better physician than you." So in Olympia[f] when Philip was being defamed, and some persons said that the Greeks should smart for it since they spoke evil of Philip though they were being well

[b] That is, our "no guts"; *cf.* Archilochus, Frag. 131, Bergk, and Capps's note on Menander, *Perikeiromenē*, 259.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 182 C: Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 22. 2.
[d] *Cf.* Athenaeus, vi. 249 C-D: Arcadion, while in flight from Macedonia, accidentally met Philip who asked him how long he was going to stay in exile. This is Arcadion's reply.
[e] A parody of Homer, *Od.*, xi. 122; xxiii. 269.
[f] *Cf. Moralia*, 143 F; 179 A with Nachstädt's note *ad loc.*

κακῶς αὐτὸν λέγουσι, " τί οὖν," ἔφη, " ποιήσουσιν, ἂν κακῶς πάσχωσιν; "

Καλὰ δὲ καὶ Πεισιστράτου τὰ πρὸς Θρασύβουλον
458 καὶ Πορσίννα τὰ πρὸς Μούκιον καὶ Μάγα τὰ πρὸς Φιλήμονα· δημοσίᾳ γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κωμῳδηθεὶς ἐν θεάτρῳ·

A. παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως γράμματ' ἦκεί σοι, Μάγα.
B. Μάγα κακόδαιμον, γράμματ' οὐκ ἐπίστασαι·

λαβὼν ὑπὸ χειμῶνος εἰς Παραιτόνιον ἐξενεχθέντα, στρατιώτην[1] μὲν ἐκέλευσε γυμνῇ μαχαίρᾳ θιγεῖν τοῦ τραχήλου μόνον εἶτα κοσμίως ἀπελθεῖν· ἀστραγάλους δὲ καὶ σφαῖραν ὡς παιδαρίῳ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι προσπέμψας ἀφῆκε. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ γραμματικὸν εἰς ἀμαθίαν ἐπισκώπτων ἠρώτησε τίς ὁ τοῦ Πηλέως πατὴρ ἦν· κἀκεῖνος, " ἂν σὺ πρότερον εἴπῃς," ἔφη,
B " τίς ὁ τοῦ Λάγου "· τὸ δὲ σκῶμμα τῆς δυσγενείας ἥπτετο τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ πάντες ἠγανάκτησαν ὡς οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον ὂν καὶ ἄκαιρον[2]· καὶ ὁ Πτολεμαῖος, " εἰ μὴ τὸ φέρειν," ἔφη, " σκωπτόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ σκώπτειν βασιλικόν ἐστιν." Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ πικρότερος αὐτοῦ γέγονεν ἐν[3] τοῖς περὶ Καλλισθένη καὶ Κλεῖτον. ᾗ καὶ Πῶρος ἁλοὺς παρεκάλει χρήσασθαι βασιλικῶς αὐτῷ· καὶ πυθομένου, " μή τι πλέον; " " ἐν τῷ βασιλικῶς," ἔφη, " πάντ'

[1] στρατιώτην Stegmann, confirmed by MSS.: στρατιώτῃ.
[2] ὂν καὶ ἄκαιρον E. Schwartz: ὄντα χαίρειν (or φέρειν).
[3] γέγονεν ἐν] γέγονε Xylander and Kronenberg.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 189 C, and Nachstädt *ad loc.*
[b] *Ibid.* 305 F; *Life of Publicola*, xvii. (106 A-D) with Lindskog's note.
[c] *Cf.* 449 F, *supra.*
[d] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, ii. p. 522, Frag. 144.
[e] Officially the father of Ptolemy I, who, however, was commonly thought to have been the bastard son of Philip of Macedon.
[f] *Cf. Life of Alexander*, lv. (696 D-E); 449 E, *supra*; Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 17. 1.
[g] *Cf. Moralia*, 181 E, 332 E; *Life of Alexander*, lx. (699 C), and Ziegler's note.

treated by him, Philip said, "What will they do, then, if they are badly treated?"

Likewise admirable was the behaviour of Peisistratus [a] to Thrasybulus, and of Porsenna [b] to Mucius, and of Magas [c] to Philemon. For when Magas had been publicly ridiculed by Philemon in a comedy at the theatre:

A. For you some letters, Magas, from the king.
B. Unhappy Magas, who no letters know! [d]

Magas later captured Philemon, who had been cast ashore by a storm at Paraetonium, and ordered a soldier merely to touch Philemon on the neck with a naked sword and then depart courteously; and Magas sent dice and a ball to Philemon, as to a senseless child, and sent him on his way. So also Ptolemy, when he was jeering at a pedant for his ignorance, asked him who was Peleus' father; and the pedant replied, "I shall tell you if you will first tell me who was the father of Lagus." [e] This was a jest at the dubious birth of the king, and everyone was indignant at its improper and inopportune character; but Ptolemy said, "If it is not the part of a king to take a jest, neither is it to make one." But Alexander had behaved more harshly than was his custom toward Callisthenes and Cleitus.[f] And so Porus,[g] when he was taken captive, requested Alexander to treat him "like a king." When Alexander asked, "Is there nothing more?" "In the words 'like a king,'" replied Porus, "there is

(458) ἔνεστι." διὸ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὸν βασιλέα "Μειλίχιον," Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ "Μαιμάκτην," οἶμαι, καλοῦσι· C τὸ δὲ κολαστικὸν ἐρινυῶδες καὶ δαιμονικόν, οὐ θεῖον οὐδ' ὀλύμπιον.

10. Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλίππου τις εἶπε κατασκάψαντος Ὄλυνθον, "ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀνοικίσαι[1] γε πόλιν ἐκεῖνος δύναιτο τηλικαύτην," οὕτως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν θυμόν, "ἀνατρέψαι μὲν δύνασαι καὶ διαφθεῖραι καὶ καταβαλεῖν, ἀναστῆσαι δὲ καὶ σῶσαι καὶ φείσασθαι καὶ καρτερῆσαι πραότητός ἐστι καὶ συγγνώμης καὶ μετριοπαθείας, καὶ Καμίλλου καὶ Μετέλλου καὶ Ἀριστείδου καὶ Σωκράτους· τὸ δ' ἐμφῦναι καὶ δακεῖν μυρμηκῶδες καὶ μυωπῶδες." οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄμυναν σκοπῶν τὸν δι' ὀργῆς D τρόπον ἄπρακτον εὑρίσκω τὰ πολλά, ἅμα[2] δήγμασι χειλῶν καὶ πρίσεσιν ὀδόντων καὶ κεναῖς ἐπιδρομαῖς καὶ βλασφημίαις ἀπειλὰς ἀνοήτους ἐχούσαις καταναλισκόμενον, εἶθ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις τὰ παιδία τῷ μὴ κρατεῖν ἑαυτῶν προκαταπίπτοντα τοῦ τέλους ἐφ' ὃ σπεύδει γελοίως. ὅθεν οὐ φαύλως ὁ Ῥόδιος πρὸς ὑπηρέτην τοῦ Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοῦ βοῶντα καὶ θρασυνόμενον, "οὐ μέλει μοι τί σὺ

[1] ἀνοικίσαι Reiske: οἰκίσαι.
[2] ἅμα stands before σκοπῶν in the MSS.; transferred here by Capps (ἀνασκοπῶν E. Schwartz).

[a] But "Gentle" when propitiated. See Hesychius and Roscher, *Lexicon d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie, s.v.*; and Hewitt, *Harvard Stud. Class. Phil.*, xix. (1908), 75-78.

everything." For this reason also they call the king of the gods Meilichios, or the Gentle One, while the Athenians, I believe, call him Maimactes, or the Boisterous[a]; but punishment is the work of the Furies and spirits, not of the high gods and Olympian deities.

10. Just as, then, someone said of Philip[b] when he had razed Olynthus to the ground, "But he could not possibly repeople a city so large," so one may address Anger and say, "You are able to overturn and destroy and throw down, but to raise up and preserve and spare and forbear is the work of mildness and forgiveness and moderation in passion, the work of a Camillus or a Metellus[c] or an Aristeides or a Socrates; but to attach oneself to the wound and to sting is the part of an ant or a horse-fly."[d] As I study, however, anger's method of defending itself, I find it for the most part ineffectual, since it spends itself in biting the lips[e] and gnashing the teeth, in vain attacks and railings coupled with senseless threats, and eventually resembles children[f] running races, who, through lack of self-control, fall down ridiculously before they reach the goal toward which they are hastening. Therefore there was point in what the Rhodian said to the Roman general's servant who was shouting and talking insolently: "What *you* say," said the Rhodian, "matters nothing

[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 40 E, 215 B. For the thought see Pindar, *Pythian Odes*, iv. 484.
[c] Plutarch probably means Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus; *cf. Moralia*, 202 A.
[d] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 34. 1; *cf.* Socrates' comparison of himself to a gad-fly in *Apology*, 30 E.
[e] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, i. 19. 2-3.
[f] *Cf.* 447 A, *supra*.

(458) λέγεις ἀλλὰ τί τῆνος σιγῇ." καὶ τὸν Νεοπτόλεμον ὁ Σοφοκλῆς καὶ τὸν Εὐρύπυλον ὁπλίσας

ἄκομπ'[1] ἀλοιδόρητα,

φησίν,

ἐρρηξάτην ἐς κύκλα[2] χαλκέων ὅπλων.

Τὸν μὲν γὰρ σίδηρον ἔνιοι τῶν βαρβάρων φαρ-
E μάσσουσιν, ἡ δ' ἀνδρεία χολῆς οὐ δεῖται· βέβαπται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου· τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν καὶ μανικὸν εὐπερίθραυστόν ἐστι καὶ σαθρόν. ἀφαιροῦσι γοῦν αὐλοῖς τὸν θυμὸν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν μαχομένων, καὶ Μούσαις πρὸ πολέμου θύουσιν ὅπως ὁ λόγος ἐμμένῃ· καὶ τρεψάμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους οὐ διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀνακαλοῦνται τὸν θυμόν, ὥσπερ τὰ σύμμετρα τῶν ἐγχειριδίων εὐανακόμιστον ὄντα καὶ
F ῥᾴδιον. ὀργὴ δὲ μυρίους προανεῖλε τῆς ἀμύνης, ὡς Κῦρον καὶ Πελοπίδαν τὸν Θηβαῖον. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ πράως ἔφερε λοιδορούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιορκουμένων· καί τινος εἰπόντος, "Κεραμεῦ, πόθεν ἀποδώσεις τοῖς ξένοις τὸν μισθόν;" ἐπιγελάσας, "αἴκα ταύταν ἐξέλω." καὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον[3] ἀπὸ

[1] ἄκομπ' Badham, who would also add τε at the end of the line: ἐκόμπασ'.
[2] κύκλα] σκῦλα Pearson.
[3] τὸν Ἀντίγονον] τὸν αὐτὸν W.C.H.

[a] Frag. 210. 8, 9, ed. Pearson, vol. i. pp. 152 ff., where see he careful discussion of the relation of this passage to *Ox. Pap.*, ix. 1175; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², Sophocles, Frag. 768.
[b] The poison of anger.
[c] *Cf.* *Moralia*, 238 B, with Nachstädt *ad loc.*
[d] *Cf.* Pausanias, iv. 8. 11.

to me, but what your master doesn't say." And Sophocles,[a] when he has armed Neoptolemus and Eurypylus, says

Without a vaunt, without reviling, they
Have rushed within the ring of brazen arms.

For although there are barbarians who poison their steel, true bravery has no need of bitter gall,[b] for it has been dipped in reason; but rage and fury are rotten and easily broken. At any rate the Spartans[c] use the playing of pipes to remove from their fighting men the spirit of anger, and they sacrifice to the Muses before battle in order that reason may remain constant within them; and when they have routed the enemy, they do not pursue,[d] but sound the recall to their high spirits, which, like small daggers,[e] are manageable and can be easily withdrawn. Yet wrath has slain thousands before its revenge was accomplished, as, for instance, Cyrus[f] and Pelopidas the Theban.[g] But Agathocles[h] endured with mildness the revilings of those he was besieging, and when one of them cried out, "Potter, how will you get pay for your mercenaries?", Agathocles laughed and said, "If I take this town." And there is the case of Antigonus,[i] who, when some men on the

[e] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 35. 1: tale ira telum est: vix retrahitur.
[f] Probably Cyrus the Younger, *cf.* Xenophon, *Anabasis*, i. 8. 26-27; but Cyrus the Great may be meant, *cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 21, which is not, however, quite in point; nor is Herodotus, i. 205 ff.
[g] *Cf.* *Life of Pelopidas*, xxxii. (296 A).
[h] *Cf.* *Moralia*, 176 E; Diodorus, xx. 63. Agathocles was the son of a potter.
[i] The One-eyed: *cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 22. 4-5; related of Agathocles in *Moralia*, 176 E-F.

τοῦ τείχους τινὲς εἰς ἀμορφίαν ἔσκωπτον· ὁ δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς, " καὶ μὴν ἐδόκουν εὐπρόσωπος εἶναι." λαβὼν δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἐπίπρασκε τοὺς σκώπτοντας, μαρτυράμενος ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας ἕξει τὸν λόγον, ἂν πάλιν αὐτὸν λοιδορῶσιν.

Ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ συνηγόρους[1] σφαλλομένους ὑπ' ὀργῆς μεγάλα καὶ ῥήτορας. Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἱστορεῖ
459 Σατύρου τοῦ Σαμίου[2] τοὺς φίλους ἐμφράξαι τὰ ὦτα κηρῷ δίκην ἔχοντος, ὅπως μὴ συγχέῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα διὰ θυμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λοιδορούμενος. αὐτοὺς δ' ἡμᾶς οὐ πολλάκις ἐκφεύγει τὸ κολάσαι πλημμελήσαντα δοῦλον;[3] ἀποδιδράσκουσι γὰρ τὰς ἀπειλὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους δείσαντες. ὅπερ οὖν αἱ τίτθαι πρὸς τὰ παιδία λέγουσι, " μὴ κλαῖε καὶ λήψῃ," τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν οὐκ ἀχρήστως λεκτέον, " μὴ σπεῦδε μηδὲ βόα μηδ' ἐπείγου, καὶ μᾶλλον ἃ θέλεις γενήσεται καὶ βέλτιον." καὶ γὰρ παῖδα πατὴρ ἰδὼν ἐπιχειροῦντά τι σιδηρίῳ διελεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν,[4] αὐτὸς λαβὼν τὸ σιδήριον ἐποίησε· καὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ τὴν τιμωρίαν παρελόμενος ὁ λόγος[5]
B αὐτὸς ἀσφαλῶς καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως ἐκόλασε τὸν ἄξιον οὐχ ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ ὁ θυμὸς ἀντ' ἐκείνου πολλάκις.

11. Πάντων δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἐθισμοῦ δεομένων, οἷον δαμάζοντος καὶ καταθλοῦντος ἀσκήσει τὸ ἄλογον καὶ δυσπειθές, οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο μᾶλλον ἔστιν

[1] *συνηγόρους* Kaltwasser: *κινηγοὺς*.
[2] *τοῦ Σαμίου*] omitted by all mss. except G, but found in Stobaeus also.
[3] *πλημμελήσαντας δούλους* Reiske.
[4] *τεμεῖν*] *περιτεμεῖν* some mss.
[5] *ὁ λόγος* added by Amyot, confirmed by *ὁ λογισμὸς* in G.

wall of a town jeered at him because of his deformity, said to them, " Why, I thought my face was handsome!" But when he took the town he sold as slaves those who jeered at him, protesting that he would have speech with their masters if they reviled him again.

I observe also that both advocates and orators commit serious mistakes because of anger; and Aristotle[a] relates that the friends of Satyrus the Samian, when he was to plead, stopped up his ears with wax, that he might not spoil his case through temper at the insults of his enemies. And as for ourselves, does it not happen often that the punishment of a delinquent slave eludes our power? For slaves are made afraid by threatening words and run away.[b] The words, therefore, which nurses use with children, " Stop crying and you shall have it!" may, not without benefit, be applied to temper: " Stop hurrying and shouting and making haste, and you shall have what you want better and more easily!" For if a father sees his son trying to cut something in two or to make a notch in it with a knife, he takes the knife himself and does it; so likewise, if reason takes upon itself the punishment which temper would inflict, it chastises the person who deserves it safely and harmlessly and for that person's good, and does not, as temper often does, punish itself instead.[c]

11. But however true it is that all the passions have need of a process of habituation, which tames as it were and subdues by rigorous training the irrational and obstinate element of the soul, there is no passion

[a] *Problemata*, iii. 27 (875 a 34 ff.); cited by Stobaeus, iii. p. 551 ed. Hense. [b] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 5. 4.
[c] *Cf.* Xenophon, *Hellenica*, v. 3. 7.

(459) ἐγγυμνάσασθαι τοῖς οἰκέταις ἢ πρὸς τὸν θυμόν. οὔτε γὰρ φθόνος οὔτε φόβος οὔτε φιλοτιμία τις ἐγγίνεται πρὸς αὐτούς· ὀργαὶ δὲ συνεχεῖς πολλὰ ποιοῦσαι προσκρούματα καὶ σφάλματα διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ὀλισθηρῷ χωρίῳ, μηδενὸς ἐνισταμένου μηδὲ κωλύοντος, ὑποφέρουσιν.[1] οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀναμάρτητον ἐν πάθει τὸ ἀνυπεύθυνον κατασχεῖν, μὴ πολλῇ[2] τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐμπεριλαβόντα
C πραότητι μηδὲ πολλὰς ὑπομείναντα φωνὰς γυναικὸς καὶ φίλων ἐγκαλούντων ἀτονίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν. οἷς μάλιστα παρωξυνόμην καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὡς τῷ· μὴ κολάζεσθαι διαφθειρομένους. ὀψὲ μέντοι συνεῖδον ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνους ἀνεξικακίᾳ χείρονας ποιεῖν βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ πικρίᾳ καὶ θυμῷ διαστρέφειν ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἑτέρων ἐπανόρθωσιν· ἔπειτα πολλοὺς ὁρῶν αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ κολάζεσθαι πολλάκις αἰδουμένους κακοὺς εἶναι καὶ μεταβολῆς ἀρχὴν τὴν συγγνώμην μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν τιμωρίαν λαμβάνοντας, καὶ νὴ Δία δουλεύοντας ἑτέροις ἀπὸ νεύματος
D σιωπῇ[3] προθυμότερον ἢ μετὰ πληγῶν καὶ στιγμάτων ἑτέροις, ἐπειθόμην ἡγεμονικώτερον εἶναι τοῦ θυμοῦ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς εἶπεν,

ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς·

ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον αἰδουμένοις ὁ σωφρονίζων ἐγγίνε-

[1] ὑποφέρουσιν Reiske: ὑποφέρουσαι.
[2] πολλῇ] πολλὴν most MSS.
[3] καὶ after σιωπῇ deleted by E. Schwartz after Hartmann.

[a] Homer), *Cypria*, Frag. 20 ed. Kinkel; *cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Cleomenes*, ix. (xxx.) (808 E); Plato, *Euthyphro*, 12 A-B.

that we can better learn to control by practising on servants than temper. For no envy or fear or rivalry enters into our relations with them, but frequent fits of anger bring about many conflicts and errors, and because of the absolute power we possess, there being no one to oppose or prevent us, these cause us to slide and fall, since we are, as it were, on slippery ground. For it is impossible that irresponsible power under the influence of passion should be free from error, unless he who wields this power shall encompass it with a bulwark of gentleness, and shall hold out against many pleas of wife and friends, all charging him with laxity and easy-going ways. By such charges I myself used to be very greatly exasperated against my slaves, in the conviction that they were being ruined by not being punished. At long last, however, though late it was, I came to perceive that, in the first place, it is better to make them worse by forbearance than by harshness and anger to pervert my own self for the correction of the others. In the second place, when I observed that many, just because they were not being punished, were often ashamed to be bad, and made pardon, rather than correction, the starting-point of reformation, and, I swear, performed their duties more zealously for the kind of master who gave orders silently with a nod than for the others who used blows and branding-irons, I began to be convinced that reason is more fit than anger to govern. For it is not as the Poet [a] has said,

Where fear is, there is also reverence;

but, on the contrary, in those who revere there is

(459) ται φόβος, ἡ δὲ συνεχὴς πληγὴ καὶ ἀπαραίτητος οὐ μετάνοιαν ἐμποιεῖ τοῦ κακουργεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῦ λανθάνειν πρόνοιαν μᾶλλον. τρίτον ἀεὶ μνημονεύων καὶ διανοούμενος πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ὡς οὔθ' ὁ τοξεύειν ἡμᾶς διδάξας ἐκώλυσε[1] βάλλειν ἀλλὰ μὴ διαμαρτάνειν, οὔτε τῷ κολάζειν ἐμποδὼν ἔσται τὸ διδάσκειν εὐκαίρως τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ μετρίως καὶ ὠφελίμως καὶ πρεπόντως, πειρῶμαι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφαιρεῖν
E μάλιστα τῷ μὴ παραιρεῖσθαι τῶν κολαζομένων τὴν δικαιολογίαν ἀλλ' ἀκούειν. ὅ τε γὰρ χρόνος ἐμποιεῖ τῷ πάθει διατριβὴν καὶ μέλλησιν ἐκλύουσαν ἥ τε κρίσις εὑρίσκει καὶ τρόπον πρέποντα καὶ μέγεθος ἁρμόττον κολάσεως· ἔτι δ' οὐχ ὑπολείπεται πρόφασις τῷ διδόντι δίκην ἀντιτείνειν πρὸς τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν, ἂν μὴ κατ' ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἐξελεγχθεὶς κολάζηται· τό τ'[2] αἴσχιστον οὐ πρόσεστι, φαίνεσθαι δικαιότερα τοῦ δεσπότου λέγοντα τὸν οἰκέτην.

Ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Φωκίων μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν οὐκ ἐᾶν προεξανίστασθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐδὲ ταχὺ πιστεύειν, "εἰ σήμερον," εἶπεν, "ἄνδρες
F Ἀθηναῖοι, τέθνηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην τεθνηκώς"· οὕτως οἶμαι δεῖν ὑποβάλλειν ἑαυτῷ τὸν σπεύδοντα δι' ὀργὴν ἐπὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν, "εἰ σήμερον οὗτος ἠδίκηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην

[1] ἐκώλυσε] ἐκέλευε Madvig.
[2] τ'] δ' most mss.

[a] *Cf.* 451 E, *supra.*

engendered the kind of fear that corrects behaviour, whereas continual and unmerciful beating produces, not repentance for wrongdoing, but rather the far-sighted cunning to do wrong without detection. In the third place, I always keep in mind and reflect in privacy that he who taught us the use of the bow did not forbid us to shoot, but only to miss the mark,[a] and that the infliction of punishment will not be hindered by our teaching how to inflict it at the right time,[b] with moderation, and in a useful and suitable manner; and, remembering these things, I try to get rid of my anger, if possible, by not depriving those who are to be punished of the right to speak in their defence, but by listening to their plea. For both the passage of time gives a pause to passion and a delay which dissolves it, and also the judgement discovers a suitable manner of punishment and an adequate amount; furthermore, the man who suffers punishment has no pretext left for opposing the correction if punishment is inflicted, not in anger, but after the accused has been proved guilty; and finally, the most shameful thing is avoided—that the slave should seem to be making a juster plea than his master.

And so, just as Phocion[c] after Alexander's death, trying to keep the Athenians from revolting prematurely or believing the report too quickly, said to them, "If, men of Athens, he is dead to-day, he will be dead to-morrow also, and the day after"; in like manner, I think, the man who, urged on by anger, is in a hurry for vengeance, should suggest to himself, "If this person is guilty of wronging you to-day, he will still be guilty to-morrow also, and the day after;

[b] When it is really deserved.
[c] *Cf. Life of Phocion*, xxii. (751 E); *Moralia*, 188 D.

ἠδικηκώς· καὶ δεινὸν οὐδέν, εἰ δώσει δίκην βράδιον, ἀλλ' εἰ ταχὺ παθὼν ἀεὶ φανεῖται[1] μὴ ἀδικῶν· ὅπερ ἤδη συμβέβηκε πολλάκις." τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτω δεινός ἐστιν, ὥστε μαστιγοῦν καὶ κολάζειν δοῦλον,
460 ὅτι πέμπτην ἢ δεκάτην ἡμέραν προσέκαυσε τοὖψον ἢ κατέβαλε τὴν τράπεζαν ἢ βράδιον ὑπήκουσε; καὶ μὴν ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐφ' οἷς εὐθὺς γενομένοις καὶ προσφάτοις οὖσι ταραττόμεθα καὶ πικρῶς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἔχομεν. ὡς γὰρ δι' ὁμίχλης τὰ σώματα, καὶ δι' ὀργῆς τὰ πράγματα μείζονα φαίνεται.

Διὸ δεῖ ταχὺ συμμνημονεύειν τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἔξωθεν ὄντας[2] ἀνυπόπτως, ἂν καθαρῷ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ καθεστῶτι φαίνηται μοχθηρόν, ἐπιστραφῆναι καὶ μὴ προέσθαι τότε μηδ' ἀφεῖναι τὴν κόλασιν, ὥσπερ σιτίον[3] ἀνορέκτους γεγονότας. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ παρούσης ὀργῆς
B κολάζειν, ὡς τὸ παυσαμένης μὴ κολάζειν ἀλλ' ἐκλελύσθαι, καὶ ταὐτὸν πεπονθέναι τοῖς ἀργοῖς κωπηλάταις, οἳ γαλήνης ὁρμοῦσιν[4] εἶτα κινδυνεύουσιν ἀνέμῳ πλέοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοῦ λογισμοῦ κατεγνωκότες ἀτονίαν καὶ μαλακίαν ἐν τῷ κολάζειν, σπεύδομεν παρόντι τῷ θυμῷ καθάπερ πνεύματι παραβόλως. τροφῇ μὲν γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν κατὰ φύσιν χρῆται, τιμωρίᾳ δ'[5] ὁ μὴ πεινῶν μηδὲ διψῶν αὐτῆς, μηδ' ὥσπερ ὄψου πρὸς τὸ κολάσαι τοῦ θυμοῦ δεόμενος, ἀλλ' ὅταν πορρωτάτω τοῦ

[1] ἀεὶ φανεῖται] ἀναφανεῖται Madvig.
[2] ὄντας Benseler: ὄντα.
[3] σιτίον] σιτίων in some mss.
[4] ὁρμοῦσιν] ὁρμῶσιν most mss.
[5] δ'] δὲ δικαίᾳ Capps: "a just punishment is" etc.

no harm will be done if he shall be punished somewhat late, but if he is punished in haste he will always be thought to have suffered without offending; and this has happened many times in the past." For which of us is so harsh that he scourges and chastises a slave because five or ten days ago he overroasted the meat or upset the table or came too slowly at our bidding? And yet these are the very things which cause us to be excited and in a cruel and implacable mood at the moment they happen and are still fresh in our memory. For as the shapes of persons seen through a fog, so things seen through a mist of rage appear greater than they are.

These are the reasons why we should immediately call to mind such instances and precepts; and when we are free from all suspicion of passion, if the offence still appears evil to the clear and settled judgement, we should attend to it then and not dismiss or abandon the punishment, as we leave food when we have lost our appetite. And nothing is so much the cause of our punishing in a rage as that, when our anger is over, we do not punish, but leave things alone. We are very much like lazy oarsmen, who during calm weather lie in port, and later, at the risk of their lives, avail themselves of a wind to go sailing. And so do we condemn reason for remissness and softness in punishment and hasten on to the deed rashly and to our peril when anger, like a gale, is upon us. For while a hungry man indulges in food as nature dictates, yet punishment is indulged in by one who is not hungry or thirsty for it, nor does he need anger as a relish to stimulate him to punish; on the contrary, when he finds himself very far removed from the desire to

(460) ὀρέγεσθαι γένηται προσάγων τὸν λογισμὸν ἀναγ-
C καίως. οὐ γάρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ μαστιγοῦσθαι τοὺς οἰκέτας πρὸς αὐλόν, οὕτω πρὸς ἡδονὴν δεῖ καθάπερ ἀπολαύσματος ὀρέξει τῆς τιμωρίας ἐμφορεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν κολάζοντας, κολάσαντας δὲ[1] μετανοεῖν· ὧν τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες τὸ δὲ γυναικῶδες· ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῆς χωρὶς ἐν τῷ τοῦ λογισμοῦ χρόνῳ τὴν δίκην κομίζεσθαι[2] μὴ ὑπολείποντας[3] τῷ θυμῷ πρόφασιν.

12. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἴσως οὐκ ὀργῆς ἰατρεία φανεῖται, διάκρουσις δὲ καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν ἐν ὀργῇ τινος ἁμαρτημάτων. καίτοι καὶ σπληνὸς οἴδημα σύμ-
D πτωμα μέν ἐστι πυρετοῦ πραϋνόμενον δὲ κουφίζει τὸν πυρετόν, ὥς φησιν Ἱερώνυμος. ἀλλ' αὐτῆς γε τῆς ὀργῆς ἀναθεωρῶν τὴν γένεσιν ἄλλους ὑπ' ἄλλων αἰτιῶν ἐμπίπτοντας εἰς αὐτὴν ἑώρων, οἷς ἐπιεικῶς ἅπασι δόξα τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι καὶ ἀμελεῖσθαι παραγίνεται. διὸ καὶ τοῖς παραιτουμένοις ὀργὴν δεῖ βοηθεῖν πορρωτάτω τὴν πρᾶξιν ὀλιγωρίας ἀπάγοντας καὶ θρασύτητος, εἰς ἄγνοιαν[4] ἢ ἀνάγκην ἢ πάθος ἢ δυστυχίαν τιθεμένους· ὡς Σοφοκλῆς,

ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ,[5] ὦναξ, οὐδ' ὃς ἂν βλάστῃ μένει
νοῦς τοῖς κακῶς πράξασιν,[6] ἀλλ' ἐξίσταται.

[1] κολάσαντας δὲ Reiske, confirmed by the Syriac version: εἶτα or δὲ in some MSS.; most omit.
[2] κομίζεσθαι Reiske: κολάζεσθαι.
[3] ὑπολείποντας Bernardakis: ὑπολείποντα or -ος.
[4] ἄγνοιαν Reiske (*cf.* Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, 1110 a 1): ἄνοιαν.
[5] ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ] οὐ γάρ ποτ' MSS. of Sophocles.
[6] πράξασιν] πράσσουσιν MSS. of Sophocles.

[a] Frag. 608 ed. Rose.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 550 E, where the whole context may be

punish, he brings up reason to reinforce him and punishes under compulsion. Aristotle[a] relates that in Etruria in his day slaves were scourged to the music of pipes. But one should not, in that spirit, through a craving for the punishment as for a kind of enjoyment, gorge oneself with it, and rejoice while inflicting chastisement and after inflicting it repent[b] —of these the first is bestial, the second womanish— but without either sorrow or pleasure one should mete out punishment in reason's own good time, leaving anger no excuse.

12. However this, perhaps, will not appear to be a cure for anger, but a temporary reprieve and prophylactic[c] against those errors which some men commit in anger. And yet, though the swelling of the spleen is but a symptom of fever, reducing it assuages the fever, as Hieronymus says. But when I contemplated the origin of anger itself, I observed that different persons are liable to anger from different causes; yet in the case of practically all of them there is present a belief that they are being despised or neglected.[d] For this reason we should assist those who endeavour to avoid anger, by removing as far as possible the act that rouses wrath from any suspicion of contempt or arrogance and by imputing it to ignorance or necessity or emotion or mischance. So Sophocles[e]:

O king, not even the reason Nature gives
Stays with the unfortunate, but goes astray;

compared with this chapter. See also Seneca, *De Ira*, i. 17-18.
[c] For the phrase *cf. Moralia*, 420 E.
[d] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ii. 3 (1380 a 8 ff.).
[e] *Antigonê*, 563-564; quoted with the same textual variants in the *Life of Phocion*, i. (742 A).

καὶ τῆς Βρισηΐδος τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν εἰς τὴν Ἄτην
E ἀναφέρων ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων, ὅμως

ἄψ ἐθέλω[1] ἀρέσαι, δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα.

καὶ γὰρ τὸ δεῖσθαι τοῦ μὴ καταφρονοῦντός ἐστι, καὶ ταπεινὸς φανεὶς ὁ ἀδικήσας ἔλυσε τὴν τῆς ὀλιγωρίας δόξαν. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα περιμένειν τὸν ὀργιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Διογένους, "οὗτοί σου καταγελῶσιν, ὦ Διόγενες"· "ἐγὼ δ' οὐ καταγελῶμαι," λαμβάνειν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ καταφρονεῖσθαι μὴ νομίζειν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐκείνου καταφρονεῖν, ὡς δι' ἀσθένειαν ἢ[2] προπέτειαν ἢ ῥᾳθυμίαν ἢ ἀνελευθερίαν ἢ γῆρας ἢ νεότητα πλημμελοῦντος. οἰκέταις δὲ καὶ φίλοις ἀφετέον τὸ τοιοῦτο παντάπασιν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀδυνάτων οὐδ' ὡς ἀπράκτων
F ἀλλὰ δι' ἐπιείκειαν ἢ δι' εὔνοιαν οἱ μὲν ὡς χρηστῶν οἱ δ' ὡς φιλούντων καταφρονοῦσι. νυνὶ δ' οὐ μόνον πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ δούλους καὶ φίλους ὡς καταφρονούμενοι τραχέως ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πανδοκεῦσι καὶ ναύταις καὶ ὀρεωκόμοις μεθύουσι πολλάκις ὑπ' ὀργῆς συμπίπτομεν οἰόμενοι καταφρονεῖσθαι, καὶ
461 κυσὶν ὑλακτοῦσι καὶ ὄνοις ἐμβάλλουσι χαλεπαίνομεν· ὡς ἐκεῖνος ὁ βουλόμενος τύπτειν τὸν ὀνηλάτην, εἶτ' ἀνακραγόντος ὅτι "Ἀθηναῖός εἰμι," "σὺ δέ γ'[3] οὐκ εἶ Ἀθηναῖος," τὸν ὄνον λέγων, ἔτυπτε καὶ πολλὰς ἐνεφόρει πληγάς.

[1] ἐθέλω D: ἐθέλει or ἐθέλειν.
[2] ἢ πλημμέλειαν before ἢ deleted by Stegmann, confirmed by one MS. and the Syriac version.
[3] δέ γ' Cobet and van Herwerden: μέν, δέ, or δὲ μέν.

[a] Homer, *Il.*, xix. 138.

and so likewise Agamemnon[a] ascribes the taking away of Briseïs to divine infatuation:

> I wish again to make amends, to give
> You countless ransom.

Supplication, indeed, is the act of one who does not despise; and when he that has done an injury shows himself humble, he removes all notion of contempt. But the man in a rage should not wait for such humility, but should take to himself the reply of Diogenes[b]: when someone said to him, "They are laughing at you, Diogenes," he answered, "But I am not laughed down." Just so the angry man should not consider himself despised, but rather despise the man who gave the offence as acting from weakness or rashness, carelessness or illiberality, dotage or childishness. But such a notion must not on any account be entertained toward servants or friends; for our servants presume on our upright character, our friends on our affection, and both disregard us, not as being impotent or ineffectual, but because of our reasonableness or our goodwill. As it is, thinking ourselves despised, we not only treat harshly wife and slaves and friends, but also through rage often fall out with innkeepers and sailors and drunken muleteers; we even rage against dogs that bark at us and asses that jostle us,[c] like the man who wished to beat the ass-driver, but when the driver cried out, "I am an Athenian," indicated the ass and said, "You at any rate are not an Athenian," and fell to beating it with many blows.

[b] *Cf. Life of Fabius Maximus*, x. (179 F); Diogenes Laertius, vi. 54.
[c] *Cf.* Plato, *Republic*, 563 C.

(461) 13. Καὶ μὴν τάς γε συνεχεῖς καὶ πυκνὰς καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συλλεγομένας ὀργὰς μάλιστα φιλαυτία καὶ δυσκολία μετὰ τρυφῆς καὶ μαλακίας οἷον σμῆνος ἢ σφηκιὰν ἡμῖν ἐντίκτουσι. διὸ μεῖζον οὐδὲν εὐκολίας καὶ ἀφελείας ἐφόδιον εἰς πραότητα πρὸς οἰκέτας καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ φίλους τῷ δυναμένῳ συμφέρεσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ μὴ δεομένῳ πολλῶν καὶ περιττῶν·

B ὁ δ' οὔτ' ἄγαν ὀπτοῖσιν οὔθ' ἑφθοῖς ἄγαν,
οὔθ' ἧττον οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε διὰ μέσου
ἡρτυμένοις ἔχαιρεν[1] ὥστ' ἐπαινέσαι,

χιόνος δὲ μὴ παρούσης οὐκ ἂν πιών, οὐδ'[2] ἄρτον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς φαγὼν οὐδ' ὄψου γευσάμενος ἐν λιτοῖς ἢ κεραμεοῖς σκεύεσιν, οὐδὲ κοιμηθεὶς ἐπὶ στρωμνῆς μὴ οἰδούσης ὥσπερ θαλάσσης διὰ βάθους κεκινημένης, ῥάβδοις δὲ καὶ πληγαῖς τοὺς περὶ τράπεζαν ὑπηρέτας[3] ἐπιταχύνων μετὰ δρόμου καὶ βοῆς καὶ ἱδρῶτος, ὥσπερ φλεγμοναῖς[4] καταπλάσματα κομίζοντας, ἀσθενεῖ καὶ φιλαιτίῳ καὶ μεμψιμοίρῳ δουλεύων διαίτῃ, καθάπερ ὑπὸ βηχὸς ἐνδελεχοῦς
C προσκρουμάτων[5] πολλῶν ἕλαθεν ἑλκώδη καὶ καταρροϊκὴν διάθεσιν περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἀπεργασάμενος. ἐθιστέον οὖν τὸ σῶμα δι' εὐτελείας πρὸς εὐκολίαν αὔταρκες ἑαυτῷ γινόμενον· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγων δεόμενοι πολλῶν οὐκ ἀποτυγχάνουσιν.

Καὶ δεινὸν οὐδὲν ἀρξαμένους[6] ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς

[1] ἡρτυμένοις ἔχαιρεν Meineke: ἡρτυμένοισι χαίρων.
[2] οὐδ' Stegmann: οὔτε.
[3] τοῖς . . . ὑπηρέταις in most mss.
[4] φλεγμοναῖς Syriac version and some mss.: φλεγμαίνων or φλεγμονῶν.
[5] ἤ before προσκρουμάτων deleted by Salmasius.

13. Furthermore it is especially selfishness and peevishness, together with luxury and softness, which beget in us those continuous or oft-recurring fits of anger that are gathered together in the soul little by little, like a swarm of bees or wasps. And so there is nothing more conducive to gentleness than graciousness and simplicity toward servants and wife and friends if a man is able to get along with what comforts he has and is in no need of many superfluities:

> But he who liked his meat not overdone
> Nor underdone, nor medium, nor boiled
> Too much: and liked no food enough to praise [a]

who will drink no wine if there is no snow with it,[b] nor eat bread purchased in the market, nor touch food served on cheap or earthenware dishes, nor sleep upon a bed that does not billow like the sea stirred to its depths; he who with rods and blows makes his servants at table hasten about running and crying out and sweating as though they were bringing poultices for boils,[c] such a man is enslaved to an impotent, querulous, and discontented mode of life. His many shocks of anger are like a chronic cough by which he reduces himself to a condition where anger becomes a running sore. We must, therefore, accustom the body to contentment by plain living and to self-sufficiency, for those who need but little are not disappointed of much.

And, to begin with our food, it is no great hardship

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 472, ades. 343.
[b] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 25. 4.
[c] A matter evidently requiring urgent haste.

[6] ἀρξαμένους Reiske: ἀρξάμενον.

(461) σιωπῇ χρήσασθαι τοῖς παρατυγχάνουσι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ χολουμένους[1] καὶ δυσκολαίνοντας ἀτερπέστατον ὄψον ἐμβαλεῖν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ φίλοις τὴν ὀργήν·

δόρπου δ' οὐκ ἄν πως ἀχαρίστερον ἄλλο γένοιτο,

διὰ πρόσκαυσιν ἢ καπνὸν ἢ ἁλῶν ἔνδειαν ἢ ψυχρότερον ἄρτον οἰκετῶν τυπτομένων καὶ λοιδορουμένης γυναικός.

D Ἀρκεσιλάου δὲ μετὰ ξένων τινῶν ἑστιῶντος τοὺς φίλους παρετέθη τὸ δεῖπνον, ἄρτοι δ' οὐκ ἦσαν ἀμελησάντων πρίασθαι τῶν παίδων. ἐφ' ᾧ τίς οὐκ ἄν ἡμῶν διέστησε τοὺς τοίχους κεκραγώς; ὁ δὲ μειδιάσας, "οἷόν ἐστιν," ἔφη, "τὸ συμποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν σοφόν."

Τοῦ δὲ Σωκράτους ἐκ παλαίστρας παραλαβόντος τὸν Εὐθύδημον, ἡ Ξανθίππη μετ' ὀργῆς ἐπιστᾶσα καὶ λοιδορηθεῖσα τέλος ἀνέτρεψε τὴν τράπεζαν, ὁ δ' Εὐθύδημος ἐξαναστὰς ἀπῄει περίλυπος γενόμενος· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, "παρὰ σοὶ δ'," εἶπεν, "οὐ πρώην ὄρνις τις εἰσπτᾶσα ταὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐποίησεν, ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ ἠγανακτήσαμεν;"

E Δεῖ γὰρ σὺν εὐκολίᾳ καὶ γέλωτι καὶ φιλοφροσύνῃ τοὺς φίλους δέχεσθαι, μὴ τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγοντας μηδὲ φρίκην καὶ τρόμον ἐμβάλλοντας τοῖς ὑπηρετοῦσιν. ἐθιστέον δὲ καὶ σκεύεσιν εὐκόλως ὁμιλεῖν ἅπασι καὶ μὴ τῷδε μᾶλλον ἢ τῷδε χρῆσθαι· καθάπερ ἔνιοι πολλῶν παρόντων ἓν ἐξελόμενοι

[1] χολουμένους] φοβουμένους many mss.; ἀσχολουμένους Madvig.

[a] Homer, *Od.*, xx. 392.
[b] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 25.

if we partake in silence of whatever is set before us and do not, by being repeatedly choleric and peevish, thrust upon ourselves and our friends the worst sauce for meat, anger.

No more unpleasant supper could there be [a]

than that wherein servants are beaten and wife is reviled because something is burned or smoked or not salted enough, or because the bread is too cold.[b]

Arcesilaüs was once entertaining his friends and with them some foreign guests, and when dinner was served, there was no bread, since the slaves had neglected to buy any. In such a predicament which one of us would not have rent the walls asunder with outcries? But Arcesilaüs merely smiled and said, "How lucky it is that the wise man takes to the flowing bowl!" [c]

Once when Socrates took Euthydemus home with him from the palaestra, Xanthippê came up to them in a rage and scolded them roundly, finally upsetting the table.[d] Euthydemus, deeply offended, got up and was about to leave when Socrates said, "At your house the other day did not a hen fly in and do precisely this same thing, yet we were not put out about it?"

For we should receive our friends affably and with laughter and cheerful friendliness, not with frowning brows, or striking fear and trembling into our servants. We must, further, accustom ourselves to make cheerful use of any kind of table utensils and not to prefer this service to that, as some men do

[c] There being no bread for the *deipnon*, the *symposium* will come earlier.
[d] *Cf.* 471 B, *infra*, of Pittacus.

κανθάριον, ὡς Μάριον ἱστοροῦσιν, ἢ ῥυτὸν[1] οὐκ ἂν ἑτέρῳ πίοιεν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ πρὸς ληκύθους ἔχουσι καὶ πρὸς στλεγγίδας, ἀγαπῶντες ἐκ πασῶν μίαν· εἶθ' ὅταν συντριβῇ τι τούτων ἢ ἀπόληται, βαρέως φέρουσι καὶ κολάζουσιν. ἀφεκτέον οὖν τῷ πρὸς ὀργὴν φαύλως ἔχοντι καὶ τῶν σπανίων καὶ περιττῶν, οἷον ἐκπωμάτων καὶ σφραγίδων καὶ λίθων
F πολυτελῶν· ἐξίστησι γὰρ ἀπολλύμενα μᾶλλον τῶν εὐπορίστων καὶ συνήθων. διὸ καὶ τοῦ Νέρωνος ὀκτάγωνόν τινα σκηνὴν ὑπερφυὲς κάλλει καὶ πολυτελείᾳ θέαμα κατασκευάσαντος, "ἤλεγξας," ἔφη ὁ
462 Σενέκας, "πένητα σεαυτόν· ἐὰν γὰρ ταύτην ἀπολέσῃς, ἑτέραν οὐ κτήσῃ τοιαύτην." καὶ μέντοι καὶ συνέπεσε τοῦ πλοίου καταδύντος ἀπολέσθαι τὴν σκηνήν· ὁ δὲ Νέρων ἀναμνησθεὶς τοῦ Σενέκα μετριώτερον ἤνεγκεν.

Ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματ' εὐκολία καὶ πρὸς οἰκέτας εὔκολον ποιεῖ καὶ πρᾶον· εἰ δὲ πρὸς οἰκέτας, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς φίλους καὶ πρὸς ἀρχομένους. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ δούλους νεωνήτους περὶ τοῦ πριαμένου πυνθανομένους, οὐκ εἰ δεισιδαίμων οὐδ' εἰ φθονερὸς ἀλλ' εἰ θυμώδης· καὶ ὅλως σὺν ὀργῇ μηδὲ σωφροσύνην ἄνδρας γυναικῶν μηδ' ἔρωτα γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν ὑπομένειν δυναμένας μηδὲ συνήθειαν ἀλλήλων φίλους. οὕτως οὔτε γάμος οὔτε φιλία μετ' ὀργῆς

[1] ἢ ῥυτὸν Basel ed.: νήρυτον.

[a] *Cf.* Plutarch, *De Calumnia*, Frag. 1 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 128).

who select one goblet or horn out of the many they have, and will drink from no other, as they relate of Marius. Some have this same feeling about oil-flasks and strigils, of which they have a liking for but one out of many ; and so when one of these preferred objects is broken or lost, they take it hard and punish severely. Therefore anyone who is prone to anger should abstain from rare and curiously wrought things, like drinking-cups and seal-rings and precious stones ; for their loss drives their owner out of his senses more than do objects which are easily procured and may be seen everywhere. This is the reason why, when Nero had had an octagonal tent built, a huge structure which was a sight to be seen because of its beauty and costliness, Seneca remarked, " You have proved yourself a poor man, for if you ever lose this you will not have the means to procure another like it." And indeed it did so happen that the ship which conveyed it was sunk and the tent lost. But Nero remembered Seneca's saying and bore his loss with greater moderation.

A cheerful behaviour toward the affairs of life makes a master cheerful and gentle toward his slaves also ; and if to slaves, he will evidently be so to his friends as well as to those who are subject to his rule. And in fact we observe that newly purchased slaves inquire about their new master, not whether he is superstitious or envious, but whether he is ill-tempered [a] ; and, speaking generally, we see that if anger is present in a home, husbands cannot endure even their wives' chastity, nor wives even their husbands' love, nor friends even familiar intercourse with one another. Thus neither marriage nor friendship is tolerable if anger is there, but without anger even

B ἀνεκτόν· ἀλλὰ χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ μέθη κοῦφόν ἐστιν.
(462) ὁ γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ νάρθηξ ἱκανὸς κολαστὴς τοῦ μεθύοντος, ἂν μὴ προσγενόμενος ὁ θυμὸς ὠμηστὴν καὶ μαινόλην ἀντὶ λυαίου καὶ χορείου ποιήσῃ τὸν ἄκρατον. καὶ τὴν μανίαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ Ἀντίκυρα θεραπεύει, μιχθεῖσα δ' ὀργῇ τραγῳδίας ποιεῖ καὶ μύθους.

14. Δεῖ δὲ μήτε παίζοντας αὐτῇ διδόναι τόπον, ἔχθραν γὰρ ἐπάγει τῇ φιλοφροσύνῃ· μήτε κοινολογουμένους, φιλονεικίαν γὰρ ἐκ φιλολογίας ἀπεργάζεται· μήτε δικάζοντας, ὕβριν γὰρ τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ
C προστίθησι· μήτε παιδεύοντας, ἀθυμίαν γὰρ ἐμποιεῖ καὶ μισολογίαν· μήτ' εὐτυχοῦντας, αὔξει γὰρ τὸν φθόνον· μήτε δυστυχοῦντας, ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἔλεον, ὅταν δυσκολαίνωσι καὶ μάχωνται τοῖς συναχθομένοις· ὡς ὁ Πρίαμος

ἔρρετε, λωβητῆρες, ἐλεγχέες· οὔ νυ καὶ ὑμῖν
οἶκοι[1] ἔστι[2] γόος, ὅτι μ' ἦλθετε κηδήσοντες;

ἡ δ' εὐκολία τοῖς μὲν βοηθεῖ τὰ δ' ἐπικοσμεῖ τὰ δὲ συνηδύνει, περιγίνεται δὲ τῇ πραότητι καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ δυσκολίας ἁπάσης· ὥσπερ Εὐκλείδης, τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰπόντος, "ἀπολοίμην, εἰ μή σε τιμωρησαίμην," "ἐγὼ δέ," φήσας, "ἀπολοίμην, εἰ μή σε πείσαιμι," διέτρεψε
D παραχρῆμα καὶ μετέθηκε. Πολέμων δέ, λοιδορουῦντος αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπου φιλολίθου καὶ περὶ σφρα-

[1] οἶκοι] omitted by all MSS. except G.
[2] ἔστι] ἔνεστι most MSS. of Homer.

[a] *Choreius* and *Lyaeus*, epithets of Dionysus.
[b] A town on the Corinthian Gulf in Phocis, famous for its hellebore; see Rolfe's note on Aulus Gellius, xvii. 15. 6 (L.C.L., vol. iii. p. 260).

drunkenness is easily borne. For the wand of Dionysus suffices to punish the drunkard, unless hot temper is added and makes the undiluted drink a cause of savagery and madness instead of a dispeller of care and an inspirer of the dance.[a] Madness pure and simple can indeed be cured by Anticyra[b]; but if madness is mingled with anger, it produces tragedies and tales of horror.

14. Surely we should allow no place to anger even in jest, for that brings enmity in where friendliness was; nor in learned discussions, for that turns love of learning into strife; nor when rendering judgement, for that adds insolence to authority; nor in teaching, for that engenders discouragement and hatred of learning; nor in prosperity, for that increases envy; nor in adversity, for that drives away compassion when men become irritable and quarrel with those who sympathize with them, as Priam[c] did:

> Be gone, you wretched, shameful men! Have you
> No cause for grief at home that you have come
> To trouble me?

But a cheerful disposition in some circumstances is helpful, others it adorns, and still others it helps to sweeten; by its gentleness it overcomes both anger and all moroseness. Thus Eucleides,[d] when his brother said to him after a quarrel, "Damned if I don't get even with you!" answered, "But as for me, may I be damned if I don't convince you!" and so at once turned him from his purpose and won him over. And Polemon, when a man who was fond of precious stones and quite mad about expensive seal-

[c] Homer, *Il.*, xxiv. 239-240.
[d] *Cf.* 489 D, *infra*.

(462) γίδια πολυτελῆ νοσοῦντος, ἀπεκρίνατο μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν σφραγιδίων δ' ἑνὶ προσεῖχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ κατεμάνθανεν· ἡσθεὶς οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, "μὴ οὕτως," εἶπεν "ὦ Πολέμων, ἀλλ' ὑπ' αὐγὰς θεῶ, καὶ πολύ σοι βέλτιον φανεῖται." ὁ δ' Ἀρίστιππος, ὀργῆς αὐτῷ πρὸς Αἰσχίνην γενομένης καί τινος εἰπόντος, "ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, ποῦ ὑμῶν ἡ φιλία;" "καθεύδει," φησίν, "ἐγὼ δ' αὐτὴν ἐγερῶ"· καὶ τῷ Αἰσχίνῃ προσελθὼν εἶπεν, "οὕτω σοι δοκῶ παντάπασιν ἀτυχής τις εἶναι καὶ ἀνήκεστος, ὥστε
E μὴ νουθεσίας τυχεῖν;" ὁ δ' Αἰσχίνης, "οὐδέν," ἔφη, "θαυμαστόν, εἰ πρὸς πάντα μου τῇ φύσει διαφέρων κἀνταῦθα τὸ δέον πρότερος συνεῖδες."

καὶ γὰρ κάπρον φριξαύχεν' οὐ μόνον γυνή,
παῖς δ' ἂν νεογνὸς χειρὶ προσκνήθων νέᾳ
κλίνοι[1] παλαιστοῦ παντὸς εὐμαρέστερον.

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἀγριαίνοντα τιθασεύομεν ζῷα καὶ πραΰνομεν, λυκιδεῖς καὶ σκύμνους λεόντων ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις περιφέροντες, εἶτα τέκνα καὶ φίλους καὶ συνήθεις ἐκβάλλομεν ὑπ' ὀργῆς· οἰκέταις δὲ καὶ πολίταις[2] τὸν θυμὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐφίεμεν· οὐ καλῶς
F ὑποκοριζόμενοι μισοπονηρίαν, ἀλλ'[3] ὥσπερ, οἶμαι, τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν τῆς[4] ψυχῆς καὶ νοσημάτων τὸ μὲν πρόνοιαν τὸ δ' ἐλευθεριότητα τὸ δ' εὐσέβειαν καλοῦντες οὐδενὸς ἀπαλλαγῆναι δυνάμεθα.

15. Καίτοι, καθάπερ ὁ Ζήνων ἔλεγε τὸ σπέρμα

[1] κλίνοι Nauck : κλίναι.
[2] πελάταις Kronenberg.
[3] ἀλλ'] Reiske would delete.
[4] τῆς] omitted in most mss.

rings reviled him. made no answer, but fixed his gaze on one of the seal-rings and eyed it closely. The man, accordingly, was pleased and said to him, "Do not look at it in this light, Polemon, but under the sun's rays, and it will appear to you far more beautiful." Aristippus, again, when anger had arisen between him and Aeschines and someone said, "Where now, Aristippus, is the friendship of you two?" replied, "It is asleep, but I shall awaken it"; and, going to Aeschines, he said, "Do I appear to you so utterly unfortunate and incurable as not to receive correction from you?" And Aeschines replied, "No wonder if you, who are naturally superior to me in all things, should in this matter also have discerned before I did the right thing to do."

For not a woman only, even a child,
Tickling the bristly boar with tender hand,
May throw him easier than a wrestler might.[a]

But we who tame wild beasts and make them gentle and carry about in our arms young wolves and lions' cubs,[b] then under the impulse of rage cast off children, friends, and companions and let loose our wrath, like some wild beast, on servants and fellow-citizens—we, I say, do not well to use a cozening word for our anger by calling it "righteous indignation,"[c] but it is with anger, I believe, as with the other passions and diseases of the soul: we can rid ourselves of none of them by calling one "foresight," another "liberality," another "piety."

15. And yet, as Zeno[d] used to say that the seed

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 912, ades. 383.
[b] *Cf.* 482 C, *infra.*
[c] *Cf.* 456 F, 449 A, *supra.*
[d] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. p. 36, Frag. 128.

σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ὑπάρχειν ἀπεσπασμένον, οὕτως ἔοικε τῶν παθῶν
463 πανσπερμία τις ὁ θυμὸς εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ λύπης ἀπέσπασται καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ ὕβρεως, καὶ φθόνου μὲν ἔχει τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, φθόνου[1] δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐστίν· ἀγωνίζεται γάρ, οὐχὶ μὴ παθεῖν αὐτός, ἀλλὰ παθεῖν κακῶς ἐπιτρίψας ἕτερον· ἐπιθυμίας δ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἀτερπέστατον ἐμπέφυκεν, εἴ γε δὴ τοῦ λυπεῖν ἕτερον ὄρεξίς ἐστι. διὸ τῶν μὲν ἀσώτων ταῖς οἰκίαις προσιόντες αὐλητρίδος ἀκούομεν ἑωθινῆς, καί " πηλόν," ὥς τις εἶπεν, " οἴνου καὶ σπαράγματα στεφάνων," καὶ κραιπαλῶντας ὁρῶμεν ἐπὶ θύραις ἀκολούθους· τὰ δὲ τῶν πικρῶν ἐκκαλύμ-
B ματα[2] καὶ δυσκόλων ἐν τοῖς προσώποις τῶν οἰκετῶν ὄψει καὶ τοῖς στίγμασι καὶ ταῖς πέδαις·

ἀεὶ δ' ἀοιδῶν μοῦνος ἐν στέγαις

ὀργίλου ἀνδρὸς

κωκυτὸς ἐμπέπτωκε,

μαστιγουμένων ἔνδον οἰκονόμων καὶ στρεβλουμένων θεραπαινίδων, ὥστε τοῦ θυμοῦ τὰς λύπας ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς οἰκτίρειν ὁρῶντας.

16. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσοις γε συμβαίνει διὰ μισοπονηρίαν ἀληθῶς ἁλίσκεσθαι πολλάκις ὑπ' ὀργῆς, τὸ ἄγαν ἀφαιρετέον αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἄκρατον ἅμα τῇ σφοδρᾷ πίστει περὶ τῶν συνόντων. αὕτη γὰρ αὔξει

[1] *φθόνου*] most mss. have *φόνου*; G *φόβου*.
[2] *ἐκκαλύμματα*] *ἐκκλύσματα* Michael, *cf. Moralia*, 1089 B.

[a] *Cf.* Sophocles, Frag. 783 ed. Pearson, with the notes *ad loc.*
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 913, ades. 387; quoted more completely in 518 B-C, *infra*.

was a mixture and compound drawn from all the faculties of the soul, so temper appears to be a mixture of seeds drawn from all the passions. For it is drawn from pain and pleasure, and from insolence; and although it has envy's malicious joy in the ills of others, it is even worse than envy; for the object of its striving is, not that it may itself avoid suffering evil, but that at the cost of suffering evil, it may utterly ruin its antagonist; and the most unlovely kind of desire is innate in it, inasmuch as it is a craving to pain someone else. And that is why, when we approach the houses of profligates, we hear a flute-girl still playing in the early morning, and we see " muddy dregs of wine," [a] as someone has said, " and mangled fragments of garlands," and tipsy servants reeling at the doors; but the tokens of savage and irascible men you will see on the faces of their servants and in the marks branded upon them and their fetters.

The only music heard within the house

of an angry man

Is wailing cries,[b]

as the stewards are being lashed within and the serving-maids being tortured, so that those who witness the anguish caused by anger in gratifying its desires and ministering to its pleasures must feel pity.

16. However, those of whom it is true that righteous indignation causes them frequently to be overwhelmed by anger should get rid of its excessive and violent form, together with their extreme confidence in those with whom they live.[c] For such

[c] *Cf.* Plato, *Phaedo*, 89 D.

(463) μάλιστα τῶν αἰτιῶν τὸν θυμόν, ὅταν ἡ χρηστὸς ὑποληφθεὶς[1] ἀναφανῇ μοχθηρὸς ἢ φιλεῖν δόξας ἐν C διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ μέμψει γένηται. τὸ δ' ἐμὸν ἦθος οἶσθα δήπουθεν ἡλίκαις ῥοπαῖς φέρεται πρὸς εὔνοιαν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πίστιν· ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ κατὰ κενοῦ βαίνοντες, ὅσῳ[2] μᾶλλον ἐπερείδω τῷ φιλεῖν ἐμαυτόν, ἁμαρτάνω μᾶλλον καὶ σφαλλόμενος ἀνιῶμαι· καὶ τοῦ μὲν φιλεῖν ἀπαρύσαι τὸ ἐμπαθὲς ἄγαν καὶ πρόθυμον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δυνηθείην· τοῦ δὲ πιστεύειν σφόδρα χρησαίμην ἂν ἴσως χαλινῷ τῇ Πλάτωνος εὐλαβείᾳ. καὶ γὰρ Ἑλικωνα τὸν μαθηματικὸν οὕτως ἐπαινεῖν φησιν, ὡς φύσει εὐμετάβολον ζῷον, καὶ τοὺς τεθραμμένους ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶς δε- D διέναι, μὴ ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπέρματα ἀνθρώπων ὄντες ἐκφήνωσί που τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀσθένειαν. ὁ δὲ Σοφοκλῆς λέγων ὅτι

τὰ πλεῖστα φωρῶν αἰσχρὰ φωράσεις βροτῶν

ἄγαν ἔοικεν ἡμῖν ἐπεμβαίνειν καὶ κολούειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ δύσκολον τοῦτο τῆς κρίσεως καὶ φιλαίτιον εὐκολωτέρους ποιεῖ ταῖς ὀργαῖς· ἐκστατικὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἄφνω καὶ τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον· δεῖ δ', ὥς που

[1] ὑποληφθεὶς] ὑποληφθείς τις Bernardakis.
[2] ὅσῳ Reiske : ὅπου.

[a] " Nothing fans the flame of human resentment so much as the discovery that one's bosom has been utilized as a snake sanatorium."—H. H. Monro.

[b] *Epistle* xiii. 360 c; *cf.* 474 E, *infra*, and *Moralia*, 533 B-C

[c] δεδιὼς δὲ λέγω ταῦτα, ὅτι ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου δόξαν ἀποφαίνομαι, οὐ φαύλου ζῴου ἀλλ' εὐμεταβόλου: "This, however, I say with trepidation, since I am uttering an opinion about

confidence more than any other cause increases the spirit of wrath, when, for example, one who has been accounted honourable proves to be base,[a] or one whom we have supposed a true friend quarrels and finds fault with us. As for my own temperament, you doubtless know how strong are the impulses which incline it to be of goodwill toward my fellow-men and to trust them. Consequently, like men who attempt to walk on empty air, the more I give myself up to loving a person the more I go astray, and when I stumble and fall, the greater my distress ; and although I may no longer be able to reduce my too great propensity and eagerness to love, yet I may perhaps be able to use Plato's[b] caution as a curb against excessive trust. For Plato says that he praises Helicon the mathematician in such terms as he uses[c] because man is by nature an animal readily subject to change ; and that he does well to fear those who have been educated in the city lest, being men and the seeds of men,[d] they may reveal somewhere the weakness inherent in their nature. But when Sophocles[e] says

Search out most human traits ; you'll find them base,

he seems to go too far in trampling upon and belittling us. This peevish and censorious judgement does, however, tend to make us more considerate in our outbursts of temper ; for it is the sudden and the unexpected that throw men off their bearings.[f]

a man, and man, though not a worthless, is an inconstant creature."—(Bury in L.C.L.)

[d] *Cf.* Plato, *Laws*, 853 c.

[e] Frag. 853 ed. Pearson ; Nauck. *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 311, Frag. 769 ; quoted again in 481 F, *infra*.

[f] *Cf.* 449 E, *supra*.

καὶ Παναίτιος ἔφη, χρῆσθαι τῷ Ἀναξαγόρου,[1] καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ παιδὸς εἶπεν, "ἤδειν ὅτι θνητὸν ἐγέννησα," τοῦτο τοῖς παροξύ-
E νουσιν ἑκάστοτ'[2] ἐπιφωνεῖν ἁμαρτήμασιν, "ἤδειν ὅτι σοφὸν οὐκ ἐπριάμην δοῦλον," "ἤδειν ὅτι ἀναμάρτητον φίλον[3] οὐκ ἐκτησάμην," "ἤδειν ὅτι τὴν γυναῖκα γυναῖκ' εἶχον." ἂν δὲ κἀκεῖνό τις ἐπιφθεγγόμενος ἀεὶ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, "ἦ που ἄρ' ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος;" ἔξωθεν εἴσω τὸν λογισμὸν ἀναστρέφῃ καὶ παρεμβάλλῃ ταῖς μέμψεσι τὴν εὐλάβειαν, οὐ πολλῇ χρήσεται μισοπονηρίᾳ πρὸς ἑτέρους πολλῆς ὁρῶν ἑαυτὸν συγγνώμης δεόμενον. νῦν δ' ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὀργιζόμενος καὶ κολάζων Ἀριστείδου φωνὰς ἐπιφέρει καὶ Κάτωνος, "μὴ κλέπτε," "μὴ ψεύδου," "διὰ τί ῥᾳθυμεῖς;" καὶ ὃ δὴ πάντων αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὀργιζομένοις ἐπι-
F τιμῶμεν μετ' ὀργῆς καὶ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡμαρτημένα θυμῷ κολάζομεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἰατροὶ

πικρῷ πικρὰν κλύζουσι φαρμάκῳ χολήν,

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνοντες καὶ προσεκταράττοντες.

Ὅταν οὖν ἐν τούτοις γένωμαι τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς, ἅμα τι πειρῶμαι καὶ τοῦ πολυπράγμονος ἀφαιρεῖν.
464 τὸ γὰρ ἐξακριβοῦν ἅπαντα καὶ φωρᾶν καὶ πᾶσαν

[1] Ἀναξαγόρου] ἀναξαγόρα all mss. but two.
[2] ἑκάστοτ' Stegmann: ἕκαστον.
[3] ἀναμάρτητον φίλον Capps, *cf.* Menander, *Epitr.*, 487 ἀπαθῆ τὸν φίλον or καὶ τὸν ἄφιλον.

[a] *Cf.* 474 D, *infra*; *Moralia*, 118 D and the references *ad loc.*; Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], ii. p. 14, § 33.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 40 D, 88 E, 129 D. *Cf.* Horace, *Satires*, i. 4. 136: numquid ego illi | imprudens olim faciam simile?; "There but for the grace of God go I."

But we should, as Panaetius also has somewhere remarked, make use of the precept of Anaxagoras,[a] and just as he, at the death of his son, said, "I knew that I had begotten a mortal"; so on each occasion we should remark with reference to the faults which exasperate us: "I knew that I had not bought a philosopher for a slave," "I knew that the friend I had made was not incapable of error," "I knew that my wife was a woman." And if we keep repeating to ourselves Plato's question, "Can it be that I am like that?"[b] and turn our reason inward instead of to external things, and substitute caution for censoriousness, we shall no longer make much use of "righteous indignation" toward others when we observe that we ourselves stand in need of much indulgence. But as it is, everyone of us, when we are angry and inflicting punishment, brings out the injunctions of an Aristeides or a Cato: "Do not steal!" "Do not lie!" "Why are you so lazy?"; and—what is most disgraceful of all—while angry we chide others for being angry and punish by rage faults which have been committed in a rage, not like physicians, who

With bitter drugs can purge the bitter bile[c];

but rather make more intense the malady and aggravate it.

Whenever, therefore, I have become engaged in these reflections, at the same time I try to do away with some part of my inquisitiveness. For to search out with great precision and detect and drag into the

[c] Sophocles, Frag. 854 ed. Pearson, with the note; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 312, Frag. 770; quoted in a different form 468 B, *infra*, and *Moralia*, 923 F.

(464) ἔλκειν εἰς μέσον ἀσχολίαν οἰκέτου καὶ πρᾶξιν φίλου καὶ διατριβὴν υἱοῦ καὶ ψιθυρισμὸν γυναικὸς ὀργὰς φέρει πολλὰς καὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ καθημερινάς, ὧν δυσκολία τρόπου καὶ χαλεπότης τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θεός, ὡς Εὐριπίδης φησί, τῶν ἄγαν

ἅπτεται,
τὰ μικρὰ δ' εἰς τύχην ἀφεὶς[1] ἐᾷ·

ἐγὼ δὲ τῇ τύχῃ μὲν οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖν ἐπιτρέπειν οὐδὲ παρορᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, πιστεύειν δὲ καὶ χρῆσθαι τὰ μὲν γυναικὶ τὰ δ' οἰκέταις τὰ δὲ
B φίλοις οἷον ἄρχοντ'[2] ἐπιτρόποις τισὶ καὶ λογισταῖς καὶ διοικηταῖς, αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων ὄντα τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ μεγίστων. ὡς γὰρ τὰ λεπτὰ γράμματα τὴν ὄψιν, οὕτω τὰ μικρὰ πράγματα μᾶλλον ἐντείνοντα νύττει καὶ ταράττει τὴν ὀργήν, ἔθος πονηρὸν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζονα λαμβάνουσαν.

Ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους μέγα καὶ θεῖον ἡγούμην, τὸ "νηστεῦσαι κακότητος"· ἐπῄνουν δὲ κἀκείνας ὡς οὐκ ἀχαρίστους οὐδ' ἀφιλοσόφους ἐν εὐχαῖς ὁμολογίας, ἀφροδισίων ἐνιαυτὸν ἁγνεῦσαι καὶ οἴνου, τιμῶντας ἐγκρατείᾳ τὸν θεόν· ἢ ψευδολογίας πάλιν ἀπέχεσθαι χρόνον ὡρισμένον, αὐτοῖς προσέχοντας πῶς ἀληθεύσομεν

[1] ἀφεὶς] ἀνεὶς *Moralia*, 811 D.
[2] ἄρχοντ' Xylander and Hutten: ἄρχοντα (or ἄρχουσιν) ἀρχόντων.

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 675, Frag. 974; quoted also in *Moralia*, 811 D. *Cf.* Lucan, v. 340 ff.; and perhaps Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 191-192.
[b] *Cf.* Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 26; iii. 11.
[c] Erasmus, followed by Amyot, believed this concluding paragraph to be a Christian appendix added to Plutarch's work. This is very unlikely.
[d] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], i. p. 369, Frag. 144; *cf.* Herrick:

To starve thy sin, not bin,
That is to keep thy Lent.

light every little concern of a slave, every action of a friend, every pastime of a son, every whisper of a wife, produces frequent, or rather continual and daily, fits of anger, of which the sum total is a morose and intractable disposition. It may be, as Euripides[a] says, that God

Will intervene in matters grown too great,
But small things he lets pass and leaves to Fate:

but I am of the opinion that a man of sense should commit nothing to Fate, nor overlook anything at all, but should trust and use for some things his wife, for others servants, for others friends, as a ruler makes use of overseers and accountants and administrators, but himself keeps under his own control the most important and weighty matters by the use of reason. For as small writing strains the eyes, so do trifling matters, by causing a greater strain, prick and stir up anger,[b] which becomes a bad habit that affects more important matters.

Accordingly, in addition to all these considerations,[c] I have been wont to regard as great and divine that saying of Empedocles,[d] "Fast from evil," and to applaud also those other vows made in prayer as being neither ungracious nor inappropriate to a philosopher: to abstain from love and wine for a year, honouring God by continence; or again to refrain from lying for a stated time, paying close heed to ourselves that we shall be truthful always whether

C ἔν τε[1] παιδιᾷ καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἁπάσης. εἶτα
(464) ταύταις τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ παρέβαλλον εὐχὴν[2] ὡς οὐχ
ἧττον θεοφιλῆ καὶ ἱεράν[3]· ἡμέρας πρῶτον ὀλίγας
ἀοργήτους οἷον ἀμεθύστους καὶ ἀοίνους διαγαγεῖν
ὥσπερ νηφάλια καὶ μελίσπονδα θύοντα· εἶτα μῆν'
ἕνα[4] καὶ δύο, πειρώμενος ἐμαυτοῦ κατὰ μικρὸν
οὕτω τῷ χρόνῳ προὔβαινον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τῆς
ἀνεξικακίας, ἐγκρατῶς προσέχων καὶ διαφυλάττων
μετ' εὐφημίας ἵλεω καὶ ἀμήνιτον ἐμαυτόν, ἀγνεύ-
οντα καὶ λόγων πονηρῶν καὶ πράξεων ἀτόπων καὶ
D πάθους ἐφ' ἡδονῇ μικρᾷ καὶ ἀχαρίστῳ ταραχάς
τε μεγάλας καὶ μεταμέλειαν αἰσχίστην φέροντος.
ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ θεοῦ τι συλλαμβάνοντος, ἐσαφήνι-
ζεν ἡ πεῖρα τὴν κρίσιν ἐκείνην, ὅτι τὸ ἵλεων τοῦτο
καὶ πρᾶον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐδενὶ τῶν συνόντων
εὐμενές ἐστιν οὕτω καὶ φίλον καὶ ἄλυπον ὡς αὐτοῖς
τοῖς ἔχουσιν.

[1] τε] γε most MSS.
[2] εὐχὴν Wyttenbach : ψυχὴν.
[3] ἱεράν Reiske : ἱερᾶς or ἱεράς.
[4] μῆν' ἕνα van Herwerden : μῆνα.

in jest or earnest. Then with these I compared my own vow, thinking it no less sacred and pleasant in the sight of God : first, to pass a few days without anger, sober and wineless days, as it were, as though I were offering a sacrifice of honey unmixed with wine [a] ; then I would do so for a month or two, and so, making trial of myself little by little, in time I made some progress in my forbearance, continently observing and keeping myself courteous in speech, placid, and free from anger, and pure of the taint of evil words and offensive actions and of passion which, at the price of a little unsatisfying pleasure, brings great perturbations of spirit and the most shameful repentance. By such means, I think—and God also gave me help—experience has shown the truth of that judgement : this placid and gentle and humane spirit is not so agreeable and pleasant and free from sorrow to any of those brought in contact with it as it is to those who themselves possess it.

[a] Like the offerings to the Eumenides, Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 107 ; Sophocles, *Oedipus Coloneus*, 100, 481 ; *cf.* also Wyttenbach's note on *Moralia*, 132 E.

ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND
(DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI)

INTRODUCTION

It is only natural that this essay should have aroused curiosity and speculation about its sources, for Plutarch in the very first paragraph conveys the information that he has rummaged among his note-books (ὑπομνήματα [a]) in great haste for the material necessary to help his friend Paccius to composure in the midst of a busy life. R. Hirzel (*Hermes*, xiv. 354 ff., especially 373 ff.) attempted to show that much was drawn from Democritus's Περὶ εὐθυμίης, some by way of the Stoic Panaetius, who, he thought, naturally opposed the Abderite's conclusions. R. Heinze (*Rheinisches Museum*, xlv. 497 ff.) emphasized the relation between *De Tranquillitate* and *De Virtute et Vitio*: both go back to a Stoic [b] prototype and *De Tranquillitate* to a model which has some close relation to the Cynic Bion's methods of presentation, that is, probably, to Ariston of Chios.[c] M. Pohlenz [d] (*Hermes*, xl. 275 ff.), on the

[a] Pohlenz and Siefert have at times insisted that in spite of the plural there is only *one* main source. This lacks all probability.

[b] But Heinze (p. 507) admitted the possibility of some Epicurean excerpts also being used.

[c] At the same time, O. Hense (*Rheinisches Museum*, xlv. 550 ff.) was attempting to trace *De Curiositate* to Ariston. Readers of the *Jahresberichte* should note that F. Bock (*Jbb.*, clii. 1911, p. 334) has not read these articles and is, as often, a thoroughly untrustworthy guide.

[d] See also *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, xlviii. 95 and note.

other hand, found that the source of the essay was Epicurean,[a] while admitting that Plutarch added a certain amount of original material to fit the personality and circumstances of the friend he was addressing. Finally, G. Siefert[b] (*Plutarchs Schrift* Περὶ εὐθυμίας, Progr. Pforta, Naumburg, 1908) reverts to Democritus and Panaetius, with particular emphasis on the material illustrative of Panaetius's lost work to be found in Cicero's *De Officiis* and in Seneca: Panaetius, who was following, not the Stoa, but Democritus, is the principal source of Plutarch, practically his only source.

Siefert's discussion, in particular, is impressive as well as learned; but I would remark that all these authorities may well be right—and wrong. Some of them admit that portions, at least, of the essay were written, or adapted, especially to suit the particular occasion for which the essay was composed. Plutarch himself is not averse to naming authorities here and elsewhere; that he followed exclusively one, or even two, is made very unlikely by his own opening statement and by the very mixed nature of his philosophical terminology.[c]

[a] But now Pohlenz (in the Teubner ed., 1929) has become partially converted to Siefert's views, while rightly continuing to maintain some Epicurean influence. The fact that Plutarch in the last part of his work follows the εὐχαριστία to the gifts of Fortune urged by Epicurus (Fragg. 435 and 491 ed. Usener) seems to me decisive, in spite of Siefert's evasions.

[b] For the structure of the essay see Siefert's earlier work (*Commentationes Ienenses*, vi. 1896, pp. 57-74), supplemented and corrected by Pohlenz, *l.c.*

[c] This conclusion bears some resemblance to that reached by H. N. Fowler (*Harvard Stud. Cl. Phil.*, i. 149 ff.), whose work is called by Siefert "noch unergiebiger" than the "Biomanie" of the Hense-Heinze school; but Fowler was inclined to stress too much the relation to Democritus and the parallels which Hirzel had urged between Seneca and Plutarch. That Seneca's *De Tranquillitate Animi* goes back to an immediate original common to Plutarch's work also is extremely unlikely. Only one anecdote, one quotation, and a dozen or so commonplaces are not nearly enough to show any close relationship. And how dissimilar the two works are in treatment, design, terminology, and form (*pace* Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, ii. p. 28, n. 1)!

Theological writers of all ages have made good use of this store-house of moral precepts. Many of the imitations in the works of St. Basil and of St. John Chrysostom will be found listed in the Teubner edition and discussed by Pohlenz (*Zeit. f. wiss. Theologie*, xlviii. 72-95). Jeremy Taylor, also, in *Holy Living*, ii. 6, has again made some pleasant borrowings and paraphrases.

Sir Thomas Wyat's interesting translation of 1528, made from the Latin of Budaeus, has been reprinted, with an excellent introduction from the pen of C. R. Baskervill, by the authorities of the Huntington Library (Harvard University Press, 1931).

The MS. tradition is not good. Many passages are probably hopelessly corrupt and the reconstructions offered in the Teubner text and here are, at the best, make-shifts. The work is No. 95 in the catalogue of Lamprias.

E

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΘΥΜΙΑΣ

Πλούταρχος Πακκίῳ εὖ πράττειν.

1. Ὀψέ σου τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκομισάμην, ἐν ᾗ παρεκάλεις περὶ εὐθυμίας σοί τι γραφῆναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Τιμαίῳ δεομένων ἐπιμελεστέρας ἐξηγήσεως. ἅμα δέ πως τὸν ἑταῖρον ἡμῶν Ἔρωτα κατελάμβανεν αἰτία τοῦ πλεῖν εὐθὺς εἰς Ῥώμην, παρὰ Φουνδάνου τοῦ κρατίστου γράμματα δεδεγμένον,
F οἷος ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιταχύνοντα. μήτε δὲ χρόνον ἔχων, ὡς προῃρούμην, γενέσθαι πρὸς οἷς ἐβούλου μήθ' ὑπομένων κεναῖς παντάπασι τὸν ἄνδρα χερσὶν ὀφθῆναί σοι παρ' ἡμῶν ἀφιγμένον, ἀνελεξάμην περὶ εὐθυμίας ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὧν ἐμαυτῷ πεποιημένος ἐτύγχανον· ἡγούμενος καὶ σὲ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐκ ἀκροάσεως ἕνεκα θηρωμένης καλλιγραφίαν
465 ἀλλὰ χρείας βοηθητικῆς ἐπιζητεῖν, καὶ συνηδόμενος ὅτι καὶ φιλίας ἔχων ἡγεμονικὰς καὶ δόξαν οὐδενὸς

[a] All that is known of Paccius is inferred from the present essay.

[b] We possess a work of Plutarch entitled *De Animae*

ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND

From Plutarch to Paccius,[a] health and prosperity.

1. It was only very recently that I received your letter in which you urged me to write you something on tranquillity of mind, and also something on those subjects in the *Timaeus* [b] which require more careful elucidation. And at the same time it chanced that our friend Eros [c] was obliged to sail at once for Rome, since he had received from the excellent Fundanus [d] a letter, which, in his usual style, urged haste. But since I neither had the time I might have desired to meet your wishes nor could I bring myself to let the friend who came from me be seen arriving at your home with hands quite empty, I gathered together from my note-books those observations on tranquillity of mind which I happened to have made for my own use, believing that you on your part requested this discourse, not for the sake of hearing a work which would aim at elegance of style, but for the practical use in living it might afford ; and I congratulate you because, though you have commanders as your friends and a reputation second to none of the forensic

Procreatione in Timaeo, but it is addressed by the writer to his sons, Autobulus and Plutarch (*Moralia*, 1012 A ff.).

[c] See 453 C, *supra*.

[d] The principal speaker of *De Cohibenda Ira*, 452 F, *supra*.

(465) ἐλάττονα τῶν ἐν ἀγορᾷ λεγόντων τὸ τοῦ τραγικοῦ Μέροπος οὐ πέπονθας, οὐδ' ὡς ἐκεῖνον

εὐδαιμονίζων ὄχλος[1] ἐξέπληξέ σε[2]

τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἀκηκοὼς μνημονεύεις ὡς οὔτε ποδάγρας ἀπαλλάττει κάλτιος[3] οὔτε δακτύλιος πολυτελὴς παρωνυχίας οὔτε διάδημα κεφαλαλγίας. πόθεν γε δὴ πρὸς ἀλυπίαν ψυχῆς καὶ βίον ἀκύμονα χρημάτων ὄφελος ἢ δόξης ἢ δυνάμεως ἐν αὐλαῖς, ἂν μὴ τὸ χρώμενον εὐχάριστον ᾖ τοῖς
B ἔχουσι καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀπόντων μὴ δεόμενον ἀεὶ παρακολουθῇ; τί δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄλλο ἢ λόγος εἰθισμένος καὶ μεμελετηκὼς τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξισταμένου πολλάκις ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι ταχὺ καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν ἀπορρέον καὶ καταφερόμενον ὑπὸ[4] τῶν ἀπόντων;[5] ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Ξενοφῶν παρῄνει τῶν θεῶν εὐτυχοῦντας μάλιστα μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν, ὅπως, ὅταν ἐν χρείᾳ γενώμεθα, θαρροῦντες αὐτοὺς παρακαλῶμεν ὡς εὐμενεῖς ὄντας ἤδη καὶ φίλους· οὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὅσοι πρὸς τὰ πάθη βοηθοῦσι, δεῖ πρὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας,
C ἵν' ἐκ πολλοῦ παρεσκευασμένοι μᾶλλον ὠφελῶσιν· ὡς γὰρ οἱ χαλεποὶ κύνες πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐκταραττόμενοι βοὴν ὑπὸ μόνης καταπραΰνονται τῆς συνήθους, οὕτω καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς διαγριαινόμενα καταπαῦσαι ῥᾳδίως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἂν μὴ λόγοι

[1] ὄχλος Meineke: ὁ ὄχλος. [2] σε added by Meziriacus.
[3] κάλτιος Xylander: πατρίκιος or καλτίκιος.
[4] ὑπὸ] ἀπὸ some MSS. [5] ἀπόντων Capps: παρόντων.

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 606, Euripides, Frag. 778.

speakers of our day, your experience has not been that of Merops in the play, and because it cannot be said of you, as of him, that

The plaudits of the mob have driven you [a]

from those emotions given us by nature; but you continue to remember what you have often heard, that an aristocratic shoe does not rid us of the gout, nor an expensive ring of a hangnail, nor a diadem of a headache. For what power is there in money or fame or influence at court to help us to gain ease of soul or an untroubled life, if it is not true that the use of them is pleasant to us when we have them and that we never miss them when we have them not? [b] And how else can this be achieved except through reason, which has been carefully trained quickly to hold back the passionate and irrational part of the soul when it breaks bounds, as it often does, and not to allow it to flow away and be swept downstream because it does not have what it wants? Therefore, just as Xenophon [c] advised that in prosperity we should be particularly mindful of the gods and should honour them, so that, when some need comes upon us, we may invoke them with the confidence that they are already well-disposed and friendly; so also with such reasonings as give help in controlling the passions: wise men should give heed to them before the passions arise in order that, being prepared far in advance, their help may be more efficacious. For as savage dogs become excited at every strange cry and are soothed by the familiar voice only, so also the passions of the soul, when they are raging wild, are not easily

[b] *Cf.* Frag. *Contra Divitias*, 2 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 123); Lucretius, iii. 957: semper avet quod abest.
[c] *Cyropaedia*, i. 6. 3.

(465) παρόντες οἰκεῖοι καὶ συνήθεις ἐπιλαμβάνωνται τῶν ταραττομένων.

2. Ὁ μὲν οὖν εἰπὼν ὅτι "δεῖ τὸν εὐθυμεῖσθαι[1] μέλλοντα μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε ξυνῇ," πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῖν πολυτελῆ τὴν εὐθυμίαν καθίστησι, γινομένην ὤνιον ἀπραξίας· οἷον ἀρρώστῳ παραινῶν ἑκάστῳ

μέν', ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις.

D καίτοι κακὸν μὲν ἀναισθησία[2] σώματος[3] φάρμακον ἀπονοίας[2]· οὐδὲν δὲ βελτίων ψυχῆς ἰατρὸς ὁ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ μαλακίᾳ καὶ προδοσίᾳ φίλων καὶ οἰκείων καὶ πατρίδος ἐξαιρῶν τὸ ταραχῶδες αὐτῆς καὶ λυπηρόν.

Ἔπειτα καὶ ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ εὐθυμεῖν τοὺς μὴ πολλὰ πράσσοντας. ἔδει γὰρ εὐθυμοτέρας εἶναι γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν οἰκουρίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ συνούσας· νυνὶ δ' ὁ μὲν Βορέας

διὰ παρθενικῆς ἁπαλόχροος οὐ διάησιν,

ὥς φησιν Ἡσίοδος, λῦπαι δὲ καὶ ταραχαὶ καὶ κακοθυμίαι διὰ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ κενῶν δοξῶν, ὅσας οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις,

[1] εὐθυμεῖσθαι] εὐθυμεῖν most mss.
[2] ἀναισθησία . . . ἀπονοίας Stobaeus: ἀναισθησίας . . . ἀπονία.
[3] σώματος Capps: σώματι.

[a] Democritus; Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], ii. p. 132, Frag. 3; Marcus Aurelius, iv. 24; Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, xiii. 1, where the statement is made that these words form the beginning of Democritus's work (see especially Siefert, *op. cit.*, p. 8); *De Ira*, iii. 6. 3. But Plutarch misunderstands the meaning; Democritus did not advise renouncing public life completely: *cf. Moralia*, 1100 B-C.

allayed, unless customary and familiar arguments are at hand to curb the excited passions.

2. Now he[a] who said, "The man who would be tranquil in his mind must not engage in many affairs, either private or public," first of all makes our tranquillity very expensive if it is bought at the price of inactivity; it is as though he advised every sick man:

Lie still, poor wretch, and move not from your bed.[b]

And yet it is true that a state of bodily stupor is a bad remedy for insanity; but no whit better as a physician of the soul is he who would relieve it of its disturbances and distress by prescribing idleness and softness and the betrayal of friends and family and country.[c]

In the next place, it is also false that those who are not occupied with many things are tranquil in mind. For if that were true, women ought to be more tranquil than men, since for the most part they keep at home; but as it is, the North Wind

Blows not through the soft-skinned maid,

as Hesiod[d] says, yet more pain and excitement and despondency than one could enumerate, caused by jealousy and superstitition and ambition and vain

Note also the word "many" in the present passage. (The following paragraph is cited by Stobaeus, vol. iii. pp. 651 f. ed. Hense.)

[b] Euripides, *Orestes*, 258; quoted again 501 C, *infra*, and in *Moralia*, 788 F, 901 A, 1126 A; the words are addressed by Electra to Orestes, delirious after the murder of his mother, and must be taken closely with the following clause.

[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 135 B.

[d] *Works and Days*, 519, where the poet adds "who stays indoors with her dear mother." *Cf.* 516 F, *infra*.

εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν ὑπορρέουσιν. ὁ δὲ Λαέρτης
E εἴκοσιν ἔτη καθ' αὑτὸν ἐν ἀγρῷ διαιτώμενος

γρηὶ σὺν ἀμφιπόλῳ, ἥ οἱ βρῶσίν τε πόσιν τε
παρτίθει,[1]

τὴν μὲν πατρίδα καὶ τὸν οἶκον καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν
ἔφυγε,[2] τὴν δὲ λύπην μετ' ἀπραξίας καὶ κατηφείας
ἀεὶ συνοικοῦσαν εἶχεν. ἐνίους δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ[3]
πράσσειν αὐτὸ πολλάκις εἰς ἀθυμίαν καθίστησιν,
ὡς τοῦτον·

αὐτὰρ ὁ μήνιε νηυσὶ παρήμενος ὠκυπόροισι
Διογενὴς Πηλέως υἱός, πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς·
οὔτε ποτ' εἰς ἀγορὴν πωλέσκετο κυδιάνειραν,
οὔτε ποτ' ἐς πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ φθινύθεσκε φίλον κῆρ
αὖθι μένων, ποθέεσκε δ' ἀυτήν τε πτόλεμόν τε.

F καὶ λέγει περιπαθῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἀσχάλλων
αὐτός,

ἀλλ' ἦμαι παρὰ νηυσὶν ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης.

ὅθεν οὐδ' Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ
τῇ φύσει χρῆσθαι πολιτευομένους καὶ πράσσοντας
τὰ κοινὰ τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ φιλοδόξους, ὡς μᾶλ-
466 λον ὑπ' ἀπραγμοσύνης ταράττεσθαι καὶ κακοῦσθαι
πεφυκότας, ἂν ὧν ὀρέγονται μὴ τυγχάνωσιν. ἀλλ'
ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἄτοπος οὐ τοὺς δυναμένους τὰ κοινὰ
πράσσειν προτρεπόμενος ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν

[1] *παρτίθει* Cobet, confirmed by one MS. (*παρτιθεῖ* edd. of Homer): *παρετίθει*.
[2] *ἔφυγε*] *ἔφευγε* Babbitt. [3] *μὴ*] *μηδὲν* Hartman.

[a] Homer, *Od.*, i. 191.

imaginings, seep into the women's quarters. And though Laërtes[a] lived twenty years by himself in the country

With one old woman, who his food and drink
Would place beside him,

and abandoned his birthplace,[b] his home, and his kingship, yet he had grief as an ever-constant companion of his inactivity and dejection. And for some persons, even inactivity itself often leads to discontent, as in this instance :

The swift Achilles, Peleus' noble son,
Continued in his wrath beside the ships ;
Nor would he ever go to council that
Ennobles men, nor ever go to war,
But wasted away his heart, remaining there,
And always longed for tumult and for war.[c]

And he himself is greatly disturbed and distressed at this and says :

But here I sit beside my ships,
A useless burden to the earth.[d]

For this reason not even Epicurus[e] believes that men who are eager for honour and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfil their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire. But he is absurd in urging public life, not on those who are able to undertake it, but on those who are unable

[b] That is, the town of Ithaca; he continued to live on the island.
[c] Homer, *Il.*, i. 488 ff. [d] *Ibid.* xviii. 104.
[e] Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 328, Frag. 555. The following passage is cited by Stobaeus, vol. iii. p. 652 ed. Hense.

(466) μὴ δυναμένους· δεῖ δὲ μὴ πλήθει μηδ' ὀλιγότητι πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ αἰσχρῷ τὸ εὔθυμον ὁρίζειν καὶ τὸ δύσθυμον· τῶν γὰρ καλῶν ἡ παράλειψις οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τῶν φαύλων[1] ἡ πρᾶξις ἀνιαρόν ἐστι καὶ ταραχῶδες, ὡς εἴρηται.

3. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀφωρισμένως ἕνα βίον ἄλυπον νομίζοντας, ὡς ἔνιοι τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν ἢ τὸν τῶν ἠιθέων ἢ τὸν τῶν βασιλέων, ἱκανῶς ὁ Μένανδρος ὑπομιμνήσκει λέγων,

B ὤμην ἐγὼ τοὺς πλουσίους, ὦ Φανία,
οἷς μὴ τὸ δανείζεσθαι πρόσεστιν, οὐ στένειν
τὰς νύκτας οὐδὲ στρεφομένους ἄνω κάτω
" οἴμοι " λέγειν, ἡδὺν δὲ καὶ πρᾴον τινα
ὕπνον καθεύδειν.

εἶτα προσδιελθών,[2] ὡς καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ὁρᾷ[3] ταὐτὰ πάσχοντας τοῖς πένησιν,

ἆρ' ἐστί (φησί) συγγενές τι λύπη καὶ βίος;
τρυφερῷ βίῳ σύνεστιν, ἐνδόξῳ βίῳ
πάρεστιν, ἀπόρῳ συγκαταγηράσκει βίῳ.

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ ναυτιῶντες ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, εἶτα ῥᾷον οἰόμενοι διάξειν ἐὰν εἰς γαῦλον ἐξ ἀκά-
C του καὶ πάλιν ἐὰν εἰς τριήρη μεταβῶσιν, οὐδὲν περαίνουσι τὴν χολὴν καὶ τὴν δειλίαν συμμεταφέροντες ἑαυτοῖς· οὕτως αἱ τῶν βίων ἀντιμεταλήψεις οὐκ ἐξαιροῦσι[4] τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ λυποῦντα καὶ

[1] φαύλων] βλαβερῶν Stobaeus.
[2] προσδιελθών Reiske, confirmed by two MSS.: προσελθών.
[3] ὁρᾷ] ἑώρα in most MSS.
[4] ἐξαιροῦσι Dübner: ἐξαίρουσι.

[a] Probably by Democritus (*cf.* Frag. 256), not Plutarch.

to lead an inactive life; tranquillity and discontent should be determined, not by the multitude or the fewness of one's occupations, but by their excellence or baseness; for the omission of good acts is no less vexatious and disturbing than the commission of evil acts, as has been said.[a]

3. To those who believe that one quite special kind of life is free from pain, as some do the life of farmers, others that of bachelors, others that of kings, the words of Menander[b] are a sufficient reminder:

I used to think the wealthy, Phanias,
Who have no need to borrow, would not groan
Of nights, nor tossing up and down would cry
" Ah, woe is me! " but that they slept a sweet
And tranquil sleep.

He then goes on to relate that he observes that even the wealthy fare the same as the poor:

Is there then kinship between life and grief?
Grief's in a famous life; with a rich life
It stays; with a mean life it too grows old.

But like people at sea[c] who are cowardly and sea-sick and think that they would get through this voyage more comfortably if they should transfer from their little boat to a ship, and then again from the ship to a man-of-war; but they accomplish nothing by the changes, since they carry their nausea and cowardice along with them; so the exchange of one mode of life for another does not relieve the soul

[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 79, Frag. 281 (p. 378 ed. Allinson, L.C.L.); from the *Citharistes*.

[c] The rest of this chapter and the beginning of the next is cited by Stobaeus, vol. iii. p. 249 ed. Hense. It is also imitated by St. Basil, *Epistle* ii. (vol. i. p. 8 ed. Deferrari, L.C.L.).

(466) ταράττοντα· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἀπειρία πραγμάτων, ἀλογιστία, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μηδ' ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν ὀρθῶς. ταῦτα καὶ πλουσίους χειμάζει καὶ πένητας, ταῦτα καὶ γεγαμηκότας ἀνιᾷ καὶ ἀγάμους· διὰ ταῦτα φεύγουσι τὴν ἀγοράν, εἶτα τὴν ἡσυχίαν οὐ φέρουσι, διὰ ταῦτα προαγωγὰς ἐν αὐλαῖς διώκουσι, καὶ παρελθόντες εὐθὺς βαρύνονται.

δυσάρεστον οἱ νοσοῦντες ἀπορίας ὕπο·

καὶ γὰρ ἡ γυνὴ λυπεῖ καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν αἰτιῶνται καὶ δυσχεραίνουσι τὸ κλινίδιον,

D φίλων δ' ὅ τ' ἐλθὼν λυπρὸς[1] ὅ τ' ἀπιὼν βαρύς,

ὡς ὁ Ἴων φησίν. εἶτα τῆς νόσου διαλυθείσης καὶ κράσεως ἑτέρας ἐγγενομένης,[2] ἦλθεν ἡ ὑγίεια φίλα πάντα ποιοῦσα καὶ προσηνῆ· ὁ γὰρ ἐχθὲς ᾠὰ καὶ ἁμύλια καὶ σητάνειον ἄρτον διαπτύων, τήμερον αὐτόπυρον ἐπ' ἐλαίαις ἢ καρδαμίδι σιτεῖται προσφιλῶς[3] καὶ προθύμως.

4. Τοιαύτην ὁ λογισμὸς εὐκολίαν καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐγγενόμενος ποιεῖ[4] πρὸς ἕκαστον βίον. Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀναξάρχου περὶ κόσμων ἀπειρίας ἀκούων ἐδάκρυε, καὶ τῶν φίλων ἐρωτώντων ὅ τι πέπονθεν, "οὐκ ἄξιον," ἔφη, "δακρύειν, εἰ κόσμων ὄντων ἀπείρων

[1] λυπρὸς Grotius: λυπηρός.
[2] ἐγγενομένης Meineke; ἐγγιγνομένης Stobaeus: γενομένης.
[3] προσφιλῶς] omitted by most mss. and Stobaeus.
[4] ποιεῖ Stegmann, confirmed by mss. of Stobaeus: μεταποιεῖ.

[a] *Cf.* Lucretius, iii. 1057 ff.: commutare locum quasi onus deponere possit; Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, ii. 13 f.
[b] Euripides, *Orestes*, 232.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 743, Frag. 56.

of those things which cause it grief and distress[a]: these are inexperience in affairs, unreasonableness, the want of ability or knowledge to make the right use of present conditions. These are the defects which, like a storm at sea, torment rich and poor alike, that afflict the married as well as the unmarried; because of these men avoid public life, then find their life of quiet unbearable; because of these men seek advancement at court, by which, when they have gained it, they are immediately bored.

Through helplessness the sick are hard to please,[b]

for their wives are troublesome, they grumble at the doctor, they are vexed with the bed,

Each friend that comes annoys, that goes affronts,

as Ion[c] has it. But later, when the disease is over and a sounder disposition supervenes, health returns and makes everything pleasant and agreeable[d]: he that yesterday loathed eggs and delicate cakes and fine bread to-day eats eagerly and willingly of a coarse loaf with olives and water-cress.

4. Such contentment and change of view toward every kind of life is created by reason when it has been engendered within us. Alexander wept when he heard Anaxarchus[e] discourse about an infinite number of worlds, and when his friends inquired what ailed him, "Is it not worthy of tears," he said, "that, when the number of worlds is infinite,[f] we have not

[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 101 c-D.
[e] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*⁵, ii. p. 238, A 11; this Anaxarchus accompanied Alexander to India (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61).
[f] *Cf.* F. M. Cornford, *Cl. Quart.*, xxviii. (1934), 1 ff. on "Innumerable Worlds in Presocratic Philosophy."

E ἑνὸς οὐδέπω κύριοι γεγόναμεν;" Κράτης δὲ πήραν ἔχων καὶ τρίβωνα[1] παίζων καὶ γελῶν ὥσπερ ἐν ἑορτῇ τὸν βίον[2] διετέλεσε. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα τὸ πολλῶν βασιλεύειν ἐλύπει·

γνώσεαι Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα, τὸν περὶ πάντων
Ζεὺς ἐνέηκε πόνοισι διαμπερές·

Διογένης δὲ πωλούμενος ἔσκωπτε τὸν κήρυκα κατακείμενος· ἀναστῆναι δ' οὐκ ἐβούλετο κελεύοντος, ἀλλὰ παίζων καὶ καταγελῶν ἔλεγεν, "εἰ δ' ἰχθὺν ἐπίπρασκες;" καὶ Σωκράτης μὲν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ φιλοσοφῶν διελέγετο τοῖς ἑταίροις· ὁ δὲ
F Φαέθων ἀναβὰς εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔκλαιεν, εἰ μηδεὶς αὐτῷ τοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς ἵππους καὶ τὰ ἅρματα[3] παραδίδωσιν.

Ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ ὑπόδημα τῷ ποδὶ συνδιαστρέφεται καὶ οὐ τοὐναντίον, οὕτω τοὺς βίους αἱ διαθέσεις συνεξομοιοῦσιν αὐταῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖ τοῖς ἑλομένοις τὸν ἄριστον βίον ἡδύν, ὥς τις εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν ἅμα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ποιεῖ καὶ
467 ἄριστον καὶ ἥδιστον. διὸ τὴν πηγὴν τῆς εὐθυμίας ἐν αὐτοῖς οὖσαν ἡμῖν ἐκκαθαίρωμεν, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, ὡς οἰκεῖα καὶ φίλια, μὴ χαλεπῶς χρωμένοις συμφέρηται·

[1] *τρίβωνα*] *τριβώνιον* in two MSS.
[2] *τὸν βίον*] *τῷ βίῳ* in many MSS.
[3] *τὰ ἅρματα*] *τὸ ἅρμα* Dübner.

yet become lords of a single one?" But Crates, though he had but a wallet and a threadbare cloak, passed his whole life jesting and laughing as though at a festival. It was, indeed, burdensome to Agamemnon to be lord of many men:

> Agamemnon you shall know, King Atreus' son,
> Whom, beyond all, Zeus cast into a mesh
> Of never-ending cares [a];

but Diogenes, when he was being sold at auction,[b] lay down on the ground and kept mocking the auctioneer; when this official bade him arise, he would not, but joked and ridiculed the man, saying, "Suppose you were selling a fish?" And Socrates,[c] though in prison, discoursed on philosophic themes to his friends; but Phaëthon, when he had mounted up to heaven, wept because no one would deliver to him his father's horses and chariot.

So, just as the shoe is turned with the foot, and not the contrary, so do men's dispositions make their lives like themselves. For it is not, as someone[d] has said, habituation which makes the best life sweet to those who have chosen it, but wisdom which makes the same life at once both best and sweetest. Therefore let us cleanse the fountain of tranquillity that is in our own selves, in order that external things also, as if our very own and friendly, may agree with us when we make no harsh use of them:

[a] Homer, *Il.*, x. 88-89.
[b] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vi. 29.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 607 F.
[d] A Pythagorean precept, *cf. Moralia*, 602 B, 47 B-C, 123 C; probably not Democritus, as Hirzel (*Hermes*, xiv. 367) suggests, or Seneca, as Apelt in his translation of Plutarch supposes.

(467) τοῖς πράγμασιν γὰρ οὐχὶ θυμοῦσθαι χρεών·
μέλει γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐδέν· ἀλλ' οὐντυγχάνων[1]
τὰ πράγματ' ὀρθῶς ἂν[2] τιθῇ, πράξει[3] καλῶς.

5. Κυβείᾳ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων τὸν βίον ἀπείκασεν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ βάλλειν δεῖ τὰ πρόσφορα, καὶ βαλόντα χρῆσθαι καλῶς τοῖς πεσοῦσι. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν βάλλειν[4] οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ προσηκόντως[5] δέχεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα[6] παρὰ τῆς τύχης καὶ νέμειν ἑκάστῳ τόπον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ὠφελήσει μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ἀβούλητον ἥκιστα λυπήσει τοὺς ἐπιτυγχάνοντας, ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἐστίν, ἂν εὖ φρονῶμεν. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀτέχνους καὶ ἀνοήτους περὶ τὸν βίον, ὥσπερ τοὺς νοσώδεις τοῖς σώμασι μήτε καῦμα φέρειν μήτε κρύος δυναμένους, ἐξίστησι μὲν εὐτυχία συστέλλει δὲ δυστυχία· ταράττονται δ' ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων, μᾶλλον δ' ὑφ' αὑτῶν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις καὶ οὐχ ἧττον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς. Θεόδωρος μὲν γὰρ ὁ κληθεὶς ἄθεος ἔλεγε τῇ δεξιᾷ τοὺς λόγους ὀρέγοντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ δέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀκροωμένους· οἱ δ' ἀπαίδευτοι πολλάκις τὴν τύχην δεξιὰν παρισταμένην ἐπαριστέρως μεταλαμβάνοντες[7] ἀσχημονοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ φρόνιμοι, καθάπερ ταῖς μελίτταις μέλι φέρει τὸ δριμύτατον τῶν φυτῶν[8] καὶ

[1] οὐντυγχάνων Valckenaer (οὖν τυγχάνων Stobaeus): ὁ τυγχάνων.
[2] ἂν] ἢν Stobaeus.
[3] πράξει] πράσσει Stobaeus.
[4] βάλλειν Dübner: βαλεῖν.
[5] προσηκόντως] προσήκειν in most MSS.
[6] γινόμενα] διδόμενα some MSS., perhaps rightly.
[7] μεταλαμβάνοντες] λαμβάνοντες most MSS.

It does no good to rage at circumstance ;
Events will take their course with no regard
For us. But he who makes the best of those
Events he lights upon will not fare ill.[a]

5. Plato,[b] for instance, compared life to a game of dice in which we must try, not only to throw what suits us best, but also, when we have thrown, to make good use of whatever turns up. But with circumstances, though it is not in our power to throw what we please, yet it is our task, if we are wise, to accept in a suitable manner whatever accrues from Fortune and to assign to each event a place in which both what suits us shall help us most and what is unwanted shall do least harm. For those who are without skill and sense as to how they should live, like sick people whose bodies can endure neither heat nor cold, are elated by good fortune and depressed by adversity ; and they are greatly disturbed by both, or rather by themselves in both and as much in what is called good as in the bad. Theodorus,[c] called the Atheist, used to say that he offered his discourses with his right hand, but his audience received them with their left ; so uninstructed persons, when Fortune presents herself adroitly on their right, often gauchely substitute their left hands in receiving her and cut a sorry figure. But men of sense, just as bees extract honey from thyme, the most pungent and the driest

[a] Euripides, *Bellerophon*, Frag. 287 (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 446) ; quoted also in *De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 153 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 424).
[b] *Republic*, 604 c ; quoted in *Moralia*, 112 E-F.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 378 B, 5 A ; Polybius, xxxviii. 2. 8-9 ; see also von Scala, *Rheinisches Museum*, xlv. 474 f.

[8] τῶν φυτῶν added by W.C.H., after Reiske.

(467) ξηρότατον ὁ θύμος, οὕτως ἀπὸ τῶν δυσχερεστάτων πολλάκις πραγμάτων οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ χρήσιμον αὑτοῖς λαμβάνουσι.

6. Τοῦτ' οὖν δεῖ πρῶτον ἀσκεῖν καὶ μελετᾶν, ὥσπερ ὁ τῆς κυνὸς ἁμαρτὼν τῷ λίθῳ καὶ τὴν μητρυιὰν πατάξας, "οὐδ' οὕτως," ἔφη, "κακῶς." ἔξεστι γὰρ μεθιστάναι τὴν τύχην ἐκ τῶν ἀβουλήτων. ἐφυγαδεύθη Διογένης· "οὐδ' οὕτω κακῶς." D ἤρξατο γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν μετὰ τὴν φυγήν. Ζήνωνι τῷ Κιτιεῖ μία ναῦς περιῆν φορτηγός· πυθόμενος δὲ[1] ταύτην αὐτόφορτον ἀπολωλέναι συγκλυσθεῖσαν, "εὖγ'," εἶπεν, "ὦ τύχη, ποιεῖς εἰς τὸν τρίβωνα[2] συνελαύνουσ' ἡμᾶς."

Τί οὖν κωλύει μιμεῖσθαι τούτους; ἀρχήν τινα μετιὼν[3] διήμαρτες; ἐν ἀγρῷ διάξεις ἐπιμελόμενος τῶν ἰδίων. ἀλλὰ φιλίαν μνώμενος ἡγεμόνος ἀπώσθης; ἀκινδύνως καὶ ἀπραγμόνως βιώσῃ. πάλιν ἐν πράγμασιν ἀσχολίας ἔχουσι καὶ φροντίδας γέγονας;

οὐδὲ θερμὸν ὕδωρ τόσον γε[4] τεύξει[5] μαλθακὰ γυῖα,

[1] δὲ] δὲ καὶ Reiske.
[2] After τρίβωνα Sandbach deletes καὶ τὴν στοάν.
[3] τινα μετιὼν Cobet; παραγγέλλων Reiske: τινὰ τελῶν.
[4] τόσον γε] τοσόνδε most MSS.
[5] τεύξει] τέγξει most MSS.; τεύχει MSS. of Pindar; τέγγει Heyne; τόσον γε μαλθακὰ τεύχει γυῖα Pindar.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 32 E, 41 F; Porphyry, *De Abstinentia*, iv. 20 (p. 264 ed. Nauck).
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 147 C.
[c] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vi. 21.
[d] *Ibid.* vii. 5; *cf.* also *Moralia*, 87 A, 603 D; Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, xiv. 3; Crates, Frag. 21 A (Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, vol. ii. p. 66).

of plants,[a] often in like manner draw from the most unfavourable circumstances something which suits them and is useful.

6. This, then, we should practice and cultivate first of all, like the man who threw a stone at his dog, but missed her and hit his stepmother, whereupon he exclaimed, "Not so bad after all!"[b] For it is possible to change the direction of Fortune when she has given us things we do not wish. Diogenes[c] was driven into exile: "Not so bad after all!" for after his exile he began to lead the life of a philosopher. Zeno[d] of Citium had one merchantman remaining; when he learned that this had been sunk at sea and lost with all its cargo, he cried, "Much obliged, Fortune! You also drive me to the philosopher's cloak."[e]

What, then, prevents our imitating such men as these? Have you failed in your canvass for an office? You will be able to live in the country and look after your own affairs. Were you repulsed in wooing the friendship of some great man? Your life will be free from danger and trouble. Have you, again, become occupied with matters which take all your time and fill you with cares?

Nor shall hot water so soften the limbs,

[e] In the MSS. the words "and the Stoa" follow. F. H. Sandbach, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, Nov. 7, 1929, has shown that these words are interpolated by someone, who, "seeing that τὸν τρίβωνα means the cynic's cloak, thought to air his knowledge that Zeno was not a Cynic but a Stoic." If Zeno had made the remark our MSS. credit him with, it would be "remarkable prescience on the part of the beginner in philosophy, who was to spend many years as a pupil first of the Cynic Crates and then of other philosophers before starting his own school in the Stoa!"

(467) κατὰ Πίνδαρον, ὡς δόξα ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι μετά τινος δυνάμεως

πόνον ἡδὺν
κάματόν τ' εὐκάματον.

E ἀλλά τις ἀπήντησεν ἐκ διαβολῆς ἢ φθόνου δυσημερία καὶ σκορακισμός; ἐπὶ τὰς Μούσας οὖριον τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν Ἀκαδήμειαν, ὥσπερ Πλάτωνι χειμασθέντι περὶ τὴν Διονυσίου φιλίαν.

Διὸ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς εὐθυμίαν μέγα, τὸ τοὺς ἐνδόξους ἀποθεωρεῖν, εἰ μηδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πεπόνθασιν. οἷον ἀπαιδία τὸ λυποῦν ἐστι; τοὺς Ῥωμαίων ὅρα βασιλεῖς, ὧν οὐδεὶς υἱῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπέλιπε. πενίᾳ δυσφορεῖς παρούσῃ; καὶ τίς ἂν ἐβούλου μᾶλλον εἶναι[1] Βοιωτῶν ἢ Ἐπαμεινώνδας; τίς δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἢ Φαβρίκιος; "ἀλλὰ διέφθαρταί μου[2] τὸ γύναιον." οὐκ ἀνέγνωκας οὖν τοὐπίγραμμα τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς,

F ὑγρᾶς καὶ τραφερᾶς βασιλεὺς Ἄγις μ' ἀνέθηκεν·

οὐδ' ἀκήκοας, ὅτι τούτου τὴν γυναῖκα Τιμαίαν Ἀλκιβιάδης διέφθειρε, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐκάλει ψιθυρίζουσα πρὸς τὰς θεραπαινίδας; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' Ἄγιν οὐκ ἐκώλυσεν ἐνδοξότατον Ἑλ-

[1] μᾶλλον εἶναι Benseler, confirmed by MSS.: εἶναι μᾶλλον.
[2] μου] σου or σοι in many MSS.

[a] *Nemean Odes*, iv. 4.
[b] Euripides, *Bacchae*, 66; *cf. Moralia*, 758 C, 794 B; *Commentarii in Hesiodum*, 48 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 75).
[c] The Academy was dedicated to the Muses.
[d] *Cf.* for example Diogenes Laertius, iii. 19-21. When Dionysius had caused Plato to be sold into slavery, a friend

as Pindar[a] has it, since high repute and honour conjoined with a measure of power make

Labour pleasant and toil to be sweet toil.[b]

Have you, by reason of slander or envy, become the butt of jeers and cat-calls? The breeze is favouring that bears you to the Muses and the Academy,[c] as it was for Plato[d] when he was buffeted by the storm of Dionysius's friendship.

For this reason it will also help greatly toward tranquillity of mind to observe that famous men have suffered nothing at all from evils the same as yours. Does childlessness, for example, vex you? Consider the kings[e] of Rome, of whom not one was able to bequeath the kingdom to a son. Are you distressed by your present poverty? Well, what Boeotian rather than Epameinondas, what Roman rather than Fabricius, would you have preferred to be? "But my wife has been seduced." Have you, then, not read the inscription at Delphi,

The lord of land and sea, King Agis, put me here[f];

and have you not heard that Alcibiades[g] seduced Agis's wife, Timaea, and that, whispering to her handmaids, she called her child Alcibiades? But this did not prevent Agis from being the most celebrated and

ransomed him and bought for him "the little garden in the Academy."

[e] Others prefer to translate "Emperors," and regard the passage as proof that this essay was written during the reign of Vespasian, who was the first emperor to be succeeded by a son. I consider such an early date for this work altogether unlikely.
[f] Preger, *Inscr. Graec. Metricae*, p. 76, no. 87.
[g] *Cf. Life of Alcibiades*, xxiii. 7 (203 D).

λήνων εἶναι καὶ μέγιστον· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Στίλπωνα
468 τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν φιλοσόφων ἱλαρώτατα ζῆν ἀκόλαστος οὖσ' ἡ θυγάτηρ· ἀλλὰ καὶ Μητροκλέους ὀνειδίσαντος, "ἐμὸν οὖν," ἔφη, "ἁμάρτημα τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκείνης;" εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Μητροκλέους, "ἐκείνης μὲν ἁμάρτημα, σὸν δ' ἀτύχημα"· "πῶς λέγεις;" εἶπεν, "οὐχὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ διαπτώματ' ἐστί;" "πάνυ μὲν οὖν," ἔφη. "τὰ δὲ διαπτώματ' οὐχ ὧν διαπτώματα καὶ ἀποτεύγματα;" συνωμολόγησεν ὁ Μητροκλῆς. "τὰ δ' ἀποτεύγματ' οὐχ ὧν ἀποτεύγματα καὶ ἀτυχήματα;"[1] πράῳ λόγῳ καὶ φιλοσόφῳ κενὸν ἀποδείξας ὕλαγμα τὴν τοῦ κυνικοῦ βλασφημίαν.

B 7. Τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς οὐ μόνον τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ οἰκείων ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀνιᾷ καὶ παροξύνει κακά. βλασφημίαι γὰρ καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ φθόνοι καὶ κακοήθειαι καὶ ζηλοτυπίαι μετὰ δυσμενείας αὐτῶν μέν εἰσι τῶν ἐχόντων κῆρες, ἐνοχλοῦσι δὲ καὶ παροξύνουσι τοὺς ἀνοήτους· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ γειτόνων ἀκραχολίαι καὶ συνήθων δυσκολίαι καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ὑπουργῶν μοχθηρίαι τινές. ὑφ' ὧν οὐχ ἥκιστά μοι δοκεῖς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιταραττόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ Σοφοκλέους ἰατροὶ

πικρὰν χολὴν κλύζουσι φαρμάκῳ πικρῷ,

οὕτως ἀντιχαλεπαίνειν καὶ συνεκπικραίνεσθαι τοῖς
C ἐκείνων πάθεσι καὶ νοσήμασιν, οὐκ εὐλόγως. ἃ γὰρ πράττεις πράγματα πεπιστευμένος, οὐχ ἁπλοῖς ἤθεσιν οὐδὲ χρηστοῖς ὥσπερ εὐφυέσιν ὀργάνοις

[1] καὶ ἀτυχήματα Stegmann, confirmed by two MSS.: ἀτυχήματα.

[a] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, ii. 114.

the greatest of Greeks. Just as the licentiousness of his daughter did not prevent Stilpo[a] from leading the most cheerful life of all the philosophers of his time; on the contrary, when Metrocles reproached him, he asked, "Is this my fault or hers?" And when Metrocles replied, "Her fault, but your misfortune," he said, "What do you mean? Are not faults also slips?" "Certainly," said Metrocles. "And are not slips also mischances of those who have slipped?" Metrocles agreed. "And are not mischances also misfortunes of those whose mischances they are?" By this gentle and philosophic argument he showed the Cynic's abuse to be but idle yapping.

7. But most people are pained and exasperated by the faults, not only of their friends and relatives, but also of their enemies. For abuse and rage on their part, envy and malevolence and jealousy, coupled with ill-will, are the bane of those who are subject to these faults, but it is fools whom they trouble and exasperate—as, for example, neighbours' outbursts of temper and friends' peevishness, and certain acts of dishonesty on the part of state officials charged with administration. By these things you yourself seem to me to be disturbed as much as anybody, and like the physicians to whom Sophocles[b] alludes—

With bitter drugs they purge the bitter bile—

so you become angry and bitter against these men and suffer from their passions and infirmities; but this is irrational. For even in the execution of matters committed to your personal care, most of them are in fact administered, not by simple and excellent natures,

[b] *Cf.* 463 F, *supra*, and the note.

(468) ἀλλὰ καρχάροις τὰ πολλὰ καὶ σκολιοῖς διακονεῖται. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀπευθύνειν ταῦτα μὴ νόμιζε σὸν ἔργον εἶναι μηδ' ἄλλως ῥᾴδιον. ἂν δ' ὡς τοιούτοις αὐτοῖς πεφυκόσι χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἰατρὸς ὀδοντάγραις καὶ ἀγκτῆρσιν, ἤπιος φαίνῃ καὶ μέτριος ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εὐφρανῇ τῇ σῇ διαθέσει μᾶλλον ἢ λυπήσῃ ταῖς ἑτέρων ἀηδίαις καὶ μοχθηρίαις, ὥσπερ κύνας,[1] ἂν ὑλακτῶσι, τὸ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἐκείνους[2] οἰόμενος περαίνειν, καὶ οὐκέτι λήσεις[3] πολλὰ λυπηρὰ
D συνεισάγων,[4] ὥσπερ εἰς χωρίον κοῖλον καὶ ταπεινὸν ἐπιρρέοντα, τὴν μικροψυχίαν ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλοτρίων ἀναπιμπλάμενος[5] κακῶν. ὅπου γὰρ ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τὸν ἔλεον ψέγουσι πρὸς ἀτυχοῦντας ἀνθρώπους γινόμενον, ὡς καλοῦ τοῦ βοηθεῖν οὐ τοῦ συναλγεῖν καὶ συνενδιδόναι τοῖς πλησίον ὄντος· ὃ δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστιν, οὐδ' αὐτῶν[6]
E ἁμαρτανόντων καὶ διακειμένων φαύλως τὸ ἦθος αἰσθανομένους ἀθυμεῖν καὶ δυσφορεῖν ἐῶσιν, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἄνευ λύπης τὴν κακίαν ᾗ δεῖ,[7] σκόπει δὴ[8] πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι περιορᾶν αὐτούς, ὅτι μὴ πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ χρώμενοι καὶ προσιόντες ἡμῖν ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ χαρίεντες, ἀχθομένους καὶ δυσκολαίνοντας; ἀλλ' ὅρα, φίλε Πάκκιε, μὴ λανθάνομεν[9] ἑαυτοὺς οὐ τὸ καθόλου τῆς μοχθηρίας τῶν ἐντυγχα-

[1] κύνας Stephanus: κύνες.
[2] ἐκείνους Reiske: ἐκείνοις.
[3] καὶ οὐκέτι λήσεις Pohlenz: ἐπὶ (or ἐπεὶ) λήσεις (or λήσῃ).
[4] συνεισάγων Capps: συνάγων.
[5] ἀναπιμπλάμενος Wilamowitz: ἀναπιμπλαμένην.
[6] αὐτῶν Reiske: αὐτῶν.
[7] ᾗ δεῖ Meziriacus, confirmed by mss.: ἤδη.
[8] δὴ added by W.C.H.
[9] λανθάνομεν Bernardakis: λανθάνωμεν.

men naturally suited to be another's instruments, as it were, but by jagged and crooked ones. Do not, therefore, consider it your business to straighten them out, and it would not in any case be easy to do so. But if—dealing with them as being what they are by nature, just as a physician uses forceps for teeth and clips for wounds[a]—you show yourself as gentle and self-controlled as you can, you will have greater pleasure in your own state of mind than distress at the unpleasantness and villainy of those others, and you will think that they, like dogs when they bark, are but fulfilling their nature; and no longer will you unwittingly gather into this present captiousness or infirmity of yours many grievances, like offscourings which drain into some hollow and low-lying ground,[b] thus letting yourself be infected with the vices of others. For since some of the philosophers censure even pity that is expended upon unfortunate persons, on the ground that it is good to give help to our neighbours, but not to participate in their sorrows nor give in to them; and, what is more important, since these philosophers do not allow us, when we perceive ourselves to be doing wrong and to be getting into a bad state of mind, to despair or be dejected, but bid us cure our vice painlessly, as we should: just consider, then—how can it be anything but irrational to allow ourselves to become vexed and troubled because not everyone who has dealings with us or approaches us is honourable and cultivated? No, my dear Paccius, you must see to it that we are not unwittingly taking a stand in alarm, not at the

[a] See J. S. Milne, *Surgical Instruments in Greek and Roman Times*, pp. 162-163.
[b] *Cf.* 479 B, *infra*.

νόντων ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ φιλαυτίας τινὸς οὐ μισοπονηρίας προβαλλόμενοι καὶ δεδοικότες. αἱ γὰρ σφοδραὶ περὶ τὰ πράγματα πτοῖαι καὶ παρ' ἀξίαν ἐφέσεις καὶ διώξεις ἢ πάλιν ἀποστροφαὶ καὶ διαβολαὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐγγεννῶσιν ὑποψίας καὶ δυσκολίας, ὑφ' ὧν τὰ μὲν ἀποστερεῖσθαι τοῖς δὲ περιπίπτειν δοκοῦμεν· ὁ δὲ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐθισθεὶς ἐλαφρῶς συμπεριφέρεσθαι καὶ μετρίως
F εὐκολώτατος ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν γίνεται καὶ πραότατος.

8. Ὅθεν ἐκεῖνον αὖθις τὸν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων λόγον ἀναλάβωμεν. ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῷ πυρέττειν πικρὰ πάντα καὶ ἀηδῆ φαίνεται γενομένοις, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἑτέρους ταὐτὰ προσφερομένους καὶ μὴ δυσχεραίνοντας, οὐκέτι τὸ σιτίον οὐδὲ τὸ ποτὸν ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς αἰτιώμεθα καὶ τὴν νόσον· οὕτως καὶ
469 τοῖς πράγμασι παυσόμεθα μεμφόμενοι καὶ δυσχεραίνοντες, ἂν ἑτέρους ταὐτὰ προσδεχομένους ἀλύπως καὶ ἱλαρῶς ὁρῶμεν. ἀγαθὸν τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς ἀβουλήτοις συμπτώμασι πρὸς εὐθυμίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν ὅσα προσφιλῆ καὶ ἀστεῖα πάρεστιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ μιγνύντας ἐξαμαυροῦν τὰ χείρονα τοῖς βελτίοσι. νῦν δὲ τὰς μὲν ὄψεις ὑπὸ[1] τῶν ἄγαν λαμπρῶν τιτρωσκομένας ἀποστρέφοντες ταῖς ἀνθηραῖς καὶ ποώδεσι χροιαῖς παρηγοροῦμεν, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἐντείνομεν εἰς τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ προσβιαζόμεθα τοῖς
B τῶν ἀνιαρῶν ἐνδιατρίβειν ἀναλογισμοῖς, μονονοὺ

[1] ὑπὸ] ἀπὸ in most MSS.

[a] *Cf.*, for example, 456 F, *supra*.

[b] That is, the argument presented in chap. 4, *supra*.

general wickedness of those we encounter, but at their particular wickedness to us; so our motive would be a selfish interest, not detestation of villainy.[a] For excessive apprehension about public affairs and unworthy appetites and desires, or, on the other hand, aversions and dislikes, engender suspicions and enmities toward persons who were, we think, the cause of our being deprived of some desirable things and of our encountering others which are unpleasant; it is the man who has become accustomed to adapt himself to public affairs easily and with self-control who becomes the most gracious and gentle in his dealings with his fellows.

8. Therefore let us resume our discussion of circumstances.[b] For just as in a fever everything we eat seems bitter and unpleasant to the taste, and yet when we see others taking the same food and finding no displeasure in it, we no longer continue to blame the food and the drink, but accuse ourselves and our malady; so we shall cease blaming and being disgruntled with circumstances if we see others accepting the same events cheerfully and without offence. And so it is conducive to tranquillity of mind, in the midst of happenings which are contrary to our wishes, not to overlook whatever we have that is pleasant and attractive, but, mingling good with bad, cause the better to outshine the worse. But as it is, while we turn away our eyes[c] when they are wounded by too dazzling a light and refresh them with the tints and hues of flowers and grass, yet we strain the mind toward painful things and force it to dwell on the consideration of disagreeable matters, all but

[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 490 C-D, *infra*, 543 E-F, 854 B-C; *Life of Demosthenes*, xxii. (856 B).

(469) βίᾳ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀποσπάσαντες. καίτοι τό γε πρὸς τὸν πολυπράγμονα λελεγμένον οὐκ ἀηδῶς δεῦρ' ἔστι μετενεγκεῖν·

τί τἀλλότριον, ἄνθρωπε βασκανώτατε,
κακὸν ὀξυδορκεῖς, τὸ δ' ἴδιον παραβλέπεις;

τί τὸ σεαυτοῦ κακόν, ὦ μακάριε, λίαν καταβλέπεις καὶ ποιεῖς ἐναργὲς ἀεὶ καὶ πρόσφατον, ἀγαθοῖς δὲ παροῦσιν οὐ προσάγεις τὴν διάνοιαν; ἀλλ' ὥσπερ αἱ σικύαι τὸ χείριστον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἕλκουσιν, οὕτω τὰ κάκιστα τῶν ἰδίων[1] συνάγεις ἐπὶ σαυτόν, οὐδέν τι τοῦ Χίου βελτίων γινόμενος[2] ὃς παλαιὸν[3]
C καὶ χρηστὸν οἶνον ἑτέροις πιπράσκων ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον ὀξίνην ἐζήτει διαγευόμενος, οἰκέτης δέ τις ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑφ' ἑτέρου τί ποιοῦντα τὸν δεσπότην καταλέλοιπεν, "ἀγαθῶν," ἔφη, "παρόντων, κακὸν ζητοῦντα." καὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ πότιμα τῶν ἰδίων[4] ὑπερβαίνοντες ἐπὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ μοχθηρὰ τρέχουσιν. ὁ δ' Ἀρίστιππος οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, πρὸς τὰ βελτίονα τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐξαναφέρειν καὶ ἀνακουφίζειν αὑτόν· χωρίον γοῦν ἀπολέσας καλὸν ἠρώτησεν ἕνα τῶν πάνυ προσποιουμένων συνάχθεσθαι καὶ συναγα-

[1] ἰδίων Meziriacus: ἡδέων.
[2] γινόμενος] γενόμενος in most mss.
[3] παλαιὸν Kronenberg: πολὺν.
[4] ἰδίων Meziriacus: ἡδέων.

dragging it by compulsion away from those which are better. And yet one might adapt here not inaptly the remark addressed to the meddlesome man [a]:

Why do you look so sharp on others' ills,
Malignant man, yet overlook your own?

Why do you scrutinize too keenly your own trouble, my good sir, and continue to make it ever vivid and fresh in your mind, but do not direct your thoughts to those good things which you have? But, just as cupping-glasses [b] draw the most virulent humour from the flesh, so you gather together against yourself the worst of your own conditions, proving yourself not a whit better than the man of Chios who sold excellent old wine to everyone else, but tried to find sour wine for his own luncheon; and when one of his slaves was asked by the other what he had left his master doing, he answered, "Hunting bad when good was at hand." Most persons, in fact, do pass by the excellent and palatable conditions of their lot and hasten to those that are unpleasant and disagreeable. Aristippus,[c] however, was not one of these, but was wise enough, like one who weighs things in a balance, by weighing the bad against the better, to rise above the conditions in which he found himself and thus to lighten his spirits. At any rate, when he had lost a fine estate, he asked one of those who made a great pretence of condoling with him and sharing in his ill humour at misfortune,

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 476, ades. 359; *cf.* 515 D, *infra*. *Cf.* Horace, *Sermones*, i. 3. 25-27:

Cum tua pervideas oculis male lippus inunctis,
cur in amicorum vitiis tam cernis acutum
quam aut aquila aut serpens Epidaurius?

[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 518 B, 600 C. [c] *Cf. Moralia*, 330 C.

(469) νακτεῖν, " οὐχὶ σοὶ μὲν χωρίδιον ἓν ἔστιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ τρεῖς ἀγροὶ καταλείπονται; " συνομολογήσαντος
D δ' ἐκείνου, " τί οὖν," εἶπεν, " οὐ σοὶ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς συναχθόμεθα; " μανικὸν γάρ ἐστι τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις ἀνιᾶσθαι μὴ χαίρειν δὲ τοῖς σῳζομένοις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὰ μικρὰ παιδάρια, ἀπὸ πολλῶν παιγνίων ἂν ἕν τις ἀφέληταί τι, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἀπορρίψαντα[1] κλαίει καὶ βοᾷ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἡμᾶς περὶ ἓν ὀχληθέντας ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ποιεῖν ἀνόνητα ἑαυτοῖς ὀδυρομένους καὶ δυσφοροῦντας.

9. " Καὶ τί," φήσαι τις ἄν, " ἔχομεν; τί δ' οὐκ ἔχομεν; " ὁ μὲν δόξαν, ὁ δ' οἶκον, ὁ δὲ γάμον, τῷ δὲ φίλος ἀγαθὸς ἔστιν. Ἀντίπατρος δ' ὁ Ταρσεὺς πρὸς τῷ τελευτᾶν ἀναλογιζόμενος ὧν ἔτυχεν ἀγαθῶν, οὐδὲ τὴν εὔπλοιαν παρέλιπε τὴν ἐκ
E Κιλικίας αὐτῷ γενομένην εἰς Ἀθήνας. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ μὴ παροραῖν ἀλλ' ἔν τινι λόγῳ τίθεσθαι καὶ χάριν ἔχειν[2] ὅτι ζῶμεν, ὑγιαίνομεν, τὸν ἥλιον ὁρῶμεν· οὔτε πόλεμος οὔτε στάσις ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ γῆ παρέχει γεωργεῖν καὶ θάλασσα πλεῖν ἀδεῶς τοῖς βουλομένοις· καὶ λέγειν ἔξεστι καὶ πράττειν καὶ σιωπᾶν καὶ σχολάζειν. εὐθυμήσομεν δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον παροῦσιν, ἂν μὴ παρόντων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαμβάνωμεν· ἀναμιμνήσκοντες αὐτοὺς πολλάκις, ὡς ποθεινόν ἐστιν ὑγίεια νοσοῦσι καὶ πολε-
F μουμένοις εἰρήνη, καὶ κτήσασθαι δόξαν ἐν πόλει τηλικαύτῃ[3] καὶ φίλους ἀγνῶτι καὶ ξένῳ· καὶ τὸ

[1] ἀπορρίψαντα W.C.H. after Fobes: προσρίψαντα.
[2] χάριν ἔχειν] χαίρειν in most mss.
[3] τηλικαύτῃ Reiske, confirmed by mss.: τηλικαύτην.

" Isn't it true that you have only one small bit of land, while I have three farms remaining? " When the person agreed that this was so, Aristippus said, " Should I not then rather condole with you? " For it is the act of a madman to be distressed at what is lost and not rejoice at what is saved, but like little children, who, if someone takes away one of their many toys, will throw away all the rest as well and cry and howl; in the same way, if we are troubled by Fortune in one matter, we make everything else also unprofitable by lamenting and taking it hard.

9. " And what," someone may say, " do we really have and what do we not have? " One man has reputation, another a house, another a wife, another a good friend. Antipater[a] of Tarsus, on his death-bed reckoning up the good things that had fallen to his lot, did not omit even the fair voyage he had from Cilicia to Athens; so we should not overlook even common and ordinary things, but take some account of them and be grateful that we are alive and well and look upon the sun; that there is neither war nor factious strife among us, but that both the earth grants cultivation and the sea fair sailing to those who wish it; that we may speak or act, be silent or at leisure, as we choose. These things when they are present will afford us greater tranquillity of mind, if we but imagine them to be absent, and remind ourselves often how desirable is health to the sick, and peace to those at war, and, to an unknown stranger in so great a city,[b] the acquisition of reputation and

[a] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 246, Frag. 15; *cf. Life of Marius*, xlvi. 2 (433 A); Stobaeus, vol. v. p. 1086 ed. Hense.
[b] Probably Rome.

στέρεσθαι γενομένων ὡς ἀνιαρόν. οὐ γὰρ τότε γίνεται μέγα καὶ τίμιον ἕκαστον ἡμῖν, ὅταν ἀπόληται, σῳζόμενον δὲ τὸ μηθέν ἐστιν. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀξίαν τὸ μὴ εἶναι[1] προστίθησιν, οὐδὲ δεῖ κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς μεγάλα καὶ τρέμειν ἀεὶ δεδιότας ὡς ὑπὲρ μεγάλων μὴ στερηθῶμεν, ἔχοντας δὲ παρορᾶν καὶ
470 καταφρονεῖν ὡς μηδενὸς ἀξίων, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῷ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπολαύειν αὐτῶν, ἵνα καὶ τὰς ἀποβολάς, ἂν συντυγχάνωσι, πραότερον φέρωμεν. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ποιήματα μέν, ὡς ἔλεγεν Ἀρκεσίλαος, ἀλλότρια καὶ γραφὰς καὶ ἀνδριάντας οἴονται δεῖν ἀκριβῶς καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἕκαστον ἐπιπορευόμενοι τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ τῇ ὄψει θεωρεῖν, τὸν δ' ἑαυτῶν βίον ἔχοντα πολλὰς οὐκ ἀτερπεῖς ἀναθεωρήσεις ἐῶσιν, ἔξω[2] βλέποντες ἀεὶ καὶ θαυμάζοντες ἀλλοτρίας δόξας καὶ τύχας ὥσπερ μοιχοὶ τὰς ἑτέρων γυναῖκας, αὐτῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων καταφρονοῦντες.

10. Καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο μέγα πρὸς εὐθυμίαν ἐστί,
B τὸ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ καθ' αὑτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους ἀποθεωρεῖν καὶ μή, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοί, πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀντιπαρεξάγειν.[3] οἷον εὐθὺς οἱ δεδεμένοι εὐδαιμονίζουσι τοὺς λελυμένους, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι τοὺς πολίτας, οὗτοι δὲ πάλιν αὖ τοὺς πλουσίους, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι τοὺς σατράπας, οἱ δὲ σατράπαι τοὺς βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς τοὺς θεούς,

[1] εἶναι] παρεῖναι Capps.
[2] ἔξω] τὰ ἔξω Capps.
[3] ἀντιπαρεξάγειν Reiske and Wyttenbach; ἀντιπαρεξετάζειν van Herwerden: ἀντιπαρεξάγουσιν.

friends; and how painful it is to be deprived of these things when we have once had them. For it will not then be the case that we find each one of these important and valuable only when it has been lost, but worthless while securely held. Our not possessing it does not add value to anything, nor should we acquire these things as though they were of great worth and live in fear and trembling as though for things of great moment, lest we be deprived of them, and yet while we have them overlook and despise them as of no value: we should above all take care to use them for our pleasure and enjoyment, in order that we may bear their loss, if that should happen, with greater moderation. But most people, as Arcesilaïs said, think it right to examine poems and paintings and statues of others with the eyes of both the mind and the body, poring over them minutely and in every detail, whereas they neglect their own life, which has many not unpleasing subjects for contemplation, looking ever to externals and admiring the repute and the fortunes of others, as adulterers do other men's wives, yet despising themselves and their own possessions.

10. And yet it is also highly conducive to tranquillity of mind to examine, if possible, oneself and one's fortunes, but if that is not possible, to observe persons of inferior fortune, and not, as most people do, compare oneself with those who are superior; as, for example, those in prison account fortunate those who have been set free[a]; and they, men born free; and free men, citizens; and citizens, in their turn, the rich; and the rich, satraps; and satraps, kings; and kings, the gods, scarcely stopping short of

[a] *Cf.* Teles, p. 43 ed. Hense.

(470) μονονουχὶ βροντᾶν καὶ ἀστράπτειν ἐθέλοντες. εἶθ' οὕτως ἀεὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοὺς ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες οὐδέποτε τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτοὺς χάριν ἔχουσιν.

οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει,
C οὐδ'[1] εἰλέ πώ με ζῆλος, οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι
θεῶν ἔργα, μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἐρῶ τυραννίδος·
ἀπόπροθεν γάρ ἐστιν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐμῶν.

"Θάσιος γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνος"· ἄλλος δέ τις Χῖος, ἄλλος δὲ Γαλάτης ἢ Βιθυνὸς οὐκ ἀγαπῶν, εἴ τινος μερίδος ἢ δόξαν ἢ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πολίταις εἴληχεν, ἀλλὰ κλαίων ὅτι μὴ φορεῖ πατρικίους· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ φορῇ, ὅτι μηδέπω στρατηγεῖ Ῥωμαίων· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ στρατηγῇ,[2] ὅτι μὴ ὑπατεύει· καὶ ὑπατεύων, ὅτι μὴ πρῶτος ἀλλ' ὕστερος ἀνηγορεύθη. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τί ἄλλο ἢ συλλέγοντα προφάσεις ἀχαριστίας ἐπὶ τὴν
D τύχην αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὑτοῦ κολάζεσθαι καὶ διδόναι δίκην; ἀλλ' ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων σωτήρια φρονοῦντα τοῦ ἡλίου μυριάδας ἀνθρώπων ἀπείρους[3] ἐφορῶντος

εὐρυεδοῦς[4] ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός,

οὐκ εἴ τινων ἧττον ἔνδοξός ἐστι καὶ πλούσιος, ὀδυρόμενος κάθηται καὶ ταπεινούμενος, ἀλλ' ὅτι

[1] οὐδ' Schneidewin, confirmed by MSS.: καὶ οὐδ'.
[2] φορῇ . . . στρατηγῇ] φορῶν . . . στρατηγῶν in most MSS.
[3] ἀπείρους] omitted in most MSS.
[4] εὐρυεδοῦς Plato, *Protag.*, 345 c: εὐρυόδους.

[a] Archilochus, Frag. 25 ed. Bergk and ed. Edmonds; Frag. 22 ed. Diehl.
[b] Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, iii. 17, 1418 b 31) says that Archilochus (who long resided in Thasos) speaks, not *in propria persona*, but through the mouth of Charon the carpenter. Charon is, then, the Thasian, if we can believe that Plutarch

desiring the power to produce thunder and lightning. Thus, through being always conscious that they lack things which are beyond them, they are never grateful for what befits their station.

I want no wealth of Gyges rich in gold,
Nor have I ever envied him; I am
Not jealous of gods' works, nor love a great
Kingdom: such things are far beyond my ken.[a]

"But he was a Thasian," one may say.[b] Yet there are others, Chians, Galatians, or Bithynians, who are not content with whatever portion of either repute or power among their own fellow-countrymen has fallen to their lot, but weep because they do not wear the patrician shoe; yet if they do wear it, they weep because they are not yet Roman praetors; if they are praetors, because they are not consuls; and if consuls, because they were proclaimed, not first, but later.[c] What is this other than collecting excuses for ingratitude to Fortune in order to chastise and punish oneself? But he, at least, who has a mind filled with salutary thoughts, knowing that the sun looks down upon countless myriads of men,

As many of us as win the fruit of the spacious earth,[d]

if he be less famous or wealthy than some others, does not sit down in sorrow and dejection, but since he knows that he lives ten thousand times better and

drew the quotation directly from Archilochus, and not from a florilegium (*aliter*, Fowler, *Harv. Stud.*, i. p. 144). Plutarch probably means that one nationality is no more exempt from this vice than another, but the argument is very oddly stated.
[c] For the importance of being announced first in the *renuntiatio*, see, for example, Cicero, *Pro Murena*, viii. 18.
[d] Simonides, Frag. 5 ed. Bergk, 4 ed. Diehl, 19 ed. Edmonds, verse 17; quoted again in *Moralia*, 485 c, *infra*, 743 f.

(470) μυρίων μυριάκις ἐν τοσούτοις εὐσχημονέστερον ζῇ καὶ βέλτιον, ὑμνῶν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τὸν βίον ὁδῷ[1] πρόεισιν.

Ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νικᾶν ἐκλεγόμενον ἀντιπάλους, ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ τὰ πράγματα δίδωσι περιόντα πολλῶν μέγα φρονεῖν, καὶ ζηλωτὸν εἶναι
E μᾶλλον ἢ ζηλοῦν ἑτέρους, ἄν γε δὴ μὴ τοῦ Βριάρεω μηδὲ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ποιήσῃς σεαυτὸν ἀνταγωνιστήν. ὅταν οὖν πάνυ θαυμάσῃς ὡς κρείττονα τὸν ἐν τῷ φορείῳ κομιζόμενον, ὑποκύψας θέασαι καὶ τοὺς βαστάζοντας· καὶ ὅταν διαβαίνοντα τὴν σχεδίαν μακαρίσῃς τὸν Ξέρξην ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὁ Ἑλλησπόντιος, ἴδε καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ μάστιξι διορύττοντας τὸν Ἄθω καὶ τοὺς περικοπτομένους ὦτα καὶ ῥῖνας ἐπὶ τῷ διαλυθῆναι τὴν γέφυραν ὑπὸ τοῦ κλύδωνος, ἅμα καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀποθεωρῶν διάνοιαν ὅτι τὸν σὸν βίον καὶ τὰ σὰ πράγματα μακαρίζουσιν.

F Ὁ Σωκράτης ἀκούσας τινὸς τῶν φίλων λέγοντος ὡς πολυτελὴς ἡ πόλις, "μνᾶς ὁ Χῖος οἶνος, ἡ πορφύρα τριῶν μνῶν, τοῦ μέλιτος ἡ κοτύλη πέντε δραχμῶν," λαβὼν αὐτὸν προσήγαγε τοῖς ἁλφίτοις, "ὀβολοῦ τὸ ἡμίεκτον, εὐτελὴς ἡ πόλις"· εἶτα ταῖς ἐλαίαις, "δυεῖν χαλκοῖν[2] ἡ χοῖνιξ[3]"· εἶτα ταῖς ἐξωμίσι, "δέκα δραχμῶν, εὐτελὴς ἡ πόλις." οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅταν ἀκούσωμεν ἑτέρου λέγοντος ὡς μικρὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς πράγματα καὶ λυπρὰ δεινῶς,

[1] ὁδῷ Cobet: ἐν ὁδῷ.
[2] δυεῖν χαλκοῖν] δυοὶ χαλκοῖς (or χαλκῶν) most MSS.
[3] After χοῖνιξ some MSS. add εὐτελὴς ἡ πόλις.

[a] *Cf.* Herodotus, vii. 56: "O Zeus, why have you taken the likeness of a Persian and changed your name to Xerxes,

more suitably than tens of thousands in so great a number, he will go on his way praising his own guardian spirit and his life.

Now at Olympia you cannot win the victory by selecting competitors, but in this life circumstances permit you to take pride in your superiority to many, and to be an object of envy rather than envious of the others—unless, indeed, you make a Briareus or a Heracles your opponent. Whenever, then, you are lost in admiration of a man borne in his litter as being superior to yourself, lower your eyes and gaze upon the litter-bearers also; and whenever you account happy, as the man of Hellespont[a] did, that famous Xerxes crossing his bridge, look also upon those who are digging through Athos[b] beneath the lash, and those whose ears and noses are mutilated because the bridge was broken by the current. Consider also their state of mind: *they* account happy your life and your fortunes.

When Socrates[c] heard one of his friends remark how expensive the city was, saying "Chian wine costs a mina, a purple robe three minae, a half-pint of honey five drachmas," he took him by the hand and led him to the meal-market, "Half a peck for an obol! the city is cheap"; then to the olive-market, "A quart for two coppers!"; then to the clothes-market, "A sleeveless vest for ten drachmas! the city is cheap." We also, therefore, whenever we hear another say that our affairs are insignificant and in a

and now lead the whole world with you in your desire to uproot Greece? Surely you might have done all this without these means."

[b] *Cf.* 455 D, *supra*.

[c] *Cf.* Teles, pp. 12-13 ed. Hense; Diogenes Laertius, vi. 35 (of Diogenes).

μὴ ὑπατευόντων μηδ' ἐπιτροπευόντων, ἔξεστιν
471 εἰπεῖν, "λαμπρὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς πράγματα καὶ ζηλωτὸς ἡμῶν ὁ βίος· οὐ προσαιτοῦμεν οὐκ ἀχθοφοροῦμεν οὐ κολακεύομεν."

11. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἑτέρους μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπ' ἀβελτερίας εἰθίσμεθα ζῆν, καὶ πολὺ τὸ δύσζηλον ἡ φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ τὸ βάσκανον οὐ χαίρει τοσοῦτον τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅσον ἀνιᾶται τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, μὴ μόνον ὅρα τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ τὰ περιβόητα τῶν ζηλουμένων ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ θαυμαζομένων, ἀλλ' ἀνακαλύψας καὶ διαστείλας ὥσπερ ἀνθηρὸν παραπέτασμα τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἐντὸς γενοῦ, καὶ κατόψει πολλὰ δυσ-
B χερῆ καὶ πολλὰς ἀηδίας ἐνούσας αὐτοῖς. ὁ γοῦν Πιττακὸς ἐκεῖνος, οὗ μέγα μὲν ἀνδρείας μέγα δὲ σοφίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης κλέος, εἱστία ξένους· ἐπελθοῦσα δ' ἡ γυνὴ μετ' ὀργῆς ἀνέτρεψε τὴν τράπεζαν· τῶν δὲ ξένων διατραπέντων, "ἑκάστῳ τι," ἔφη, "ἡμῶν κακὸν ἔστιν· ᾧ δὲ τοὐμόν,[1] ἄριστα πράττει."

οὗτος μακάριος ἐν ἀγορᾷ νομίζεται,
ὅταν[2] δ' ἀνοίξῃ τὴν θύραν,[3] τρισάθλιος·
γυνὴ κρατεῖ πάντων, ἐπιτάσσει, μάχετ' ἀεί.
ἀπὸ πλειόνων ὀδυνᾶτ', ἐγὼ δ' ἀπ' οὐδενός.

τοιαῦτα πολλὰ καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ βασιλείᾳ πρόσεστιν ἄδηλα τοῖς πολλοῖς· ἐπιπροσθεῖ γὰρ ὁ τῦφος.

C ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρείδη, μοιρηγενές, ὀλβιόδαιμον·

[1] τοὐμόν] τοῦτο μόνον in some MSS.
[2] ὅταν] ἐπὰν *Moralia*, 100 E.
[3] τὴν θύραν] τὰς θύρας *Moralia*, 100 E.

woeful plight because we are not consuls or governors, may reply, "Our affairs are splendid and our life is enviable: we do not beg, or carry burdens, or live by flattery."

11. Yet since, however, through our folly we have grown accustomed to live with eyes fixed on everyone else rather than on ourselves, and since our nature contains much envy and malice and does not rejoice so much in our own blessings as it is pained by those which other men possess, do not look only at the splendour and notoriety of those you envy and wonder at, but open and, as it were, draw aside the gaudy curtain of their repute and outward appearance, and get inside them, and you will see many disagreeable things and many things to vex them there. Thus, when that renowned Pittacus,[a] whose fame for bravery and for wisdom and justice was great, was entertaining some guests, his wife entered in a rage and upset the table; his guests were dismayed, but Pittacus said, "Every one of us has some trouble. He that has only mine is doing very well indeed."

This man's held happy in the market-place,
But when he enters home, thrice-wretched he:
His wife rules all, commands, and always fights.
His woes are more than mine, for mine are none![b]

Many such evils attend wealth and repute and kingship, evils unknown to the vulgar, for ostentation hinders the vision.

O happy son of Atreus, child of destiny,
Blessed with a kindly guardian spirit![c]

[a] *Cf.* 461 D, *supra*, of Socrates.
[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 86, Menander, Frag. 302, verses 4-7 (p. 397 ed. Allinson, L.C.L.); *cf. Moralia*, 100 E.
[c] Homer, *Il.*, iii. 182.

(471) ἔξωθεν οὗτος ὁ μακαρισμός, ὅπλων καὶ ἵππων καὶ στρατιᾶς περικεχυμένης· αἱ δὲ τῶν παθῶν φωναὶ πρὸς τὴν κενὴν δόξαν ἔνδοθεν ἀντιμαρτυροῦσι·

Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτῃ ἐνέδησε βαρείῃ

καὶ

ζηλῶ σε, γέρον,
ζηλῶ δ' ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἀκίνδυνον
βίον ἐξεπέρασ' ἀγνώς, ἀκλεής.

ἔξεστιν οὖν καὶ τούτοις τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς ἀπαρύτειν τοῦ πρὸς τὴν τύχην μεμψιμοίρου καὶ διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν τὰ τῶν πλησίον ἐκταπεινοῦντος τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ καταβάλλοντος.

D 12. Οὐχ ἥκιστα τοίνυν εὐθυμίαν κολούει τὸ μὴ συμμέτροις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην δύναμιν ὁρμαῖς ὥσπερ ἱστίοις, ἀλλὰ μειζόνων ἐφιεμένους ταῖς ἐλπίσιν εἶτ' ἀποτυγχάνοντας αἰτιᾶσθαι δαίμονα καὶ τύχην ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀβελτερίαν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ τοξεύειν τῷ ἀρότρῳ βουλόμενος καὶ τῷ βοῒ τὸν λαγῶ[1] κυνηγετεῖν δυστυχής ἐστιν οὐδὲ τῷ γρίφοις καὶ σαγήναις ἐλάφους μὴ λαμβάνοντι μηδὲ ὗς[2] δαίμων ἐναντιοῦται μοχθηρός, ἀλλ' ἀβελτερίᾳ καὶ μωρίᾳ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν. αἴτιον δ' ἡ φιλαυτία μάλιστα, φιλοπρώτους ποιοῦσα καὶ φιλονίκους[3] ἐν πᾶσι καὶ πάντων ἐπιδραττομένους
E ἀπλήστως. οὐ γὰρ πλούσιοι μόνον ὁμοῦ καὶ λόγιοι καὶ ἰσχυροὶ καὶ συμποτικοὶ καὶ ἡδεῖς εἶναι καὶ

[1] λαγῶ] λαγών, λαγὼν *et sim.* in most MSS.
[2] ὗς] most MSS. have οἷς or εἷς. Some MSS. rewrite the sentence completely, but their variants are too improbable to be cited in full.
[3] φιλονίκους Dübner: φιλονείκους.

Such felicitation comes from externals only—for his arms and horses and far-flung host of warriors; but against the emptiness of his glory the voice of his sufferings cries out in protest from the very heart:

The son of Cronus, Zeus, entangled me
In deep infatuation,[a]

and

I envy you, old man;
I envy any man whose life has passed
Free from danger, unknown and unrenowned.[b]

By such reflections also, then, it is possible to reduce the violence of our fault-finding with fate, fault-finding which, through admiration of our neighbours' lot, both debases and destroys our own.

12. Further, another matter which greatly interferes with tranquillity of mind is that we do not manage our impulses, as sailors do their sails, to correspond to our capacity; in our expectations we aim at things too great; then, when we fail, we blame our destiny and our fortune instead of our own folly. For he is not unfortunate who wishes to shoot with his plough and hunt the hare with his ox, nor does a malicious destiny oppose him who cannot capture deer or boar with fishing creels or drag-nets; it is through folly and stupidity that such men attempt the impossible. And self-love is chiefly to blame, which makes men eager to be first and to be victorious in everything and insatiably desirous of engaging in everything. For not only do men demand to be at the same time rich and learned and strong and con-

[a] Homer, *Il.*, ii. 111, ix. 18.
[b] Agamemnon to his old servant: Euripides, *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, 16-18.

φίλοι βασιλέων καὶ πόλεων ἄρχοντες ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ καὶ κύνας ἕξουσι πρωτεύοντας ἀρετῇ καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὄρτυγας καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας, ἀθυμοῦσι.

Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος οὐκ ἠγάπα μέγιστος ὢν τῶν τότε τυράννων, ἀλλ' ὅτι Φιλοξένου τοῦ ποιητοῦ μὴ βέλτιον ᾖδε[1] μηδὲ περιῆν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι Πλάτωνος, ὀργισθεὶς καὶ παροξυνθεὶς τὸν μὲν εἰς τὰς λατομίας ἐνέβαλε τὸν δ' ἀπέδοτο πέμψας εἰς Αἴγιναν. οὐ τοιοῦτος ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ Κρίσων[2] ὁ σταδιοδρόμος ἁμιλλώμενος αὐτῷ περὶ τάχους ἔδοξεν ἑκὼν παρεῖναι, σφόδρα διηγανάκτη-
F σεν. εὖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ποιητικὸς Ἀχιλλεὺς ὑπειπὼν

τοῖος ἐὼν οἷος οὔ τις Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων

ἐπήνεγκεν

ἐν πολέμῳ· ἀγορῇ δέ τ' ἀμείνονές εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι.

Μεγάβυζον δὲ τὸν Πέρσην εἰς τὸ ζωγραφεῖον
472 ἀναβάντα τὸ Ἀπελλοῦ καὶ λαλεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαντα περὶ τῆς τέχνης ἐπεστόμισεν ὁ Ἀπελλῆς εἰπών, "ἕως μὲν ἡσυχίαν ἦγες, ἐδόκεις τις εἶναι διὰ τὰ χρυσία καὶ τὴν πορφύραν, νυνὶ δὲ καὶ ταυτὶ τὰ τρίβοντα τὴν ὤχραν παιδάρια καταγελᾷ σου φλυαροῦντος."

Ἀλλ' ἔνιοι τοὺς μὲν Στωικοὺς οἴονται παίζειν, ὅταν ἀκούσωσι τὸν σοφὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς μὴ μόνον φρόνιμον καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥήτορα καὶ

[1] ᾖδε] ᾖδει in most MSS.
[2] Κρίσων] βρίσων in most MSS.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 334 C, and Nachstädt's references *ad loc.*
[b] *Ibid.* 58 F.

vivial spirits and good company, and friends of kings and magistrates of cities, but unless they shall also have dogs and horses and quails and cocks that can win prizes, they are disconsolate.

The elder Dionysius [a] was not content with being the greatest tyrant of his age, but because he could not sing verses better than the poet Philoxenus or get the better of Plato in dialectic, enraged and embittered, he cast Philoxenus into the stone-quarries, and, sending Plato to Aegina, sold him into slavery. Alexander [b] was not of this temper, but when Crison, the famous sprinter, ran a race with him and appeared to slacken his pace deliberately, Alexander was very indignant. And when the Homeric Achilles [c] had first said,

Of the bronze-clad Achaeans none is a match for me,

he did well to add,

In war; but in speaking others are better than I.

But when Megabyzus the Persian came up to the studio of Apelles [d] and attempted to chatter about art, Apelles shut his mouth by saying, "As long as you kept still, you seemed to be somebody because of your gold and purple; but now even these lads who grind the pigments are laughing at your nonsense."

But some think that the Stoics [e] are jesting when they hear that in their sect the wise man is termed not only prudent and just and brave, but also an

[c] *Il.*, xviii. 105-106.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 58 D; Zeuxis, according to Aelian, *Varia Historia*, ii. 2.
[e] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 164, Frag. 655 *cf. Moralia*, 58 E; Horace, *Sermones*, i. 3. 124 ff. See also Siefert, *op. cit.*, p. 54, note 2.

(472) ποιητὴν καὶ στρατηγὸν καὶ πλούσιον καὶ βασιλέα προσαγορευόμενον, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων ἀξιοῦσι τούτων, κἂν μὴ τυγχάνωσιν, ἀνιῶνται. καίτοι καὶ τῶν
B θεῶν ἄλλος ἄλλην ἔχων δύναμιν, ὁ μὲν ἐννάλιος, ὁ δὲ μαντεῖος,[1] ὁ δὲ κερδῷος ἐπονομάζεται· καὶ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ὁ Ζεύς, ὡς οὐ μετὸν αὐτῇ πολεμικῶν ἔργων, ἐπὶ γάμους ἀποστέλλει καὶ θαλάμους.

13. Τινὰ γὰρ οὐδὲ συννπάρχειν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι πέφυκεν ἀλλήλοις τῶν σπουδαζομένων· οἷον ἄσκησις λόγων καὶ μαθημάτων ἀνάληψις ἀπραγμοσύνης δεῖται καὶ σχολῆς, δυνάμεις δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φιλίαι βασιλέων οὐκ ἄνευ πραγμάτων
C οὐδ' ἀσχολιῶν περιγίνονται. καὶ μὴν "οἶνός[2] τε καὶ σαρκῶν ἐμφορήσεις[3] σῶμα μὲν ἰσχυρὸν ποιοῦσι καὶ ῥωμαλέον, ψυχὴν δ' ἀσθενῆ"· καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιμέλεια μὲν συνεχὴς καὶ τήρησις αὔξει πλοῦτον, ὑπεροψία[4] δὲ καὶ περιφρόνησις[5] μέγα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἐφόδιον. ὅθεν οὐ πάντα πάντων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῷ Πυθικῷ γράμματι πειθόμενον αὐτὸν καταμαθεῖν, εἶτα χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἓν ὃ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἄλλοτε βίου ζῆλον ἕλκειν καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν·

[1] *μαντεῖος*] *μαντῶος* (or *-ῷος*) in most MSS.
[2] *οἶνος*] *οἶνοι* Stobaeus.
[3] *ἐμφορήσεις* Stobaeus: *ἐμφόρησις*.
[4] *ὑπεροψία δὲ καὶ περιφρόνησις*] *ἀνυπεροψία δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνη* Stobaeus.
[5] *περιφρόνησις*] *παραφροσύνη* many MSS.

orator, a poet, a general, a rich man, and a king; and then they count themselves worthy of all these titles, and if they fail to get them, are vexed. Yet even among the gods different gods hold different powers: one bears the epithet "War-like," another "Prophetic," another "Gain-bringing"; and Zeus[a] dispatches Aphroditê to marriages and nuptial chambers, on the ground that she has no part in deeds of war.

13. There are, indeed, some pursuits which cannot by their very nature exist together, but rather are by nature opposed to each other; for example, training in rhetoric and the pursuit of mathematics require a quiet life and leisure, while political functions and the friendship of kings cannot succeed without hard work and the full occupation of one's time. And[b] "wine and indulgence in meat" do indeed "make the body strong and vigorous, but the soul weak"[c]; and unremitting care to acquire and preserve money increases wealth, yet contempt and disdain for it is greatly conducive to progress in philosophy. Therefore not all pursuits are for everyone, but one must, obeying the Pythian[d] inscription, "know one's self," and then use one's self for that one thing for which Nature has fitted one and not do violence to nature by dragging one's self towards the emulation of now one sort of life, now another.

[a] *Cf.* Homer, *Il.*, v. 428 ff.
[b] This passage to the beginning of the quotation from Pindar below is quoted by Stobaeus, vol. iii. p. 559 ed. Hense.
[c] Words of Androcydes: *cf.* Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, vii. 6 ed. Stählin; see also *Moralia*, 995 E, Athenaeus, iv. 157 d.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 164 B.

(472) ἐν[1] ἅρμασιν ἵππος
ἐν δ' ἀρότρῳ βοῦς, παρὰ ναῦν δ' ἰθύει τάχιστα δελφίς,
κάπρῳ δὲ βουλεύοντα[2] φόνον κύνα χρὴ τλάθυμον ἐξευρεῖν.

ὁ δ' ἀσχάλλων καὶ λυπούμενος ὅτι μὴ καὶ λέων ἐστὶν

ὀρεσίτροφος, ἀλκὶ πεποιθώς,

ἅμα καὶ κυνίδιον Μελιταῖον ἐν κόλπῳ χήρας γυναικὸς τιθηνούμενον, ἀπόπληκτός ἐστι. τούτου δ' οὐδέν τι βελτίων ὁ βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ Πλάτων ἢ Δημόκριτος εἶναι περὶ κόσμου γράφων καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείας, ἅμα δὲ πλουσίᾳ γραῒ συγκαθεύδειν ὡς Εὐφορίων, ἢ τῶν ἐπικώμων ὢν[3] Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συμπίνειν ὡς Μήδιος· ἀγανακτῶν δὲ καὶ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ θαυμάζεται διὰ πλοῦτον ὡς Ἰσμηνίας καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν ὡς Ἐπαμεινώνδας. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δρομεῖς, ὅτι μὴ τοὺς τῶν παλαιστῶν φέρονται στεφάνους, ἀθυμοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὑτῶν ἀγάλλονται καὶ χαίρουσι.

Σπάρταν ἔλαχες, ταύταν κόσμει.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ Σόλων,

[1] ἐν] ὑφ' *Moralia*, 451 D, *supra*.
[2] βουλεύοντα] βουλεύοντι in most MSS.; *cf.* 451 D, *supra*.
[3] τῶν ἐπικώμων ὢν Pohlenz: ἰὼν ἐπὶ κῶμον Reiske: τῶν ἐπὶ κῶμον.

The horse is for the chariot;
The ox for the plough; beside the ship most swiftly speeds the dolphin;
And if you think to slay a boar, you must find a stout-hearted hound.[a]

But that man is out of his wits who is annoyed and pained that he is not at the same time both a lion

Bred on the mountains, sure of his strength,[b]

and a little Maltese dog cuddled in the lap of a widow.[c] But not a whit better than he is the man who wishes at the same time to be an Empedocles or a Plato or a Democritus, writing about the universe and the true nature of reality, and, like Euphorion, to be married to a wealthy old woman, or, like Medius,[d] to be one of Alexander's boon companions and drink with him; and is vexed and grieved if he is not admired for his wealth, like Ismenias, and also for his valour, like Epameinondas. We know that runners are not discouraged because they do not carry off wrestlers' crowns, but they exult and rejoice in their own.

Your portion is Sparta: let your crowns be for her![e]

So also Solon[f]:

[a] Pindar, Frag. 234; *cf.* 451 D, *supra*.
[b] Homer, *Od.*, vi. 130.
[c] *Cf.* O. Hense, *Rheinisches Museum*, xlv. 549, note 1.
[d] *Cf. Life of Alexander*, lxxv. (706 C); *Moralia*, 65 C, 124 C; Arrian, *Anabasis*, vii. 225. 1.
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 588, Euripides, Frag. 723, from the *Telephus*; *cf. Moralia*, 602 B; *Paroemiographi Graeci*, ii. p. 772.
[f] Frag. 4, verses 10-12 ed. Diehl; Frag. 15, verses 2-4 ed. Edmonds; *cf. Moralia*, 78 C, 92 E, *Life of Solon*, iii. (79 F).

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς[1] οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
E τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον· ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδόν
ἐστι,[2]
χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

καὶ Στράτων ὁ φυσικός, ἀκούσας ὅτι πολλαπλασίους ἔχει Μενέδημος μαθητάς, "τί οὖν," ἔφη, "θαυμαστόν, εἰ πλείονές εἰσιν οἱ λούεσθαι[3] τῶν ἀλείφεσθαι βουλομένων;" Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ προς Ἀντίπατρον γράφων, "οὐκ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ μόνον," ἔφη, "προσήκει μέγα φρονεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ θεῶν ἃ δεῖ δοξάζειν." τοὺς γὰρ οὕτω τὰ οἰκεῖα σεμνύνοντας οὐκ ἐνοχλήσει τὰ τῶν πλησίον. νῦν δὲ
F τὴν μὲν[4] ἄμπελον σῦκα φέρειν οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαίαν βότρυς· αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτούς, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν πλουσίων ἅμα καὶ τὰ τῶν λογίων καὶ τὰ τῶν στρατευομένων καὶ τὰ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων καὶ τὰ τῶν κολακευόντων καὶ τὰ τῶν παρρησιαζομένων καὶ τὰ τῶν φειδομένων καὶ τὰ τῶν δαπανώντων ἔχωμεν προτερήματα, συκοφαντοῦμεν καὶ ἀχαριστοῦμεν αὐτοῖς[5] καὶ καταφρονοῦμεν ὡς ἐνδεῶς καὶ
473 εὐτελῶς[6] βιούντων.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ὑπομιμνήσκουσαν ἡμᾶς. ὡς γὰρ τῶν θηρίων ἑτέροις ἀφ' ἑτέρων παρεσκεύασε τὴν τροφὴν εἶναι καὶ οὐ πάντα σαρκοφαγεῖν ἢ σπερμολογεῖν ἢ ῥιζωρυχεῖν ἐποίη-

[1] αὐτοῖς] τούτοις Theognis, 316, Stobaeus.
[2] ἐστι] αἰεί Theognis.
[3] After λούεσθαι some MSS. add θέλοντες.
[4] μὲν] in two MSS. (G, W) only.
[5] αὐτοῖς Bernardakis: αὐτοῖς.

But we shall not exchange with them our virtue
For their wealth, since virtue is a sure possession,
But money falls now to this man, now that.

And Strato, the natural philosopher, when he heard that Menedemus had many more pupils than he himself had, said, "Why be surprised if there are more who wish to bathe than to be anointed for the contest?"[a] And Aristotle,[b] writing to Antipater, said, "It is not Alexander alone who has the right to be proud because he rules over many men, but no less right to be proud have they who have true notions concerning the gods." For those who have such lofty opinions of their own possessions will not be offended by their neighbours' goods. But as it is, we do not expect the vine to bear figs nor the olive grapes,[c] but, for ourselves, if we have not at one and the same time the advantages of both the wealthy and the learned, of both commanders and philosophers, of both flatterers and the outspoken, of both the thrifty and the lavish, we slander ourselves, we are displeased, we despise ourselves as living an incomplete and trivial life.

Furthermore, we see that Nature also admonishes us; for just as she has provided different foods for different beasts and has not made them all carnivorous or seed-pickers or root-diggers, so has she

[a] *Cf.* the anecdote of Zeno, *Moralia*, 78 D-E, 545 F.
[b] Frag. 664 ed. V. Rose; *cf.* *Moralia*, 78 D, 545 A; Julian's *Letter to Themistius*, 265 A (ii. p. 231 ed. Wright, L.C.L.).
[c] "Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?"

[6] εὐτελῶς Reiske: ἀτελῶς.

(473) σεν, οὕτω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποικίλας πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀφορμὰς ἔδωκε,

μηλοβότᾳ τ' ἀρότᾳ τ' ὀρνιχολόχῳ[1] τε καὶ ὃν πόντος τρέφει.

δεῖ δὴ τὸ πρόσφορον ἑαυτοῖς ἑλομένους καὶ διαπονοῦντας ἐᾶν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μὴ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐλέγχειν ἐνδεέστερον εἰπόντα

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.

οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοὺς ὁμοτέχνους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοτρό-
B πους ζηλοτυποῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογίους πλούσιοι καὶ πλουσίους ἔνδοξοι καὶ δικολόγοι σοφιστάς, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κωμῳδοὺς εὐημεροῦντας ἐν θεάτροις[2] καὶ ὀρχηστὰς καὶ θεράποντας ἐν αὐλαῖς βασιλέων ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐπατρίδαι κατατεθαμβημένοι καὶ μακαρίζοντες, οὐ μετρίως λυποῦσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ταράττουσιν.

14. Ὅτι δ' ἕκαστος ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τῆς εὐθυμίας καὶ δυσθυμίας ἔχει ταμιεῖα, καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν πίθους οὐκ "ἐν Διὸς οὔδει" κατακειμένους ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κειμένους,[3] αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν
C παθῶν δηλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνόητοι καὶ παρόντα τὰ χρηστὰ παρορῶσι καὶ ἀμελοῦσιν ὑπὸ[4] τοῦ συντετάσθαι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀεὶ ταῖς φροντίσιν, οἱ δὲ φρόνιμοι καὶ τὰ μηκέτ' ὄντα[5] τῷ μνημονεύειν

[1] ὀρνιχολόχῳ Pindar, *Isthm.*, i. 48: ὀρνιθολόχῳ.
[2] θεάτροις] θεάτρῳ Schol. Hes.
[3] κειμένους] *del.* van Herwerden.
[4] ὑπὸ] ὑπὲρ in most mss.
[5] ὄντα] ἐόντα in many mss.: perhaps a quotation from poetry or Ionian philosophy.

given to men a great variety of means for gaining a livelihood,

To shepherd and ploughman and fowler and to him whom the sea
Provides with sustenance.[a]

We should, therefore, choose the calling appropriate to ourselves, cultivate it diligently, let the rest alone, and not prove that[b] Hesiod spoke inexactly when he said,

Potter is angry with potter, joiner with joiner.

For not only are men jealous of fellow-craftsmen and those who share the same life as themselves, but also the wealthy envy the learned, the famous the rich, advocates the sophists, and, by Heaven free men and patricians regard with wondering admiration and envy successful comedians in the theatre and dancers and servants in the courts of kings; and by so doing they afford themselves no small vexation and disturbance.

14. But that every man has within himself the storerooms of tranquillity and discontent, and that the jars containing blessings and evils are not stored "on the threshold of Zeus,"[c] but are in the soul, is made plain by the differences in men's passions. For the foolish overlook and neglect good things even when they are present, because their thoughts are ever intent upon the future, but the wise by remembrance

[a] Pindar, *Isthmian Odes*, i. 48; *cf. Moralia*, 406 c.
[b] *Works and Days*, 25; the whole passage, to the end of the chapter, is quoted in the Munich scholia on this verse of Hesiod (Usener, *Rheinisches Museum*, xxii. 592).
[c] *Cf.* Homer, *Il.*, xxiv. 527; *Moralia*. 24 B and the note, 105 C and the note, 600 C; Plato, *Republic*, 379 D; Siefert, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 f. and the notes.

(473) ἐναργῶς ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς. τὸ γὰρ παρὸν τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ τοῦ χρόνου μορίῳ θιγεῖν παρασχὸν εἶτα τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐκφυγὸν οὐκέτι δοκεῖ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ' ἡμέτερον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνοήτοις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Ἅιδου ζωγραφούμενος σχοινοστρόφος ὄνῳ τινὶ[1] παρίησιν ἐπιβοσκομένῳ καταναλίσκειν τὸ πλεκόμενον, οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν ἀναίσθητος καὶ ἀχάριστος ὑπολαμβάνουσα λήθη καὶ κατανεμομένη πρᾶξίν τε
D πᾶσαν ἀφανίζουσα καὶ κατόρθωμα καὶ σχολὴν ἐπίχαριν καὶ συμπεριφορὰν καὶ ἀπόλαυσιν, οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν βίον ἕνα γενέσθαι, συμπλεκομένων τοῖς παροῦσι τῶν παρῳχημένων· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἕτερον τὸν ἐχθὲς ὄντα τοῦ σήμερον καὶ τὸν αὔριον ὁμοίως οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ σήμερον διαιροῦσα, πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον εὐθὺς εἰς τὸ ἀγένητον τῷ ἀμνημονεύτῳ καθίστησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τὰς αὐξήσεις ἀναιροῦντες ὡς τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδελεχῶς ῥεούσης, λόγῳ ποιοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ἄλλον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλον· οἱ δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ τὰ[2] πρότερον μὴ στέγοντες μηδ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες ἀλλ' ὑπεκρεῖν ἐῶντες ἔργῳ ποιοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς καθ' ἡμέραν ἀποδεεῖς καὶ κενοὺς καὶ
E τῆς αὔριον ἐκκρεμαμένους, ὡς τῶν πέρυσι καὶ πρώην καὶ χθὲς οὐ πρὸς αὐτοὺς[3] ὄντων οὐδ' ὅλως αὐτοῖς γενομένων.[4]

15. Καὶ τοῦτ' οὖν τὴν εὐθυμίαν ἐπιταράσσει·

[1] ὄνῳ τινὶ] ὥτινι most MSS.: ἑρπετῷ τινι D.
[2] τὰ] omitted in most MSS.
[3] αὐτοὺς Xylander: αὐτῶν or αὐτὸν.
[4] γενομένων] γινομένων in most MSS.

make even those benefits that are no longer at hand to be vividly existent for themselves. For the present good, which allows us to touch it but for the smallest portion of time and then eludes our perception, seems to fools to have no further reference to us or to belong to us at all; but like that painting of a man [a] twisting rope in Hades, who permits a donkey grazing near by to eat it up as he plaits it, so insensible and thankless forgetfulness steals upon the multitude and takes possession of them, consuming every action and success, every pleasant moment of leisure and companionship and enjoyment; it does not allow life to become unified, when past is interwoven with present, but separating yesterday, as though it were different, from to-day, and to-morrow likewise, as though it were not the same as to-day, forgetfulness straightway makes every event to have never happened because it is never recalled. For those who in the Schools do away with growth and increase on the ground that Being is in a continual flux, in theory make each of us a series of persons different from oneself [b]; so those who do not preserve or recall by memory former events, but allow them to flow away, actually make themselves deficient and empty each day and dependent upon the morrow, as though what had happened last year and yesterday and the day before had no relation to them nor had happened to them at all.

15. This, then, is a matter disturbing to tranquillity

[a] Ocnus or "Sloth"; the painting was by Polygnotus in the Lesché at Delphi: Pausanias, x. 29. 1. *Cf.* also Propertius, iv. 3. 21-22: dignior obliquo funem qui torqueat Ocno, | aeternusque tuam pascat, aselle, famem; Diodorus, i. 97; Pliny, *Natural History*, xxxv. 137.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 392 D, 559 B.

κἀκεῖνο μᾶλλον, ὅταν, ὥσπερ αἱ μυῖαι τῶν λείων τόπων ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις ἀπολισθάνουσι ταῖς δὲ τραχύτησι προσέχονται καὶ ταῖς ἀμυχαῖς, οὕτως ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἱλαρῶν καὶ προσηνῶν ἀπορρέοντες ἐμπλέκωνται ταῖς τῶν ἀηδῶν ἀναμνήσεσι· μᾶλλον δ' ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ τοὺς κανθάρους λέγουσιν, εἴς τι χωρίον ἐμβαλόντας[1] ὃ καλεῖται "Κανθαρώλεθρον," ἐκβῆναι μὴ δυναμένους ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ στρεφο-
F μένους καὶ κυκλοῦντας ἐναποθνήσκειν, οὕτως εἰς τὴν τῶν κακῶν μνήμην ὑπορρυέντες ἀνενεγκεῖν μὴ θέλωσι μηδ' ἀναπνεῦσαι. δεῖ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν πινακίῳ χρωμάτων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ φαιδρὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ προβάλλοντας, ἀποκρύπτειν τὰ σκυθρωπὰ καὶ πιέζειν· ἐξαλεῖψαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι παντάπασιν οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι. "παλίντροπος[2] γὰρ
474 ἁρμονίη κόσμου, ὅκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου," καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καθαρὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀμιγές. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν μουσικῇ βαρεῖς φθόγγοι καὶ ὀξεῖς ἐν δὲ γραμματικῇ φωνήεντα καὶ ἄφωνα γράμματα, μουσικὸς δὲ καὶ γραμματικὸς οὐχ ὁ θάτερα δυσχεραίνων καὶ ὑποφεύγων ἀλλ' ὁ πᾶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ μιγνύναι πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστάμενος, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντιστοιχίας ἐχόντων (ἐπεὶ κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,
ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχειν καλῶς),

[1] ἐμβαλόντας Bernardakis: ἐμβάλλοντας.
[2] παλίντροπος] παλίντονος D and *Moralia*, 369 B.

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus*, 120 (842 a 5 f.); Pliny, *Natural History*, xi. 28. 99.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 599 F—600 A; 863 E.

of mind; and another, even more disturbing, arises when, like flies which slip off the smooth surfaces of mirrors, but stick to places which are rough or scratched, men drift away from joyous and agreeable matters and become entangled in the remembrance of unpleasant things; or rather, as they relate that when beetles have fallen into a place at Olynthus which is called "Death-to-Beetles,"[a] they are unable to get out, but turn and circle about there until they die in that place, so when men have slipped into brooding upon their misfortunes, they do not wish to recover or revive from that state. But, like colours in a painting,[b] so in the soul it is right that we should place in the foreground bright and cheerful experiences and conceal and suppress the gloomy; for to wipe them out and be rid of them altogether is impossible. "For the harmony of the universe, like that of a lyre or a bow, is by alternatives,"[c] and in mortal affairs there is nothing pure and unmixed. But as in music there are low notes and high notes, and in grammar there are vowels and consonants, yet a musician or a grammarian is not the man who dislikes and avoids the one or the other, but rather the man who knows how to use all and to blend them properly,[d] so also in human affairs, which contain the principles of opposition to each other (since, as Euripides[e] has it,

The good and bad cannot be kept apart,
But there's some blending, so that all is well),

[c] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], i. p. 162, Heracleitus, Frag. 51; *cf. Moralia*, 369 B, 1026 B; "by alternatives," that is, by alternate tightening and relaxing.
[d] *Cf.* Plato, *Philebus*, 17 B ff.
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 369, Frag. 21, from the *Aeolus*; quoted again in *Moralia*, 25 C-D and 369 B.

(474) οὐ δεῖ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐξαθυμεῖν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύειν·
B ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἁρμονικοὺς ἀμβλύνοντας ἀεὶ τοῖς κρείττοσι τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ χείρονα τοῖς χρηστοῖς ἐμπεριλαμβάνοντας, ἐμμελὲς τὸ τοῦ βίου μῖγμα ποιεῖν καὶ οἰκεῖον αὑτοῖς.[1]

Οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὁ Μένανδρός φησιν,

ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται[2]
εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου
ἀγαθός,

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, δίτταί τινες ἕκαστον ἡμῶν γινόμενον παραλαμβάνουσι καὶ κατάρχονται μοῖραι καὶ δαίμονες·

ἔνθ' ἦσαν Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἡλιόπη ταναῶπις,
Δῆρίς θ' αἱματόεσσα καὶ Ἁρμονίη θεμερῶπις,
Καλλιστώ τ' Αἴσχρη τε Θόωσά τε Δηναίη[3] τε,
C Νημερτής τ' ἐρόεσσα μελάγκουρός[4] τ' Ἀσάφεια.

16. Ὥστε[5] τούτων ἑκάστου σπέρματα τῶν παθῶν ἀνακεκραμένα δεδεγμένης ἡμῶν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἐχούσης, εὔχεται μὲν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων τὰ βελτίονα προσδοκᾷ δὲ καὶ θάτερα, χρῆται δ' ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ἄγαν ἀφαιρῶν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον " ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος," ὥς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, " ἥδιστα πρόσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον," ἀλλὰ καὶ πλοῦτος εὐφραίνει καὶ δόξα καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ[6] μάλιστα τοὺς ἥκιστα τἀναντία ταρβοῦν-

[1] αὑτοῖς Stegmann: αὐτοῖς.
[2] συμπαρίσταται] συμπαραστατεῖ most MSS.
[3] Δηναίη Bentley, confirmed by MSS.: δειναίη.
[4] μελάγκουρός Tzetzes: μελάγκαρπός.
[5] ὥστε] ὡς δὲ Wyttenbach.
[6] καὶ after ἀρχὴ deleted by Xylander.

we should not be disheartened or despondent in adversity, but like musicians who achieve harmony by consistently deadening bad music with better and encompassing the bad with the good, we should make the blending of our life harmonious and conformable to our own nature.

For it is not true, as Menander [a] says, that

By every man at birth a Spirit stands,
A guide of virtue for life's mysteries;

but rather, as Empedocles [b] affirms, two Fates, as it were, or Spirits, receive in their care each one of us at birth and consecrate us:

Chthonia was there and far-seeing Heliopê,
And bloody Deris, grave-eyed Harmonia,
Callisto, Aeschra, Thoösa, and Denaea,
Lovely Nemertes, dark-eyed Asapheia.

16. The result is that since we at our birth received the mingled seeds of each of these affections, and since therefore our nature possesses much unevenness, a man of sense prays for better things, but expects the contrary as well, and, avoiding excess, deals with both conditions. For not only does " he who has least need of the morrow," as Epicurus [c] says, " most gladly advance to meet the morrow," but also wealth and reputation and power and public office delight most of all those who least fear their

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 167, Frag. 550 (p. 491 ed. Allinson).
[b] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], i. pp. 360-361, Frag. 122. The names are intended to mean Earth-maiden, Sun-maiden; Discord, Harmony; Beauty, Ugliness; Swiftness, Slowness; Truth, Uncertainty.
[c] Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 307, Frag. 490 (p. 139 Bailey); *cf* Horace, *Epistulae*, i. 4. 13-14.

(474) τας. ἡ γὰρ σφοδρὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἐπιθυμία
D σφοδρότατον φόβον ἐμποιοῦσα τοῦ μὴ παραμενεῖν, ἀσθενῆ τὴν χάριν ποιεῖ καὶ ἀβέβαιον ὥσπερ φλόγα καταπνεομένην. ᾧ δὲ δίδωσι πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀδεῶς καὶ ἀτρόμως εἰπεῖν ὁ λογισμός,

ἡδὺ μὲν ἄν τι φέρῃς, ὀλίγον δ' ἄχος ἂν ἀπολείπῃς,

τοῦτον ἥδιστα ποιεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι τὸ θαρραλέον καὶ μὴ δεδιὸς αὐτῶν τὴν ἀποβολὴν ὡς ἀφόρητον. ἔξεστι γὰρ τὴν Ἀναξαγόρου διάθεσιν, ἀφ' ἧς ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ παιδὸς ἀνεφώνησεν, "ἤδειν θνητὸν γεννήσας," μὴ θαυμάζοντας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμουμένους ἐπιλέγειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν τυχηρῶν, "οἶδα τὸν πλοῦτον ἐφήμερον ἔχων καὶ οὐ
E βέβαιον"· "οἶδα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφελέσθαι δυναμένους τοὺς δεδωκότας"· "οἶδα τὴν γυναῖκα χρηστὴν γυναῖκα δ' οὖσαν· καὶ τὸν φίλον ἄνθρωπον ὄντα, ζῷον φύσει εὐμετάβολον, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων εἶπεν." αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται παρασκευαὶ καὶ διαθέσεις, ἐάν τι συμβῇ τῶν ἀβουλήτων μὲν οὐκ ἀπροσδοκήτων δέ, μὴ δεχόμεναι τὸ "οὐκ ἂν ᾤμην" καὶ τὸ "ἄλλ'[1] ἤλπιζον" καὶ τὸ "ταῦτ' οὐ προσεδόκων," οἷον[2] πηδήματα καρδίας καὶ σφυγμοὺς ἀφαιροῦσι καὶ ταχὺ πάλιν τὸ μανιῶδες καὶ ταραττόμενον ἱδρύουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Καρνεάδης ἐπὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων
F ὑπεμίμνησκεν ὅτι πᾶν καὶ ὅλον ἐστὶν εἰς λύπην ἄγον[3] καὶ ἀθυμίαν τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον. ἡ γὰρ

[1] τὸ ἄλλα Meziriacus: πολλὰ. [2] οἷον] οἷα Reiske.
[3] ἄγον added by Capps.

[a] Perhaps a fragment of Callimachus (*cf.* Frag. Anon. 371 ed. Schneider); see also Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, xi. 3.

opposites. For the violent desire for each of these implants a most violent fear that they may not remain, and so renders pleasure in them weak and unstable, like a fluttering flame. But the man whom Reason enables to say to Fortune without fear and trembling,

> Welcome to me if any good you bring;
> But if you fail, the pain is very slight,[a]

his confidence and the absence of fear that their loss would be unbearable cause him to make most pleasant use of present advantages. For it is possible not only to admire the disposition of Anaxagoras,[b] which made him say at the death of his son, "I knew that my son was mortal," but also to imitate it and to apply it to every dispensation of Fortune: "I know that my wealth is temporary and insecure," "I know that those who bestowed my magistracy can take it away," "I know that my wife is excellent, but a woman, and that my friend is but a man, by nature an animal readily subject to change, as Plato[c] said." For men of such preparedness and of such disposition, if anything unwished yet not unexpected happens, disdain sentiments like these: "I never should have thought it," or "I had hoped for other things," or "I did not expect this," and so do away with anything like throbbings and palpitations of the heart, and speedily restore again to quiet the madness and disturbance of their minds. Carneades, indeed, reminded us that in matters of great importance it is the unexpected[d] that is completely and wholly the cause of grief and

[b] *Cf.* 463 D, *supra*, and the note.
[c] *Epistle* xiii. 360 D: *cf.* 463 D, *supra*, and the note.
[d] *Cf.* 449 E, *supra*.

Μακεδόνων βασιλεία τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας πολλοστημόριον ἦν· ἀλλὰ Περσεὺς μὲν ἀποβαλὼν Μακεδονίαν αὐτός τε κατεθρήνει τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ πᾶσιν ἐδόκει δυστυχέστατος ἀνθρώπων
475 γεγονέναι καὶ βαρυποτμότατος· ὁ δὲ τούτου κρατήσας Αἰμίλιος ἑτέρῳ παραδιδοὺς τὴν ὁμοῦ τι γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρχουσαν δύναμιν ἐστεφανοῦτο καὶ ἔθυεν εὐδαιμονιζόμενος, εἰκότως· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἥδει λαμβάνων ἀρχὴν ἀποδοθησομένην, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀπέβαλε μὴ προσδοκήσας. εὖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οἷόν ἐστι τὸ παρὰ προσδοκίαν ἐδίδαξεν· ὁ γὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς τοῦ μὲν κυνὸς σαίνοντος[1] ἐξεδάκρυσε, τῇ δὲ γυναικὶ κλαιούσῃ παρακαθήμενος οὐδὲν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτον· ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ἀφῖκτο τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος ὑποχείριον ἔχων καὶ προκατειλημμένον, εἰς δ' ἐκεῖνο[2] μὴ προσδοκήσας ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης διὰ τὸ παράδοξον ἐνέπεσεν.

B 17. Καθόλου δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀβουλήτων τὰ μὲν φύσει τὸ λυποῦν καὶ βαροῦνον ἐπιφέρει, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα δόξῃ δυσχεραίνειν ἐθιζόμεθα καὶ μανθάνομεν, οὐκ[3] ἄχρηστόν ἐστι πρὸς ταῦτα μὲν[4] ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸ τοῦ Μενάνδρου πρόχειρον·

οὐδὲν πέπονθας δεινὸν ἂν μὴ προσποιῇ

[1] σαίνοντος Hartman: θανόντος.
[2] ἐκεῖνο Reiske, confirmed by MSS.: ἐκεῖνον.
[3] καὶ before οὐκ deleted by Stephanus and Hutten.
[4] μὲν] omitted in most MSS.

[a] *Cf.*, for example, *Life of Aemilius Paulus*, xxxiv. 1-2 (273 C-E).
[b] *Od.*, xvii. 302-304: ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ.

dejection. For example, the kingdom of Macedonia was infinitely smaller than the Roman dominion, yet when Perseus lost Macedonia, both he himself bewailed his own evil genius and every one thought that he had become the most unfortunate and ill-starred man in the world[a]; but Aemilius, his conqueror, handed over to another his supreme command of practically the whole earth and sea, yet was crowned and offered sacrifice and was esteemed fortunate—and with good reason, for he knew that he had taken a command which would have to be relinquished again, whereas Perseus lost his kingdom when he had not expected to do so. And well has the Poet taught us how strong the effect of an unexpected happening is: Odysseus, for instance, shed a tear when his dog fawned upon him,[b] yet when he sat beside his weeping wife,[c] gave way to no such emotion; for into the latter situation he had come with his emotion under control and fortified by reason, but he had stumbled into the former without having expected it, and suddenly.

17. And, to speak generally, although some of the things which happen against our will do by their very nature bring pain and distress, yet since it is through false opinion that we learn and become accustomed to be disgruntled with the greatest part of them, it is not unprofitable to have the verse of Menander[d] ever ready against the latter:

No harm's been done you, if you none admit

[c] *Ibid.* xix. 208 ff.; quoted in 442 D, *supra*, where see the note.
[d] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 52, Frag. 179, from the *Epitrepontes*; Allinson, p. 127. The translation is that of A. M. Harmon.

(475) (*τί γὰρ πρὸς σέ ἐστι, φησίν,*[1] *ἂν μήτε σαρκὸς ἅπτηται μήτε ψυχῆς, οἷόν ἐστι δυσγένεια πατρὸς ἢ μοιχεία γυναικὸς ἢ στεφάνου τινὸς ἢ προεδρίας ἀφαίρεσις, ὧν οὐ κωλύεται παρόντων ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιστα διακείμενον ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ψυχήν;)· πρὸς δὲ τὰ φύσει δοκοῦντα λυπεῖν, οἷα*
C *νόσοι καὶ πόνοι καὶ θάνατοι φίλων καὶ τέκνων, ἐκεῖνο τὸ Εὐριπίδειον*

οἴμοι· τί δ' οἴμοι; θνητά τοι πεπόνθαμεν.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω τοῦ παθητικοῦ καταφερομένου καὶ ὀλισθάνοντος ἀντιλαμβάνεται λόγος, ὡς ὁ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ φυσικῆς ἀνάμνησιν ποιῶν ἀνάγκης, ᾗ διὰ τὸ σῶμα μεμιγμένος ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνην ταύτην τῇ τύχῃ λαβὴν δίδωσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ μεγίστοις ἀσφαλὴς ἕστηκεν.

Ὁ Δημήτριος τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καταλαβὼν ἠρώτησε τὸν Στίλπωνα, μή τι τῶν ἐκείνου διήρπασται. καὶ ὁ Στίλπων ἔφη μηδέν' ἰδεῖν "τἀμὰ"[2] *φέροντα. καὶ τοίνυν τῆς τύχης πάντα τἄλλα λεηλατούσης καὶ περιαιρουμένης, ἔχομέν τι τοιοῦ-*
D *τον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς,*

οἷόν κ' οὔτε φέροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἄγοιεν.

[1] *φησίν*] *φασίν* in some mss.; *φημί* or *φήσομεν* van Herwerden.
[2] *τἀμὰ*] *τὰν ἐπιστάμαν* Pohlenz; *ἐπιστάμαν* Dübner.

[a] The *προεδρία* was the privilege of sitting in the front seats at public games, or the theatre, or public assemblies, granted to distinguished citizens, foreigners, or magistrates.

(for what, he means, if they touch neither body nor soul, are such things to you as the low birth of your father, or the adultery of your wife, or the deprivation of a crown or of front seats,[a] since when these misfortunes are present a man is not prevented from having both body and soul in the best of condition ?) ; and against those things which seem to pain us by their very nature, as sicknesses, anxieties, and the death of friends and children, we should have ready that famous verse of Euripides [b] :

> Alas !—Yet why alas ? Our sufferings
> Are but what we mortals must endure.

For no reasoning so effectively engages the emotional part of us, when it is being borne down and is slipping, as that which reminds us of the common and natural necessity to which man is exposed through his composite and corporeal nature : it is the only hold he gives to Fortune, while in his most vital and important parts he stands secure.

When Demetrius took the Megarians' city, he asked Stilpo if any of his possessions had been plundered. And Stilpo said, " I saw no one carrying off *my* property." [c] And therefore when Fortune plunders and strips us of everything else, we have something within ourselves of the sort that

> Achaeans could never harry or plunder.[d]

[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec Frag.*[2], p. 449, Frag. 300, from the *Bellerophon* ; *cf.* Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, aetat. 45 (vol. i. p. 277 ed. Hill).
[c] " Virtue " according to *Moralia*, 5 F ; " knowledge " in the *Life of Demetrius*, ix. (893 A): *οὐδένα γὰρ εἶδον ἐπιστάμαν ἀποφέροντα.*
[d] Adapted from Homer, *Il.*, v. 484

(475) ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ παντάπασιν ἐκταπεινοῦν[1] οὐδὲ καταβάλλειν τὴν φύσιν, ὡς μηδὲν ἰσχυρὸν μηδὲ μόνιμον μηδ' ὑπὲρ τὴν τύχην ἔχουσαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον εἰδότας ὅτι μικρόν ἐστι μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σαθρὸν[2] καὶ ἐπίκηρον,[3] ᾧ[4] δέχεται τὴν τύχην, τῆς δὲ βελτίονος μερίδος αὐτοὶ κρατοῦμεν, ἐν ᾗ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱδρυθέντα, δόξαι τε χρησταὶ καὶ μαθήματα καὶ λόγοι τελευτῶντες εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀναφαίρετον ἔχουσι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον, ἀνεκπλήκτους[5] πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι καὶ θαρραλέους,
E πρὸς[6] τὴν τύχην λέγοντας, ἃ Σωκράτης δοκῶν πρὸς τοὺς κατηγόρους[7] λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἔλεγεν, ὡς ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος δύνανται, βλάψαι δ' οὐ δύνανται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τύχη δύναται νόσῳ περιβαλεῖν, ἀφελέσθαι χρήματα, διαβαλεῖν πρὸς δῆμον ἢ τύραννον· κακὸν δὲ καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ταπεινόφρονα καὶ ἀγεννῆ καὶ φθονερὸν οὐ δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀνδρώδη καὶ μεγαλόψυχον[8] οὐδὲ παρελέσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν,[9] ἧς ἀεὶ παρούσης πλέον ἢ κυβερνήτου πρὸς θάλατταν ὄφελός ἐστι
F πρὸς τὸν βίον. κυβερνήτῃ γὰρ οὔτε κῦμα πραῦναι τραχὺ καὶ πνεῦμα δυνατόν ἐστιν, οὔθ' ὅποι βούλεται δεομένῳ λιμένος τυχεῖν οὔτε θαρραλέως καὶ

[1] ἐκταπεινοῦν οὐδὲ καταβάλλειν] ταπεινοῦν Stobaeus; but *cf.* 471 C, *supra.*
[2] τὸ σαθρὸν καὶ] σαθρόν τε καὶ Stobaeus.
[3] ἐπίκηρον Stobaeus and G: τὸ ἐπίκηρον.
[4] ᾧ] ὃ Leonicus and some MSS.
[5] ἀνεκπλήκτους Stobaeus: ἀηττήτους.
[6] πρὸς Madvig, confirmed by MSS.: καὶ πρὸς.
[7] κατηγόρους Stobaeus: κατηγόρους Ἄνυτον καὶ Μέλητον.

Therefore [a] we should not altogether debase and depreciate Nature in the belief that she has nothing strong, stable, and beyond the reach of Fortune, but, on the contrary, since we know that the corrupt and perishable part of man wherein he lies open to Fortune is small, and that we ourselves are masters of the better part, in which the greatest of our blessings are situated—right opinions and knowledge and the exercise of reason terminating in the acquisition of virtue, all of which have their being inalienable and indestructible—knowing all this, we should face the future undaunted and confident and say to Fortune what Socrates,[b] when he was supposed to be replying to his accusers, was really saying to the jury, "Anytus and Meletus are able to take away my life, but they cannot hurt me." Fortune, in fact, can encompass us with sickness, take away our possessions, slander us to people or despot; but she cannot make the good and valiant and high-souled man base or cowardly, mean, ignoble, or envious, nor can she deprive us of that disposition, the constant presence of which is of more help in facing life than is a pilot in facing the sea. For a pilot cannot calm a savage wave or a wind, nor can he find a harbour wherever he wishes at need, nor can he await the event confidently and

[a] The following passage is cited in Stobaeus, vol. ii. p. 161 ed. Wachsmuth, as from Πλουτάρχου Περὶ φιλίας; but Patzig (*Quaest. Plutarch.*, p. 34) is doubtless right in thinking that φιλίας is a scribal error for εὐθυμίας.
[b] *Cf.* Plato, *Apology*, 30 C-D; the same form of this statement with almost the same differences from Plato's words is found in Epictetus, i. 29. 18, and the *Encheiridion*, liii. 4.

[8] C. Wachsmuth would add καὶ γενναῖον καὶ ἐλευθέριον; *cf.* 485 A, *infra.*
[9] διάθεσιν] διάθεσιν τῶν καλῶν Stobaeus.

ἀτρόμως ὑπομεῖναι τὸ συμβαῖνον· ἀλλ' ἕως οὐκ ἀπέγνωκε τῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος,

φεύγει μέγα λαῖφος ὑποστολίσας εἰς[1] ἐνέρτερον ἶστὸν
ἐρεβώδεος ἐκ θαλάσσης,

476 ἐπειδὰν δὲ τὸ πέλαγος[2] ὑπέρσχῃ, τρέμων κάθηται καὶ παλλόμενος. ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονίμου διάθεσις τοῖς τε σωματικοῖς παρέχει γαλήνην ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, ἐκλύουσα τὰς τῶν νόσων κατασκευὰς ἐγκρατείᾳ καὶ διαίτῃ σώφρονι καὶ μετρίοις πόνοις· κἄν τις ἔξωθεν ἀρχὴ πάθους ὥσπερ διαδρομὴ γένηται σπιλάδος, "εὐσταλεῖ καὶ κούφῃ κεραίᾳ παρήνεγκεν," ὥς φησιν Ἀσκληπιάδης· παραλόγου δέ τινος καὶ μεγάλου καταλαβόντος καὶ κρατήσαντος, ἐγγὺς ὁ λιμὴν καὶ πάρεστιν ἀπονήξασθαι τοῦ σώματος ὥσπερ ἐφολκίου μὴ στέγοντος.

18. Τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀνόητον ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος οὐχ ὁ τοῦ ζῆν πόθος ἐκκρέμασθαι τοῦ σώματος
B ποιεῖ, περιπεπλεγμένον ὥσπερ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τῷ ἐρινεῷ δεδοικότα τὴν Χάρυβδιν ὑποκειμένην,

ἔνθ' οὔτε μίμνειν ἄνεμος οὔτε πλεῖν[3] ἐᾷ,

καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα δυσαρέστως καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα περι-

[1] εἰς] most mss. have ἕως or ἔστ'.
[2] ἐπειδὰν δὲ τὸ πέλαγος added by Pohlenz from Demosthenes, *Third Philippic*, 69.
[3] οὔτε πλεῖν] οὔτ' ἐκπλεῖν Suidas and Diogenianus.

[a] *Cf.* Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.*[2], iii. p. 730, Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, iii. p. 474, or Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 910, ades. 377. The text is quite uncertain, though Pohlenz's interpretation seems better than any earlier one. *Cf.* also

without trembling; as long as he has not despaired, making use of his skill,

> With the mainsail dropped to the lower mast
> He flees from the murky sea,[a]

whereas when the sea towers over him, he sits there quaking and trembling. But the disposition of the wise man yields the highest degree of calm to his bodily affections, destroying by means of self-control, temperate diet, and moderate exertion the conditions leading to disease; even if the beginning of some evil comes from without, "he rides it out with light and well-furled sail," as Asclepiades[b] has it, just as one passes through a storm. But if some great unforeseen disaster comes upon him and masters him, the harbour is close at hand and he may swim away from his body, as from a leaky boat.[c]

18. For it is the fear of death, not the desire for life, which makes the fool dependent on his body, clinging to it as Odysseus[d] did to the fig-tree through fear of Charybdis below,

> Where breezes let him neither stay nor sail,[e]

so that he is displeased at this and fearful of that.

Moralia, 169 B, where the fragment is quoted in another form.
[b] Asclepiades of Samos; *cf.* Knox, *Choliambica*, p. 270, who rewrites the line.
[c] Apparently by suicide: *cf.* the admiration Plutarch expresses for Demosthenes' suicide (*Comp. Cic. and Dem.*, v. 888 c); but his position is quite different in the polemic against Epicurus, *Moralia*, 1103 E.
[d] Homer, *Od.*, xii. 432; *cf. De Anima*, vi. 4 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 26).
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 81, Aeschylus, Frag. 250, from the *Philoctetes*; Frag. 137 ed. Smyth (L.C.L.).

(476) δεῶς ἔχοντα. ὁ δὲ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀμωσγέπως ἐπινοῶν[1] καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ βέλτιον αὐτῆς ἢ μηθὲν κάκιον ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ μεταβολὴν ἐπιλογιζόμενος, οὐ μικρὸν ἔχει τῆς πρὸς τὸν βίον εὐθυμίας ἐφόδιον τὴν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἀφοβίαν. ᾧ γὰρ ἔξεστι τῆς μὲν ἀρεστῆς[2] καὶ οἰκείας μερίδος ἐπικρατούσης ἡδέως ζῆν, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπερβαλλόντων ἀδεῶς ἀπελθεῖν εἰπόντα,

λύσει μ' ὁ δαίμων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω,

C τί ἂν τούτῳ χαλεπὸν ἢ δύσκολον ἢ ταραχῶδες ἐμπίπτον ἐπινοήσαιμεν; ὁ γὰρ εἰπών, "προκατείλημμαί σ', ὦ Τύχη, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σὴν ἀφῄρημαι παρείσδυσιν," οὐ μοχλοῖς οὐδὲ κλεισὶν οὐδὲ τείχεσιν ἐθάρρυνεν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ δόγμασι καὶ λόγοις ὧν πᾶσι μέτεστι τοῖς βουλομένοις. καὶ δεῖ μηδὲν ἀπογινώσκειν μηδ' ἀπιστεῖν τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοντα καὶ ζηλοῦντα καὶ συνενθουσιῶντα πεῖραν ἅμα λαμβάνειν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατανόησιν ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσι πρὸς τὰ μείζονα, μὴ φεύγοντα μηδ' ἀπωθοῦντα τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἐπιμέ-
D λειαν αὐτῶν μηδὲ διαδιδράσκοντ' εἰς τὸ[3] "τάχα δ' οὐδὲν ἔσται δυσχερέστερον." ἀτονίαν[4] γὰρ ἐμποιεῖ καὶ μαλακίαν ἀγύμναστον ἡ περὶ τὸ ῥᾷστον ἀεὶ διατρίβουσα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον ἐκ τῶν ἀβουλήτων ἀναχωροῦσα γλυκυθυμία τῆς ψυχῆς. ἡ δὲ καὶ νόσου καὶ πόνου καὶ φυγῆς μελετῶσα φαντασίαν ὑφίστα-

[1] ἐπινοῶν] ὑπονοῶν in all MSS. except D.
[2] ἀρεστῆς Reiske: ἀρετῆς.
[3] εἰς τὸ added by Meziriacus.
[4] ἀτονίαν Reiske; ἀργίαν Dübner; ἄνοιαν Xylander: ἀνίαν; *cf.* 460 B, *supra*.

But he who understands somehow or other the nature of the soul and reflects that the change it undergoes at death will be for the better, or at least not for the worse, has no small provision to secure tranquillity of mind for facing life—fearlessness towards death. For he who can live pleasantly when the agreeable and congenial part of life is in the ascendant, but when alien and unnatural principles prevail, can depart fearlessly, saying,

The god himself shall free me, when I will,[a]

what can we imagine might befall such a man as this that would vex or trouble or disturb him? For he[b] who said, "I have anticipated you, Fortune, and taken from you every entry whereby you might get at me," encouraged himself, not with bolts or keys or battlements, but by precepts and reasoning in which everyone who desires may share. And one must not despair or disbelieve any of these arguments, but should admire and emulate them and, being filled with their inspiration, make trial of oneself and observe oneself in smaller matters with a view to the greater, not avoiding or rejecting from the soul the care of these things, nor taking refuge in the remark, "Perhaps nothing will be more difficult than this." For languor and flabby softness are implanted by that self-indulgence of the soul which ever occupies itself with the easiest way, and retreats from the undesirable to what is most pleasant. But the soul which endeavours, by study and the severe application of its

[a] Euripides, *Bacchae*, 498; *cf.* Horace, *Epistulae*, i. 16. 78-79:

"Ipse deus simul atque volam me solvet." opinor
hoc sentit, "moriar." mors ultima linea rerum est.

[b] Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Frag. 49 ed. Körte.

(476) σθαι καὶ προσβιαζομένη τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς ἕκαστον εὑρήσει πολὺ τὸ[1] κατεψευσμένον καὶ διάκενον καὶ σαθρὸν ἐν τοῖς δοκοῦσι χαλεποῖς καὶ φοβεροῖς, ὡς ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀποδείκνυσι λόγος.

19. Καίτοι πολλοὶ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Μενάνδρου πεφρίκασιν,

οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα, "τοῦτ' οὐ πείσομαι,"

ἀγνοοῦντες ὅσον ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλυπίαν ἀγαθὸν τὸ
E μελετᾶν καὶ δύνασθαι πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀνεῳγόσι τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἀντιβλέπειν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν αὑτῷ τὰς φαντασίας "ἀτρίπτους ἁπαλὰς"[2] ὥσπερ ἐνσκιατροφούμενον πολλαῖς ἐλπίσιν ὑπεικούσαις ἀεὶ καὶ πρὸς μηθὲν ἀντιτεινούσαις. ἐκεῖνο μέντοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν Μένανδρον ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν,

οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν[3] ζῶντα, "τοῦτ' οὐ πείσομαι,"

ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα, "τοῦτ' οὐ ποιήσω· οὐ ψεύσομαι, οὐ ῥᾳδιουργήσω, οὐκ ἀποστερήσω, οὐκ ἐπιβουλεύσω." τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείμενον οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ μέγα πρὸς εὐθυμίαν πάρεστιν. ὥσπερ αὖ τοὐναντίον

ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος,

F οἷον ἕλκος ἐν σαρκὶ τῇ ψυχῇ[4] τὴν μεταμέλειαν αἱμάσσουσαν ἀεὶ καὶ νύσσουσαν ἐναπολείπει. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλας ἀναιρεῖ λύπας ὁ λόγος, τὴν δὲ

[1] τὸ] omitted in most MSS.
[2] ἁπαλὰς] καὶ ἁπαλὰς in most MSS.
[3] οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν] omitted in most MSS.
[4] τῇ ψυχῇ] τῆς ψυχῆς in most MSS.

powers of reasoning, to form an idea of what sickness, suffering, and exile really are will find much that is false and empty and corrupt in what appears to be difficult and fearful, as the reason shows in each particular.[a]

19. And yet many shudder even at the verse of Menander,[b]

No man alive may say, "I shall not suffer this,"

since they do not know how much it helps in warding off grief to be able by practice and study to look Fortune in the face with eyes open, and not to manufacture in oneself "smooth, soft"[c] fancies, like one reared in the shade of many hopes which ever yield and hold firm against nothing. We can, however, make this reply to Menander: "True,

No man alive may say, 'I shall not suffer this,'

yet while still alive one can say, 'I will not do this: I will not lie nor play the villain nor defraud nor scheme.'" For this is in our power and is not a small, but a great help toward tranquillity of mind. Even as, on the contrary again,

My conscience, since I know I've done a dreadful deed,[d]

like[e] an ulcer in the flesh, leaves behind it in the soul regret which ever continues to wound and prick it. For the other pangs reason does away with, but

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *Disputationes Tusculanae*, iii. 81 f.
[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 103, Frag. 355, v. 4.
[c] Probably a quotation of *Od.*, xxi. 151.
[d] Euripides, *Orestes*, 396; *cf.* Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], ii. p. 199, Democritus, Frag. 264.
[e] The following passage is cited by Stobaeus, vol. iii. p. 604 ed. Hense.

μετάνοιαν αὐτὸς ἐργάζεται[1] δακνομένης σὺν αἰσχύνῃ τῆς ψυχῆς[2] καὶ κολαζομένης[3] ὑφ' αὑτῆς. 477 ὡς γὰρ οἱ ῥιγοῦντες ἠπιάλοις καὶ πυρετοῖς διακαόμενοι τῶν ταὐτὰ[4] πασχόντων ἔξωθεν ὑπὸ καύματος ἢ κρύους μᾶλλον ἐνοχλοῦνται καὶ κάκιον ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἐλαφροτέρας ἔχει τὰ τυχηρὰ τὰς λύπας ὥσπερ ἔξωθεν ἐπιφερομένας· τὸ δὲ

οὔ τις ἐμοὶ τῶνδ'[5] ἄλλος ἐπαίτιος, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ αὐτὸς

ἐπιθρηνούμενον τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις ἔνδοθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ βαρύτερον ποιεῖ τῷ αἰσχρῷ τὸ ἀλγεινόν. ὅθεν οὔτ' οἰκία πολυτελὴς οὔτε χρυσίου πλῆθος οὔτ' ἀξίωμα γένους οὔτε μέγεθος ἀρχῆς, οὐ λόγου χάρις οὐ[6] δεινότης εὐδίαν παρέχει βίῳ καὶ γαλήνην τοσαύτην, ὅσην ψυχὴ καθαρεύουσα πραγμάτων καὶ B βουλευμάτων πονηρῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου πηγὴν τὸ ἦθος ἀτάραχον ἔχουσα καὶ ἀμίαντον· ἀφ' ἧς αἱ καλαὶ πράξεις ῥέουσαι καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐνθουσιώδη καὶ ἱλαρὰν μετὰ τοῦ μέγα φρονεῖν ἔχουσι καὶ τὴν μνήμην ἡδίονα καὶ βεβαιοτέραν τῆς Πινδαρικῆς γηροτρόφου ἐλπίδος. οὐ γὰρ "αἱ μὲν λιβανωτρίδες," ὡς ἔλεγε Καρνεάδης, "κἂν ἀποκενωθῶσι,

[1] ἐργάζεται] ἐνεργάζεται G and Stobaeus, as Madvig had conjectured.
[2] τῆς ψυχῆς] omitted in most MSS.
[3] δακνομένης . . . κολαζομένης] δακνομένην . . . κολαζομένην most MSS.
[4] ταὐτὰ Gaisford: ταῦτα.
[5] τῶνδ' Schneider, confirmed by Teles' version: τῶν.

regret is caused by reason itself, since the soul, together with its feeling of shame, is stung and chastised by itself. For as those who shiver with ague or burn with fevers are more distressed and pained than those who suffer the same discomforts through heat or cold from a source outside the body, so the pangs which Fortune brings, coming, as it were, from a source without, are lighter to bear; but that lament,

None is to blame for this but me myself,[a]

which is chanted over one's errors, coming as it does from within, makes the pain even heavier by reason of the disgrace one feels. And so it is that no costly house nor abundance of gold nor pride of race nor pomp of office, no grace of language, no eloquence, impart so much calm and serenity to life as does a soul free from evil acts and purposes and possessing an imperturbable and undefiled character as the source of its life, a source whence flow fair actions[b] which have both an inspired and joyous activity joined with a lofty pride therein, and a memory sweeter and more stable than that hope of Pindar's[c] which sustains old age. For do not censers,[d] as Carneades said, even if they have been completely emptied, retain their

[a] Assigned by Schneider to Callimachus (Frag. anon. 372); *cf.* also Teles, ed. Hense, p. 8; Sternbach, *Gnomologicum Parisinum*, 331 (*Acad. Litt. Cracov.*, xx. 1893). The verse was perhaps suggested by Homer, *Il.*, i. 335.
[b] *Cf.* von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. p. 50, Zeno, Frag. 203; see also *Moralia*, 56 B, 100 C.
[c] Frag. 214 Bergk, 233 Boeckh; p. 608 ed. Sandys. See also Plato, *Republic*, 331 A.
[d] On the form λιβανωτρίδες see F. Solmsen, *Rheinisches Museum*, liv. 347.

[6] οὐ] ἢ in some MSS., as Pohlenz had conjectured (*Zeit. f. wiss. Theol.*, *l.c.*, p. 93, n. 1).

(477) τὴν εὐωδίαν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀναφέρουσιν," ἐν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος αἱ καλαὶ πράξεις οὐκ ἀεὶ κεχαρισμένην καὶ πρόσφατον ἐναπολείπουσι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ὑφ' ἧς τὸ χαῖρον ἄρδεται καὶ τέθηλε καὶ καταφρονεῖ τῶν ὀδυρομένων καὶ λοιδο-
C ρούντων τὸν βίον, ὥς τινα κακῶν χώραν ἢ φυγαδικὸν τόπον ἐνταῦθα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδεδειγμένον;

20. Ἄγαμαι δὲ τοῦ[1] Διογένους, ὃς τὸν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ξένον ὁρῶν παρασκευαζόμενον εἰς ἑορτήν τινα καὶ φιλοτιμούμενον, "ἀνὴρ δ'," εἶπεν, "ἀγαθὸς οὐ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν ἑορτὴν ἡγεῖται;" καὶ πάνυ γε λαμπράν, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν. ἱερὸν μὲν γὰρ ἁγιώτατον ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶ καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον· εἰς δὲ τοῦτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰσάγεται διὰ τῆς γενέσεως οὐ χειροκμήτων οὐδ' ἀκινήτων ἀγαλμάτων θεατής, ἀλλ' οἷα νοῦς θεῖος αἰσθητὰ μιμήματα[2] νοητῶν, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, ἔμφυτον ἀρχὴν ζωῆς ἔχοντα καὶ
D κινήσεως ἔφηνεν, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ποταμοὺς νέον ὕδωρ ἐξιέντας[3] ἀεὶ καὶ γῆν φυτοῖς τε καὶ ζῴοις τροφὰς[4] ἀναπέμπουσαν. ὧν τὸν βίον μύησιν ὄντα καὶ τελετὴν τελειοτάτην εὐθυμίας[5] δεῖ μεστὸν εἶναι καὶ γήθους· οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ Κρόνια καὶ Διάσια[6] καὶ Παναθήναια καὶ τοιαύτας ἄλλας ἡμέρας περιμένουσιν, ἵν' ἡσθῶσι καὶ ἀναπνεύσωσιν, ὠνητοῦ γέλωτος[7] μίμοις καὶ ὀρχησταῖς μισθοὺς τελέσαντες. εἶτ' ἐκεῖ μὲν εὔφημοι[8] καθή-

[1] τοῦ] τὸ Reiske: τὸ τοῦ Bernardakis.
[2] μιμήματα early editors: μιμητά.
[3] ἐξιέντας] ἐξιόντας most MSS. [4] τροφὰς] τρυφὰς most MSS.
[5] εὐθυμίας] εὐφημίας most MSS.
[6] Διάσια] διονύσια most MSS.
[7] ὠνητοῦ γέλωτος Wyttenbach: ὠνητὸν γέλωτα.
[8] εὔφημοι] εὔθυμοι Meziriacus and some MSS.

fragrance for a long time,[a] and in the soul of the wise man do not fair actions leave behind the remembrance of them eternally delightful and fresh, by which joy in them is watered and flourishes, and he comes to despise those who bewail and abuse life as a land of calamities or a place of exile appointed here for our souls?

20. And I am delighted with Diogenes, who, when he saw his host in Sparta preparing with much ado for a certain festival, said, "Does not a good man consider every day a festival?" And a very splendid one, to be sure, if we are sound of mind. For the universe is a most holy temple and most worthy of a god; into it man is introduced through birth as a spectator, not of hand-made or immovable images, but of those sensible representations of knowable things that the divine mind, says Plato,[b] has revealed, representations which have innate within themselves the beginnings of life and motion, sun and moon and stars, rivers which ever discharge fresh water, and earth which sends forth nourishment for plants and animals. Since life is a most perfect initiation into these things and a ritual celebration of them, it should be full of tranquillity and joy, and not in the manner of the vulgar, who wait for the festivals of Cronus[c] and of Zeus and the Panathenaea and other days of the kind, at which to enjoy and refresh themselves, paying the wages of hired laughter to mimes and dancers. It is true that we sit there on

[a] *Cf.* Horace, *Epistulae*, i. 2. 69:
quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem
testa diu.
[b] *Cf. Timaeus*, 92 c. *Epinomis*, 984 A.
[c] The Roman Saturnalia.

(477) μεθα κοσμίως· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀδύρεται μυούμενος οὐδὲ θρηνεῖ Πύθια θεώμενος ἢ πίνων[1] ἐν Κρονίοις· ἃς δ'
E ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν ἑορτὰς χορηγεῖ καὶ μυσταγωγεῖ καταισχύνουσιν, ἐν ὀδυρμοῖς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ βαρυθυμίαις καὶ μερίμναις ἐπιπόνοις διατρίβοντες. καὶ τῶν μὲν ὀργάνων χαίρουσι τοῖς ἐπιτερπὲς ἠχοῦσι καὶ τῶν ὀρνέων τοῖς ᾄδουσι, καὶ τὰ παίζοντα καὶ σκιρτῶντα τῶν ζῴων ἡδέως ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοὐναντίον ὠρυομένοις καὶ βρυχωμένοις καὶ σκυθρωπάζουσιν ἀνιῶνται· τὸν δ' ἑαυτῶν βίον ἀμειδῆ καὶ κατηφῆ καὶ τοῖς ἀτερπεστάτοις πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασι καὶ φροντίσι μηδὲν πέρας ἐχούσαις πιεζόμενον ἀεὶ
F καὶ συνθλιβόμενον ὁρῶντες, οὐχ ὅπως[2] αὐτοὶ μὲν[3] ἑαυτοῖς ἀναπνοήν τινα καὶ ῥᾳστώνην πορίζουσιν[4]· πόθεν; ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἑτέρων παρακαλούντων προσδέχονται λόγον ᾧ χρώμενοι καὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀμέμπτως συνοίσονται[5] καὶ τῶν γεγονότων εὐχαρίστως μνημονεύσουσι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν ἵλεω τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ φαιδρὰν ἔχοντες ἀδεῶς καὶ ἀνυπόπτως προσάξουσιν.[6]

[1] *πίνων* Basel edition: *πεινῶν*.
[2] *οὐχ ὅπως*] omitted in most MSS.
[3] *μὲν*] omitted in a few MSS.

those occasions decorously in reverent silence, for no one wails while he is being initiated or laments as he watches the Pythian games or as he drinks at the festival of Cronus; but by spending the greater part of life in lamentation and heaviness of heart and carking cares men shame the festivals with which the god supplies us and in which he initiates us. And though men delight in sweetly sounding instruments and singing birds, and take pleasure in seeing animals romping and frisking, and, on the contrary, are displeased when they howl and bellow and look fierce; yet though they see that their own life is unsmiling and dejected and ever oppressed and afflicted by the most unpleasant experiences and troubles and unending cares, they not only do not provide themselves with some alleviation or ease—from what source could they do so?—but even when others urge them, they do not accept a word of admonition by following which they would acquiesce in the present without fault-finding, remember the past with thankfulness, and meet the future without fear or suspicion, with their hopes cheerful and bright.

[4] *πορίζουσιν*] *πορίζειν* most MSS.
[5] *συνοίσονται*] *συνοίσουσι* all MSS. except G, S.
[6] *προσάξουσιν*] *πράξουσιν* Meziriacus.

ON BROTHERLY LOVE
(DE FRATERNO AMORE)

INTRODUCTION

In this essay Plutarch has arranged his material somewhat more methodically than is his usual practice. In chaps. 1-7 he shows that Brotherly Love is in accordance with nature ; in 9-19 he tells us how we should conduct ourselves toward a brother : (*a*) while our parents are alive, (*b*) when they are dead, (*c*) when the brother is our inferior, (*d*) when our superior ; and also the reasons for quarrels and the treatment thereof. He closes with some pleasant tales of affection for brothers' children.

That Plutarch wrote this work after *De Adulatore et Amico, De Amicorum Multitudine,*[a] and the *Life of Cato Minor* was demonstrated by C. Brokate (*De aliquot Plut. libellis*, diss. Göttingen, 1913, pp. 17-24, 58 ; and see the excellent tables on pp. 47, 61). Plutarch appears to have retained a certain amount of more or less irrelevant material on friendship from his recent work on these treatises, and also to have drawn upon some portions of Theophrastus's treatise *On Friendship.*[b]

The essay is No. 98 in the Lamprias catalogue.

[a] This point was subsequently shown, but with much less care and detail, by G. Hein (*Quaestiones Plut.*, diss. Berlin, 1916, p. 37), who seems to have been ignorant of Brokate's far superior work.

[b] *Cf.* Brokate, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 ff.

1. Τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν Διοσκόρων[1] ἀφιδρύματα Σπαρτιᾶται "δόκανα" καλοῦσιν· ἔστι δὲ δύο ξύλα
B παράλληλα δυσὶ πλαγίοις ἐπεζευγμένα, καὶ δοκεῖ τῷ φιλαδέλφῳ τῶν θεῶν οἰκεῖον εἶναι τοῦ ἀναθήματος τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑμῖν, ὦ Νιγρῖνε καὶ Κυῆτε,[2] τὸ σύγγραμμα τοῦτο περὶ φιλαδελφίας ἀνατίθημι, κοινὸν ἀξίοις οὖσι δῶρον. ἐφ' ἃ γὰρ προτρέπεται, ταῦτα πράττοντες ἤδη μαρτυρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ παρακαλεῖσθαι δόξετε· καὶ τὸ χαῖρον ὑμῶν ἐφ' οἷς κατορθοῦτε ποιήσει τῇ κρίσει τὴν ἐπιμονὴν βεβαιοτέραν, ὥσπερ ἐν χρηστοῖς καὶ φιλοκάλοις θεαταῖς εὐημερούντων.
'Αρίσταρχος μὲν οὖν ὁ Θεοδέκτου πατήρ, ἐπι-
C σκώπτων τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἔλεγε πάλαι

[1] Διοσκόρων] διοσκούρων in most MSS.
[2] Κυῆτε Patzig: Κύντε.

[a] *Cf.* M. C. Waites, *Amer. Jour. Arch.*, xxiii., 1919, pp. 1 ff.; this passage is cited by Eustathius on *Il.*, 1125. 60.
[b] The identity of Avidius Nigrinus and Avidius Quietus is not certainly established; see *Prosopographia Imp. Rom.*, i. pp. 189-190.
[c] Nauck, comparing Suidas, *s.v.* Theodectes, and Stephanus Byzantius, would correct "Aristarchus" to Aristandrus, the father of the tragic poet Theodectas of Phaselis.

ON BROTHERLY LOVE

1. The ancient representations of the Dioscuri are called by the Spartans "beam-figures"[a]: they consist of two parallel wooden beams joined by two other transverse beams placed across them; and this common and indivisible character of the offering appears entirely suitable to the brotherly love of these gods. In like manner do I also dedicate this treatise *On Brotherly Love* to you, Nigrinus and Quietus,[b] a joint gift for you both who well deserve it. For as to the exhortations this essay contains, since you are already putting them into practice, you will seem to be giving your testimony in their favour rather than to be encouraged to perform them; and the pleasure you will take in acts which are right will make the perseverance of your judgement more firm, inasmuch as your acts will win approval before spectators, so to speak, who are honourable and devoted to virtue.

Now Aristarchus,[c] the father of Theodectes, by way of jeering at the crowd of sophists, used to say that in the old days there were barely seven Sophists,[d] but

[d] That is, the Seven Wise Men. Plutarch so uses σοφιστής (*cf. Moralia*, 96 A, where all MSS. but one read σοφιστοῦ: 857 F); so also Aristotle, Frag. 5 ed. V. Rose. *Cf.* the earlier usage of Herodotus, i. 29 (where Wells's note is hopelessly wrong); ii. 49; iv. 95; Hippocrates, *De Vet. Med.*, 20.

(478) μὲν ἑπτὰ σοφιστὰς[1] μόλις γενέσθαι, τότε δὲ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἰδιώτας τοσούτους εὑρεθῆναι· ἐγὼ δ' ὁρῶ καθ' ἡμᾶς τὴν φιλαδελφίαν οὕτω σπάνιον οὖσαν ὡς τὴν μισαδελφίαν ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἧς γε τὰ φανέντα παραδείγματα τραγῳδίαις καὶ θεάτροις ὁ βίος ἐξέδωκε διὰ τὸ παράδοξον· οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄνθρωποι πάντες, ὅταν ἐντυγχάνωσι χρηστοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, θαυμάζουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς Μολιονίδας ἐκείνους, συμφυεῖς τοῖς σώμασι γεγονέναι δοκοῦντας, καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι κοινῶς τοῖς πατρῴοις χρήμασι καὶ φίλοις καὶ δούλοις οὕτως ἄπιστον ἡγοῦνται καὶ
D τερατῶδες, ὡς τὸ χρῆσθαι μίαν ψυχὴν δυεῖν σωμάτων χερσὶ καὶ ποσὶ καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖς.

2. Καίτοι τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡ φύσις οὐ μακρὰν ἔθηκεν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀναγκαίων διττὰ καὶ ἀδελφὰ καὶ δίδυμα μηχανησαμένη, χεῖρας πόδας ὄμματ' ὦτα ῥῖνας, ἐδίδαξεν ὅτι ταῦτα[2] σωτηρίας ἕνεκα καὶ συμπράξεως κοινῆς οὐ διαφορᾶς καὶ μάχης οὕτως διέστησεν· αὐτάς τε τὰς χεῖρας εἰς πολλοὺς καὶ ἀνίσους δακτύλους σχίσασα πάντων ὀργάνων ἐμμελέστατα καὶ τεχνικώτατα παρέσχεν,
E ὥστ' Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν παλαιὸν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τίθεσθαι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας καὶ συνέσεως. ἀλλὰ τούτου μὲν ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοὐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι χεῖρας ἔσχεν ἄνθρωπος σο-

[1] σοφιστὰς] σοφοὺς in some MSS.
[2] ταῦτα] ταῦτα πάντα in some MSS.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 1083 c; Fraser's note on Apollodorus, ii. 7. 2 (L.C.L. vol. i. p. 249).
[b] *Cf.* Hierocles, Frag. *De Fraterno Amore* (Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 663 ed. Hense).

that in his own day an equally large number of non-sophists could not easily be found. And according to my observation, brotherly love is as rare in our day as brotherly hatred was among the men of old; when instances of such hatred appeared, they were so amazing that the times made them known to all as warning examples in tragedies and other stage-performances; but all men of to-day, when they encounter brothers who are good to each other, wonder at them no less than at those famous sons of Molionê,[a] who, according to common belief, were born with their bodies grown together; and to use in common a father's wealth and friends and slaves is considered as incredible and portentous as for one soul to make use of the hands and feet and eyes of two bodies.

2. And yet the illustration of such common use by brothers Nature has placed at no great distance from us; on the contrary, in the body itself she has contrived to make most of the necessary parts double and brothers and twins[b]: hands, feet, eyes, ears, nostrils; and she has thus taught us that she has divided them in this fashion for mutual preservation and assistance, not for variance and strife. And when she separated the very hands into a number of unequal fingers, she supplied men with the most accurate and skilful of instruments, so that Anaxagoras[c] of old assigned the reason for man's wisdom and intelligence to his having hands. The contrary of this, however, seems to be true[d]: it is not because man acquired hands that he is wisest of animals;

[c] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], ii. p. 30, § 102.
[d] *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium*, iv. 10 (687 a 17 ff.).

φώτατον, ἀλλ' ὅτι φύσει λογικὸν ἦν καὶ τεχνικόν, ὀργάνων φύσει τοιούτων ἔτυχεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ παντὶ δῆλον, ὡς ἀπὸ σπέρματος ἑνὸς καὶ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ἡ φύσις ἀδελφοὺς δύο καὶ τρεῖς καὶ πλείονας ἐποίησεν οὐ πρὸς διαφορὰν καὶ ἀντίταξιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως χωρὶς ὄντες ἀλλήλοις μᾶλλον συνεργῶσιν. οἱ γὰρ δὴ τρισώματοι καὶ ἑκατόγχειρες, εἴπερ ἐγένοντο, συμφυεῖς ὄντες πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν, οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς αὑτῶν[1]
F οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἐδύναντο ποιεῖν· ὃ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ μένειν καὶ ἀποδημεῖν ἅμα καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ γεωργεῖν δυναμένοις δι' ἀλλήλων, ἅνπερ ἣν ἡ φύσις ἔδωκεν εὐνοίας καὶ συμφωνίας ἀρχὴν φυλάττωσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, ποδῶν οὐθέν, οἶμαι, διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλους ὑποσκελιζόντων καὶ δακτύλων ἐμπλεκομένων καὶ διαστρεφομένων παρὰ φύσιν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. μᾶλλον δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ταὐτῷ σώματι μιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα φύ-
479 σεως καὶ τροφῆς τὰ ὑγρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ θερμὰ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ ἡδίστην κρᾶσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἧς χωρὶς οὔτε

πλούτου

φασὶν οὔτε

τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώ-
ποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς

εἶναί τινα χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν· ἂν δὲ πλεονεξία καὶ στάσις αὐτοῖς ἐγγένηται, διέφθειρεν αἴσχιστα καὶ συνέχεε τὸ ζῷον, οὕτως ἀδελφῶν ὁμοφροσύνη

[1] αὑτῶν Bernardakis : αὐτῶν.

[a] *Cf.* Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, ii. 3. 18-19.

it is because by nature he was endowed with reason and skill that he acquired instruments of a nature adapted to these powers. And this fact is obvious to everyone : Nature from one seed and one source has created two brothers, or three, or more, not for difference and opposition to each other, but that by being separate they might the more readily co-operate with one another. For indeed creatures that had three bodies and an hundred hands, if any such were ever really born, being joined together in all their members, could do nothing independently and apart from one another, as may brothers, who can either remain at home or reside abroad, as well as undertake public office and husbandry through each other's help if they but preserve that principle of goodwill and concord which Nature has given them. But if they do not, they will differ not at all, I think, from feet which trip up one another and fingers which are unnaturally entwined and twisted by each other.[a] But rather, just as in the same body the combination of moist and dry, cold and hot, sharing one nature and diet, by their consent and agreement engender the best and most pleasant temperament and bodily harmony—without which, they say, there is not any joy or profit either " in wealth " or

In that kingly rule which makes men
Like to gods [b]—

but if overreaching and factious strife be engendered in them, they corrupt and destroy the animal most shamefully ; so through the concord of brothers both

[b] From Ariphron's *Paean to Health* : *cf.* 450 B, *supra*. The present passage is paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 658 ed. Hense.

(479) καὶ γένος καὶ οἶκος ὑγιαίνει καὶ τέθηλε, καὶ φίλοι καὶ συνήθεις ὥσπερ ἐμμελὴς χορὸς οὐθὲν οὔτε πράσσουσιν ἐναντίον οὔτε λέγουσιν ἢ φρονοῦσιν·

ἐν δὲ διχοστασίῃ καὶ ὁ πάγκακος ἔμμορε τιμῆς,

οἰκέτης διάβολος ἢ κόλαξ παρενδὺς θυραῖος ἢ
B πολίτης βάσκανος. ὡς γὰρ αἱ νόσοι τοῖς σώμασι μὴ προσιεμένοις τὸ οἰκεῖον πολλῶν ἐμποιοῦσιν ἀτόπων καὶ βλαβερῶν ὀρέξεις, οὕτως ἡ πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς διαβολὴ καὶ ὑφόρασις ὁμιλίας ἐπάγεται φαύλας καὶ πονηρὰς εἰς τὸ ἐκλιπὲς[1] ἔξωθεν ἐπιρρεούσας.

3. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρκαδικὸς μάντις ἀναγκαίως[2] πόδα ξύλινον προσεποιήσατο καθ' Ἡρόδοτον τοῦ οἰκείου στερηθείς· ἀδελφὸς δὲ πολεμῶν ἀδελφῷ καὶ κτώμενος ὀθνεῖον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἢ παλαίστρας ἑταῖρον οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἄλλο ποιεῖν ἢ σάρκινον καὶ συμφυὲς ἑκουσίως ἀποκόψας μέλος[3] ἀλλότριον προστίθεσθαι[4]
C καὶ προσαρμόττειν. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ προσδεχομένη καὶ ζητοῦσα φιλίαν καὶ ὁμιλίαν χρεία διδάσκει τὸ συγγενὲς τιμᾶν καὶ περιέπειν καὶ διαφυλάττειν, ὡς ἀφίλους καὶ ἀμίκτους καὶ μονοτρόπους ζῆν μὴ δυναμένους μηδὲ πεφυκότας. ὅθεν ὁ Μένανδρος ὀρθῶς

[1] ἐκλιπὲς] ἐλλιπὲς some MSS.
[2] ἀναγκαίως] δικαίως Stobaeus.
[3] μέλος] μέρος most MSS.
[4] προστίθεσθαι] προστρίβεσθαι Stobaeus.

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.*, iii. p. 690; Edmonds, *Elegy* 252

family and household are sound and flourish, and friends and intimates, like an harmonious choir, neither do nor say, nor think, anything discordant;

Even the base wins honour in a feud [a]:

a slandering servant, or a flatterer who slips in from outside, or a malignant citizen. For as diseases in bodies which cannot accept their proper diet engender cravings for many strange and harmful foods, so slander and suspicion entertained against kinsmen ushers in evil and pernicious associations which flow in from outside to fill the vacant room.[b]

3. It is true that the Arcadian prophet [c] of necessity manufactured for himself, according to Herodotus, a wooden foot, deprived as he was of his own; but the man who quarrels with his brother, and takes as his comrade a stranger from the market-place or the wrestling-floor, appears to be doing nothing but cutting off voluntarily a limb of his own flesh and blood, and taking to himself and joining to his body an extraneous member. Indeed it is our very need, which welcomes and seeks friendship and comradeship, that teaches us to honour and cherish and keep our kin, since we are unable and unfitted by Nature to live friendless, unsocial, hermits' lives. Wherefore Menander [d] rightly says,

and Iambus, ii. p. 284; quoted also in *Life of Alexander*, liii. (695 E); *Life of Nicias*, xi. (530 D); *Comparison of Lysander and Sulla*, i. (475 F).

[b] *Cf.* 468 C-D, *supra*.

[c] Hegisistratus of Elis in Herodotus, ix. 37. The first sentence of this chapter is paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 675 ed. Heuse.

[d] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 169, Frag. 554 (p. 493 ed. Allinson, L.C.L.); v. 4 is quoted in *Moralia*, 93 c.

(479) οὐκ ἐκ πότων καὶ τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν τρυφῆς[1]
ζητοῦμεν ᾧ πιστεύσομεν τὰ τοῦ βίου (φησί),
πάτερ. οὐ περιττὸν οἴετ'[2] ἐξευρηκέναι
ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστος, ἂν ἔχῃ φίλου σκιάν;

σκιαὶ γάρ εἰσιν ὄντως αἱ πολλαὶ φιλίαι καὶ μιμή-
D ματα καὶ εἴδωλα τῆς πρώτης ἐκείνης, ἣν παισί τε
πρὸς γονεῖς ἡ φύσις ἀδελφοῖς τε πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς
ἐμπεποίηκε,[3] κἀκείνην ὁ μὴ σεβόμενος μηδὲ τιμῶν
ἆρά τινα[4] πίστιν εὐνοίας τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις δίδωσιν;
ἢ ποῖός τίς ἐστι τὸν ἑταῖρον ἐν φιλοφροσύναις καὶ
γράμμασιν ἀδελφὸν προσαγορεύων, τῷ δ' ἀδελφῷ
μηδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν οἰόμενος δεῖν βαδίζειν; ὡς
γὰρ εἰκόνα κοσμεῖν ἀδελφοῦ τὸ δὲ σῶμα τύπτειν
καὶ ἀκρωτηριάζειν μανικόν, οὕτω τοὔνομα σέβε-
σθαι καὶ τιμᾶν ἐν ἑτέροις αὐτὸν δὲ μισεῖν καὶ
φεύγειν οὐχ ὑγιαίνοντός ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐν νῷ πώποτε
τὴν φύσιν ὡς ἁγιώτατον καὶ μέγιστον ἱερῶν[5]
λαβόντος.

E 4. Οἶδα γοῦν ἐμαυτὸν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δυεῖν ἀδελφῶν
ἀναδεξάμενον δίαιταν, ὧν ἄτερος ἐδόκει φιλοσοφεῖν·
ἦν δ' ὡς ἔοικεν οὐ μόνον ἀδελφὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλό-
σοφος ψευδεπίγραφος καὶ ψευδώνυμος· ἐμοῦ γὰρ
ἀξιοῦντος αὐτὸν ὡς ἀδελφὸν[6] ἀδελφῷ καὶ ἰδιώτῃ
φιλόσοφον προσφέρεσθαι, "ταῦτ'," εἶπεν, "ὡς
πρὸς ἰδιώτην ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ μέγα
ποιοῦμαι τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν μορίων γεγονέναι."
"σὺ μέν," ἔφην ἐγώ, "δῆλος εἶ μηδὲ τὸ ἐκ μορίων

[1] τρυφῆς] one MS. has τροφῆς, Grotius's conjecture.
[2] οἴετ' Xylander: οἷσί τ' or οἵς τ'.
[3] ἐμπεποίηκε] πεποίηκε most MSS.
[4] ἆρά τινα] ἄρα (or ἀρα) τίνα (or τίνι); ὅρα Pohlenz.
[5] ἱερῶν] ἱερὸν many MSS.

Not from drink or from daily revelling
Do we seek one to whom we may entrust
Our life, father. Do we not think we've found
Great good in but the shadow of a friend?

For most friendships are in reality shadows and imitations and images of that first friendship which Nature implanted in children toward parents and in brothers toward brothers; and as for the man who does not reverence or honour this friendship, can he give any pledge of goodwill to strangers? Or what sort of man is he who addresses his comrade as "brother" in salutations and letters, but does not care even to walk with his own brother when they are going the same way? For as it is the act of a madman to adorn the effigy of a brother and at the same time to beat and mutilate the brother's body, even so to reverence and honour the name "brother" in others, but to hate and shun the person himself, is the act of one who is not sane and has never yet got it into his head that Nature is the most holy and great of sacred things.[a]

4. I remember, for instance, that in Rome I undertook to arbitrate between two brothers, of whom one had the reputation of being a philosopher. But he was, as it appears, not only as a brother but also as a philosopher, masquerading under a false name and appellation; for when I asked him to conduct himself as brother to brother and as philosopher to layman, "What you say," said he, "as to his being a layman, is correct, but I account it no momentous or important matter to have sprung from the same loins." "As for you," said I, "it is obvious that you

[a] For the hyperbole contrast 491 D, *infra*.

[6] ἀδελφὸν added by Stegmann.

γεγονέναι μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν ἡγούμενος." ἀλλ' οἵ
F γε ἄλλοι πάντες, εἰ καὶ μὴ φρονοῦσιν οὕτως,
λέγουσι γοῦν καὶ ᾄδουσιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμὴν μετὰ
θεοὺς πρώτην καὶ μεγίστην ἥ τε φύσις ὅ τε τὴν
φύσιν σώζων νόμος ἀπέδωκε· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι
μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι κεχαρισμένον θεοῖς δρῶσιν ἢ
τοκεῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τροφεῦσι "παλαιὰς ἐπὶ νέοις[1]
δανεισθείσας" χάριτας εὐμενῶς καὶ προθύμως
ἐκτίνοντες. οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν μείζων ἐπίδειξις ἀθέου
γέγονε τῆς περὶ γονεῖς ὀλιγωρίας καὶ πλημμελείας·
480 διὸ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀπείρηται, μητρὶ
δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ πατρὶ τὸ μὴ παρέχειν[2] δρῶντας ἀεὶ
καὶ λέγοντας ἀφ' ὧν εὐφρανοῦνται, κἂν μὴ προσῇ
τὸ λυποῦν, ἀνόσιον ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἄθεσμον. τίς
οὖν ἐστι παρὰ παίδων γονεῦσιν ἡ πρᾶξις ἢ χάρις
ἢ διάθεσις μᾶλλον εὐφραίνειν δυναμένη τῆς πρὸς
ἀδελφὸν εὐνοίας βεβαίου καὶ φιλίας;

5. Καὶ[3] τοῦτό γε ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων
καταμαθεῖν. ὅπου γὰρ οἰκότριβα τιμώμενον ὑπὸ
μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς υἱοὶ προπηλακίζοντες καὶ φυτῶν
καὶ χωρίων οἷς ἔχαιρον ἀμελοῦντες ἀνιῶσιν αὐτούς,
καὶ κύων τις οἰκογενὴς παρορώμενος καὶ ἵππος
B ἅπτεται φιλοστόργων καὶ φιλοτίμων γερόντων,
ἄχθονται δὲ τοῖς παισὶν ἀκροάματα καὶ θεάματα
καὶ ἀθλητὰς οὓς[4] ἐθαύμαζον αὐτοὶ διασύρουσι καὶ
καταφρονοῦσιν· ἧπου μετρίως ἔχουσιν[5] υἱοῖς δια

[1] *νέοις* Madvig: *νέαις* or *νέας*.
[2] *προσέχειν* some mss.; others add *ἑαυτοὺς*.
[3] *καὶ* Reiske: *ἤ*. [4] *οὓς* Reiske: *ὅσους*.
[5] *ἔχουσιν*] *ἔξουσιν* Xylander and Kronenberg.

[a] *Cf. Commentarii in Hesiodum*, 65 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 84), on *Works and Days*, 707.

consider it no important or momentous matter to have sprung from any loins at all." But certainly all other philosophers, even if they do not think so, at least do affirm with constant iteration that both Nature and the Law, which upholds Nature, have assigned to parents, after gods, first and greatest honour[a]; and there is nothing which men do that is more acceptable to gods than with goodwill and zeal to repay to those who bore them and brought them up the favours "long ago lent to them when they were young."[b] Nor is there, again, a greater exhibition of an impious nature than neglect of parents or offences against them. Therefore, while we are forbidden to do wrong to all others, yet to our mother and father, if we do not always afford, both in deed and in word, matter for their pleasure, even if offence be not present, men consider it unholy and unlawful. Hence what deed or favour or disposition, which children may show toward their parents, can give more pleasure than steadfast goodwill and friendship toward a brother?

5. And surely this fact is quite easy to perceive from the contrary. For when we observe that parents are grieved by sons who maltreat a servant honoured by mother and father, and neglect plants or farm-lands in which their parents took delight, and that remissness in caring for some house-dog or horse hurts elderly persons who feel a jealous affection for them; and when, again, we observe that parents are vexed when their children disparage and hiss at concerts and spectacles and athletes all of which they themselves used to admire; when we observe these things, is it reasonable to suppose that parents are indifferent

[b] Plato, *Laws*, 717 c; *cf.* 496 c, *infra*.

(480) φερομένοις καὶ μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους καὶ κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ πρὸς ἔργα καὶ πράξεις ἀντιταττομένοις ἀεὶ καὶ καταλυομένοις ὑπ' ἀλλήλων; οὐκ ἄν εἴποι τις. οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον ἐρῶντες ἀλλήλων καὶ φιλοῦντες ἀδελφοί, καὶ ὅσον ἡ φύσις τοῖς σώμασι διέστησεν, ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀποδιδόντες,[1] καὶ λόγους κοινοὺς καὶ διατριβὰς ἅμα καὶ παιδιὰς μετ' ἀλλήλων ἔχοντες, ἡδεῖαν
C καὶ μακαρίαν παρεσκευάκασι γηροτρόφον τοῖς γονεῦσι τὴν φιλαδελφίαν. οὔτε γὰρ φιλόλογος πατὴρ οὕτως οὔτε φιλότιμος οὔτε φιλοχρήματος γέγονεν ὡς φιλότεκνος· διὸ τοὺς υἱοὺς οὔτε λέγοντας οὔτε πλουτοῦντας οὔτ' ἄρχοντας ἡδέως οὕτως ὡς φιλοῦντας ἀλλήλους ὁρῶσιν. Ἀπολλωνίδα γοῦν τὴν Κυζικηνήν, Εὐμένους δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως μητέρα καὶ τριῶν ἄλλων, Ἀττάλου καὶ Φιλεταίρου καὶ Ἀθηναίου, λέγουσι μακαρίζειν ἑαυτὴν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς
D χάριν ἔχειν οὐ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοὺς τρεῖς υἱοὺς ἑώρα τὸν πρεσβύτατον δορυφοροῦντας κἀκεῖνον ἐν μέσοις αὐτοῖς δόρατα καὶ ξίφη φοροῦσιν ἀδεῶς διαιτώμενον. ὥσπερ αὖ τοὐναντίον, Ἀρταξέρξης[2] αἰσθόμενος Ὦχον τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιβεβουλευκότα τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ἀθυμήσας ἀπέθανε.

χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν,

ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκεν, ὄντες χαλεπώτατοι τοῖς

[1] ἀποδιδόντες] ἐπιδιδόντες Wyttenbach, which Rouse prefers.
[2] Ἀρταξέρξης Palmerius: ξέρξης.

[a] Perhaps with a reference to Pindar, Frag. 214: *cf.* 477 B, *supra*, and the note.

when sons quarrel, hate and malign each other, and array themselves ever against each other's interests and activities, and are finally ruined by each other? No one can say that the parents are indifferent. Hence when, on the other hand, brothers love and feel affection for each other, and, in so far as Nature has made them separate in their bodies, so far do they become united in their emotions and actions, and share with each other their studies and recreations and games, then they have made their brotherly love a sweet and blessed "sustainer of old age"[a] for their parents. For no father is so fond of oratory or of honour or of riches as he is of his children; therefore fathers do not find such pleasure in seeing their sons gaining a reputation as orators, acquiring wealth, or holding office as in seeing that they love one another. So they report of Apollonis of Cyzicus, mother of King Eumenes[b] and three other sons, Attalus and Philetaerus and Athenaeus, that she always congratulated herself and gave thanks to the gods, not because of wealth or empire, but because she saw her three sons members of the body-guard of the eldest, who passed his days without fear surrounded by brothers with swords and spears in their hands. So again, on the contrary, when Artaxerxes[c] perceived that his son Ochus had plotted against his brothers, he despaired and died.

For cruel are the wars of brothers,

as Euripides[d] says, and they are cruellest of all to

[b] *Cf.* 489 D f., *infra*; *Gnomologicum Vaticanum*, 293 (*Wiener Stud.*, x. p. 241).
[c] *Cf. Life of Artaxerxes*, XXX. (1027 B).
[d] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 675, Frag. 975.

(480) γονεῦσιν αὐτοῖς[1] εἰσιν· ὁ γὰρ μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ βαρυνόμενος οὐ δύναται μὴ τὸν γεννήσαντα μέμφεσθαι καὶ τὴν τεκοῦσαν.

6. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πεισίστρατος ἐπιγαμῶν ἐνηλίκοις οὖσι τοῖς υἱοῖς ἔφη καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἐκείνους ἡγούμενος ἔτι πλειόνων ἐθέλειν τοιούτων πατὴρ γενέσθαι. χρηστοὶ δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι παῖδες οὐ μόνον
E διὰ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπήσουσι μᾶλλον ἀλλήλους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς δι' ἀλλήλους· οὕτως ἀεὶ καὶ φρονοῦντες καὶ λέγοντες, ὅτι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἀντὶ πολλῶν χάριν ὀφείλοντες μάλιστα διὰ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς ὀφείλουσιν, ὡς τοῦτο δὴ κτημάτων ἁπάντων τιμιώτατον καὶ ἥδιστον ἔχοντες παρ' αὐτῶν. εὖ γέ τοι καὶ Ὅμηρος πεποίηκε Τηλέμαχον ἐν συμφορᾷ τἀνάδελφον[2] τιθέμενον·

ὣδε γὰρ ἡμετέρην γενεὴν μούνωσε Κρονίων.

ὁ δ' Ἡσίοδος οὐκ εὖ παραινεῖ "μουνογενῆ παῖδα" τῶν πατρώων ἐπίκληρον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα τῶν
F Μουσῶν γεγονὼς μαθητής, ἃς ὁμοῦ δι' εὔνοιαν ἀεὶ καὶ φιλαδελφίαν οὔσας οὕτως ὠνόμαζον, μούσας.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν γονεῖς ἡ φιλαδελφία τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ φιλεῖν ἀδελφὸν εὐθὺς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι τοῦ

[1] αὐτοῖς] αὐτῶν Hartman.
[2] The MSS. read τὸ ἀνάδελφον and τὸν ἀδελφόν.

[a] Perhaps this sentence is paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 658 ed. Hense.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 189 D; related also of Cato Maior in Plutarch's *Life*, xxiv. (351 B).
[c] Paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 658 ed. Hense.
[d] *Od.*, xvi. 117.

the parents themselves. For he that hates his own brother and is angry with him cannot refrain from blaming the father that begat and the mother that bore such a brother.[a]

6. So Peisistratus,[b] marrying for a second time when his sons were full grown, said that because he considered them to be honourable and good he wished to become the father of more children like them. Excellent and just sons will not only love each other the more because of their parents, but will also love their parents the more because of each other; so will they always both think and say that, though they owe their parents gratitude for many favours, it is most of all for their brothers that they owe it,[c] since these are truly the most precious and delightful of all the possessions they have received from them. Well indeed has Homer[d] also depicted Telemachus as reckoning his brotherless condition a misfortune:

> The son of Cronus thus has doomed our race
> To have one son alone.

But Hesiod[e] does not well in advising "an only son" to inherit his father's estate—and that too when he was himself a pupil of the Muses,[f] who, in fact, received this name[g] just because they were "always together" (*homou ousas*) in concord and sisterly affection.[h]

Now, as regards parents, brotherly love is of such sort that to love one's brother is forthwith a proof of love for both mother and father; and again, as

[e] *Works and Days*, 376; *cf.* the *Commentarii in Hesiodum*, 37 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 70).
[f] *Theogony*, 22.
[g] A fanciful derivation: Μοῦσαι from ὁμοῦ οὖσαι.
[h] Paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense.

καὶ τὴν μητέρα φιλεῖν καὶ τὸν πατέρα, πρὸς δὲ παῖδας αὖ[1] δίδαγμα καὶ παράδειγμα φιλαδελφίας οἷον οὐθὲν ἄλλο, καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ πονηρὸν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀντιγράφου πατρῴου τὴν μισαδελφίαν ἀναλαμ-
481 βάνουσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἐν δίκαις καὶ στάσεσι καὶ ἀγῶσι πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς ἐγγεγηρακώς, εἶτα τοὺς υἱοὺς ὁμονοεῖν παρακαλῶν,

ἄλλων ἰατρὸς αὐτὸς ἕλκεσιν βρύων,

ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖ τοῖς ἔργοις τὸν λόγον. εἰ γοῦν ὁ Θηβαῖος Ἐτεοκλῆς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν εἰρηκώς,

ἄστρων ἂν ἔλθοιμ' ἡλίου πρὸς ἀνατολὰς
καὶ γῆς ἔνερθε δυνατὸς ὢν δρᾶσαι τάδε,
τὴν θεῶν[2] μεγίστην ὥστ' ἔχειν Τυραννίδα·

τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάλιν παρεκελεύετο τέκνοις,

Ἰσότητα τιμᾶν, ἣ φίλους ἀεὶ[3] φίλοις
πόλεις τε πόλεσι συμμάχους τε συμμάχοις
συνδεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἴσον μόνιμον[4] ἀνθρώποις ἔφυ,

B τίς οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ κατεφρόνησε; ποῖος δ' ἂν ἦν ὁ Ἀτρεύς, εἰ τοιαῦτα δειπνίσας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐγνωμολόγει πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας,

φίλων γε μέντοι χρῆσις ἡ πρὸς αἵματος
μόνη κακοῦ ῥέοντος[5] ὠφελεῖν φιλεῖ;

[1] αὖ] αὐτοῦ most MSS.
[2] θεῶν] τῶν θεῶν most MSS.
[3] ἀεὶ] εἶναι most MSS.
[4] μόνιμον] νόμιμον some MSS. here and the MSS. of Euripides, but *cf.* 484 B, *infra*.
[5] ῥέοντος] παρόντος Nauck.

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 703, Euripides, Frag. 1086; quoted also in *Moralia*, 71 F, 88 D, 1110 E. *Cf.* Aeschylus, *Prometheus*, 473; and ἰατρέ, θεράπευσον σεαυτόν.

regards children, for them there is no lesson and example comparable to brotherly love on their father's part. And, on the other hand, the contrary is a bad example for children who inherit, as from a father's testament, his hatred of brothers. For a man who has grown old in law-suits and quarrels and contentions with his brothers, and then exhorts his children to concord,

Healer of others, full of sores himself,[a]

weakens the force of his words by his own actions. If, at any rate, Eteocles[b] of Thebes had said with reference to his brother,[c]

To where the sun and stars rise would I go,
And plunge beneath the earth—if this I could—
To hold Dominion, greatest of the gods,

and then had proceeded to exhort his own children,[a]

Revere Equality, which ever binds
Friend to friend, state to state, allies unto
Allies: Nature made equal rights secure,

who would not have despised him? And what sort of man would Atreus have been, if, after serving his brother that dinner,[e] he had then proceeded to preach to his own children:

And yet the use of friends, fast joined with ties
Of blood, alone brings help when troubles flow?[f]

[a] Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 504–506.
[b] Polyneices.
[c] *Phoenissae*, 536–538, but it is Jocasta who speaks here, exhorting Eteocles to concord: *cf. Moralia*, 643 F.
[e] Atreus served to his brother Thyestes Thyestes' own children at a feast of pretended reconciliation.
[f] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 912, ades. 384.

(481) 7. Διὸ καὶ γονέων κακὴν γηροτρόφον οὖσαν καὶ κακίονα παιδοτρόφον τέκνων ἐκκαθαίρειν προσήκει τὴν μισαδελφίαν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρὸς πολίτας διάβολος καὶ κατήγορος· οἴονται γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἐκ τοσῆσδε συντροφίας καὶ συνηθείας καὶ οἰκειότητος ἐχθροὺς καὶ πολεμίους γενέσθαι μὴ πολλὰ καὶ πονηρὰ συν-
C ειδότας ἀλλήλοις· μεγάλαι γὰρ αἰτίαι μεγάλην διολλύουσιν[1] εὔνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίως αὖθις ἐνδέχονται διαλύσεις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ συμπαγέντα, κἂν χαλάσῃ τὸ ἐχέκολλον, ἐνδέχεται πάλιν δεθῆναι καὶ συνελθεῖν, συμφυοῦς δὲ σώματος ῥαγέντος ἢ σχισθέντος ἔργον ἐστὶ κόλλησιν εὑρεῖν καὶ σύμφυσιν· οὕτως αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ χρείας συνημμέναι φιλίαι κἂν διαστῶσιν οὐ χαλεπῶς αὖθις ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, ἀδελφοὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκπεσόντες οὔτε
D ῥᾳδίως συνέρχονται, κἂν συνέλθωσι, ῥυπαρὰν καὶ ὕποπτον οὐλὴν αἱ διαλύσεις ἐφέλκονται. πᾶσα μὲν οὖν ἔχθρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπῳ μετὰ τῶν μάλιστα λυπούντων ἐνδυομένη παθῶν, φιλονεικίας ὀργῆς φθόνου μνησικακίας, ὀδυνηρόν ἐστι καὶ ταραχῶδες· ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ᾧ θυσιῶν τε κοινωνεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ ἱερῶν πατρῴων ὁμόταφόν τε γενέσθαι καί που σύνοικον ἢ γείτονα χωρίων, ἐν ὄμμασιν

[1] διολλύουσιν Kronenberg: διαλύουσιν.

7. Therefore it is fitting to cleanse away completely hatred of brothers, which is both an evil sustainer of parents in their old age[a] and a worse nurturer of children in their youth. And it is also a cause of slander and accusations against such brothers; for their fellow-citizens think that, after having been so closely bound together by their common education, their common life together, and their kinship, brothers could not have become deadly enemies unless each were aware of many wicked deeds committed by the other. There must be, they infer, great reasons for the breaking-up of a great goodwill and affection. For this reason it is not easy to effect a reconciliation of brothers; for just as things which have been joined together, even if the glue becomes loose, may be fastened together again and become united, yet if a body which has grown together is broken or split, it is difficult to find means of welding or joining it; so friendships knitted together through long familiarity, even though the friends part company, can be easily resumed again, but when brothers have once broken the bonds of Nature,[b] they cannot readily come together, and even if they do, their reconciliation bears with it a filthy hidden sore of suspicion. Or rather, every enmity between man and man which steals into the heart in company with the most painful emotions —contentiousness, anger, envy, remembrance of wrongs—causes pain and perturbation of mind; but when the enmity is toward a brother, with whom it is necessary to share sacrifices and the family's sacred rites, to occupy the same sepulchre, and in life, perhaps, the same or a neighbouring habitation—such an enmity keeps the painful situation ever before our

[a] *Cf.* 480 c, *supra.*

[b] *Cf.* Racine, *La Thébaïde*:

Mais, quand de la nature on a brisé les chaînes,
Cher Attale, il n'est rien qui puisse réunir
Ceux que des nœuds si forts n'ont pas sceu retenir.
L'on hait avec excès lorsque l'on hait un frère.

(481) ἔχει τὸ λυπηρόν, ὑπομιμνήσκουσα καθ' ἡμέραν τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ παραφροσύνης, δι' ἣν τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ συγγενέστατον πρόσωπον ἰδεῖν[1] σκυθρωπότατον, ἥ τε προσφιλὴς ἐκ νέων φωνὴ καὶ συνήθης ἀκοῦσαι φοβερωτάτη γέγονε. πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδελ-
E φῶν ὁρῶντες οἰκίᾳ μιᾷ τε χρωμένους καὶ τραπέζῃ καὶ χωρίοις ἀνεμήτοις καὶ ἀνδραπόδοις αὐτοὶ καὶ φίλους διῄρηνται καὶ ξένους, ἐχθρὰ πάντα τὰ προσφιλῆ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς νέμοντες· καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν ἐν μέσῳ λογίζεσθαι παρόντος, ὅτι "λῃϊστοὶ" μέν τε φίλοι καὶ συμπόται, "κτητοὶ" δὲ κηδεσταὶ καὶ συνήθεις, τῶν πρώτων[2] ὥσπερ ὅπλων ἢ ὀργάνων διαφθαρέντων, ἀδελφοῦ δ' ἀντίκτησις οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χειρὸς ἀφαιρεθείσης οὐδ' ὄψεως ἐκ-
κοπείσης· ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἡ Περσὶς εἶπεν, ἀντὶ τῶν τέκνων ἑλομένη σῶσαι τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι παῖδας μὲν ἑτέρους κτήσασθαι δύναιτ' ἄν, ἀδελφὸς δ' ἄλλος αὐτῇ, γονέων μὴ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.

8. "Τί δῆτα χρὴ ποιεῖν," φαίη τις ἄν, "ὅτῳ
F φαῦλος ἀδελφὸς γένοιτο;" πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο μνημονεύειν, ὅτι παντὸς ἅπτεται γένους φιλίας ἡ φαυλότης καὶ κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα

τὰ πλεῖστα φωρῶν αἰσχρὰ φωράσεις βροτῶν.

οὔτε γὰρ τὸ συγγενικὸν οὔτε τὸ ἑταιρικὸν οὔτε τὸ

[1] ἰδεῖν Reiske: εἰδεῖν, εἰδείη, or βλέπεται.
[2] πρώτων] προτέρων Xylander.

[a] With reference to *Il.*, ix. 406-409:

λῃϊστοὶ μὲν γάρ τε βόες καὶ ἴφια μῆλα,
κτητοὶ δὲ τρίποδές τε καὶ ἵππων ξανθὰ κάρηνα·
ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθέμεν οὔτε λεϊστὴ
οὔθ' ἑλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἕρκος ὀδόντων.

eyes, and reminds us every day of the madness and folly which has made the sweetest countenance of the nearest kinsman become most frowning and angry to look upon, and that voice which has been beloved and familiar from boyhood most dreadful to hear. And though they see many other examples of brothers using the same house and table and undistributed estates and slaves, yet they alone maintain different sets of friends and guests, considering as hostile everything dear to their brothers — and that too though all the world may readily reflect that while friends and boon-companions may be "taken as booty," and relatives by marriage and familiars may be "obtained"[a] when the old ones, like arms or implements, have been lost, yet the acquisition of another brother is impossible,[b] as is that of a new hand when one has been removed or that of a new eye when one has been knocked out; rightly, then, did the Persian[c] woman declare, when she chose to save her brother in place of her children, that she could get other children, but not another brother, since her parents were dead.

8. "What then," someone will say, "must one who has a bad brother do?"[d] We must remember this first of all: badness can lay hold on every kind of friendship; and, according to Sophocles,[e]

Search out most human traits: you'll find them base.

For it is impossible to discover that our relations with

[b] *Cf.* the passage of Sophocles, *Antigoné*, 905 ff., now accepted by most critics as genuine.
[c] Herodotus, iii. 119.
[d] *Cf.* Hierocles in Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 661 ed. Hense.
[e] Frag. 853 ed. Pearson, 769 ed. Nauck; *cf.* 463 D, *supra*.

ἐρωτικὸν εἰλικρινὲς καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν κακίας. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λάκων μικρὰν γυναῖκα
482 γήμας ἔφη τὰ ἐλάχιστα δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀδελφοῖς δὲ σωφρόνως παραινέσειεν ἄν τις τὰ οἰκειότατα τῶν κακῶν ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἢ πειρᾶσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνέγκλητον ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ψεκτὸν ὡς αὐθαίρετον. οὐ γὰρ ὁ συμπότης οὐδ' ὁ συνέφηβος οὐδ' ὁ ξένος

αἰδοῦς ἀχαλκεύτοισιν ἔζευκται πέδαις,

ἀλλ' ὁ σύναιμος καὶ σύντροφος καὶ ὁμοπάτωρ καὶ ὁμομήτωρ, ᾧ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν[1] εἰκός ἐστιν ἐπιχωρεῖν ἔνια καὶ παρείκειν λέγοντι πρὸς ἀδελφὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα,

"τοὔνεκά σ'[2] οὐ δύναμαι προλιπεῖν δύστηνον ἐόντα

καὶ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνόητον, μὴ καὶ λάθω τι πατρῷον
B ἢ μητρῷον ἐνεσταγμένον ἀπὸ σπέρματος νόσημα χαλεπῶς καὶ πικρῶς τῷ μισεῖν ἐν σοὶ κολάζων." τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀλλοτρίους, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόφραστος, οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν· ὅπου δ' ἡ φύσις ἡγεμονίαν τῇ κρίσει πρὸς εὔνοιαν οὐ δίδωσιν οὐδ' ἀναμένει τὸν θρυλούμενον τῶν ἁλῶν μέδιμνον ἀλλὰ συγγεγέννηκε τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς φιλίας,

[1] τὴν ἀρχὴν Wilamowitz: τὴν ἀρετὴν or τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων.
[2] τοὔνεκά σ'] τῷ σε καὶ Homer.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 758 D; Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, viii. 12 (1161 b 12 ff.).
[b] Plutarch might aptly have quoted Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 909: μικκός γα μᾶκος οὗτος.—ἀλλ' ἅπαν κακόν.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 549, Euripides, Frag. 595, probably from the *Peirithoïs*; quoted again in *Moralia*, 96 C, 533 A, 763 F.

relatives or comrades or lovers[a] are unmixed with baseness, free from passion, or pure from evil. So the Spartan, when he married a little wife,[b] said that of evils one should choose the least; but brothers one would prudently advise to put up with the evils with which they are most familiar rather than to make trial of unfamiliar ones; for the former procedure as being necessary brings no reproach, but the latter is blameworthy because voluntary. No boon-companion or comrade-in-arms or guest

Is yoked in honour's bonds not forged by man,[c]

but he is who is of the same blood and upbringing, and born of the same father and mother. For such a kinsman it is altogether fitting to concede and allow some faults, saying to him when he errs,

"I cannot leave you in your wretchedness[d]

and trouble and folly, lest I might, unwittingly, punish harshly and bitterly, because I hate it, some ailment instilled into you from the seed of father or mother." For, as Theophrastus[e] said, we must not grow to love those not of our blood and then judge them, but judge them first and love them later; but where Nature does not commit the initiative to judgement in conceiving goodwill toward another nor wait for the proverbial bushel of salt,[f] but has begotten with the child at its birth the principle of love, in that case

[d] Adapted from Homer, *Od.*, xiii. 331.
[e] Frag. 74 (p. 181 ed. Wimmer, 1862); paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense.
[f] That is, does not wait many years for the relationship to ripen into affection; *cf. Moralia*, 94 A, and the references there cited.

(482) ἐνταῦθα δεῖ μὴ πικροὺς εἶναι μηδ' ἀκριβεῖς τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐξεταστάς. νυνὶ δὲ τί ἂν λέγοις, εἰ ξένων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἐκ πότου τινὸς ἢ παιδιᾶς ἢ παλαίστρας προσφθαρέντων ἁμαρτήματα
C ῥᾳδίως ἔνιοι φέροντες καὶ ἡδόμενοι, δύσκολοι καὶ ἀπαραίτητοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφούς εἰσιν; ὅπου καὶ κύνας χαλεποὺς καὶ ἵππους, πολλοὶ δὲ λύγκας, αἰλούρους, πιθήκους, λέοντας τρέφοντες καὶ ἀγαπῶντες, ἀδελφῶν οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν ὀργὰς ἢ ἀγνοίας ἢ φιλοτιμίας, ἕτεροι δὲ παλλακίσι καὶ πόρναις οἰκίας καὶ ἀγροὺς καταγράφοντες ὑπὲρ οἰκοπέδου καὶ γωνίας πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς διαμονομαχοῦσιν, εἶτα τῷ μισαδέλφῳ μισοπονηρίαν ὄνομα θέμενοι περινοστοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τὴν κακίαν προβαλλόμενοι καὶ λοιδοροῦντες, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ δυσχεραίνοντες ἀλλὰ χρώμενοι πολλῇ καὶ συνόντες.
D 9. Ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ἔστω προοίμια τοῦ λόγου παντός. ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς διδασκαλίας μὴ τὴν νέμησιν τῶν πατρῴων, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι, λάβωμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔτι ζώντων ἁμαρτανομένην τῶν γονέων ἅμιλλαν καὶ ζηλοτυπίαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι, τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων ἀεὶ γερόντων ἑκάστῳ βοῦν ἀριστεῖον πέμποντος, ἐζημίωσαν αὐτὸν αἰτίαν ὑπειπόντες ὅτι τοὺς κοινοὺς ἰδίους κτᾶται δημαγωγῶν καὶ χαριζόμενος· υἱῷ δ' ἄν τις παραινέσειε θεραπεύειν γονεῖς μὴ κτώμενον ἑαυτῷ μόνῳ μηδ' εἰς

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 94 A.
[b] *Cf.* 456 F and 462 F, *supra*.
[c] *Cf. Life of Agesilaüs*, v. (598 B).
[d] The Spartan Council of Elders.

there should be no harsh nor strict censors of his faults. But as it is, what would you say of those who sometimes readily put up with the wrongdoings of strangers and men of no kin to themselves, men picked up at some drinking-bout or play-ground or wrestling-floor,[a] and take pleasure in their company, yet are peevish and inexorable toward their own brothers? Why some even breed and grow fond of savage dogs and horses, and many people do so with lynxes and cats, monkeys and lions, yet cannot endure their brothers' rages or stupidities or ambitions; still others make over their houses and property to concubines and harlots, yet fight it out in a duel with their brothers over a site for a building or a corner of property; and finally, giving the name of "hatred of evil"[b] to their hatred of their brothers, they stalk about pompously, accusing and reviling the wickedness in their brothers; yet in others they take no offence at this same quality, but frequently resort to them and are often in their company.

9. Let this, then, serve as a preamble to my whole discourse. But as the starting-point of my admonitions, let us take, not the division of the father's goods, as other writers do, but the misguided quarrels and jealousy of the children while the parents are yet alive. The ephors, when Agesilaüs[c] used to send an ox as a mark of distinguished service to each member of the *gerousia*[d] as he was appointed, fined him, alleging as their reason that by such demagogic means of gaining popular favour he was trying to acquire as his own personal followers men who belonged to the state; but one would advise a son to care for his parents, not with the design of acquiring their goodwill for himself alone or turning it away

ἑαυτὸν ἀποστρέφοντα τὴν εὔνοιαν. ᾧ τρόπῳ πολλοὶ καταδημαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀδελφούς, εὐπρεπῆ πρόφασιν οὐ δικαίαν δὲ τῆς πλεονεξίας ταύτης ἔχοντες· E τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον τῶν πατρῴων καὶ κάλλιστον ἀποστεροῦσιν αὐτούς, τὴν εὔνοιαν, ἀνελευθέρως καὶ πανούργως ὑποτρέχοντες, ἐν καιρῷ ταῖς ἐκείνων ἀσχολίαις καὶ ἀγνοίαις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ μάλιστα παρέχοντες εὐτάκτους καὶ κατηκόους αὑτοὺς καὶ σώφρονας, ἐν οἷς ἐκείνους ἁμαρτάνοντας ἢ δοκοῦντας ὁρῶσι. δεῖ δὲ τοὐναντίον, ὅπου μὲν ὀργή, συνεκδέχεσθαι καὶ συνυποδύεσθαι καθάπερ τῷ συνεργεῖν ποιοῦντα κουφοτέραν,[1] ὑπουργίαις δὲ καὶ χάρισι συνεισποιεῖν ἁμωσγέπως τὸν ἀδελφόν· ἐλλείποντος δέ που, καιρὸν ἢ πρᾶξιν ἑτέραν ἢ[2] τὴν F φύσιν αἰτιᾶσθαι, ὡς[3] πρὸς ἄλλα[4] χρησιμωτέραν καὶ συνετωτέραν[5] οὖσαν. εὖ δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὡς

> "οὔτ' ὄκνῳ εἴκων οὔτ' ἀφραδίῃσι νόοιο,
> ἀλλ' ἐμέ τ' εἰσορόων[6]

καὶμοὶ τοῦτο παραδοὺς τὸ καθῆκον." ἡδέως δὲ καὶ 483 τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰς μεταθέσεις οἱ πατέρες προσδέχονται καὶ πιστεύουσι τοῖς υἱοῖς ἁπλότητα μὲν τὴν ῥᾳθυμίαν τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὀνομάζουσιν, ὀρθότητα δὲ τὴν σκαιότητα, τὸ δὲ φιλόνεικον ἀκαταφρόνητον·

[1] κουφοτέραν Reiske: κουφότερον.
[2] ἢ added by Xylander.
[3] ὡς] omitted in most mss.; some have ὡς μᾶλλον; none have ὡς alone.
[4] ἄλλα] ἄλληλα most mss.
[5] συνετωτέραν Apelt: σεμνοτέραν.
[6] εἰσορόων] most mss. add καὶ ἐμὴν ποτιδέγμενος ὁρμήν from *Il.*, x. 123.

from others to himself. It is in this way that many play the demagogue against their brothers, having a specious but unjust pretext for this rapacity; for they deprive them of the greatest and fairest of inheritances, their parents' goodwill, by servilely and unscrupulously cutting across their brothers' path, opportunely making their attacks when the parents are occupied and unsuspecting, and, in particular, showing themselves dutiful and obedient and prudent in those matters in which they perceive their brothers to be in error, or seeming to be so. But the right way, on the contrary, when a son sees that his father is angry with his brother, is to take his share of it and bear the brunt of it together with his brother, by such assistance making the anger lighter, and then by rendering services and favours to help somehow or other to restore his brother to his father's grace. If there is error of omission, he can allege in the brother's favour the absence of opportunity, or that he was engaged on some other work, or his very nature, as being more useful and more intelligent in other directions. The saying of Agamemnon[a] also is admirable:

> "Not to slackness does he yield or foolishness,
> But looks to me,

and to me he has committed this duty." And fathers are very willing to accept even the substitution of other terms[b] and to believe their sons when they call their brothers' carelessness "simplicity," their stupidity "straightforwardness," and their contentiousness "inability to endure contempt";

[a] On behalf of Menelaüs: *Il.*, x. 122-123.
[b] That is, terms which excuse the fault; *cf. Moralia*, 56 c.

(483) ὥστε τῷ διαλλάσσοντι περίεστι τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὀργὴν ἐλαττοῦν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εὔνοιαν αὔξειν τοῦ πατρός.

10. Οὕτω δ' ἀπολογησάμενον ἤδη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον δεῖ τρέπεσθαι καὶ καθάπτεσθαι σφοδρότερον, τὸ ἁμάρτημα καὶ τὸ ἔλλειμμα μετὰ παρρησίας ἐνδεικνύμενον. οὔτε γὰρ ἐφιέναι δεῖ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς οὔτ' αὖ
B πάλιν ἐπεμβαίνειν ἁμαρτάνουσιν αὐτοῖς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιχαίροντός ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ συνεξαμαρτάνοντος), ἀλλ' ὡς[1] κηδομένῳ καὶ συναχθομένῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ νουθετήσει· ἢ γίνεται δὴ[2] κατήγορος ἀδελφοῦ σφοδρότατος πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ προθυμότατος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνήγορος πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς γενόμενος.

Ἂν δὲ μηδὲν ἁμαρτάνων ἀδελφὸς ἐν αἰτίᾳ γένηται, τἄλλα μὲν ὑπουργεῖν γονεῦσι καὶ φέρειν ὀργήν τε πᾶσαν αὐτῶν καὶ δυσχέρειαν ἐπιεικές· αἱ δ' ὑπὲρ ἀδελφοῦ παρ' ἀξίαν κακῶς ἀκούοντος ἢ πάσχοντος ἀντιδικίαι καὶ δικαιολογίαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἄμεμπτοι καὶ καλαί· καὶ οὐ φοβητέον ἀκοῦσαι τὸ Σοφόκλειον,

ὦ παῖ κάκιστε,[3] διὰ δίκης ἰὼν πατρί,

C παρρησιαζόμενον ὑπὲρ ἀδελφοῦ δοκοῦντος ἀγνωμονεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἡ τοιαύτη δίκη τοῖς ἐλεγχομένοις ποιεῖ τὴν ἧτταν ἡδίω τῆς νίκης.

11. Ἀποθανόντος γε μὴν πατρὸς ἐμφύεσθαι μᾶλ-

[1] ἀλλ' ὡς Capps: ἀλλὰ.
[2] τῇ νουθετήσει· ἢ γίνεται δὴ Capps: τῷ νουθετοῦντι γίνεται δὲ.
[3] παῖ κάκιστε] παγκάκιστε MSS. of Sophocles.

[a] *Antigonê*, 742.

the result is that he who acts as mediator succeeds in lessening the anger against his brother, and at the same time he increases his father's goodwill toward himself.

10. Only after the erring brother has been defended in this manner should the other turn to him and rebuke him somewhat sharply, pointing out with all frankness his errors of commission and of omission. For one should neither give free rein to brothers, nor, again, should one trample on them when they are at fault (for the latter is the act of one who gloats over the sinner, the former that of one who aids and abets him), but should apply his admonition as one who cares for his brother and grieves with him. Otherwise he who has been the most zealous advocate before his parents becomes before the brother himself the most vehement of accusers.

But if a brother is guiltless when he is accused, though it is right to be subservient to parents in everything else and to endure all their wrath and displeasure, yet pleas and justifications offered to parents on behalf of a brother who is being undeservedly criticized or punished are honourable and not reprehensible ; nor must one be afraid that the words of Sophocles [a] will be addressed to him :

> Most shameless son, who with his father dare
> To litigate,

when one is speaking with all frankness on behalf of a brother who seems to be receiving unfair treatment. For to the parents themselves, when they are proved wrong, such a " litigation " makes defeat sweeter than victory.

11. After the father is dead, however, even more

(483) λον ἢ πρότερον ὀρθῶς ἔχει τῇ εὐνοίᾳ τὸν ἀδελφόν,[1] εὐθὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ συνδακρύειν καὶ συνάχθεσθαι κοινούμενον τὸ φιλόστοργον, ὑπονοίας δὲ θεραπόντων καὶ διαβολὰς ἑταίρων[2] ἑτέρωσ'[3] αὐτοὺς[4] προσνεμόντων ἀπωθούμενον, καὶ πιστεύοντα τοῖς τ' ἄλλοις ἃ μυθολογοῦσι περὶ τῶν Διοσκόρων τῆς φιλαδελφίας, καὶ ὅτι ὁ Πολυδεύκης τὸν καταψιθυρίζοντα τἀδελφοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν κονδύλῳ παίσας ἀπέκτεινεν.

D Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν νέμησιν τῶν πατρῴων, μὴ καταγγείλαντας ἀλλήλοις πόλεμον ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί,

κλῦθ', Ἀλαλά, Πολέμου θύγατερ,

ἐκ παρασκευῆς ἀπαντᾶν· ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ[5] τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην φυλαττομένους, ὡς τοῖς μὲν ἔχθρας ἀνηκέστου καὶ διαφορᾶς, τοῖς δὲ φιλίας καὶ ὁμονοίας οὖσαν ἀρχήν, μάλιστα μὲν αὐτοὺς καθ' ἑαυτούς, εἰ δὲ μή, φίλου κοινοῦ παρόντος ἀμφοτέροις μάρτυρος εὐγνωμονοῦντος[6] "δίκης κλήροις," ᾗ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὰ φίλα καὶ προσήκοντα λαμβάνοντας καὶ διδόντας οἴεσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν νέμεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν, χρῆσιν δὲ καὶ κτῆσιν
E ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι κοινὴν καὶ ἀνέμητον ἁπάντων. οἱ δὲ καὶ τίτθας ἀποσπῶντες ἀλλήλων καὶ συντρόφους

[1] τὸν ἀδελφόν] τῶν ἀδελφῶν or τοὺς ἀδελφούς in most MSS.
[2] ἑταίρων Reiske, confirmed by MSS.: ἑτέρων.
[3] ἑτέρωσ' Pohlenz: ἑτέρως or ἑτέροις.
[4] αὐτοὺς Bernardakis: αὐτούς.
[5] δὴ δεῖ W.C.H.: δὴ or δεῖ.
[6] εὐγνωμονοῦντος Pohlenz: εὐγνωμονούντων or εὐγνώμονος.

than before it is right for the brother to cling fast to his brother's goodwill, immediately sharing his affection for the dead in tears and grief, rejecting the insinuations of servants and the calumnies of comrades who range themselves on the other side, and believing all the tales about the brotherly love of the Dioscuri and in particular the one which relates that Polydeuces [a] killed with a blow of his fist a man who whispered to him something against his brother.[b]

And when they seek to divide their father's goods, they should not first declare war on each other, as the majority do, and then, shouting

Hearken, Alala, daughter of War,[c]

go out to meet each other ready armed, but they must by all means be on their guard against that day of the division, knowing that for some brothers it is the beginning of implacable enmity and strife, but for others the beginning of friendship and concord. Let them preferably assemble alone by themselves; otherwise, let there be present some common friend as a witness equally friendly to both, and then "by the lots of Justice," as Plato [d] says, let them, as they give and take what is suitable to each and preferred by each, be of the opinion that it is the care and administration of the estate that is being distributed, but that its use and ownership is left unassigned and undistributed for them all in common. But those who have outbidden their brothers by their shrewd cal-

[a] Pherecydes: *cf.* Jacoby, *Frag. d. gr. Historiker*, i. p. 101.
[b] Cited by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense (*cf.* also p. 675).
[c] Pindar, Frag. 78; *cf. Moralia*, 349 c, with the note.
[d] *Critias*, 109 B.

καὶ συνήθεις παῖδας ὑπερβαλόμενοι[1] τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς,[2] ἀπίασιν ἀνδραπόδου τιμῇ[3] πλέον ἔχοντες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον τῶν πατρῴων, φιλίαν ἀδελφοῦ καὶ πίστιν, ἀπολωλεκότες.[4]

Ἐνίους δὲ καὶ ἀκερδῶς φιλονεικίας ἕνεκα χρησαμένους τοῖς πατρῴοις οὐθὲν ἐπιεικέστερον ἢ λαφύροις ἴσμεν· ὧν καὶ Χαρικλῆς καὶ Ἀντίοχος ἦσαν οἱ Ὀπούντιοι· καὶ γὰρ ἔκπωμα διακόψαντες ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἱμάτιον διατεμόντες ἀπῆεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τραγικῆς τινος κατάρας

θηκτῷ σιδήρῳ δῶμα διαλαχόντες.

F οἱ δὲ καὶ διηγοῦνται πρὸς ἑτέρους γαυριῶντες ὅτι τῶν ἀδελφῶν πανουργίᾳ καὶ δριμύτητι καὶ παραλογισμῷ πλέον ἔσχον ἐν τῷ νέμεσθαι, δέον ἀγάλλεσθαι καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ χάριτι
484 καὶ ὑπείξει περιγενομένους. ὅθεν ἄξιόν ἐστιν[5] Ἀθηνοδώρου μεμνῆσθαι, καὶ μέμνηνταί γε πάντες παρ' ἡμῖν. ἦν γὰρ ἀδελφὸς αὐτῷ πρεσβύτερος ὄνομα Ξένων, καὶ πολλὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἐπιτροπεύων διεφόρησε· τέλος δ' ἁρπάσας γυναῖκα καὶ καταδικασθεὶς ἀπώλεσε τὴν οὐσίαν, εἰς τὸ Καίσαρος ταμιεῖον ἀναληφθεῖσαν. ὁ δ' Ἀθηνόδωρος ἦν μὲν ἔτι μειράκιον οὐδέπω γενειῶν, ἀποδοθέντος δὲ τοῦ

[1] ὑπερβαλόμενοι Capps, confirmed by MSS.: ὑπερβαλλόμενοι.
[2] διαλογισμοῖς Emperius: διωγμοῖς.
[3] τιμῇ H. Richards, confirmed by MSS.: τί μὴ.
[4] ἀπολωλεκότες Cobet, confirmed by one MS. (C): ἀποδεδωκότες.
[5] ἐστιν] omitted in most MSS.

[a] Compare the Judgement of Solomon.
[b] Adapted from Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 68: the curse of

culations and then drag away from each other nurses and slave-boys, who have been brought up with their brothers and are their familiar companions, when they go away have got the better of their brothers by the value of a slave, but have lost the greatest and most valuable part of their inheritance, a brother's friendship and confidence.

And some we know who, even with no thought of gain, but merely from the love of contention, deal with their father's goods with no more decency than they would with spoils taken from an enemy. Of this number were Charicles and Antiochus the Opuntians, who would not part until they had split in two a silver cup and torn apart a cloak,[a] as though driven on by some imprecation from a tragedy to

Divide with whetted sword their heritage.[b]

Some even relate to outsiders boastfully how by knavery and craftiness and jugglery of accounts they have got the better of their brothers in the apportionment, when they ought rather to rejoice and to pride themselves on having surpassed their brothers in fairness and generosity and compliance. It is worth our while to illustrate this point by citing the case of Athenodorus, and indeed all my countrymen still speak of him. For he had an elder brother named Xenon, who, as administrator of Athenodorus's estate, squandered a large part of his substance; at last Xenon raped a woman, was condemned in court, and lost the entire estate, made confiscate to the imperial treasury. But Athenodorus, although he was then still a beardless lad, yet when his portion of the

Oedipus on his sons, exemplified by the speech of Eteocles cited in 481 A, *supra*; and *cf.* Aeschylus, *Septem*, 789.

(484) μέρους αὐτῷ τῶν χρημάτων οὐ περιεῖδε τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀλλ' εἰς μέσον ἅπαντα καταθεὶς ἐνείματο, καὶ πολλὰ περὶ τὴν νέμησιν ἀγνωμονούμενος[1] οὐκ ἠγανάκτησεν οὐδὲ μετενόησεν, ἀλλὰ πράως καὶ ἱλαρῶς ἤνεγκε τἀδελφοῦ τὴν ἄνοιαν, περιβόητον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γενομένην.

12. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Σόλων ἀποφηνάμενος περὶ πολιτείας, ὡς ἰσότης στάσιν οὐ ποιεῖ, λίαν ἔδοξεν ὀχλικῶς ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἐπεισάγειν ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς γεωμετρικῆς· ὁ δ' ἐν οἰκίᾳ παραινῶν ἀδελφοῖς μάλιστα μὲν ὡς ὁ Πλάτων παρήνει τοῖς πολίταις, "τὸ ἐμὸν" ἐξαιρεῖν "καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν," εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἴσην ἀγαπᾶν καὶ τῆς ἴσης περιέχεσθαι, καὶ[2] καλὴν κρηπῖδα καὶ μόνιμον ὁμονοίας καὶ εἰρήνης καταβαλλόμενος,[3] χρήσθω καὶ[4] παραδείγμασιν ἐνδόξοις οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Λυδῶν πυνθανόμενον εἰ χρήματ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ, "διπλάσι'," εἶπεν, "ἢ[5] ἐβουλόμην, τἀδελφοῦ τεθνηκότος." ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἐν χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ μειώσει τῷ πλείονι πολέμιον καθίσταται τοὔλασσον, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς, ἧ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἐν μὲν ἀνωμαλίᾳ κίνησιν ἐν δ' ὁμαλότητι στάσιν ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ μονήν, οὕτω πᾶσα

[1] ἀγνωμονούμενος Wyttenbach: ἀγνωμονευόμενος.
[2] καὶ added by W.C.H.
[3] After καταβαλλόμενος the MSS. read ἀεί or ἐστι; deleted by W.C.H.
[4] καὶ] δὲ καὶ some MSS.
[5] ἢ Casaubon: εἰ.

[a] *Cf. Life of Solon*, xiv. (85 D).
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 719 B, 643 C: that is, arithmetical, instead of what Aristotle terms proportionate equality.
[c] *Cf.*, for example, Plato, *Gorgias*, 508 A.

money was restored to him, he did not neglect his brother, but put down all the money before them both and apportioned it; and even though he was being treated very unfairly in the division, he did not express indignation or change his mind, but calmly and cheerfully endured his brother's folly, which had become notorious throughout Greece.

12. When Solon,[a] speaking of principles of government, said that equality does not create sedition, he was thought to be playing up too much to the crowd by introducing an arithmetical proportion, a democratic principle,[b] instead of the sound geometrical proportion.[c] As for a man who gives advice to brothers in the matter of a family estate after the manner of Plato's[d] advice to the citizens of his state, to abolish, if possible, the notion of "mine" and "not mine," but if he cannot do this, to cherish equality and cling to it, and thus lays a fair and abiding[e] foundation of concord and peace, let him also make use of eminent precedents, such as that reply of Pittacus to the king of Lydia[f] who inquired if Pittacus had money: "Twice as much," said he, "as I would wish, now that my brother is dead." But since it is not only the getting of money and the losing of it that makes "less grow hostile to more,"[g] but in general, as Plato[h] says, in inequality movement is produced and in equality rest and repose; thus all

[d] *Republic*, 462 C: *cf. Moralia*, 140 D, 767 D, and Aristotle's attempted refutation, *Politics*, ii. 1. 8 (1261 b 16).
[e] Perhaps with a reference to Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 533 (cited 481 A, *supra*).
[f] Croesus: *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, i. 75.
[g] Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 539: τῷ πλέονι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται.
[h] *Republic*, 547 A.

(484) μὲν ἀνισότης ἐπισφαλής ἐστι πρὸς διαφορὰν ἀδελφῶν, ἐν πᾶσι δ' ἴσους γενέσθαι καὶ ὁμαλοὺς[1] ἀδύνατον (τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἱ φύσεις εὐθὺς ἀνίσως νέμουσι, τὰ δ' ὕστερον αἱ τύχαι φθόνους ἐμποιοῦσαι[2] καὶ ζηλοτυπίας, αἴσχιστα νοσήματα καὶ κῆρας οὐκ
D οἰκίαις μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεσιν ὀλεθρίους), δεῖ καὶ ταῦτα φυλάττεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν, ἂν ἐγγένηται. τῷ μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχοντι παραινέσειεν ἄν τις, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν[3] οἷς δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ταῦτα κοινὰ ποιεῖν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, συνεπικοσμοῦντα τῇ δόξῃ καὶ συνεισποιοῦντα ταῖς φιλίαις· κἂν λέγειν δεινότερος ᾖ, χρῆσθαι παρέχοντα τὴν δύναμιν, ὡς ἐκείνων[4] μηθὲν ἧττον οὖσαν· ἔπειτα μήτ' ὄγκον ἐμφαίνειν τινὰ μηθ' ὑπεροψίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνδιδόντα καὶ συγκαθιέντα τῷ ἤθει τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀνεπίφθονον ποιεῖν καὶ τὴν
E τῆς τύχης ἀνωμαλίαν ἐπανισοῦν, ὡς ἀνυστόν ἐστι, τῇ μετριότητι τοῦ φρονήματος. ὁ γοῦν[5] Λεύκολλος οὐκ ἠξίωσε τἀδελφοῦ πρότερος τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν πρεσβύτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ παρεὶς καιρὸν τὸν ἐκείνου περιέμεινεν. ὁ δὲ Πολυδεύκης οὐδὲ θεὸς ἠθέλησε μόνος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμίθεος σὺν τἀδελφῷ γενέσθαι καὶ τῆς θνητῆς μερίδος μετασχεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ μεταδοῦναι τῆς ἀθανασίας ἐκείνῳ.

"Σοὶ δέ," φαίη τις ἄν, "ὦ μακάριε, μηθὲν

[1] δ' ἴσως γενέσθαι ὁμαλοὺς ? W.C.H.
[2] ἐμποιοῦσαι] ἐμποιοῦσι most MSS.
[3] ἐν] in G only.
[4] ἐκείνων van Herwerden, confirmed by MSS.: ἐκείνου.
[5] γοῦν] μὲν οὖν most MSS.

[a] *Cf.*, for example, 468 B, *supra*.

manner of inequality is dangerous as likely to foster brothers' quarrels, and though it is impossible for them to be equal and on the same footing in all respects (for on the one hand our natures at the very beginning make an unequal apportionment, and then later on our varying fortunes beget envies and jealousies, the most shameful diseases and baneful plagues,[a] ruinous not only for private houses, but for whole states as well); against these inequalities we must be on our guard and must cure them, if they arise. One would therefore advise a brother, in the first place, to make his brothers partners in those respects in which he is considered to be superior, adorning them with a portion of his repute and adopting them into his friendships, and if he is a cleverer speaker than they, to make his eloquence available for their use as though it were no less theirs than his; in the next place, to make manifest to them neither haughtiness nor disdain, but rather, by deferring to them and conforming his character to theirs, to make his superiority secure from envy and to equalize, so far as this is attainable, the disparity of his fortune by his moderation of spirit. Lucullus,[b] for instance, refused to hold office before his brother, older though he was, but forwent his own proper time for candidature and awaited his brother's. And Polydeuces[c] refused to become even a god by himself, but chose rather to become a demigod with his brother and to share his mortal portion upon the condition of yielding to Castor part of his own immortality.

"But you, fortunate man," one might say, "are so

[b] *Cf. Life of Lucullus*, i. (492 B).
[c] Quoted by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense, joined with the Polydeuces quotation in 483 C, *supra*.

ἐλαττοῦντι τῶν προσόντων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχει συνεξομοιοῦν καὶ συνεπικοσμεῖν, ὥσπερ αὐγῆς[1] ἀπολαύοντα τῆς περὶ σὲ δόξης ἢ ἀρετῆς ἢ εὐτυχίας[2]." ὥσπερ Πλάτων τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς εἰς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν αὑτοῦ συγγραμμάτων θέμενος ὀνομαστοὺς ἐποίησε,
F Γλαύκωνα μὲν καὶ Ἀδείμαντον εἰς τὴν Πολιτείαν, Ἀντιφῶντα δὲ τὸν νεώτατον εἰς τὸν Παρμενίδην. (13.) ἔτι τοίνυν ὥσπερ ἐγγίνονται ταῖς φύσεσι καὶ ταῖς τύχαις τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἀνισότητες, οὕτως ἐν
485 πᾶσι καὶ πάντως ὑπερέχειν τὸν ἕτερον ἀδύνατόν ἐστι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖά φασιν ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης γεγονέναι, τὰς ἐναντιωτάτας ἔχοντα δυνάμεις· δυεῖν δ' ἀδελφῶν ἐκ μιᾶς μητρὸς καὶ πατρὸς ταὐτοῦ γεγονότων, οὐθεὶς ἑώρακε τὸν μέν, ὡς τὸν[3] ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς σοφόν, ὁμοῦ καλὸν εὔχαριν ἐλευθέριον ἔντιμον πλούσιον δεινὸν εἰπεῖν πολυμαθῆ[4] φιλάνθρωπον, τὸν δ' ἕτερον αἰσχρὸν ἄχαριν ἀνελεύθερον ἄτιμον[5] ἄπορον ἀσθενῆ περὶ λόγον ἀμαθῆ μισάνθρωπον. ἀλλ' ἔνεστιν ἀμωσγέπως καὶ τοῖς ἀδοξοτέροις καὶ ταπεινοτέροις μοῖρά τις χάριτος ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ πρός τι καλὸν εὐφυΐας,

ὡς ἀν' ἐχινόποδας καὶ ἀνὰ τρηχεῖαν ὄνωνιν[6]
φύονται μαλακῶν ἄνθεα λευκοΐων.

ταῦτα τοίνυν ὁ δοκῶν πλέον ἔχειν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἂν μὴ
B κολούῃ μηδ' ἐπικρύπτῃ μηδὲ πάντων ὥσπερ ἐν

[1] αὐγῆς Emperius: αὐτῆς.
[2] εὐτυχίας] συντυχίας in most MSS.
[3] ὡς τὸν added by Reiske.
[4] πολυμαθῆ Polus: φιλομαθῆ.
[5] ἄτιμον ἀνελεύθερον all MSS. but G.
[6] ὄνωνιν] most MSS. have ὁδὸν ἵνα.

situated that, without in the least diminishing your present blessings, you can make another an equal sharer in them and give him a portion of your adornment so that he may enjoy the radiance, as it were, of your reputation or excellence or prosperity." Just so did Plato make his brothers famous by introducing them into the fairest of his writings, Glaucon and Adeimantus into the *Republic*, Antiphon the youngest into the *Parmenides*. (13.) And further, just as there exist inequalities in the natures and the fortunes of brothers, so it is impossible that the one brother should excel at all points and in all ways. They say that the elements come into being from one substance, yet possess the most opposite faculties; but of two brothers sprung from one mother and father, no one ever saw the one, like the wise man of the Stoics,[a] at once handsome, gracious, liberal, eminent, rich, eloquent, learned, philanthropic, and the other ugly, graceless, illiberal, dishonoured, needy, a poor speaker, unlearned, misanthropic. Yet somehow or other there inheres, in even the more disreputable and humble creatures, some portion of grace or faculty or natural aptitude for some good thing:

As among urchin's foot and rough rest-harrow[b]
There grow the blossoms of soft snow-drops.[c]

Therefore he who appears to have the better in other respects, if he does not try to curtail or conceal these

[a] *Cf.* 472 A, *supra*, and the note; this Stoic paradox is parodied at length by Horace in *Satires*, i. 3.
[b] A field shrub with tough roots, also called "cammock."
[c] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.*, iii. p. 689: Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, ii. p. 282; quoted also in *Moralia*, 44 E, 621 E.

(485) ἀγῶνι τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐξωθῇ τῶν πρωτείων, ἀλλ' ἀνθυπείκῃ καὶ ἀποφαίνῃ πρὸς πολλὰ βελτίω καὶ χρησιμώτερον ἐκεῖνον, ὑφαιρῶν ἀεὶ τοῦ φθόνου τὴν πρόφασιν ὥσπερ ὕλην τοῦ πυρὸς ἀποσβέσει, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως οὐκ ἐάσει λαβεῖν γένεσιν οὐδὲ σύστασιν. ὁ δὲ καὶ συνεργόν, ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ κρειττων αὐτὸς εἶναι, ποιούμενος τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀεὶ καὶ σύμβουλον, οἷον ἐν δίκαις ῥητορικὸς ὤν, ἐν ἀρχαῖς πολιτευόμενος, ἐν πράξεσι φιλοπράγμων,[1] συνελόντι δ' εἰπεῖν, μηδενὸς ἀξιολόγου καὶ τιμὴν φέροντος ἔργου περιορῶν
C ἀπολειπόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῶν καλῶν πάντων κοινωνὸν ἀποφαίνων καὶ χρώμενος παρόντι καὶ περιμένων ἀπόντα, καὶ ὅλως συνεμφαίνων ὅτι πρακτικὸς μὲν οὐχ ἧττον αὐτοῦ, παραχωρητικὸς δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστι δόξης καὶ δυνάμεως, οὐθὲν ἑαυτοῦ παραιρούμενος ἐκείνῳ μεγάλα προστίθησι.

14. Τῷ μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχοντι τοιαῦτά τις ἂν παραινέσειε· τῷ δὲ λειπομένῳ πάλιν ἐνθυμητέον, ὡς οὐχ εἷς οὐδὲ μόνος αὐτοῦ πλουσιώτερος ἢ λογιώτερος ἢ λαμπρότερος εἰς δόξαν ὁ ἀδελφός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις πολλῶν ἀπολείπεται καὶ μυριάκις μυρίων,

εὐρυεδοῦς[2] ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·

εἴτε δὴ[3] πᾶσι περινοστεῖ φθονῶν εἴτε μόνος αὐτὸν
D ἐν τοσούτοις εὐτυχοῦσιν ὁ φίλτατος ἀνιᾷ καὶ[4] συγγενέστατος, ὑπερβολὴν ἑτέρῳ κακοδαιμονίας οὐ

[1] φιλοπράγμων Capps: φιλικαῖς or φιλικός.
[2] εὐρυεδοῦς Plato (*Protag.*, 345 c): εὐρυόδους.
[3] δὴ G: δὲ. [4] καὶ G: ὁ.

points of vantage in his brother or thrust him, as though in athletic competitions, from the first places always, but yields in his turn and reveals that his brother is better and more useful in many respects, by thus continually removing all ground for envy, fuel for fire, as it were, will quench the envy, or rather will not allow it to spring up or begin at all. And he who continually makes his brother a helper and adviser in matters in which he himself is supposed to be superior, as in law-suits, being himself a barrister; in the conduct of office, himself a politician; in practical affairs, himself being fond of such—in brief, he that permits his brother to be left out of no task that is worthy of notice and would bring honour, but makes him a sharer in all honourable enterprises and employs him when present, waits for him when absent, and, in general, by showing that his brother is no less a man of affairs than himself, but merely more inclined to shrink from fame and power—he deprives himself of nothing, but adds a great deal to his brother.

14. Such is the advice, then, which one would give to the superior brother. The inferior brother, on the other hand, must reflect that his brother is not the only one who is richer or more learned or more famous than himself, but that he is frequently inferior to many others—ten thousand times ten thousand,

As many as enjoy the fruit of spacious earth[a];

whether, then, he envies every man as he walks about, or whether, among the vast number of fortunate beings, the only one that distresses him is his nearest and dearest, he has left no room for any other man

[a] Simonides, Frag. 5, v. 17; *cf.* 470 D, *supra*, and the note.

(485) λέλοιπεν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Μέτελλος ᾤετο δεῖν Ῥωμαίους τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχειν ὅτι Σκιπίων ἐν ἑτέρᾳ πόλει τοιοῦτος ὢν οὐκ ἐγεννήθη, οὕτως ἕκαστος εὐχέσθω μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εὐπραξίᾳ διαφέρειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ τὴν ζηλουμένην ἔχειν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δύναμιν. οἱ δ' οὕτω πεφύκασιν ἀτυχεῖς[1] πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ὥστε φίλοις μὲν ἐνδόξοις ἀγάλλεσθαι καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἂν ξένους ἡγεμονικοὺς καὶ πλουσίους ἔχωσι, τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν λαμ-
E πρότητας αὐτῶν ἀμαυρώσεις νομίζειν· καὶ πατέρων μὲν εὐτυχίαις ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ στρατηγίαις προπάππων λεγομέναις, ὧν οὐδὲν ἀπέλαυσαν οὐδὲ μετέσχον, ἀδελφῶν δὲ κληρονομίαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ γάμοις ἐνδόξοις ἀθυμεῖν καὶ ταπεινοῦσθαι. καίτοι μάλιστα μὲν ἔδει μηδ' ἄλλῳ φθονεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρέπειν ἔξω καὶ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀποχετεύειν τὸ βάσκανον, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰς στάσεις θύραζε τοῖς πολέμοις περισπῶντες[2]·

πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐμοὶ Τρῶες κλειτοί τ' ἐπίκουροι,
πολλοὶ δ' αὖ σοὶ Ἀχαιοὶ

φθονεῖν πεφύκασι καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖν.

15. Ἀδελφῷ δὲ χρὴ μὴ καθάπερ πλάστιγγα ῥέπειν ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, ὑψουμένου ταπεινούμενον

[1] ἀτυχεῖς] ἀτυχῶς some mss.
[2] πολέμοις περισπῶντες Pohlenz (περιστάντες Bernardakis): πολεμίοις περιστῶντες.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 202 A.
[b] Or perhaps "praetorships" (so Wyttenbach).
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 91 F f.
[d] Homer, *Il.*, vi. 227, 229: Plutarch points the quotation with "envy" and so does not retain the Homeric context, in which Diomedes indicates the other Greeks for Glaucus, and the other Trojans for himself, "to kill."

to surpass him in wretchedness. Just as Metellus,[a] therefore, thought that Romans should be grateful to the gods because so great a man as Scipio was not born in any other city, so each one of us should pray that, if possible, he himself may succeed beyond all other men, yet if this cannot be, that his brother may have that superiority and influence so coveted by himself. But some are by nature so unfortunate in matters of right conduct that they exult in famous friends and are proud if they are on terms of hospitality with commanders and men of wealth, but consider that their brothers' brilliance obscures their own; and that while they are elated by the narration of their fathers' successes and their great-grandfathers' high commands,[b] matters from which they received no benefit and in which they had no share, yet they are depressed and dejected when their brothers inherit fortunes, are elected to office, or contract marriages with famous families. And yet they should by all means envy no one; if this is impossible, they should turn their malignancy outwards[c] and drain it off on those not of their blood, just as men do who divert sedition from the city by means of foreign wars:

Many Trojans have I and famous allies,
And many Achaeans have you[d]—

by nature suitable objects for envy and jealousy.

15. But a brother should not, like the pan of a balance, incline the opposite way and be himself lowered when his brother is raised on high; but just

F αὐτόν, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ ἐλάττονες τοὺς μείζονας πολλαπλασιάζοντες καὶ πολλαπλασιαζόμενοι, συναύξειν ἅμα καὶ συναύξεσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν δακτύλων ἔλαττον ἔχει τοῦ γράφοντος ἢ ψάλλοντος ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος τοῦτο ποιεῖν μηδὲ πεφυκώς, ἀλλὰ συγκινοῦνται καὶ συνεργοῦσιν ἅ-
486 παντες ἀμωσγέπως ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἄνισοι γεγονότες καὶ τὸ συλληπτικὸν ἐξ ἀντιθέσεως πρὸς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ῥωμαλεώτατον[1] ἔχοντες.

Οὕτω καὶ Κρατερὸς Ἀντιγόνου βασιλεύοντος ἀδελφὸς ὢν καὶ Κασάνδρου Περίλαος ἐπὶ τὸ στρατηγεῖν καὶ οἰκουρεῖν ἔταττον αὑτούς· Ἀντίοχοι δὲ καὶ Σέλευκοι καὶ πάλιν Γρυποὶ καὶ Κυζικηνοὶ τὰ δεύτερα λέγειν[2] οὐ μαθόντες ἀδελφοῖς ἀλλὰ πορφύρας καὶ διαδήματος ὀρεγόμενοι, πολλῶν μὲν αὑτοὺς κακῶν καὶ ἀλλήλους, πολλῶν δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐνέπλησαν.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖς φιλοτίμοις μάλιστα τῶν ἠθῶν
B ἐμφύονται φθόνοι καὶ ζηλοτυπίαι πρὸς τοὺς πλέον ἔχοντας ἐν δόξῃ καὶ τιμῇ, χρησιμώτατόν ἐστι πρὸς τοῦτο τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τὸ μὴ κτᾶσθαι μήτε τὰς τιμὰς μήτε τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου. καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων πόλεμός ἐστι πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφομένοις, καὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν οἱ πρὸς ἓν ἄθλημα κάμνοντες ἀνταγωνισταί, πύκται δὲ παγκρατιασταῖς φίλιοι καὶ δολιχοδρόμοι παλαισταῖς εὐμενεῖς εἰσι καὶ συναγωνιῶσι καὶ σπου-

[1] ῥωμαλεώτατον Reiske, confirmed by MSS.: ῥωμαλεώτερον.
[2] λέγειν] φέρειν D.

[a] Half-brother of Antigonus Gonatas (see F. Jacoby and Schoch, Pauly-Wissowa, *RE*, xi. col. 1617, 1621).

as lesser numbers multiply greater and are multiplied by them, so should he give increase to his brother and at the same time be increased along with him by their common blessings. For it is not true of the fingers, either, that the one which writes and plays musical instruments is superior to the one which cannot, by either nature or attainment, do so, but in some manner or other they all contrive to move together and assist each other, having been made unequal, as though of set purpose, and all deriving their power to grasp from the position of the others opposite the thumb, the largest and strongest of them.

In this spirit Craterus,[a] the brother of King Antigonus, and Perilaüs, the brother of Cassander, assigned themselves to the management of their brothers' military and domestic affairs; but men like Antiochus and Seleucus, and again Grypus and Cyzicenus,[b] who had not learned to play parts secondary to their brothers, but yearned for the purple and the crown, infected themselves and each other with many horrors, and infected all Asia also.

But since envy and jealousy of those who surpass them in repute and honour are implanted by nature chiefly in men of ambitious character, to guard against these vices it is highly expedient that brothers should not seek to acquire honours or power in the same field, but in quite different fields. Wild beasts, to be sure, which depend for their food upon the same things, war against each other, and athletes who direct their efforts toward one and the same contest are rivals; whereas boxers are friendly to pancratiasts and long-distance runners are well disposed toward wrestlers, and they mutually assist and

[b] Antiochus, VIII and IX respectively.

(486) δάζουσιν ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων. διὸ καὶ τῶν Τυνδαριδῶν πὺξ μὲν ὁ Πολυδεύκης ἐνίκα δρόμον[1] δ' ὁ Κάστωρ. εὖ δὲ καὶ τὸν Τεῦκρον Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν ἀπὸ C τοξικῆς εὐδοκιμοῦντα τἀδελφοῦ πρωτεύοντος ἐν τοῖς ὁπλίταις·

ὁ δέ μιν σάκεϊ κρύπτασκε φαεινῷ.

καὶ τῶν πολιτευομένων οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς δημαγωγοῦσιν οὐ πάνυ φθονοῦσιν, οὐδέ γε τῶν ῥητόρων οἱ δικολόγοι τοῖς σοφιστεύουσιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ περὶ δίαιταν τοῖς χειρουργοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπαραλαμβάνουσι καὶ συνεπιμαρτυροῦσι. τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἢ δυνάμεως ζητεῖν ἔνδοξον εἶναι καὶ περίβλεπτον οὐδὲν ἐν ἀδελφοῖς[2] διαφέρει τοῦ μιᾶς ἐρῶντας ἀμφοτέρους βούλεσθαι πλέον ἔχειν καὶ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸν ἕτερον. οἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑτέρας[3] ὁδοὺς βαδίζοντες οὐθὲν D ἀλλήλους ὠφελοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ βίοις χρώμενοι διαφόροις τόν τε φθόνον ἐκτρέπονται καὶ συνεργοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις μᾶλλον, ὡς Δημοσθένης καὶ Χάρης καὶ πάλιν Αἰσχίνης καὶ Εὔβουλος καὶ Ὑπερείδης καὶ Λεωσθένης, οἱ μὲν λέγοντες ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γράφοντες, οἱ δὲ στρατηγοῦντες καὶ πράττοντες. ὅθεν ἀπωτάτω δεῖ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τρέπεσθαι καὶ ταῖς φιλοτιμίαις τῶν ἀδελφῶν τοὺς ἀφθόνως δόξης καὶ

[1] δρόμον] δρόμῳ in many MSS.
[2] ἀδελφοῖς Schwartz: φαύλοις.

cheer for each other. This, in fact, is the reason why, of the two sons of Tyndareüs, Polydeuces won his victories in boxing and Castor in running. And Homer did well to represent Teucer as renowned in archery, while his brother was foremost among the heavy-armed:

And he covered Teucer with gleaming shield.[a]

So, of those engaged in the service of the state, generals do not at all envy popular leaders; nor, among those occupied with the art of speaking, do barristers envy teachers of rhetoric; nor, among physicians, do dieticians envy surgeons; but they even call each other into consultation and commend one another. For brothers to seek eminence and repute from the same art or faculty is precisely the same as for both to fall in love with one woman and each seek to outstrip the other in her esteem. Those, indeed, who travel different roads afford each other no help, but those who follow different modes of life both strive to avoid envy and are of greater service to each other, as were Demosthenes and Chares,[b] and again Aeschines and Eubulus, Hypereides and Leosthenes, of whom the former in each pair harangued the people and drew up laws, the latter commanded armies and translated words into action. Therefore those who cannot, by their very nature, share without envy their brothers' reputation and influence, should divert as far as possible from those of their brothers their own desires and

[a] Ajax and Teucer: *Il.*, viii. 272.
[b] *Cf. Comp. of Demosthenes and Cicero*, iii. (887 c); *Life of Phocion*, vii. (744 F).

[3] καθ' ἑτέρας] ἑτέρας? W.C.H.

δυνάμεως κοινωνεῖν μὴ πεφυκότας, ὅπως εὐφραίνωσιν εὐημεροῦντες ἀλλήλους ἀλλὰ μὴ λυπῶσι.

16. Παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα φυλακτέον ἐστὶ κη-
E δεστῶν καὶ οἰκείων καὶ γυναικὸς ἔστιν ὅτε τῇ φιλοδοξίᾳ συνεπιτιθεμένης λόγους πονηρούς, "ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἄγει καὶ φέρει πάντα καὶ θαυμάζεται καὶ θεραπεύεται, σοὶ δ' οὐδεὶς πρόσεισιν οὐδ' ἔχεις σεμνὸν οὐδέν." "ἔχω μὲν οὖν," φαίη τις ἂν[1] εὖ φρονῶν, "ἀδελφὸν εὐδοκιμοῦντα καὶ μέτεστί μοι τῆς ἐκείνου δυνάμεως τὸ πλεῖστον." ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε βούλεσθαι Δαρεῖον ἔχειν μᾶλλον φίλον ἢ[2] δαρεικόν, ἀδελφῷ δὲ νοῦν ἔχοντι καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ λογιότητος οὐκ ἔλαττον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἄρχων ἀδελφὸς ἢ πλουτῶν ἢ λόγου δυνάμει προήκων εἰς δόξαν.

Ἀλλὰ ταύτας μὲν οὕτω μάλιστα τὰς ἀνωμαλίας
F παρηγορητέον· ἕτεραι δ' εὐθὺς ἐγγίνονται διαφοραὶ περὶ τὰς ἡλικίας ἀπαιδεύτοις ἀδελφοῖς. ἐπιεικῶς γὰρ οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι τῶν νεωτέρων ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦντες ἀεὶ καὶ προΐστασθαι καὶ πλέον ἔχειν ἐν παντὶ δόξης καὶ δυνάμεως βαρεῖς εἰσι καὶ ἀηδεῖς, οἵ τε νεώτεροι πάλιν ἀφηνιάζοντες καὶ θρασυνόμενοι καταφρονεῖν καὶ ὀλιγωρεῖν ἀσκοῦσιν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων οἱ μὲν ὡς φθονούμενοι καὶ κολουόμενοι φεύγουσι
487 καὶ δυσχεραίνουσι τὰς νουθεσίας, οἱ δ' ἀεὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς γλιχόμενοι φοβοῦνται τὴν ἐκείνων

[1] ἄν added by Reiske, confirmed by G.
[2] τὸ after ἢ deleted by Wilamowitz (τὸν Bernardakis).

ambitions, so that by their successes they may give pleasure to each other instead of pain.[a]

16. But, over and above these considerations, we should be on our guard against the pernicious talk of relatives, of members of our household, and sometimes even of a wife who joins the rest in challenging our ambition by saying: "Your brother carries all before him and is admired and courted, but you are not visited by anybody and enjoy no distinction at all." "Not so," a sensible man would reply. "I have a brother who is highly esteemed, and most of his influence is mine to share." Socrates, for instance, remarked that he would rather have Darius than a daric as a friend, and for a brother who has good sense it is no less an advantage than the possession of wealth, high office, or eloquence, to have a brother who has attained to fame by virtue of office or wealth or eloquence.

But although these means are the best for smoothing away such inequalities, yet there are the other differences which naturally arise among brothers who lack the proper training, differences due to disparity in their ages. For, generally speaking, elder brothers, when they claim the right always to dominate and to have precedence over the younger and to have the advantage in every matter where reputation and influence are involved, are oppressive and disagreeable; and younger brothers, in turn, being restive under the curb and becoming fractious, make it their practice to despise and belittle the elder. The result is that while the younger, feeling that they are being treated despitefully and are discriminated against, resent and try to avoid their elders' admonitions, the elder, ever clinging fast to their superiority, fear their brothers'

[a] With the substance of chapters 13-15 Cicero's remarks on inequality in friendship (*Laelius*, 19-20, 69-73) may be compared.

(487) αὔξησιν ὡς αὐτῶν κατάλυσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς χάριτος ἀξιοῦσι μείζονα τοὺς λαμβάνοντας ἡγεῖσθαι μικροτέραν δὲ τοὺς διδόντας, οὕτως ἄν τις, τὸν χρόνον παραινῶν τῷ μὲν πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴ μέγαν[1] νομίζειν τῷ δὲ νεωτέρῳ μὴ μικρόν, ὑπεροψίας καὶ ἀμελείας καὶ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι καὶ καταφρονεῖν ἀμφοτέρους ἀπαλλάξειεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῷ μὲν πρεσβυτέρῳ τὸ κήδεσθαι καὶ καθηγεῖσθαι καὶ νουθετεῖν προσῆκόν ἐστι, τῷ δὲ νεωτέρῳ τὸ τιμᾶν καὶ ζηλοῦν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν, ἡ μὲν ἐκείνου κηδεμονία τὸ ἑταιB ρικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πατρικὸν ἐχέτω καὶ τὸ πεῖθον ἢ τὸ ἐπιτάττον καὶ τὸ χαῖρον ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθώμασι καὶ κατευφημοῦν τοῦ ψέγοντος ἂν ἁμάρτῃ καὶ κολούοντος, μὴ μόνον προθυμότερον ὂν[2] ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρωπότερον, τῷ δὲ τοῦ νεωτέρου ζήλῳ τὸ μιμούμενον ἐνέστω μὴ τὸ ἁμιλλώμενον· θαυμάζοντος γὰρ ἡ μίμησις, ἡ δ' ἅμιλλα φθονοῦντός ἐστι. διὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι βουλομένους ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς δ' ἐξισοῦσθαι πιέζουσι καὶ χαλέπτουσιν.[3] ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ τιμαῖς ἃς πρέπει παρὰ τῶν νέων ἀποδίδοσθαι τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις, τὸ πειθαρχεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ C μάλιστα καὶ κατεργάζεται μετ' αἰδοῦς εὔνοιαν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ χάριν ἀνθυπείκουσαν. ᾗ καὶ Κάτων, τὸν Καιπίωνα[4] πρεσβύτερον ὄντα θεραπεύων εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων εὐπειθείᾳ καὶ πραότητι καὶ σιωπῇ, τέλος οὕτως ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν ἐχειρώσατο καὶ τοσαύτης ἐνέπλησεν αἰδοῦς πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ὡς μήτε πρᾶξαί τι μήτ'

[1] μέγαν Pohlenz : μέγα. [2] ὂν added by Capps.
[3] χαλέπτουσιν] χαλεπαίνουσιν in most MSS.
[4] Καιπίωνα Reiske, here and below : καπίωνα.

[a] *Cf. Life of Cato Minor*, iii. (761 B-C). Q. Servilius Caepio was Cato's half-brother.

augmentation as though it meant elimination for themselves. Just as, then, we think it right that those who receive a favour should look upon it as of greater, and those who bestow it as of lesser value, so, in regard to a difference in ages, if we advise the elder to regard it as no great matter and the younger to think it no slight thing, we should rid the one of arrogance and neglect, and the other of disdain and contempt. And since it is fitting that the older should be solicitous about the younger and should lead and admonish him, and that the younger should honour and emulate and follow the older, let the solicitude of the former be rather that of a comrade than of a father, and of one who would persuade rather than command, and would rejoice in a brother's successes and applaud them rather than criticize him if he errs and restrain him—a spirit showing not only a greater desire to help, but also more kindness of heart. And in the emulation of the younger let imitation, not rivalry, be present; for imitation is the act of one who admires, but rivalry of one who envies. It is for this reason that men love those who wish to become like themselves, but repress and crush those who wish to become their equals. And among the many honours which it is fitting that the young render to their elders, obedience is most highly esteemed, and, together with respectfulness, brings about a staunch goodwill and favour which will in turn lead to concessions. Thus it was with Cato[a]: he so won over his elder brother Caepio by obedience and gentleness and silence from his earliest childhood that finally, by the time they both were men, he had so subdued him and filled him with so great a respect for himself that Caepio would neither

(487) εἰπεῖν ἀγνοοῦντος ἐκείνου. μνημονεύεται γοῦν, ὅτι μαρτυρίας ποτὲ γραμματεῖον ἐπισφραγισαμένου τοῦ Καιπίωνος ὁ Κάτων ὕστερος ἐπελθὼν οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, καὶ ὁ Καιπίων ἀπαιτήσας τὸ γραμματεῖον ἀφεῖλε τὴν αὑτοῦ σφραγῖδα πρὶν ἢ πυθέσθαι τί παθὼν ὁ ἀδελφὸς οὐκ ἐπίστευσεν ἀλλ'
D ὑπείδετο τὴν μαρτυρίαν. φαίνεται δὲ πολλὴ καὶ πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον αἰδὼς[1] τῶν ἀδελφῶν δι' εὔνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κηδεμονίαν εἴς τε τἆλλα καὶ φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ἐκείνου συνενθουσιώντων· καὶ γὰρ εἰ διημάρτανον δόξης εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων πεπεισμένοι καὶ λέγοντες ὡς οὐδεὶς γέγονεν Ἐπικούρου σοφώτερος, ἄξιόν ἐστι θαυμάζειν καὶ τοῦ διαθέντος οὕτως καὶ τῶν διατεθέντων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν νεωτέρων φιλοσόφων Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ἤλεγξε τὸν εἰπόντα δόξαν ἀκοινώνητον εἶναι, Σωτίωνα νεώτερον ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ ποιήσας ἐνδοξότερον. ἐμοὶ
E μὲν γὰρ ὅτι πολλῶν ἀξίων χάριτος παρὰ τῆς τύχης γεγονότων, ἡ Τίμωνος εὔνοια τἀδελφοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντα τἆλλα καὶ[2] γέγονε καὶ ἔστιν, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ἐντετυχηκότων ἡμῖν, ἥκιστα δ' ὑμεῖς οἱ συνήθεις.

17. Ἕτερα τοίνυν ταῖς παραλλήλοις καὶ σύνεγγυς ἡλικίαις ἀδελφῶν φυλακτέον ἐστὶ πάθη, μικρὰ μὲν συνεχῆ δὲ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πονηρὰν ποιοῦντα τοῦ λυπεῖν καὶ παροξύνειν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ πᾶσι μελέτην,

[1] αἰδὼς] ἡ αἰδὼς in some MSS.
[2] καὶ] omitted in most MSS.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 1100 A; Epicurus, Frag. 178 (Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 155).
[b] Timon appears in the *Quaest. Symp.*, i. 2 and ii. 5.

do nor say anything without Cato's knowledge. For example, it is said that on one occasion, when Caepio had affixed his seal to a deposition and Cato came up later and was unwilling to add his own seal, Caepio demanded that the document be returned and removed his seal before asking the reason why his brother had suspected the deposition instead of believing it to be true. In the case of Epicurus [a] also his brothers' respect for him was clearly great because of the goodwill and solicitude he had for them, inspired as they were with admiration both for his other attainments and especially for his philosophy. For even if they were mistaken in their opinion, yet since they were convinced and constantly declared from their earliest childhood that there was no one wiser than Epicurus, we may well admire both the man who inspired this devotion and also those who felt it. However, of the more recent philosophers, Apollonius the Peripatetic, by making Sotion, his younger brother, more famous than himself, refuted the man who asserted that fame could not be shared with another. And for myself, though I have received from Fortune many favours which call for gratitude, that my brother Timon's [b] affection for me has always transcended and still transcends all the rest, no one is unaware who has ever had any dealings whatever with me, and least of all you,[c] my familiar friends.

17. Furthermore, there are other disturbances which brothers of nearly the same age must guard against; they are but small, to be sure, yet continuous and frequent, and create a vicious practice of offending and exasperating one another on all occa-

[c] Nigrinus and Quietus; *cf.* 478 B, *supra*.

τελευτῶσαν εἰς ἀνήκεστα μίση καὶ κακοθυμίας. ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ ἐπὶ παιδιαῖς διαφέρεσθαι, περὶ τροφὰς ζῴων καὶ ἀγῶνας οἷον ὀρτύγων ἢ ἀλεκτρυόνων, εἶτα παίδων ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ κυνῶν ἐν θήραις
F καὶ ἵππων ἐν ἁμίλλαις, οὐκέτι κρατεῖν ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν οὐδὲ καταπαύειν τὸ φιλόνεικον δύνανται καὶ φιλότιμον. ὥσπερ Ἑλλήνων οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς δυνατώτατοι περὶ σπουδὰς ὀρχηστῶν εἶτα κιθαρῳδῶν διαστάντες, ἐκ τούτου τὰς ἐν Αἰδηψῷ[1] κολυμβήθρας καὶ παστάδας καὶ ἀνδρῶνας ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες ἀεὶ καὶ τοπομαχοῦντες καὶ ἀποκόπτοντες ὀχετοὺς καὶ ἀποστρέφοντες, οὕτως
488 ἐξηγριώθησαν καὶ διεφθάρησαν, ὥστε πάντων ἀφαιρεθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ τυράννου καὶ φυγάδες καὶ πένητες καὶ ὀλίγου δέω λέγειν ἕτεροι τῶν πρότερον γενόμενοι μόνῳ διέμειναν οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ μισεῖν ἀλλήλους. ὅθεν οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ περὶ[2] τὰ μικρὰ καὶ πρῶτα παραδυομένῃ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς φιλονεικίᾳ καὶ ζηλοτυπίᾳ διαμάχεσθαι, μελετῶντας ἀνθυπείκειν καὶ ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ χαίρειν τῷ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς ἢ τῷ νικᾶν. οὐ γὰρ ἑτέραν οἱ παλαιοὶ Καδμείαν νίκην ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ Θήβας τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὡς αἰσχίστην καὶ κακίστην προσηγόρευσαν.

Τί οὖν; οὐχὶ πολλὰς τὰ πράγματα καὶ[3] τοῖς

[1] Αἰδηψῷ Meziriacus: *αἰδιψῷ* or *ἐδηψῷ*.
[2] *περὶ*] *παρὰ* in most MSS.
[3] *καὶ*] omitted in most MSS.

[a] Medicinal hot baths in Euboea; *cf. Moralia*, 667 C-D.
[b] Probably Domitian, as Reiske conjectured.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 10 A, and the note; the expedition of the Seven against Thebes, in which the two sons of Oedipus, Eteocles and Polyneices, died fighting against each other in single combat.

sions, which at last ends in incurable hatred and malevolence. For having once begun to differ in childish matters, about the care of animals and their fights, as, for instance, those of quails or cocks, they then continue to differ about the contests of boys in the palaestra, of dogs on the hunt, and of horses at the races, until they are no longer able to control or subdue their contentious and ambitious spirit in more important matters. So the most powerful of the Greeks in my time, disagreeing first about rival dancers, then about harp-players, and afterwards by continually holding up to invidious comparison the swimming-baths and porticoes and banquet-halls at Aedepsus,[a] and then manoeuvring for places and positions, and going on to cut off aqueducts and divert their waters, they became so savage and reckless that they were deprived of everything by the despot,[b] and, becoming exiles and paupers and—I had almost said—something other than their former selves, they remained the same only in their hatred for one another. It is therefore of no slight importance to resist the spirit of contentiousness and jealousy among brothers when it first creeps in over trivial matters, practising the art of making mutual concessions, of learning to take defeat, and of taking pleasure in indulging brothers rather than in winning victories over them. For the men of old gave the name of "Cadmean[c] victory" to no other than that of the brothers at Thebes, as being the most shameful and the worst of victories.

What then? Do not practical affairs bring many

B ἐπιεικῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσι καὶ πράως φέρει προφάσεις
(488) ἀντιλογιῶν καὶ διαφορῶν; καὶ μάλα· ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖ φυλακτέον, ὅπως τὰ πράγματα μάχηται[1] καθ' αὑτά, μηδὲν ἐκ φιλονεικίας μηδ' ὀργῆς πάθος οἷον ἄγκιστρον προσθέντας, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ τοῦ δικαίου τὴν ῥοπὴν κοινῶς ἀποθεωροῦντας καὶ τάχιστα ταῖς κρίσεσι καὶ ταῖς διαίταις τὴν ἀμφιλογίαν παραδιδόντας ἀποκαθῆραι, πρὶν ἐνδῦσαν ὥσπερ βαφὴν ἢ κηλῖδα δυσποιὸν γενέσθαι καὶ δυσέκπλυτον· εἶτα μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς Πυθαγορικούς,
C οἷ γένει μηθὲν προσήκοντες[2] ἀλλὰ κοινοῦ λόγου μετέχοντες, εἴ ποτε προαχθεῖεν εἰς λοιδορίαν ὑπ' ὀργῆς, πρὶν ἢ τὸν ἥλιον δῦναι τὰς δεξιὰς ἐμβαλόντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀσπασάμενοι διελύοντο. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ βουβῶνι πυρετοῦ γενομένου δεινὸν οὐθέν ἐστιν, ἂν δὲ παυσαμένου παραμένῃ, νόσος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βαθυτέραν ἔχειν ἀρχήν, οὕτως ἀδελφῶν ἡ μετὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα παυομένη διαφορὰ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι, τῆς δ' ἐπιμενούσης πρόφασις ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα μοχθηράν τινα[3] καὶ ὕπουλον αἰτίαν ἔχον.[4]

18. Ἄξιον δὲ πυθέσθαι βαρβάρων ἀδελφῶν διαδικασίαν, οὐ περὶ γηδίου μερίδος οὐδ' ἐπ' ἀνδρα-
D πόδοις ἢ προβατίοις γενομένην ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς Περσῶν ἡγεμονίας. Δαρείου γὰρ ἀποθανόντος οἱ μὲν ἠξίουν Ἀριαμένην βασιλεύειν, πρεσβύτατον

[1] μαχεῖται Bernardakis.
[2] προσήκοντες] Stegmann would add ἀλλήλοις.
[3] τινα Pohlenz : τε. [4] ἐπέχον ? W.C.H.

[a] No doubt the Ἀκροάματα of the Master: see Iamblichus, *Vita Pythagorica*, 82 ff. (Notopoulos).
[b] *Cf. Ephesians*, iv. 26-27: Let not the sun go down upon your wrath; neither give place to the devil.

occasions for controversy and dissension even to those who have the reputation of being of an equitable and gentle disposition? Yes, certainly. But there also we must see to it that the affairs fight the battle quite by themselves, without our inserting into the contest, like a hook, as it were, any emotion arising from contentiousness or anger; but, keeping our eyes fixed impartially upon the swaying of Justice, as though we were watching a pair of balances, we should with all speed turn over the matter in dispute to the decision of a jury or of arbitrators, and cleanse its filth away before, like a dye or stain, it sinks into the fabric and its colours become fast and hard to wash out. We should next pattern ourselves after the Pythagoreans, who, though related not at all by birth, yet sharing a common discipline,[a] if ever they were led by anger into recrimination, never let the sun go down[b] before they joined right hands, embraced each other, and were reconciled. For just as it is nothing alarming if a fever attends a swelling in the groin, but if the fever persists when the swelling is gone, it is thought to be a malady and to have a deeper origin: so when the dissension of brothers ceases after the matter in dispute is settled, the dissension was caused by the matter; but if it remains, the matter was but a pretext and contained some malignant and festering reason.

18. It is worth our while to inquire into a dispute of brothers who were not Greeks, which arose, not about a little patch of land, nor over slaves or flocks, but about the empire of Persia. For when Darius died, some thought it right that Ariamenes should be king, being the eldest of his children; but others chose

(488) ὄντα τῆς γενεᾶς, οἱ δὲ Ξέρξην, Ἀτόσσης τε μητρὸς ὄντα τῆς Κύρου θυγατρὸς ἔκ τε Δαρείου βασιλεύοντος ἤδη γεγενημένον. Ἀριαμένης μὲν οὖν κατέβαινεν ἐκ Μήδων οὐ πολεμικῶς ἀλλ' ὡς[1] ἐπὶ δίκην ἡσυχαῖος,[2] Ξέρξης δὲ παρὼν ἔπραττεν ἅπερ ἦν βασιλεῖ προσήκοντα. ἐλθόντος δὲ τἀδελφοῦ θεὶς τὸ διάδημα καὶ καταβαλὼν τὴν τιάραν, ἣν φοροῦσιν ὀρθὴν οἱ βασιλεύοντες, ἀπήντησεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἠσπάσατο, καὶ δῶρα πέμπων ἐκέλευσεν εἰπεῖν
E τοὺς κομίζοντας, " τούτοις σε νῦν τιμᾷ Ξέρξης ὁ ἀδελφός· ἂν δὲ βασιλεὺς κρίσει καὶ ψήφῳ Περσῶν ἀναγορευθῇ, δίδωσί σοι δευτέρῳ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν εἶναι." καὶ ὁ Ἀριαμένης, " ἐγὼ δ'," ἔφη, " τὰ μὲν δῶρα δέχομαι, βασιλείαν δὲ τὴν Περσῶν ἐμαυτῷ νομίζω προσήκειν· τιμὴν δὲ τὴν μετ' ἐμὲ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς φυλάξω, Ξέρξῃ δὲ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀδελφῶν." ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ κρίσις ἐνέστη, Πέρσαι μὲν Ἀρτάβανον ἀδελφὸν ὄντα Δαρείου δικαστὴν ἀπέφηναν, τὸ δὲ[3] δόξαν αὐτοῖς Ξέρξης ἔφευγεν ὑπ'[4] ἐκείνου κριθῆναι τῷ πλήθει πεποιθώς. Ἄτοσσα δ' ἡ μήτηρ ἐπέπληξεν
F αὐτῷ, " τί φεύγεις Ἀρτάβανον, ὦ παῖ, θεῖον ὄντα καὶ Περσῶν ἄριστον; τί δ' οὕτως τὸν ἀγῶνα δέδοικας, ἐν ᾧ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα, Περσῶν βασιλέως ἀδελφὸν κριθῆναι;" πεισθέντος οὖν Ξέρξου καὶ γενομένων λόγων Ἀρτάβανος μὲν ἀπεφήνατο Ξέρξῃ τὴν βασιλείαν προσήκειν, Ἀριαμένης δ' εὐθὺς ἀναπηδήσας προσεκύνησε τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ

[1] ὡς] omitted in most MSS.
[2] ἡσυχαῖος] ἡσύχως in some MSS.
[3] τὸ δὲ added by Capps, deleting δὲ after Ξέρξης, with two MSS.
[4] ὑπ' Reiske: ἐπ'.

Xerxes,[a] as being the child of Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, and born to Darius after he had come to the throne. Now Ariamenes came down from the country of the Medes in no hostile manner, but quietly, as though to a court of justice; and Xerxes was present and performing the functions of a king. But when his brother came, putting aside the diadem and pressing down the crest of his tiara, which reigning kings wear erect,[b] he went to meet Ariamenes and embraced him, and, sending gifts, he bade the bearers say, " With these your brother Xerxes honours you now; but if he shall be proclaimed king by judgement and vote of the Persians, he grants to you the right of being second after himself." And Ariamenes said, " I accept the gifts, yet I believe the kingdom of the Persians to be mine by right. But I shall guard for my brothers their honour after my own, and for Xerxes as the first of my brothers." And when the day of judgement came, the Persians appointed as judge Artabanus, the brother of Darius; but Xerxes sought to evade their decision that the judgement should be made by Artabanus, since he put his faith in the people. But Atossa, his mother, chided him: " Why, my son, do you try to evade Artabanus, who is your uncle and the best of the Persians? Why do you so fear this contest in which even the second place is honourable—to be adjudged brother to the king of Persia?" Xerxes was therefore persuaded and when the pleas were made, Artabanus declared that the kingdom belonged by right to Xerxes; and Ariamenes at once leapt up and did obeisance to his

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 173 B-C; Justin, ii. 10; the account in Herodotus, vii. 2-3, has scarcely anything in common with this story.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 340 C.

λαβόμενος τῆς δεξιᾶς εἰς τὸν θρόνον ἐκάθισε τὸν βασίλειον. ἐκ τούτου μέγιστος ἦν παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ παρεῖχεν εὔνουν ἑαυτόν, ὥστ' ἀριστεύων ἐν τῇ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίᾳ πεσεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνου δόξης.
489 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ ἀρχέτυπον ἐκκείσθω καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμώμητον εὐμενείας καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης.

Ἀντιόχου δὲ τὴν μὲν φιλαρχίαν ψέξειεν ἄν τις, ὅτι δ' οὐ παντάπασιν αὐτῇ τὸ φιλάδελφον ἐνηφανίσθη, θαυμάσειεν. ἐπολέμει γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας Σελεύκῳ νεώτερος ὢν ἀδελφὸς καὶ τὴν μητέρα συλλαμβάνουσαν εἶχεν· ἀκμάζοντος δὲ τοῦ πολέμου, μάχην ὁ Σέλευκος Γαλάταις συνάψας καὶ ἡττηθείς, οὐδαμοῦ φανερὸς ἦν ἀλλ' ἔδοξε τεθνάναι, πάσης ὁμοῦ τι τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων κατακοπείσης. πυθόμενος οὖν ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν πορ-
B φύραν ἔθηκε καὶ φαιὸν ἱμάτιον ἔλαβε, καὶ τὰ βασίλεια κλείσας ἐπένθει τὸν ἀδελφόν· ὀλίγῳ δ' ὕστερον ἀκούσας ὅτι σώζεται καὶ δύναμιν αὖθις ἑτέραν ἀθροίζει, τοῖς τε θεοῖς ἔθυσε προελθὼν[1] καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ὧν ἦρχε θύειν καὶ στεφανηφορεῖν ἐπήγγειλεν.

Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἔριδος τῶν θεῶν μῦθον ἀτόπως πλάσαντες ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀτοπίας οὐ φαῦλον ἐνέμιξαν αὐτῷ· τὴν γὰρ δευτέραν ἐξαιροῦσιν ἀεὶ τοῦ Βοηδρομιῶνος, ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῷ Ποσειδῶνι πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν γενομένης τῆς διαφορᾶς. τί οὖν

[1] προελθὼν] προσελθὼν in most MSS.

[a] *Cf. Life of Themistocles*, xiv. (119 D-E).
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 184 A.
[c] *Cf.* 508 D, *infra*.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 740 F—741 B (*Quaest. Symp.*, ix. 6, which is unfortunately fragmentary); Frazer's note on Apollodorus, iii. 14. 1 (L.C.L., vol. ii. pp. 78 f.).

brother and taking him by the hand set him upon the kingly throne. From that time forth Ariamenes was highest in honour with Xerxes and showed himself of such loyalty toward the king that he fell in the sea-fight at Salamis performing deeds of valour for his brother's glory.[a] Let this, then, be set forth as a pure and blameless model of goodwill and high-mindedness.

But Antiochus[b] might be condemned because of his lust for dominion, yet admired because his love for his brother was not altogether extinguished thereby. For he went to war against Seleucus[c] for the kingdom, though he was the younger brother and had the aid of his mother. But when the war was at its height, Seleucus joined battle with the Galatians and was defeated; he disappeared and was thought to be dead, since practically all his army had been cut to pieces by the barbarians. So when Antiochus learned this, he laid aside his purple and put on a dark robe, and, shutting the gates of the palace, went into mourning for his brother. But a little later, when he heard that his brother was safe and was again collecting another army, he came forth and sacrificed to the gods, and made proclamation to the cities over which he ruled that they should sacrifice and wear garlands of rejoicing.

The Athenians,[d] though they absurdly invented the tale of the strife of the gods, yet inserted in it no slight correction of its absurdity, for they always omit[e] the second day of Boedromion, thinking that on that day occurred Poseidon's quarrel with Athena.

[e] That is, in Meton's scheme the day regularly became an ἡμέρα ἐξαιρέσιμος to make the lunar year agree with the solar.

(489) κωλύει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν διαφορᾷ ποτε πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ συγγενεῖς γενομένους ἐν ἀμνηστίᾳ τὴν ἡμέραν
C ἐκείνην τίθεσθαι καὶ μίαν τῶν ἀποφράδων νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐν αἷς συνετράφημεν καὶ συνεβιώσαμεν ἡμερῶν διὰ μίαν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι; ἢ γὰρ μάτην καὶ πρὸς οὐθὲν ἡ φύσις ἡμῖν ἔδωκε πραότητα καὶ μετριοπαθείας ἔκγονον ἀνεξικακίαν, ἢ μάλιστα χρηστέον τούτοις πρὸς συγγενεῖς καὶ οἰκείους. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τοῦ διδόναι συγγνώμην ἁμαρτοῦσι τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτόντας εὔνοιαν ἐμφαίνει καὶ φιλοστοργίαν. ὅθεν ὀργιζομένων τε δεῖ μὴ ἀμελεῖν καὶ παραιτουμένοις μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φθάνειν πολλάκις ἁμαρ-
D τόντας αὐτοὺς τῇ παραιτήσει τὴν ὀργὴν ἀδικηθέντας τε πάλιν αὖ τῇ συγγνώμῃ τὴν παραίτησιν.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Σωκρατικὸς Εὐκλείδης ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς περιβόητός ἐστιν ὅτι φωνὴν ἀκούσας ἀγνώμονα καὶ θηριώδη τἀδελφοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος, "ἀπολοίμην, εἰ μή σε τιμωρησαίμην"· "ἐγὼ δ'," εἶπεν, "εἰ μή σε πείσαιμι παύσασθαι τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ φιλεῖν ἡμᾶς ὡς πρότερον ἐφίλεις."

Τὸ δ' Εὐμένους τοῦ βασιλέως ἔργον οὐ λόγος ὑπερβολὴν οὐδενὶ[1] πραότητος ἀπολέλοιπεν. Περ-
E σεὺς γὰρ ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἐχθρὸς ὢν αὐτῷ παρεσκεύασε τοὺς ἀποκτενοῦντας· οἱ δὲ περὶ Δελφοὺς ἐνήδρευον αἰσθόμενοι βαδίζοντα πρὸς τὸν

[1] οὐδενὶ Pohlenz: οὐδὲν or οὐδὲν οὐδέ.

[a] *Cf.* 462 c, *supra*; paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense; Hierocles, *apud* Stob., vol. iv. p. 662. See also Sternbach on *Gnomologicum Vaticanum*, 278 (*Wiener Stud.*, x. p. 237).

What, then, prevents us also from treating the day on which we have quarrelled with any of our family or relatives as one to be consigned to oblivion, and counting it one of the unlucky days, instead of forgetting because of one day the many good days in which we grew up and lived together? For either it is in vain and to no avail that Nature has given us gentleness and forbearance, the child of restraint, or we should make the utmost use of these virtues in our relations with our family and relatives. And our asking and receiving forgiveness for our own errors reveals goodwill and affection quite as much as granting it to others when they err. For this reason we should neither overlook the anger of others, nor be stubborn with them when they ask forgiveness, but, on the contrary, should try to forestall their anger, when we ourselves are time and again at fault, by begging forgiveness, and again, when we have been wronged, in our turn should forestall their request for forgiveness by granting it before being asked.

Eucleides,[a] the Socratic, is famous in the schools because, when he heard an inconsiderate and brutal speech from his brother who said, "May I be damned if I don't get even with you," he replied, "And so will I, if I don't persuade you to stop your anger and love me as you used to do."

But in the case of King Eumenes[b] it was not a mere word, but a deed, which revealed a gentleness that no one could surpass. For Perseus, the king of Macedonia, who was his enemy, procured men to kill him. These men set an ambush near Delphi, observing that he was coming on foot from the sea to the

[b] Eumenes II of Pergamum; and *cf.* *Moralia*, 184 B, 480 C, *supra*.

θεὸν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης. γενόμενοι δ' ὄπισθεν αὐτοῦ λίθους μεγάλους ἐμβάλλουσιν εἴς τε τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸν τράχηλον, ὑφ' ὧν σκοτωθεὶς καὶ πεσὼν ἔδοξε τεθνάναι· καὶ περιῆλθε φήμη πανταχόσε, καὶ φίλοι τινὲς ἀφίκοντο καὶ θεράποντες εἰς Πέργαμον αὐτάγγελοι τοῦ πάθους ἥκειν δοκοῦντες. Ἄτταλος οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτατος αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ἀνὴρ ἐπιεικὴς καὶ περὶ τὸν Εὐμένη πάντων ἄριστος, οὐ μόνον βασιλεὺς ἀνηγορεύθη διαδησάμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα τἀδελφοῦ Στρατονίκην ἔγημε καὶ
F συνῆλθεν· ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπηγγέλη ζῶν ὁ Εὐμένης καὶ προσήει, θεὶς τὸ διάδημα καὶ λαβὼν ὥσπερ εἰώθει τὰ δοράτια μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπήντησεν αὐτῷ δορυφόρων. ὁ δὲ κἀκεῖνον εὐμενῶς ἐδεξιώσατο καὶ τὴν βασίλισσαν ἠσπάσατο μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης, καὶ χρόνον οὐκ ὀλίγον ἐπιβιώσας ἀμέμπτως καὶ ἀνυπόπτως ἀπέθανε, τῷ Ἀττάλῳ τήν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα[1] παρεγγυήσας. τί οὖν ἐκεῖνος; ἀποθανόντος αὐτοῦ παιδίον οὐδὲ ἓν ἠθέλησεν ἐκ τῆς γυναικὸς ἀνελέσθαι τεκούσης πολλά-
490 κις, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐκείνου παῖδα θρέψας καὶ ἀνδρώσας ἔτι ζῶν ἐπέθηκε τὸ διάδημα καὶ βασιλέα προσηγόρευσεν.

Ἀλλὰ Καμβύσης ἐξ ἐνυπνίου φοβηθεὶς ὡς βασι-

[1] Notopoulos would add ἔγκυον (*vel sim.*) after γυναῖκα.

[a] The other brothers are mentioned by name in 480 c, *supra*.

[b] By the ceremony in which the father raises the child in his arms to acknowledge its legitimacy. Probably Attalus did not actually disown his children, but merely made it clear that he did not regard them as heirs to the throne.

[c] Stratonicê had been childless for over sixteen years; she

temple of the god. They came behind him and hurled great stones down upon his head and neck; these made him dizzy and he fell down and was thought to be dead. A report of his death spread far and wide, and some of his friends and servants came back to Pergamum, and were thought to bring their report as actual eye-witnesses of the calamity. Attalus, therefore, the eldest of the king's brothers, an honourable man and more loyal to Eumenes than any of the others,[a] not only took the crown and was proclaimed king, but also married his brother's wife, Stratonicê, and had intercourse with her. But when the news came that Eumenes was alive, and he himself was approaching, Attalus laid aside the crown, took his spears, as had been his custom before, and went with the other guardsmen to meet the king. And Eumenes not only cordially clasped his hand, but also embraced the queen, showing her honour and friendliness; and living a considerable time after his return, without giving a hint of blame or suspicion, he died, leaving to Attalus both his kingdom and his wife. And what did Attalus? When Eumenes was dead, he was unwilling to acknowledge as his own[b] any of the children his wife had borne him, though they were many, but brought up and educated his brother's son[c] and in his own life-time placed the crown upon his head and saluted him as king.

But Cambyses,[d] frightened by a dream into the

now became pregnant and, in due course, bore a son, whom Eumenes, according to Polybius, xxx. 2, had not acknowledged at least five years later; but subsequently he succeeded his legal uncle, Attalus II, as Attalus III. See W. S. Ferguson, *Class. Phil.*, i. 233 ff. *Cf.* also Livy, xlii. 15 and Pauly-Wissowa, *RE*, xi., col. 1099.

[d] *Cf.* Herodotus, iii. 30.

(490) λεύσοντα τῆς Ἀσίας τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὐδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν οὐδ' ἔλεγχον ἀναμείνας ἀπέκτεινεν. ὅθεν ἐξέπεσε τῆς Κύρου διαδοχῆς ἡ ἀρχὴ τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ Δαρείου γένος ἐβασίλευσεν, ἀνδρὸς οὐ μόνον ἀδελφοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλοις ἐπισταμένου κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων καὶ δυνάμεως.

19. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο δεῖ μνημονεύειν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς διαφοραῖς καὶ φυλάττειν, τὸ
B τοῖς φίλοις αὐτῶν ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πλησιάζειν τότε μάλιστα, φεύγειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, μιμούμενον αὐτὸ γοῦν τοῦτο τὸ Κρητῶν, οἳ πολλάκις στασιάζοντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ πολεμοῦντες, ἔξωθεν ἐπιόντων πολεμίων διελύοντο καὶ συνίσταντο· καὶ τοῦτ' ἦν ὁ καλούμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν "συγκρητισμός." ἔνιοι γὰρ ὥσπερ ὕδωρ τοῖς χαλῶσι καὶ διισταμένοις ὑπορρέοντες ἀνατρέπουσιν οἰκειότητας καὶ φιλίας, μισοῦντες μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ἐπιτιθέμενοι δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπ' ἀσθενείας ἐνδιδόντι. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐρῶντι συνερῶσιν οἱ νεαροὶ καὶ ἄκακοι
C τῶν φίλων, τῷ δ' ὀργιζομένῳ καὶ διαφερομένῳ πρὸς ἀδελφὸν οἱ κακοηθέστατοι τῶν ἐχθρῶν συναγανακτεῖν καὶ συνοργίζεσθαι δοκοῦσι. καθάπερ οὖν ἡ Αἰσώπειος ἀλεκτορὶς πρὸς τὴν αἴλουρον, ὡς δὴ κατ' εὔνοιαν αὐτῆς νοσούσης ὅπως ἔχει πυνθανομένην, "καλῶς," εἶπεν, "ἂν σὺ ἀποστῇς," οὕτω πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον, ἐμβάλλοντα λόγον ὑπὲρ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ πυνθανόμενον καὶ ἀνορύττοντα[1] τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἔνια χρὴ λέγειν, "ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε

[1] ἀνορύττοντα Hartman: ὑπορύττοντα.

belief that his brother would be king of Asia, killed him without waiting for any evidence or proof. For this reason, when Cambyses died, the throne passed from the line of Cyrus and the kingship was gained by the family of Darius, a man who knew how to give, not only to brothers, but also to friends, participation in affairs of state and in power.

19. Then this further matter must be borne in mind and guarded against when differences arise among brothers: we must be careful especially at such times to associate familiarly with our brothers' friends, but avoid and shun all intimacy with their enemies, imitating in this point, at least, the practice of Cretans, who, though they often quarrelled with and warred against each other, made up their differences and united when outside enemies attacked; and this it was which they called "syncretism."[a] For some there are, fluid as water, who, seeping through those who relax their hold and disagree, overturn affinities and friendships, hating indeed both sides, but attacking the one which yields more readily because of its weakness. For while it is true that when a man is in love his young and guileless friends share his love, it is also true that the most ill-disposed of enemies make a show of sharing the indignation and wrath of one who is angered and at variance with his brother. As, then, Aesop's[b] hen said to the cat who inquired, with pretended solicitude, of the sick bird "How are you?" "Very well, if you keep away"; so one would say to the sort of person who brings up the subject of the quarrel and makes inquiries and tries to dig up some secrets, "But I shall

[a] *Cf.* the *Etymologicum Magnum*, *s.v.* συγκρητίσαι.
[b] *Fabulae*, 16 and 16 b ed. Halm.

(490) πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν οὐθὲν ἔσται,[1] ἂν μήτ' ἐγὼ τοῖς διαβάλλουσι προσέχω μήτ' ἐκεῖνος." νυνὶ δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ὀφθαλμιῶντες μὲν οἰόμεθα δεῖν ἀποστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ ποιοῦντα πληγὴν μηδ' D ἀντιτυπίαν χρώματα καὶ σώματα τὴν ὄψιν, ἐν δὲ μέμψεσι καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ ὑπονοίαις πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς γενόμενοι χαίρομεν καὶ προσαναχρωννύμεθα τοῖς ἐκταράττουσιν, ὅτε καλῶς εἶχε τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς καὶ δυσμενεῖς ἀποδιδράσκειν καὶ λανθάνειν, συνεῖναι δὲ καὶ συνδιημερεύειν μάλιστα κηδεσταῖς ἐκείνων καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν εἰσιόντας αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ παρρησιάζεσθαι. καίτοι λίθον οὔ φασι χρῆναι μέσον ἀδελφοὺς λαμβάνειν ὁδὸν βαδίζοντας, ἄχθονται δὲ καὶ κυνὸς διεκδραμόντος, καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδίασιν ὧν οὐδὲν E ὁμόνοιαν ἀδελφῶν διέστησεν, ἀνθρώπους δὲ κυνικοὺς καὶ διαβόλους ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντες αὐτῶν καὶ περιπταίοντες οὐ συνορῶσι.

20. Διὸ τοῦ λόγου τὸ συνεχὲς ὑπαγορεύοντος, εὖ μὲν εἶπε Θεόφραστος ὡς " εἰ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἐστί, μάλιστα δεῖ κοινοὺς τῶν φίλων εἶναι τοὺς φίλους "· οὐχ ἥκιστα δ' ἄν τις ἀδελφοῖς τοῦτο παραινέσειεν. αἱ γὰρ ἰδίᾳ καὶ χωρὶς ὁμιλίαι καὶ συνήθειαι πρὸς ἄλλους[2] ἀποστρέφουσι καὶ ἀπάγουσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· τῷ γὰρ φιλεῖν ἑτέρους εὐθὺς ἕπεται τὸ χαίρειν ἑτέροις καὶ ζηλοῦν ἑτέρους καὶ ἄγεσθαι ὑφ' ἑτέρων.

[1] ἔσται W.C.H.: ἐστιν.
[2] ἄλλους Reiske, confirmed by mss.: ἀλλήλους.

[a] *Cf.* 469 A, *supra*, and the note. [b] *Cf.* 491 D, *infra*.
[c] Frag. 75 ed. Wimmer; *cf. Moralia*, 65 A.
[d] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, viii. 9. 1 (1159 b 31); Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 6, Menander, Frag. 9, from the *Adelphoe*.

have no trouble with my brother if neither I nor he pay attention to slanderers." But as it is—I do not know the reason—although when we suffer from sore eyes, we think it proper to turn our gaze to colours and objects which do not beat against or offend the sight,[a] yet when we are in the midst of fault-finding and bursts of anger and suspicion toward our brothers, we enjoy the company of those who cause the disturbance and we take on from them a false colouring, when it would be wise to run away from our enemies and ill-wishers and avoid their notice, and to associate and spend our days almost entirely with relatives and intimates and friends of our brothers, visiting their wives also and frankly telling them our reasons for complaint.[b] And yet there is a saying that brothers walking together should not let a stone come between them, and some people are troubled if a dog runs between brothers, and are afraid of many such signs, not one of which ever ruptured the concord of brothers; yet they do not perceive what they are doing when they allow snarling and slanderous men to come between them and cause them to stumble.

20. And so the saying of Theophrastus,[c]—its relevance is suggested by our very subject—is excellent: " If the possessions of friends are common,[d] then by all means the friends of friends should be common "; and one should urge this advice upon brothers with special emphasis. For associations and intimacies which are maintained separately and apart lead brothers away from each other and turn them toward others, since an immediate consequence of affection for others is to take pleasure in others, to emulate others, and to follow the lead of others.

ἠθοποιοῦσι γὰρ αἱ φιλίαι, καὶ μεῖζον οὐθέν ἐστιν
ἠθῶν διαφορᾶς σημεῖον ἢ φίλων αἱρέσεις διαφερόν-
F των. ὅθεν οὔτε τὸ συνεσθίειν ἀδελφῷ καὶ συμπίνειν
οὔτε τὸ συμπαίζειν καὶ συνδιημερεύειν οὕτω συν-
εκτικόν ἐστιν ὁμονοίας, ὡς τὸ συμφιλεῖν καὶ
συνεχθραίνειν ἥδεσθαί τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς συνόντα καὶ
πάλιν βδελύττεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ δια-
βολὰς αἱ κοιναὶ φιλίαι φέρουσιν οὐδὲ συγκρούσεις·
ἀλλὰ κἂν γένηταί τις ὀργὴ καὶ μέμψις, ἐκλύεται διὰ
μέσον τῶν φίλων ἐκδεχομένων καὶ διασκεδαννύντων
ἅνπερ ἀμφοτέροις οἰκείως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς ἀμφο-
491 τέρους ὁμοῦ τῇ εὐνοίᾳ συννεύωσιν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ
κασσίτερος ῥαγέντα τὸν χαλκὸν συναρμόττει καὶ
συγκεράννυσι τῷ ψαύειν ἑκατέρου πέρατος οἰκείως
ὁμοπαθὴς γινόμενος, οὕτω δεῖ τὸν φίλον εὐάρμοστον
ὄντα καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς προσ-
καταπυκνοῦν τὴν εὔνοιαν· οἱ δ' ἄνισοι καὶ ἄμικτοι
καθάπερ ἐν διαγράμματι μουσικῷ φθόγγοι διάζευξιν
οὐ συναφὴν ποιοῦσιν. ἔστιν οὖν διαπορῆσαι πότερον
ὀρθῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον ὁ Ἡσίοδος εἶπε

μηδὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον·

ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐγνώμων καὶ κοινός, ὥσπερ εἴρηται,
μᾶλλον ἐγκραθεὶς δι' ἀμφοτέρων σύνδεσμος ἔσται
B τῆς φιλαδελφίας· ὁ δ' Ἡσίοδος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφο-
βήθη τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ φαύλους διὰ τὸ δύσζηλον
καὶ φίλαυτον.

Ὃ δὴ καλῶς ἔχει φυλαττομένους, κἂν εὔνοιαν

[a] More exactly, "the disjunction, not conjunction" of tetrachords.

For friendships shape character and there is no more important indication of a difference in character than the selection of different friends. For this reason neither eating and drinking together nor playing and spending the day together can so firmly cement concord between brothers as the sharing of friendships and enmities, taking pleasure in the company of the same persons, and loathing and avoiding the same. For friendships held in common do not tolerate either slanders or conflicts, but if any occasion for wrath or blame arises, it is dissipated by the mediation of friends, who take it upon themselves and disperse it, if they are but intimate with both parties and incline in their goodwill to both alike. For as tin joins together broken bronze and solders it by being applied to both ends, since it is of a material sympathetic to both, so should the friend, well-suited as he is to both and being theirs in common, join still closer their mutual goodwill; but those who are uneven and will not blend, like false notes of a scale in music, create discord, not harmony.[a] One may, then, be in doubt as to whether Hesiod[b] was right or not in saying,

Nor should one make a friend a brother's peer.

For that man who is a considerate and a common friend to both brothers, as we have described him, compounded as he is of the natures of both, will the more readily be a bond of brotherly love between them. But Hesiod, it is likely, was afraid of the common run of friends who are evil because of their jealous and selfish natures.

But even if we feel an equal affection for a friend,

[b] *Works and Days*, 707; *cf.* the *Commentarii in Hesiodum*, 65 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. pp. 83 f.).

(491) ἴσην φίλῳ νέμῃ τις,[1] ἀεὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα τἀδελφῷ φυλάττειν ἐν ἀρχαῖς καὶ πολιτείαις ἔν τε κλήσεσι καὶ γνωρίσεσιν ἡγεμόνων καὶ ὅσα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐπιφανῆ καὶ πρὸς δόξαν ἐστί, τὸ προσῆκον ἀξίωμα τῇ φύσει καὶ γέρας ἀποδιδόντας. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως τῷ φίλῳ τὸ πλέον ἐν τούτοις σεμνόν, ὡς ἀδελφῷ τοὔλαττον αἰσχρὸν γίνεται καὶ ἄδοξον.

'Αλλὰ περὶ ταύτης μὲν ἑτέρωθι τῆς γνώμης γέ-
C γραπται τὰ δοκοῦντα διὰ πλειόνων· τὸ δὲ Μενάνδρειον ὀρθῶς ἔχον, ὡς

οὐδείς[2] ἀγαπῶν αὐτὸς ἀμελεῖθ' ἡδέως,

ὑπομιμνήσκει καὶ διδάσκει τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τῇ φύσει πιστεύοντας ὀλιγωρεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἵππος τῇ φύσει φιλάνθρωπον καὶ κύων φιλοδέσποτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τυγχάνοντα θεραπείας μηδ' ἐπιμελείας ἀπόστοργα γίνεται καὶ ἀλλότρια· καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς συγγενέστατόν ἐστιν, ἀμελούμενον δὲ καὶ παρορώμενον ὑπ' αὐτῆς οὐκ ἐθέλει συνεργεῖν ἀλλὰ λυμαίνεται καὶ προλείπει τὰς πράξεις.

D 21. 'Επιμέλεια δὲ καλὴ μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ἔτι δὲ καλλίων πενθεροῖς καὶ γαμβροῖς τοῖς ἐκείνων εὔνουν ἀεὶ παρέχειν εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ πρόθυμον ἑαυτόν, οἰκέτας τε φιλοδεσπότους ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλοφρονεῖσθαι, καὶ χάριν ἔχειν ἰατροῖς θεραπεύσασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ φίλοις πιστοῖς καὶ προθύμως

[1] *νέμῃ τις* D: *νέμηται τις.*
[2] *οὐδείς*] *οὐδεὶς γὰρ Mor.*, 95 D.

[a] The reference is perhaps to chap. 5, *supra*; Volkmann and Brokate are clearly wrong in assigning it to Περὶ φιλίας, which Patzig (*Quaest. Plut.*, p. 34, *cf.* the note on 475 D. *supra*) has shown did not exist.

we should always be careful to reserve for a brother the first place in public offices and administration, and in invitations and introductions to distinguished men, and, in general, whenever we deal with occasions which in the eyes of the public give distinction and tend to confer honour, rendering thus to Nature the appropriate dignity and prerogative. For undue precedence in such matters is not so grand a thing for the friend, as the slight is shameful and degrading for a brother.

But concerning this subject my opinions have been expressed more fully elsewhere.[a] However, that verse of Menander,[b] which is quite true,

No one that loves will gladly bear neglect,

reminds and teaches us to be considerate of our brothers and not, through trust in Nature's influence, to slight them. It is true that a horse is by nature fond of man and a dog fond of his master, but if they do not meet with the proper tending or care, they grow estranged and alienated; and though the body is very closely related to the soul, yet if it is neglected and overlooked by the soul, it becomes unwilling to co-operate and even harms and abandons the soul's activities.

21. But while care for brothers themselves is an excellent thing, yet even more excellent is it to show oneself always well-disposed and obliging in all matters to brothers' fathers-in-law and brothers-in-law, to salute and treat kindly such of their servants as are loyal to their masters, and to be grateful to physicians who have restored brothers to health and to such

[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 213, Frag. 757; *cf. Moralia*, 95 D.

(491) συνδιενεγκοῦσιν ἀποδημίαν ἢ στρατείαν· γυναῖκα δ' ἀδελφοῦ γαμετὴν ὡς ἁπάντων ἱερῶν ἁγιώτατον προσορῶντα καὶ σεβόμενον, τιμῶντα μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα κατευφημεῖν,[1] ἀμελουμένῃ δὲ συναγανακτεῖν, χαλεπαίνουσαν δὲ πραΰνειν· ἂν δ' ἁμάρτῃ τι τῶν μετρίων, συνδιαλλάττειν καὶ συμπαρακαλεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα· κἂν αὐτῷ τις ἰδίᾳ γένηται διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸν
E ἀδελφόν, αἰτιᾶσθαι παρ' ἐκείνῃ καὶ διαλύεσθαι τὴν μέμψιν. ἀγαμίαν δ' ἀδελφοῦ καὶ ἀπαιδίαν μάλιστα δυσχεραίνειν καὶ παρακαλοῦντα καὶ λοιδοροῦντα συνελαύνειν πανταχόθεν εἰς γάμον καὶ συνειργνύναι νομίμοις κηδεύμασι· κτησαμένου δὲ παῖδας ἐμφανέστερον χρῆσθαι τῇ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τιμῇ· τοῖς δὲ παισὶν εὔνουν μὲν ὥσπερ ἰδίοις, ἥπιον δὲ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ μειλίχιον,[2] ὅπως ἁμαρτάνοντες οἷα νέοι μὴ δραπετεύωσι μηδὲ
F καταδύωνται[3] διὰ φόβον πατρὸς ἢ μητρὸς εἰς ὁμιλίας φαύλας καὶ ὀλιγώρους, ἀλλ' ἀποστροφὴν καὶ καταφυγὴν ἅμα νουθετοῦσαν εὐνοίᾳ καὶ παραιτουμένην ἔχωσιν. οὕτω καὶ Πλάτων ἀδελφιδοῦν ὄντα Σπεύσιππον ἐκ πολλῆς ἀνέσεως καὶ ἀκολασίας ἐπέστρεψεν, οὐδὲν οὔτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιαρὸν οὔτε ποιήσας πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντι τοὺς γονεῖς ἐλέγχοντας ἀεὶ[4] καὶ λοιδοροῦντας ἐνδιδοὺς ἑαυτὸν εὐμενῆ καὶ

[1] *τιμῶντα τὸν ἄνδρα κατευφημεῖν* Madvig (*μὲν* added by W.C.H.): *τιμᾶν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ εὐφημεῖν.*
[2] *μείλιχον* many MSS.
[3] *καταδύωνται* G and D: *καταλύωνται.*
[4] *ἀεὶ*] *αὐτὸν ἀεὶ* in most MSS.

[a] Contrast 479 D, *supra.*

faithful friends as have rendered zealous and efficient service to them in sharing the hardships of some journey abroad or military expedition. But a brother's wife should be esteemed and reverenced as the most holy of all sacred things [a]; if her husband honours her, we should applaud him; if he neglects her, we should sympathize with her annoyance; when she grows angry, soothe her; if she commits some trifling fault, take part in urging her husband to a reconciliation; and if some private difference arise between yourself and your brother, bring your complaints to her [b] and so do away with the reasons for complaint. But above all we should be troubled at a brother's unmarried and childless state, and by exhortation and raillery take part in pressing him on every side into marriage and in getting him well fastened in the bonds of lawful matrimony. And when he gets children, we should make even more manifest our affection for him and the honour we pay to his wife; and to their children let us be as well-disposed as toward our own, but even more gentle and tender, so that when they err, as children will, they may not run away or, through fear of father or mother, enter into association with knaves or sluggards, but may have recourse and refuge which at once admonishes in a kindly way and intercedes for their offence. It was in this way that Plato [c] reclaimed his nephew Speusippus from great self-indulgence and debauchery, not by either saying or doing to him anything that would cause him pain, but when the young man was avoiding his parents, who were always showing him to be in the wrong and upbraiding him,

[b] *Cf.* 490 D, *supra.*
[c] This manner of education corresponds to that advocated in *Ep.*, vii. (*e.g.* 343 E ff.).

492 ἀμήνιτον, αἰδῶ τε πολλὴν ἐνειργάσατο καὶ ζῆλον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ φιλοσοφίας. καίτοι πολλοὶ τῶν φίλων ἐνεκάλουν ὡς μὴ νουθετοῦντι τὸ μειράκιον· ὁ δὲ καὶ πάνυ νουθετεῖν ἔλεγε, τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ διαίτῃ τῆς πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρὰ τῶν καλῶν διαφορᾶς παρέχων κατανόησιν.

Ἀλεύαν δὲ τὸν Θεσσαλὸν ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἀγέρωχον ὄντα καὶ ὑβριστὴν ἐκόλουε καὶ χαλεπὸς ἦν, ὁ δὲ θεῖος ἀνελάμβανε καὶ προσήγετο· πεμπόντων δὲ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν φρυκτοὺς περὶ βασιλέως πρὸς τὸν
B θεὸν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐνέβαλε κρύφα τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ θεῖος ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἀλεύα· καὶ τῆς Πυθίας τοῦτον ἀνελούσης ὅ τε πατὴρ ἀπέφησεν ἐμβεβληκέναι τὸν φρυκτὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πᾶσιν ἐδόκει πλάνη τις ἐν ταῖς καταγραφαῖς τῶν ὀνομάτων γεγονέναι. διὸ καὶ πέμψαντες αὖθις ἐπανήροντο τὸν θεόν· ἡ δὲ Πυθία καθάπερ ἐκβεβαιουμένη τὴν προτέραν ἀναγόρευσιν εἶπε

τὸν πυρρόν τοί φημι, τὸν Ἀρχεδίκη τέκε παῖδα.

καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὁ Ἀλεύας ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ βασιλεὺς διὰ τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀδελφὸν ἀποδειχθεὶς αὐτός τε πολὺ πάντων ἐπρώτευσε τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ[1] καὶ τὸ ἔθνος εἰς δόξαν προήγαγε μεγάλην καὶ δύναμιν.

C Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐπραξίαις τε καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἀρχαῖς παίδων ἀδελφοῦ χαίροντα καὶ σεμνυνόμενον αὔξειν προσήκει καὶ συνεξορμᾶν πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ κατορ-

[1] αὐτοῦ Bernardakis: αὐτοῦ.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 71 E.

[b] With φρυκτούς the noun κνάμους is understood. The use of parched beans as lots seems to be known from this passage only.

Plato showed himself friendly and free from anger to Speusippus and so brought about in him great respect and admiration for Plato himself and for philosophy. Yet many of Plato's friends used to rebuke him for not admonishing the youth, but Plato [a] would say that he was indeed admonishing him: by his own, the philosopher's, manner of life, showing him a way to distinguish the difference between what is shameful and what is honourable.

So Aleuas the Thessalian, who was an arrogant and insolent youth, was kept down and treated harshly by his father; but his uncle received him and attached him to himself, and when the Thessalians sent to the god at Delphi lots [b] to determine who should be king, the uncle, without the father's knowledge, slipped in a lot for Aleuas. When the Pythian priestess drew the lot of Aleuas, his father denied that he had put in one for him, and to everyone it appeared that there had been some error in the recording of names. So they sent again and questioned the god a second time; and the prophetic priestess, as though to confirm fully her former declaration, answered:

It is the red-haired [c] man I mean,
The child whom Archedicê bore.

And in this manner Aleuas was proclaimed king by the god through the help of his father's brother, and himself surpassed by far his predecessors and advanced his race to great fame and power.

And indeed it is an uncle's duty to rejoice and take pride in the fair deeds and honours and offices of a brother's sons and to help to give them an incentive

[c] *Cf.* Aristotle, Frag. 497 ed. Rose; that is, Pyrrhus, "the red-haired man."

(492) θοῦντας ἀφειδῶς ἐπαινεῖν· αὐτοῦ γὰρ υἱὸν ἐπαχθὲς ἴσως ἐγκωμιάζειν, ἀδελφοῦ δὲ σεμνὸν καὶ οὐ φίλαυτον ἀλλὰ φιλόκαλον καὶ θεῖον ὡς ἀληθῶς· δοκεῖ[1] γάρ μοι καὶ τοὔνομα καλῶς ὑφηγεῖσθαι πρὸς εὔνοιαν ἀδελφιδῶν[2] καὶ ἀγάπησιν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ζηλοῦν. Ἡρακλῆς τε γὰρ δυεῖν δέοντας[3] ἑβδομήκοντα γεννήσας παῖδας, οὐδενὸς ἧττον αὐτῶν τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν ἠγάπησεν· ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν πολλαχοῦ σύμβωμός ἐστιν Ἰόλαος αὐτῷ, καὶ συγκατεύχονται παραστάτην Ἡρακλέους ὀνομά-
D ζοντες· Ἰφικλέους δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ πεσόντος ἐν τῇ περὶ Λακεδαίμονα μάχῃ, περίλυπος γενόμενος πᾶσαν ἐξέλιπε Πελοπόννησον. ἥ τε[4] Λευκοθέα τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀποθανούσης ἔθρεψε τὸ βρέφος καὶ συνεξεθείασεν· ὅθεν αἱ Ῥωμαίων γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς τῆς Λευκοθέας ἑορταῖς, ἣν Ματοῦταν ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν παῖδας ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐναγκαλίζονται καὶ τιμῶσιν.

[1] δοκεῖ] ἐδόκει in most MSS.
[2] ἀδελφιδῶν an early anonymous correction, confirmed by G: ἀδελφῶν.
[3] δέοντας] δέοντα many MSS.
[4] ἥ τε Bernardakis: ἥ δὲ.

[a] θεῖος = " an uncle " and " divine."
[b] Heracles' nephew, who helped him in his encounter with the Nemean lion.

to honourable achievement, and, when they succeed, to praise them without stint; for it is, perhaps, offensive to praise one's own son, yet to praise a brother's is a noble thing, not inspired by selfishness, but honourable and truly divine; for it seems to me that the very name [a] admirably points the way to goodwill and affection for nephews. And one must also strive to emulate the deeds of those beings who are superior to man. So Heracles, though he begat sixty-eight sons, loved his nephew no less than any of them, and even to this day in many places Iolaüs [b] has an altar in common with Heracles and men pray to them together, calling Iolaüs Heracles' assistant. And when his brother Iphicles [c] fell at the battle in Lacedaemon, Heracles was filled with great grief and retired from the entire Peloponnesus. And Leucothea,[d] also, when her sister died, brought up her child and helped to have him consecrated together with herself as a god; whence it is that the women of Rome in the festival of Leucothea, whom they call Matuta, take in their arms and honour, not their own, but their sisters' children.

[c] Twin-brother of Heracles, son of Alcmenê and Amphitryon; *cf. Moralia*, 285 F.
[d] Leucothea is the name of the deified Ino, wife of Athamas, who threw herself into the sea and was changed into a goddess; *cf. Life of Camillus*, v. (131 B-C); *Moralia*, 267 D-E. On the Matralia, celebrated in honour of Mater Matuta, see most recently H. J. Rose, *Class. Quart.*, xxviii. 156 f.

ON AFFECTION FOR OFFSPRING
(DE AMORE PROLIS)

INTRODUCTION

This essay, or declamation, is clearly in an unfinished state throughout and a good deal is doubtless lost at the end, for the author has done little more with his subject than to show that φιλοστοργία [a] is more complete in man than in beasts.[b] The efforts of Döhner [c] and Weissenberger [d] to prove that the essay is not genuine have not been successful. Döhner is, further, quite wrong, as Patzig [e] and Weissenberger have shown, in assuming the work to be an epitome.

[a] Volkmann reminds us that *De Amore Prolis* is a bad Latin translation for the title, but that there is no better: *cf.* Fronto, i. p. 280, ii. p. 154 ed. Haines (L.C.L.) for the statement that there is no such quality as τὸ φιλόστοργον at Rome and consequently no name for it. See also Marcus Aurelius, i. 11.

[b] Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften, u. Philos. Plutarchs*, ii. pp. 165-167, attempts to complete the thought of this treatise.

[c] *Quaest. Plut.*, iii. pp. 26 ff.

[d] *Die Sprache Plutarchs*, ii. pp. 31-33. When Weissenberger attempts to find discrepancies between Plutarch's thought here and elsewhere, he chooses examples in which he either misinterprets the meaning or else forgets that Plutarch is ironical and intends the opposite of what he says.

[e] *Quaest. Plut.*, pp. 3-21: by far the most complete discussion of the vocabulary and syntax of this strange work. Patzig's conclusion is that we have here a *finished* essay of Plutarch; this is untenable, but his arguments for genuineness are quite conclusive. None of his successors, not even Pohlenz, shows any knowledge of his valuable work.

It is best regarded as an unfinished fragment, containing, so far as it goes, the rough and unrevised hand of Plutarch.

Dyroff's [a] attempt to show that this work was composed before *De Esu Carnium*, *De Sollertia Animalium*, and *Gryllus* is not to be taken seriously : the grounds are too slight.

The text is very corrupt. The work is not listed in the Lamprias catalogue.

[a] Program Würzburg, 1896/7.

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ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΑ ΕΓΓΟΝΑ[1] ΦΙΛΟΣΤΟΡΓΙΑΣ

1. Ἔκκλητοι κρίσεις καὶ ξενικῶν δικαστηρίων ἀγωγαὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὸ πρῶτον ἀπιστίᾳ τῇ πρὸς
B ἀλλήλους ἐπενοήθησαν, ἀλλοτρίας δικαιοσύνης ὥσπερ ἑτέρου τινὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων μὴ φυομένου παρ' αὐτοῖς δεηθεῖσιν. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι τῶν προβλημάτων ἔνια διὰ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορὰς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν ζῴων ὥσπερ ἀλλοδαπὴν πόλιν ἐκκαλοῦνται, καὶ τοῖς ἐκείνων πάθεσι καὶ ἤθεσιν ὡς ἀνεντεύκτοις καὶ ἀδεκάστοις ἐφιᾶσι τὴν κρίσιν; ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κακίας ἔγ-
C κλημα κοινόν ἐστι, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων καὶ μεγίστων ἀμφιδοξοῦντας ἡμᾶς ζητεῖν ἐν ἵπποις καὶ κυσὶ καὶ ὄρνισι, πῶς γαμῶμεν αὐτοὶ καὶ γεννῶμεν καὶ τεκνοτροφῶμεν[2] (ὡς μηδὲν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δήλωμα τῆς φύσεως ὄν)· καὶ τὰ[3] τῶν θηρίων ἤθη καὶ πάθη προσαγορεῦσαι καὶ καταμαρτυρῆσαι τοῦ βίου ἡμῶν πολλὴν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκδιαίτησιν καὶ παράβασιν,

[1] ἔγγονα] probably the form preferred by Plutarch. But some MSS. here and elsewhere read ἔκγονα.

[2] γαμῶμεν . . . τεκνοτροφῶμεν Hatzidakis: γαμοῦμεν . . . τεκνοτροφοῦμεν.

[3] καὶ τὰ Reiske and two MSS.: τὰ.

[a] Plutarch is probably referring to the common practice of small states appealing to the greater, Athens or Rhodes, to arbitrate in disputes; the distrust was thus not of all other Greeks but of fellow-citizens. *Cf.* Schwyzer, *Dial. Gr. Exempla*, 83 for an inscription in which Argos regulates the relations between Cnossus and Tylissus *circa* 450 B.C.; see also M. N. Tod, *International Arbitration among the Greeks* (Oxford, 1913).

ON AFFECTION FOR OFFSPRING

1. Trials of cases on appeal[a] before special arbitrators and the carrying of cases before foreign courts were first devised by the Greeks by reason of their mutual distrust, since they had need of the justice supplied by others than themselves, like any other non-indigenous necessity. Is it thus, then, that philosophers also, because of their disagreements with each other, refer some of their questions to the nature of irrational animals, as though to a foreign city, and submit the decision to the emotions and character and habits of these creatures as to a court that cannot be influenced or bribed? Or is this also a common charge against human depravity—that, being in doubt about the most necessary and important things, we seek among horses and dogs and birds how we ourselves should marry and beget and bring up children (as though we had no plain indication of Nature in ourselves); and that we term the traits which brute beasts have "characters" and "emotions," and accuse our life of a great deviation

(493) εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα συγχεομένων καὶ ταραττομένων; ἄκρατον γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἡ φύσις καὶ ἀμιγὲς καὶ ἁπλοῦν φυλάττει τὸ ἴδιον, ἐν δ' ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς συνηθείας, ὃ τοὔλαιον ὑπὸ τῶν μυρεψῶν πέπονθε, πρὸς πολλὰ μιγνυμένη δόγματα καὶ κρίσεις ἐπιθέτους ποικίλη γέγονε καὶ ἡδεῖα[1] τὸ δ' οἰκεῖον οὐ τετήρηκε. καὶ μὴ
D θαυμάζωμεν, εἰ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα τῶν λογικῶν μᾶλλον ἕπεται τῇ φύσει· καὶ γὰρ τὰ φυτὰ τῶν ζώων, οἷς οὔτε φαντασίαν οὔθ' ὁρμὴν ἔδωκεν ἢ[2] ἑτέρων ὄρεξιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποσαλεύουσαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν δεσμῷ συνειργμένα μένει καὶ κεκράτηται, μίαν ἀεὶ πορείαν ἣν ἡ φύσις ἄγει πορευόμενα. τοῖς δὲ θηρίοις τὸ μὲν πολύτροπον[3] τοῦ λόγου καὶ περιττὸν καὶ φιλελεύθερον ἄγαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλόγους δ' ὁρμὰς καὶ ὀρέξεις ἔχοντα καὶ χρώμενα πλάναις καὶ περι-
δρομαῖς πολλάκις, οὐ μακρὰν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀγκύρας τῆς φύσεως σαλεύει ἢ[4] καθάπερ ὄνῳ ὁδὸν ὑφ' ἡνίᾳ καὶ χαλινῷ βαδίζοντι[5] δείκνυσι τὴν[6] εὐθεῖαν. ὁ δ' ἀδέσποτος[7] ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ αὐτοκρατὴς λόγος[8]
E ἄλλας ἄλλοτε παρεκβάσεις[9] καὶ καινοτομίας ἀνευρίσκων οὐδὲν ἴχνος ἐμφανὲς οὐδ' ἐναργὲς ἀπολέλοιπε τῆς φύσεως.

2. Ὅρα περὶ τοὺς γάμους ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς

[1] ἡδεῖα Patzig (*cf.* Plato, *Rep.*, 558 c): *ἰδία.*
[2] ἢ added by Bernardakis.
[3] *πολύτροπον* Pohlenz, *cf. Life of Alcibiades*, xxiv. (204 B); *παράτροπον* H. Richards: *πραΰτροπον.*
[4] ἢ added by Capps.
[5] *ὄνῳ . . . βαδίζοντι* Capps: *οὖν . . . βαδίζοντα.*
[6] *τὴν* added by Capps.
[7] *ὁ δ' ἀδέσποτος* Kronenberg, after Pohlenz: *ὁ δεσπότης.*
[8] *λόγος*] *λόγῳ* most MSS.
[9] *παρεκβάσεις*] *παρεμβάσεις* most MSS.

and departure from Nature, confused and disordered as we are at the very beginning concerning even the first principles? For in dumb animals Nature preserves their special characteristics pure and unmixed and simple, but in men, through reason and habit, they have been modified by many opinions and adventitious judgements so that they have lost their proper form and have acquired a pleasing variety comparable to the variety of perfumes made by the pharmacist on the basis of a single oil. And let us not wonder if irrational animals follow Nature more closely than rational ones; for animals are, in fact, outdone in this by plants, to which Nature has given neither imagination nor impulse, nor desire for something different, which causes men to shake themselves free from what Nature desires; but plants, as though they were fastened in chains, remain in the power of Nature, always traversing the one path along which Nature leads them. Yet in wild beasts versatility of reasoning and uncommon cleverness and excessive love of freedom are not too highly developed; and though they have irrational impulses and desires and often wander about on circuitous paths, they do not go far afield, but ride, as it were, at the anchor provided by Nature, who points out to them the straight way, as to an ass which proceeds under bit and bridle. But in man ungoverned reason is absolute master, and, discovering now one way of deviation and innovation and now another, has left no clear or certain vestige of Nature visible.[a]

2. Observe to what extent there exists in animals

[a] The text of this chapter is exceedingly corrupt: the restorations and suggestions adopted here claim only an approximation to the required thought.

ζῴοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. πρῶτον οὐκ ἀναμένει νόμους ἀγαμίου καὶ ὀψιγαμίου,[1] καθάπερ οἱ Λυκούργου πολῖται καὶ Σόλωνος· οὐδ' ἀτιμίας ἀτέκνων δέδοικεν, οὐδὲ τιμὰς διώκει τριπαιδίας,[2] ὡς Ῥωμαίων πολλοὶ γαμοῦσι καὶ γεννῶσιν, οὐχ ἵνα κληρονόμους ἔχωσιν ἀλλ' ἵνα κληρονομεῖν δύνωνται. ἔπειτα μίγνυται τῷ θήλει τὸ ἄρρεν οὐχ ἅπαντα χρόνον· ἡδονὴν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τέλος ἀλλὰ γέννησιν καὶ
F τέκνωσιν. διὰ τοῦτ' ἔτους ὥρᾳ, ἢ πνοάς τε γονίμους ἔχει καὶ πρόσφορον ὀχευομένοις[3] κρᾶσιν, ἦλθεν[4] εἰς ταὐτὸ τῷ ἄρρενι τὸ θῆλυ χειρόηθες καὶ ποθεινόν, ἡδείᾳ[5] μὲν ὀσμῇ χρωτὸς ἰδίῳ δὲ κόσμῳ σώματος ἀγαλλόμενον, δρόσου καὶ βοτάνης ἀνάπλεων
494 καθαρᾶς· αἰσθόμενον δ' ὅτι κύει καὶ πεπλήρωται, κοσμίως ἄπεισι καὶ προνοεῖ περὶ τὴν κύησιν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῦ ἀποτεχθέντος. ἀξίως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὰ δρώμενα, πλὴν ὅτι γίνεται ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἓν[6] τῷ φιλοστόργῳ, ταῖς προνοίαις, ταῖς καρτερίαις,

[1] ἀγαμίου καὶ ὀψιγαμίου Döhner: ἀγάμου καὶ ὀψιγάμου.
[2] τριπαιδίας Döhner: τρίπαιδας.
[3] ὀχευομένοις Kronenberg: λοχευομένοις.
[4] ἦλθεν] συνῆλθεν Döhner.
[5] ἡδείᾳ] ἰδίᾳ Jacobs.
[6] ἓν Emperius: ἐν.

[a] *Cf. Life of Lysander*, xxx. (451 A-B); *Life of Lycurgus*, xv.1 (48 c); *Moralia*, 227 F; Ariston in Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 497 ed. Hense (or von Arnim. *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. p. 89); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, ii. 141 (vol. ii. p. 191 ed. Stählin).

conformity to nature in regard to their marriages. In the first place, they do not wait for laws against celibacy or late wedlock, as did the citizens of Lycurgus[a] and Solon,[b] nor fear loss of civil rights because of childlessness, nor pursue the honours of the *ius trium liberorum*,[c] as many Romans do when they marry and beget children, not that they may have heirs, but that they may inherit. In the next place, the male does not consort with the female during all seasons, for the end and aim is not pleasure, but procreation and the begetting of offspring; therefore it is in the season of spring, which has procreative breezes[d] and a temperature suitable to intercourse,[e] that the female, rendered submissive and desirable, comes to consort with the male, exulting, as she does, in the pleasing odour of her flesh and the peculiar adornment[f] of her body, and filled with dew and clean grass[g]; but when she perceives that she is pregnant and sated, she modestly retires and takes thought for the birth and safety of her offspring. But it is impossible to recount the procedure in a manner worthy of the subject, except to say that each of the pair is as one in their affection for their offspring, in their forethought, their endurance, and

[b] This is not true of Solon: *cf.* Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 521 ed. Hense.

[c] See, for example, Hardy's notes on Pliny, *Epistulae*, x. 2. Plutarch refers to a law of Augustus limiting the right of inheritance and the privileges of those who had less than three children.

[d] *Cf.* Lucretius, i. 10-20: reserata viget genitabilis aura favoni, and the whole passage.

[e] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Historia Animalium*, vi. 18 (573 a 27).

[f] *Cf.* Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus*, iii. 11. 1 (vol. i. p. 242 ed. Stählin).

[g] *Cf. Moralia*, 990 c ff.

(494) ταῖς ἐγκρατείαις. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν[1] μέλιτταν ἡμεῖς σοφὴν καλοῦμεν καὶ νομίζομεν

ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομέναν

κολακεύοντες τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ γαργαλίζον ἡμᾶς τῆς γλυκύτητος, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὰς λοχείας καὶ τὰς ἀνατροφὰς σοφίαν καὶ τέχνην παρορῶμεν. οἷον εὐθύς, ἡ ἀλκυὼν κύουσα τὴν νεοττιὰν συντίθησι, συλλαμβάνουσα τὰς ἀκάνθας τῆς θαλαττίας βελόνης καὶ ταύτας δι' ἀλλήλων ἐγκαταπλέκουσα καὶ συν-
B είρουσα, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα περιαγὲς ὡς ἁλιευτικοῦ κύρτου καὶ πρόμηκες ἀπεργάζεται, τῇ δ' ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ πυκνότητι συμφράξασα τὰς ἀκάνθας[2] ἀκριβῶς ὑπέθηκε τῷ κλύσματι τοῦ κύματος, ὡς τυπτόμενον ἡσυχῇ καὶ πηγνύμενον τὸ πίλημα τῆς ἐπιφανείας στεγανὸν γένηται· γίνεται δὲ σιδήρῳ καὶ λίθῳ δυσδιαίρετον. ὃ δ' ἐστὶ θαυμασιώτερον, οὕτω τὸ στόμα τῆς νεοττιᾶς συμμέτρως πέπλασται[3] πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἀλκυόνος, ὥστε μήτε μεῖζον ἄλλο μήτε μικρότερον ἐνδύεσθαι ζῷον, ὡς δέ φασι, μηδὲ θαλάττης[4] παραδέχεσθαι μηδὲ τὰ ἐλάχιστα.

C Μάλιστα δ' οἱ γαλεοὶ ζωογονοῦσι μὲν ἐν[5] ἑαυτοῖς, ἐκβαίνειν δὲ παρέχουσιν ἐκτὸς καὶ νέμεσθαι τοῖς σκυμνίοις,[6] εἶτα πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνουσι καὶ περιπτύσσουσιν ἐγκοιμώμενα τοῖς σπλάγχνοις.

[1] μὲν added by Wilamowitz.
[2] τὰς ἀκάνθας Reiske: τῆς ἀκάνθης.
[3] πέπλασται Xylander: πεπλάσθαι.
[4] θαλάττης Pohlenz: θάλατταν.
[5] ἐν] omitted in most MSS. [6] σκυμνίοις] σκύμνοις most MSS.

[a] Simonides: Frag. 47 ed. Bergk; 43 ed. Diehl; 57 ed. Edmonds. *Cf. Moralia*, 41 F, 79 C.

their self-control. Further, though we call the bee wise and believe that it

Makes the yellow honey its care.[a]

flattering the saccharine quality of its sweetness which tickles our palates, yet we overlook the wisdom and artifice of the other creatures which is manifested in the bearing and the nurture of offspring. As, for example, the king-fisher[b] after conception makes her nest by gathering the thorns of the sea-needle and interweaving and joining them together, and makes it round and oblong in form, like a fisherman's creel; and, packing the thorns closely together with the most exact jointure and density, submits it to the dashing of the waves so that, being gradually beaten upon and riveted together, the hard-packed surface may become water-proof; and it does become hard to divide with iron or stone. And what is more wonderful, the mouth of the nest is so exactly fitted to the size and measure of the king-fisher that no other creature, either larger or smaller, may enter, and, so they say, that it will not admit even the most minute drops of sea-water.[c]

And sea-dogs[d] are a very good example, for they bring forth their young alive within their bodies,[e] but permit their offspring to emerge and forage, and then take them back again and enfold them in their vitals and let them sleep there.

[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 983 C-D; Aelian, *De Natura Animalium*, ix. 17.
[c] In *Moralia*, 983 C (*De sollertia animalium*), Plutarch adds a few details to this description.
[d] Aelian, *op. cit.*, ii. 55: *Moralia*, 982 A; for the kinds of γαλεοί (a species of shark), see Mair's note on Oppian, *Halieutica*, i. 379 (L.C.L.).
[e] That is, they are viviparous.

(494) Ἡ δ' ἄρκτος, ἀγριώτατον καὶ σκυθρωπότατον θηρίον, ἄμορφα καὶ ἄναρθρα τίκτει, τῇ δὲ γλώττῃ καθάπερ ἐργαλείῳ διατυποῦσα τοὺς ὑμένας[1] οὐ δοκεῖ γεννᾶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ δημιουργεῖν τὸ τέκνον.

Ὁ δ' Ὁμηρικὸς λέων,

ᾧ ῥά τε νήπι' ἄγοντι συναντήσωνται[2] ἐν ὕλῃ
ἄνδρες ἐπακτῆρες, ὁ δέ τε σθένεϊ βλεμεαίνει,
πᾶν δέ τ' ἐπισκύνιον κάτω ἕλκεται ὄσσε καλύπτον,[3]

D ἆρ'[4] ὅμοιός ἐστι διανοουμένῳ πρὸς τοὺς κυνηγοὺς σπένδεσθαι περὶ τῶν τέκνων; καθόλου γὰρ ἡ πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία καὶ τολμηρὰ τὰ δειλὰ[5] ποιεῖ, καὶ φιλόπονα τὰ ῥᾴθυμα καὶ φειδωλὰ τὰ γαστρίμαργα· ὥσπερ[6] ἡ Ὁμηρικὴ ὄρνις προσφέρουσα τοῖς νεοττοῖς

μάστακ', ἐπεί κε λάβῃσι, κακῶς δέ τε οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ·

τῷ γὰρ αὐτῆς τρέφει λιμῷ τὰ ἔγγονα, καὶ τὴν τροφὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἁπτομένην ἀποκρατεῖ καὶ πιέζει τῷ στόματι, μὴ λάθῃ καταπιοῦσα.

ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῇσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα
ἄνδρ' ἀγνοιήσασ' ὑλάει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι,

E τὸν περὶ τῶν τέκνων φόβον ὡς δεύτερον προσλαβοῦσα θυμόν.

Αἱ δὲ πέρδικες ὅταν διώκωνται μετὰ τῶν τέκνων,

[1] ὑμένας] σκύμνους Döhner, *cf.* Theocritus, xi. 41.
[2] ᾧ ῥά τε νήπι' ἄγοντι συναντήσωνται Homer: ὅν ῥά τε νήπια τέκνα ἄγοντα συναντήσονται.
[3] καλύπτον] καλύπτων in some MSS.
[4] οὐχ after ἆρ' deleted by van Herwerden.
[5] τολμηρὰ τὰ δειλὰ Emperius: τὰ τολμηρὰ δειλά.
[6] καὶ before ὥσπερ deleted by Stegmann.

And the she-bear,[a] the most savage and sullen of beasts, brings forth her young formless and without visible joints, and with her tongue, as with a tool, she moulds into shape their skin[b]; and thus she is thought, not only to bear, but to fashion her cub.

And in Homer[c] the lion—

Whom hunters meet leading his young within
A wood; he glares with valour and draws down
His eye-lids till they hide his eyes—

does he look like a beast that has any notion of making terms with the hunters for his children's lives? For, in general, the love of animals for their children makes the timid bold, the lazy energetic, the voracious sparing; like the bird in Homer[d] which brings to her nestlings

Whatever morsels she can catch, though she
Fares ill herself,

for she feeds her young at the cost of her own hunger, and, though she has laid hold of food for her belly, she withholds it and presses it tightly with her beak, lest she gulp it down unawares; or

As a bitch bestrides her tender pups, and barks
At one she does not know, and longs to fight,[e]

acquiring, as it were, a second courage in her fear for her young.

And partridges,[f] when, accompanied by their

[a] *Cf.* Aelian, *op. cit.*, ii. 19; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 579 a 24: ἀδιάρθρωτα τὰ σκέλη καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν μορίων.
[b] *Cf.* Aulus Gellius, xvii. 10. 3. [c] *Il.*, xvii. 134-136.
[d] *Il.*, ix. 324; *cf. Moralia*, 80 A.
[e] Homer, *Od.*, xx. 14-15; *cf. De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 86 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 375).
[f] *Cf. Moralia*, 971 C-D; Aelian, *op. cit.*, iii. 16; Aristotle, *Historia Animalium*, ix. 8 (613 b 17); scholia on Aristophanes, *Birds*, 768.

ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐῶσι προπέτεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν, αὑταῖς δὲ μηχανώμεναι προσέχειν τοὺς θηρεύοντας ἐγγὺς κυλινδούμεναι καὶ καταλαμβανόμεναι μικροῦ[1] ὑπεκθέουσιν, εἶτα πάλιν ἵστανται καὶ παρέχουσιν ἐν ἐφικτῷ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἑαυτάς, ἄχρι ἂν οὕτω προκινδυνεύουσαι τῶν νεοττῶν τῆς ἀσφαλείας προαγάγωνται πόρρω τοὺς διώκοντας.

Τὰς δ' ἀλεκτορίδας ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι καθ' ἡμέραν ἔχομεν, ὃν τρόπον τὰ νεόττια περιέπουσι, τοῖς μὲν
F ἐνδῦναι χαλῶσαι τὰς πτέρυγας, τὰ δ' ἐπιβαίνοντα τῶν νώτων καὶ προστρέχοντα[2] πανταχόθεν ἀναδεχόμεναι μετὰ τοῦ γεγηθός τι[3] καὶ προσφιλὲς ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι· κύνας δὲ καὶ δράκοντας,[4] ἂν περὶ αὐτῶν φοβηθῶσι, φεύγουσιν, ἂν δὲ περὶ τῶν τέκνων, ἀμύνονται καὶ διαμάχονται παρὰ δύναμιν.

Εἶτα ταῦτ' οἰόμεθα τὰ[5] πάθη τούτοις ἐνειργάσθαι τὴν φύσιν ἀλεκτορίδων ἐπιγονῆς καὶ κυνῶν καὶ ἄρκτων προνοοῦσαν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡμᾶς δυσωποῦσαν καὶ τιτρώσκουσαν ἐπιλογιζομένους ὅτι ταῦτα
495 παραδείγματα τοῖς ἑπομένοις, τοῖς δ' ἀναλγήτοις ὀνείδη περίεστι τῆς ἀπαθείας, δι' ὧν κατηγοροῦσι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως μόνης μὴ προῖκα τὸ στέργειν ἐχούσης μηδ' ἐπισταμένης φιλεῖν ἄνευ χρείας; θαυμάζεται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ὁ εἰπών,

μισθοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων τίς ἄνθρωπον φιλεῖ;

[1] μικροῦ Capps: μικρὸν.
[2] προστρέχοντα Döhner; προσέρποντα Wyttenbach: προσέρχονται.
[3] τι Reiske: ἤ.
[4] κύνας δὲ καὶ δράκοντας Xylander: κυνέας δὲ καὶ δρακοντίας.
[5] τὰ added by Döhner.

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *op. cit.*, ix. 8 (613 b 15); *Anthologia Palatina*, ix. 95.

young, they are being pursued, allow the fledglings to fly ahead and attempt to escape, and contrive to fix the hunter's attention on themselves by wheeling close and, when they are almost captured, fly off and away, then again remain at rest and place themselves within the reach of the hunter's hope, until, by so exposing themselves to danger for their nestlings' safety, they have led on the hunters to a considerable distance.

And we have before our eyes every day the manner in which hens [a] care for their brood, drooping their wings for some to creep under, and receiving with joyous and affectionate clucks others that mount upon their backs or run up to them from every direction; and though they flee from dogs and snakes if they are frightened only for themselves, if their fright is for their children, they stand their ground and fight it out beyond their strength.

Are we, then, to believe that Nature has implanted these emotions in these creatures because she is solicitous for the offspring of hens and dogs and bears, and not, rather, because she is striving to make us ashamed and to wound us, when we reflect that these instances are examples to those of us who would follow the lead of Nature, but to those who are callous, as rebukes for their insensibility, by citing which they [b] disparage human nature as being the only kind that has no disinterested affection and that does not know how to love without prospect of gain? In our theatres, indeed, people applaud the verse of the poet who said,[c]

What man will love his fellow-man for pay?

[b] *i.e.* the philosophers whose views Plutarch is criticizing.
[c] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 450, ades. 218.

(495) καίτοι[1] κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱόν, ἡ[2] μήτηρ τὸ τέκνον, οἱ παῖδες τοὺς τεκόντας· ἀλλ' εἰ λόγου γένοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις σύνεσις, καὶ τοῦτό τις εἰς κοινὸν θέατρον συναγαγὼν ἵππους καὶ βόας καὶ κύνας καὶ ὄρνιθας ἀναφθέγξαιτο μεταγράψας, ὡς "οὔτε κύνες ἐπὶ μισθῷ σκύλακας φιλοῦσιν οὔθ' B ἵπποι πώλους οὔτ' ὄρνιθες νεοττοὺς ἀλλὰ προῖκα καὶ φυσικῶς," ἐπιγνωσθήσεται τοῖς ἁπάντων πάθεσιν ὡς εὖ καὶ ἀληθῶς λεγόμενον. αἰσχρὸν γάρ, ὦ Ζεῦ, τὰς θηρίων γενέσεις καὶ λοχείας καὶ ὠδῖνας καὶ τεκνοτροφίας φύσιν εἶναι καὶ χάριν, τὰς δ' ἀνθρώπων δάνεια καὶ μισθοὺς καὶ ἀρραβῶνας ἐπὶ χρείαις διδομένους.

3. Ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος οὔτ' ἄξιος[3] ἀκούειν. ἡ γὰρ φύσις, ὥσπερ ἐν φυτοῖς ἀγρίοις, οἷον οἰνάνθαις ἐρινεοῖς κοτίνοις, ἀρχὰς ἀπέπτους καὶ ἀτελεῖς ἡμέρων καρπῶν ἐνέφυσεν,[4] οὕτω τοῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλόστοργον ἀτελὲς καὶ οὐ C διαρκὲς πρὸς δικαιοσύνην οὐδὲ τῆς χρείας πορρωτέρω προερχόμενον ἔδωκεν· ἄνθρωπον δέ, λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῷον, ἐπὶ δίκην καὶ νόμον εἰσάγουσα καὶ θεῶν τιμὰς καὶ πόλεων ἱδρύσεις καὶ φιλοφροσύνην, γενναῖα καὶ καλὰ καὶ φερέκαρπα τούτων σπέρματα παρέσχε τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα χάριν καὶ ἀγάπησιν, ἀκολουθοῦσαν[5] ταῖς πρώταις ἀρχαῖς· αὗται δ' ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων κατασκευαῖς. πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβὴς καὶ φιλότεχνος[6]

[1] καίτοι added by Pohlenz. [2] ἡ added by Reiske.
[3] ἄξιος Reiske: ἄξιον. [4] ἐνέφυσεν Reiske: εἶναι φύσιν.
[5] ἀκολουθοῦσαν Wilamowitz: ἀκολουθοῦσα.
[6] φιλότεχνος Xylander: φιλότεκνος.

And yet, according to Epicurus,[a] it is for pay that a father loves his son, a mother her child, children their parents; but if beasts could come to understand speech and someone should bring together to a common theatre horses and cows and dogs and birds and should revise this speech and say, "Dogs do not love their pups, nor horses their colts, nor birds their nestlings, for pay, but gratuitously and naturally," it would be recognized by the emotions of them all that this was well and truly spoken. For it is shameful—great Heaven!—that the begetting and the pains of travail and the nurture of beasts should be "Nature" and "a free gift," but that those of men should be loans and wages and caution-money, all given on condition of a return![b]

3. But such a statement is neither true nor worth the hearing. For just as in uncultivated plants, such as wild vines and figs and olives, Nature has implanted the principles, though crude and imperfect, of cultivated fruits, so on irrational animals she has bestowed a love of offspring, though imperfect and insufficient as regards the sense of justice and one which does not advance beyond utility; but in the case of man, a rational and social animal, Nature, by introducing him to a conception of justice and law and to the worship of the gods and to the founding of cities and to human kindness, has furnished noble and beautiful and fruitful seeds of all these in the joy we have in our children and our love of them, emotions which accompany their first beginnings; and these qualities are found in the very constitution of their bodies. For although Nature is everywhere exact and workman-

[a] Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 320, Frag. 527.
[b] *Cf.* 496 c, *infra*.

(495) καὶ ἀνελλιπὴς καὶ ἀπέριττος,[1] " οὐδέν," ὡς ἔφησεν
'Ερασίστρατος, " ἔχουσα ῥωπικόν"· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν
γένεσιν ἀξίως οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὐδ' εὐπρεπὲς ἴσως
D λίαν ἀκριβῶς τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἐμφύεσθαι[2] τοῖς
ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν, ἀλλ' ἀποκειμένων καὶ
κεκρυμμένων ἐπινοεῖν τὴν πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ
λοχεύεσθαι τῶν μορίων ἐκείνων εὐφυΐαν. ἀρκεῖ δ'
ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος ἐργασία καὶ οἰκονομία τὴν πρόνοιαν
αὐτῆς ἐμφῆναι καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν. τοῦ γὰρ αἵματος
ὅσον περίττωμα τῆς χρείας ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ δι'
ἀμβλύτητα καὶ μικρότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπι-
πολάζον ἐμπλανᾶται καὶ βαρύνει, τὸν μὲν ἄλλον
χρόνον εἴθισται καὶ μεμελέτηκεν ἐμμήνοις ἡμερῶν
περιόδοις ὀχετοὺς καὶ πόρους αὐτῷ τῆς φύσεως
ἀναστομούσης ἀποχεόμενον τὸ μὲν ἄλλο σῶμα
E κουφίζειν καὶ καθαίρειν, τὴν δ' ὑστέραν οἷον ἀρότῳ[3]
καὶ σπόρῳ γῆν[4] ὀργῶσαν ἐν καιρῷ παρέχειν. ὅταν
δὲ τὴν γονὴν ἀναλάβῃ προσπεσοῦσαν[5] ἡ ὑστέρα καὶ
περιστείλῃ, ῥιζώσεως γενομένης (" ὁ γὰρ ὀμφαλὸς
πρῶτον ἐν μήτρῃσιν," ὥς φησι Δημόκριτος, " ἀγ-
κυρηβόλιον σάλου καὶ πλάνης ἐμφύεται, πεῖσμα καὶ
κλῆμα " τῷ γεννωμένῳ[6] καρπῷ καὶ μέλλοντι) τοὺς
μὲν[7] ἐμμήνους καὶ καθαρσίους ἔκλεισεν ὀχετοὺς ἡ

[1] ἀπέριττος Paton: ἀπερίτμητος.
[2] ἐμφύεσθαι Pohlenz: ἐφ' ἃ φύεσθαι or ἐφάπτεσθαι.
[3] ἀρότῳ Reiske: ἀρότρῳ.
[4] ἐν φυτοῖς after γῆν deleted by Pohlenz (ἐμφύτως van Herwerden).
[5] προσπεσοῦσαν Wyttenbach: προσπεσοῦσα.
[6] γεννωμένῳ Xylander: γενομένῳ.
[7] τοὺς μὲν Basel ed., confirmed by MSS.: καὶ τοὺς μὲν.

like with no deficiency or superfluity, " and has," as Erasistratus [a] said, " no trumpery about her " ; yet when it comes to the processes of procreation, it is impossible to describe them in a fitting manner, and perhaps it would not be decent to fix our attention too precisely upon the names and designations of these forbidden topics, but it is proper that we should apprehend the admirable adaptation of those hidden and concealed parts to the functions of procreation and bringing to birth. However, the production [b] and administering of milk is sufficient proof of Nature's foresight and care. For in women the amount of blood exceeds the use for it because of the sluggishness and paucity of their breath and, coming to the surface, wanders at large and burdens them ; at other times it is Nature's custom and care to discharge the blood at monthly periods by opening canals and channels for it, to lighten and cleanse the rest of the body and in season to render the womb fertile ground for ploughing, as it were, and sowing. But when the womb receives the seed as it encounters it and enfolds it and it has taken root [c] there (" for the umbilical cord grows at first in the womb," as Democritus [d] says, " as an anchorage against the swell and drift, a cable and vine " for the fruit now conceived that is to be), Nature shuts the monthly

[a] A famous physician at the court of Seleucus I and later at Alexandria ; *cf. Life of Demetrius*, xxxviii. (907 a ff.).
[b] *Cf.* Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus*, i. 39 (vol. i. p. 113 ed. Stählin); Galen, vol. iv. p. 176 ed. Kühn.
[c] *Cf.* Aristotle, 745 b 25: ἀφίησιν εὐθὺς οἷον ῥίζαν τὸν ὀμφαλὸν εἰς τὴν ὑστέραν, and 493 a 18: (τῆς γαστρὸς) ῥίζα ὀμφαλός.
[d] Frag. B 148, Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], ii. p. 171 ; *cf. Moralia*, 317 A.

φύσις, τοῦ δ' αἵματος ἀντιλαμβανομένη φερομένου τροφῇ χρῆται καὶ κατάρδει τὸ βρέφος ἤδη συνιστάμενον καὶ διαπλαττόμενον, ἄχρι οὗ τοὺς προσήκοντας ἀριθμοὺς τῇ ἐντὸς αὐξήσει κυηθὲν[1] ἑτέρας
F ἀνατροφῆς καὶ χώρας δέηται. τότ' οὖν τὸ αἷμα παντὸς ἐμμελέστερον φυτουργοῦ καὶ ὀχετηγοῦ πρὸς ἑτέραν ἀφ' ἑτέρας ἐκτρέπουσα καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσα χρείαν, ἔχει παρεσκευασμένας οἷον ἐγγείους[2] τινὰς[3] κρήνας νάματος ἐπιρρέοντος, οὐκ ἀργῶς οὐδ' ἀπα-
496 θῶς ὑποδεχομένας ἀλλὰ καὶ πνεύματος ἠπίῳ θερμότητι καὶ μαλακῇ θηλύτητι ἐκπέψαι καὶ λεᾶναι καὶ μεταβαλεῖν δυναμένας· τοιαύτην γὰρ ὁ μαστὸς ἔχει ἐντὸς[4] διάθεσιν καὶ κρᾶσιν. ἐκροαὶ δὲ τοῦ γάλακτος οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ κρουνοὶ μεθιέντες ἀθρόως, εἰς δὲ σάρκα πιδακώδη καὶ πόροις ἀτρέμα λεπτοῖς διηθοῦσαν ἀπολήγων, εὐμενὲς τῷ τοῦ νηπίου στόματι καὶ προσφιλὲς ψαῦσαι καὶ περιλαβεῖν ἐνδίδωσι ταμεῖον.

Ἀλλὰ τούτων γε τῶν τοσούτων ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐργαλείων καὶ τοιούτων οἰκονομιῶν καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ προνοίας οὐδὲν ἦν ὄφελος, εἰ μὴ τὸ φιλόστοργον ἡ φύσις καὶ κηδεμονικὸν ἐνειργάσατο ταῖς τεκούσαις.

B οὐ μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν ὀιζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς
πάντων ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει[5] τε καὶ ἕρπει·

τοῦτ' οὐ ψεύδεται λέγων ἐπὶ νηπίου καὶ[6] ἀρτιγενοῦς.

[1] κυηθὲν Xylander: κινηθέν.
[2] ἐγγείους] ἐννέας in some MSS.; ἀενάους Pohlenz.
[3] τινὰς Reiske: ἤ τινας.
[4] ἐντὸς ἔχει Benseler.
[5] ἔπι πνείει Homer: ἐπιπνείει.
[6] καὶ] Döhner would delete.

canals of purification and, taking the drifting blood, uses it for nourishment and irrigates[a] the embryo,[b] which already is beginning to be formed and shaped, until, having been carried the number of months proper to its growth within the womb, it needs other nourishment and abiding-place. At that time, then, Nature, more carefully than any gardener or irrigator, turns and changes the blood from one use to another and has in readiness subterranean springs, as it were, of a fresh-flowing stream; and the springs receive the blood in no perfunctory or unemotional manner, but are even able, by the gentle heat and soft womanliness of respiration, to digest, mollify, and change it; for such a disposition and temper does the breast have within it. Yet there are no outflowing streams of milk nor spouts which discharge it all at once,[c] but the breast terminates in flesh that is full of springs and can filter the milk gently through minute passage-ways; and it thus gives a store of food that is comfortable for the infant's mouth and pleasant for it to touch and to grasp.

But there would be no benefit in these many kinds of equipment for procreation, or in such ways and means, such zeal and forethought, if Nature had not implanted in mothers affection and care for their offspring.

> There is nothing more wretched than a man,[d]
> Of all that breathes and creeps upon the earth—

the poet tells no falsehood if it is about a new-born

[a] *Cf.* Celsus, vii. 7. 17.
[b] See Aristotle, 745 b 28: διὰ τούτου (τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ) λαμβάνει τροφὴν αἱματικήν.
[c] *Cf. Life of Aemilius Paulus*, xiv. (262 B-D).
[d] Homer, *Il.*, xvii. 446–447; *cf.* 500 B, *infra*.

(496) οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὕτως ἀτελὲς οὐδ' ἄπορον οὐδὲ γυμνὸν οὐδ' ἄμορφον οὐδὲ μιαρὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐν γοναῖς ὁρώμενος· ᾧ μόνῳ σχεδὸν οὐδὲ καθαρὰν ἔδωκεν εἰς φῶς ὁδὸν ἡ φύσις, ἀλλ' αἵματι πεφυρμένος καὶ λύθρου περίπλεως καὶ φονευομένῳ μᾶλλον ἢ γεννωμένῳ ἐοικὼς οὐδενός ἐστιν ἅψασθαι καὶ ἀνελέσθαι καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι καὶ περιλαβεῖν ἢ τοῦ φύσει φιλοῦντος. διὸ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ζώων ὑπὸ
C τὴν γαστέρα τὰ οὔθατα χαλᾷ,[1] ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν ἄνω γεγόνασιν περὶ τὸ στέρνον ἐν ἐφικτῷ τοῦ φιλῆσαι καὶ περιπτύξαι καὶ κατασπάσασθαι τὸ νήπιον, ὡς τοῦ τεκεῖν καὶ θρέψαι τέλος οὐ χρείαν ἀλλὰ φιλίαν ἔχοντος.

4. Ἐπὶ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἀνάγαγε τὸν λόγον, ὧν ταῖς μὲν τεκεῖν πρώταις, τοῖς δ' ἰδεῖν συνέβη τικτόμενον βρέφος· οὔτε νόμος ἦν ἐκείνοις τεκνοτροφεῖν προστάττων οὔτε προσδοκία χάριτος ἢ τροφείων "ἐπὶ νέοις δανειζομένων." χαλεπὰς δὲ μᾶλλον εἴποιμ' ἂν εἶναι καὶ μνησικάκους τὰς τεκούσας τοῖς βρέφεσι, κινδύνων τε μεγάλων καὶ πόνων αὐταῖς γινομένων·

D ὡς δ' ὅταν ὠδίνουσαν ἔχῃ βέλος ὀξὺ γυναῖκα,
δριμύ, τό τε προϊᾶσι[2] μογοστόκοι Εἰλείθυιαι,
Ἥρης θυγατέρες, πικρὰς ὠδῖνας ἔχουσαι·

ταῦτ' οὐχ Ὅμηρον αἱ γυναῖκες ἀλλ' Ὁμηρίδα γράψαι λέγουσι τεκοῦσαν ἢ τίκτουσαν ἔτι καὶ τὸ

[1] τοὺς μαστούς after χαλᾷ deleted by van Herwerden.
[2] προϊᾶσι] προιεῖσι Homer.

[a] But it is with reference to the dead Patroclus that Zeus speaks these lines.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 758 A.
[c] Plato, *Laws*, 717 C; *cf.* 479 F, *supra*.

babe that he speaks.[a] For there is nothing so imperfect, so helpless, so naked, so shapeless, so foul, as man observed at birth, to whom alone, one might almost say, Nature has given not even a clean passage to the light[b]; but, defiled with blood and covered with filth and resembling more one just slain than one just born, he is an object for none to touch or lift up or kiss or embrace except for someone who loves with a natural affection. Therefore, while the other animals have their dugs hanging loose beneath the belly, in women they grow above on the breast where mothers can kiss and embrace and fondle the infant, the inference being that the end and aim of bearing and rearing a child is not utility, but affection.

4. Carry the discussion back to primitive mankind, to those whose women were the first to bear, and whose men were the first to see a child born; they had neither any law which bade them rear their children, nor any expectation of gratitude or of receiving the wages of maintenance "lent to their children when they were young."[c] Nay, I should rather be inclined to affirm that these mothers were hostile and malicious toward their children, since great dangers and travail had come to them from child-birth:

> As when a sharp pang pierces a woman in labour,
> A pang which the Eileithyiae of child-bed send,
> The daughters of Hera, who bring the bitter pangs—

these lines, women tell us, were written, not by Homer,[d] but by an Homerid[e] after child-birth or

[d] *Il.*, xi. 269-271.
[e] The ancients used the term, not of women, but of a class of male bards. But Plutarch choses to treat the word as a feminine noun, anticipating Samuel Butler's *Authoress of the Odyssey*.

(496) νύγμα[1] τῆς ἀλγηδόνος ὁμοῦ πικρὸν καὶ ὀξὺ γινόμενον ἐν τοῖς σπλάγχνοις ἔχουσαν. ἀλλὰ τὸ φύσει φιλόστοργον ἔκαμπτε[2] καὶ ἦγεν[3]· ἔτι θερμὴ καὶ διαλγὴς καὶ κραδαινομένη τοῖς πόνοις οὐχ ὑπερέβη τὸ νήπιον οὐδ' ἔφυγεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεστράφη καὶ προσεμειδίασε καὶ ἀνείλετο καὶ ἠσπάσατο, μηδὲν ἡδὺ
E καρπουμένη μηδὲ χρήσιμον ἀλλ' ἐπιπόνως καὶ ταλαιπώρως[4] ἀναδεχομένη, τῶν σπαργάνων

ἐρειπίοις
θάλπουσα καὶ ψήχουσα,[5] καὶ πόνῳ πόνον
ἐκ νυκτὸς ἀλλάσσουσα τὸν μεθ'[6] ἡμέραν.

τίνων ταῦτα μισθῶν ἢ χρειῶν ἐκείνοις; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς νῦν· αἱ γὰρ ἐλπίδες ἄδηλοι καὶ μακραί. ἀμπελῶν'[7] ἰσημερίας ἐαρινῆς σκάψας μετοπωρινῆς ἐτρύγησε, πυρὸν ἔσπειρε δυομένης Πλειάδος εἶτ' ἀνατελλούσης θερίζει, βόες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄρνιθες ἕτοιμα τίκτουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς χρείας· ἀνθρώπου δ' ἡ μὲν ἐκτροφὴ πολύπονος ἡ δ' αὔξησις βραδεῖα, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς μακρὰν[8] οὔσης προαποθνήσκουσιν οἱ πλεῖ-
F στοι πατέρες. οὐκ ἐπεῖδε τὴν Σαλαμῖνα Νεοκλῆς τὴν Θεμιστοκλέους οὐδὲ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα Μιλτιάδης τὸν Κίμωνος, οὐδ' ἤκουσε Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος δημηγοροῦντος οὐδ' Ἀρίστων Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφοῦντος, οὐδ' Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σοφοκλέους νίκας οἱ πατέρες ἔγνωσαν· ψελλιζόντων καὶ συλ-

[1] *νύγμα* Reiske: *μίγμα*.
[2] *ἔκαμπτε καὶ ἦγεν*] *ἔλαμψε καὶ ἡ μὲν* Patzig.
[3] *ἦγεν*] *ἦγχεν* Bernardakis.
[4] *ἐπιπόνως καὶ ταλαιπώρως*] *ἔτι πόνους καὶ ταλαιπωρίας* Döhner.
[5] *ψήχουσα* Wilamowitz: *ψύχουσα*. [6] *μεθ'* Cobet: *καθ'*.
[7] *ἀμπελῶν'* Kronenberg, *cf.* 524 A, Diodorus, iv. 31. 7: *ἄμπελον*. [8] *μακρὰν* Reiske: *μακρᾶς*.

while she was still in the throes of it and had the pain of travail, alike bitter and sharp, actually present in her entrails. But even then the affection for offspring implanted by Nature would bend and lead the mother: still hot and suffering and shaken with her pangs, she did not neglect or avoid her child, but turned to it and smiled at it and took it up and kissed it, though she reaped nothing sweet or profitable therefrom, but received it with pain and suffering, and " with tatters " of swaddling-clothes

> Thus warming and caressing it, both night
> And day she passes in alternate toil.[a]

For what pay or advantage were these services performed by those ancient parents? Nor is there any for those of our day, since their expectations are uncertain and far off. He that plants a vineyard in the vernal equinox gathers the grapes in the autumnal; he that sows wheat when the Pleiades set reaps it when they rise; cattle and horses and birds bring forth young at once ready for use; but as for man, his rearing is full of trouble, his growth is slow, his attainment of excellence is far distant and most fathers die before it comes. Neocles did not live to see the Salamis of Themistocles nor Miltiades the Eurymedon of Cimon; nor did Xanthippus ever hear Pericles harangue the people, nor did Ariston hear Plato expound philosophy; nor did the fathers of Euripides and Sophocles come to know their sons' victories; they but heard them

[a] From the *Niobê* of an unknown poet (*cf. Moralia*, 691 D), attributed by Valckenaer to Sophocles, and recently by A. Lesky (*Wien. Stud.*, lii. 7; *cf.* also Pearson, *Fragments of Sophocles*, vol. ii. p. 98), to Aeschylus.

λαβιζόντων ἠκροῶντο καὶ κώμους καὶ πότους καὶ ἔρωτας αὐτῶν οἷα νέοι[1] πλημμελούντων ἐπείδον·
497 ὥστ' ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ μνημονεύεσθαι τοῦ Εὐήνου τοῦτο μόνον ὧν[2] ἔγραψεν,[3]

ἢ δέος ἢ λύπη παῖς πατρὶ πάντα χρόνον.

ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ παύονται παῖδας τρέφοντες, μάλιστα δ' οἱ παίδων ἥκιστα δεόμενοι. γελοῖον γάρ, εἴ τις οἴεται τοὺς πλουσίους θύειν καὶ χαίρειν γενομένων αὐτοῖς τέκνων, ὅτι τοὺς θρέψοντας ἕξουσι καὶ τοὺς θάψοντας· εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία κληρονόμων ἀπορίᾳ παῖδας τρέφουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν οὐδ' ἐπιτυχεῖν τοῦ τἀλλότρια βουλομένου λαμβάνειν.

οὐ[4] ψάμμος ἢ κόνις ἢ πτερὰ ποικιλοθρόων οἰωνῶν
τόσσον ἂν χεύαιτ'[5] ἀριθμὸν

ὅσος ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν κληρονομούντων.

Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατήρ,

Β εἰ δ' ἄτεκνος ἦν, πλείονας ἂν εἶχε κληρονομοῦντας, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίους.[6] οἱ μὲν γὰρ παῖδες χάριν οὐδεμίαν ἔχουσιν οὐδ' ἕνεκα τούτου θεραπεύουσιν οὐδὲ τιμῶσιν, ὡς ὀφείλημα[7] τὸν κλῆρον ἐκδεχόμενοι· τῶν δ'

[1] οἷα νέοι Bernardakis: οἱ ἄνθρωποι. [2] ὧν Patzig: ὡς.
[3] ἔγραψεν Reiske: ἐπέγραψεν.
[4] οὐ added by Patzig from *Mor.*, 1067 D.
[5] ἂν χεύαιτ' Patzig from *Mor.*, 1067 D: ἀχλεύαι.
[6] ὁμοίους H. Richards and Hartman: ὁμοίως.
[7] ὀφείλημα] ὄφλημα Patzig after Döhner.

lisping and learning to speak and witnessed their revellings and drinking-bouts and love-affairs, as they indulged in such follies as young men commit; so that of all Evenus[a] wrote the only line that is praised or remembered is

For fathers a child is always fear or pain.

Yet none the less fathers do not cease rearing children and, most of all, those who least need them. For it is ridiculous if anyone thinks that the rich sacrifice and rejoice when sons are born to them because they will have someone to support them and bury them—unless, by Heaven, it is for lack of heirs that they bring up children, since it is impossible to find or happen upon anyone willing to accept another's property!

Not sand or dust or feathers of birds of varied note
Could heap up so great a number[b]

as is the number of those seeking inheritances.[c]

The sire of fifty daughters,[d] Danaüs;

but if he had been childless, he would have had more heirs, and heirs unlike his own. For sons feel no gratitude, nor, for the sake of inheriting, do they pay court or show honour, knowing that they receive the inheritance as their due. But you hear the words of

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.*, ii. p. 270; Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, i. p. 472.
[b] An anonymous fragment; *cf. Moralia*, 1067 D: Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica*, ii. p. 162: Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, iii. p. 452.
[c] For the plague of inheritance-seekers at Rome, see Roman Satire *passim*, especially Horace, *Satires*, ii. 5.
[d] From the *Archelaüs* of Euripides: Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 427, Frag. 228. 1; *cf. Moralia*, 837 E.

(497) ἀλλοτρίων περὶ τὸν ἄτεκνον φωνὰς ἀκούεις ταῖς κωμικαῖς ἐκείναις ὁμοίας,

ὦ Δῆμε, λοῦσαι[1] πρῶτον ἐκδικάσας μίαν,
ἐνθοῦ, ῥόφησον, ἔντραγ', ἔχε[1] τριώβολον.

τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου λεγόμενον,

τὰ χρήματ' ἀνθρώποισιν εὑρίσκειν φίλους
δύναμίν τε πλείστην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔχειν,

C οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτέκνων· τούτους οἱ πλούσιοι δειπνίζουσιν, οἱ ἡγεμόνες θεραπεύουσιν, οἱ ῥήτορες μόνοις τούτοις προῖκα συνηγοροῦσιν.

ἰσχυρόν ἐστι πλούσιος ἀγνοούμενον
ἔχων κληρονόμον.

πολλοὺς γοῦν πολυφίλους καὶ πολυτιμήτους ὄντας ἓν παιδίον γενόμενον ἀφίλους καὶ ἀδυνάτους ἐποίησεν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ πρὸς δύναμιν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὠφέλιμον ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως τὸ πᾶν κράτος οὐχ ἧττον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἢ θηρίοις.

5. Ἐξαμαυροῦται γὰρ[2] καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπὸ τῆς κακίας, ὥσπερ λόχμης ἡμέροις σπέρμασι παραβλαστανούσης. ἢ μηδ' ἑαυτὸν φύσει
D στέργειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγωμεν,[3] ὅτι πολλοὶ σφάττουσιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ κατακρημνίζουσιν; ὁ δ' Οἰδίπους

ἤρασσε περόναις[4] βλέφαρα· φοίνιαι δ' ὁμοῦ
γλῆναι γένει' ἔτεγγον·

[1] ὦ Δῆμε, λοῦσαι and ἔχε Iunius from Aristophanes: ὠδὴ μέλουσαι and ἔχει. [2] γὰρ] δὲ Amyot.
[3] λέγωμεν Meziriacus: λέγομεν.
[4] ἤρασσε περόναις Housman: ἤρασσ' ἐπαίρων with the mss. of Sophocles (all mss. of Plutarch but one omit some part of these lines).

strangers clustering around the childless man, like those famous verses of the comic poet,[a]

O Demos, judge one case, then to your bath ;
Gorge, guzzle, stuff, and take three obols' pay.

And the remark of Euripides,[b]

Money it is that finds out friends for men
And holds the greatest power among mankind,

is not a simple and general truth, but applies to the childless : it is these whom rich men feast, whom great men court, for these alone do advocates plead gratis.

A rich man with an unknown heir's a power.[c]

Many, at any rate, who had many friends and much honour, the birth of one child has made friendless and powerless. Therefore not even toward the acquisition of power is there any aid to be derived from children, but the whole force of Nature exists no less in man than in beasts.[d]

5. Now both this and many other excellences are obscured by vice, as a thicket springs up beside seeds planted in a garden. Or are we to say that man has no natural love for himself just because many men cut their throats or hurl themselves from precipices ? And Oedipus [e]

Smote his eyes with a brooch and at each blow
The bloody eye-balls wet his beard ;

[a] Aristophanes, *Knights*, 50-51.
[b] *Phoenissae*, 439-440 ; but the first line is borrowed from Sophocles, Frag. 85. 1 (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 148).
[c] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 484, ades. 404.
[d] This closes Plutarch's argument that man does not derive his love of offspring from any other source than do the brute beasts.
[e] Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*, 1276-1277.

(497) Ἡγησίας δὲ[1] διαλεγόμενος πολλοὺς ἔπεισεν ἀποκαρτερῆσαι τῶν ἀκροωμένων.

πολλαὶ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων·

ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα νοσήματα καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐξιστάντα[2] τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡς αὐτοὶ καταμαρτυροῦσιν ἑαυτῶν. ἂν γὰρ ὗς τεκοῦσα δελφάκιον ἢ κύων διασπαράξῃ σκυλάκιον, ἀθυμοῦσι καὶ ταράττονται καὶ θεοῖς ἀποτρόπαια θύουσι καὶ τέρας νομίζουσιν, ὡς πᾶσι κατὰ φύσιν[3] στέργειν τὰ τικτόμενα καὶ τρέφειν οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν προσῆκον. οὐ
E μὴν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μετάλλοις πολλῇ συμπεφυρμένον γῇ καὶ κατακεχωσμένον ὅμως διαστίλβει τὸ χρυσίον, οὕτως ἡ φύσις ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις ἤθεσι καὶ πάθεσιν ἐκφαίνει τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλόστοργον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πένητες οὐ τρέφουσι τέκνα, φοβούμενοι μὴ χεῖρον ἢ προσήκει τραφέντα δουλοπρεπῆ καὶ ἀπαίδευτα καὶ τῶν καλῶν πάντων ἐνδεᾶ γένηται· τὴν γὰρ πενίαν ἔσχατον ἡγούμενοι κακὸν οὐχ ὑπομένουσι μεταδοῦναι τέκνοις ὥσπερ τινὸς χαλεποῦ καὶ μεγάλου νοσήματος. . . .

[1] δὲ added by Dübner.
[2] ἐξιστάντα] ἐξιστάντος most MSS.
[3] κατὰ φύσιν Reiske: καὶ κατὰ (καὶ παρὰ in most MSS.) φύσιν.

[a] Philosopher of Cyrenê, early third century B.C. *Cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, i. 34. 83; Valerius Maximus, viii. 9, Ext. 3.

and Hegesias[a] by the eloquence of his reasoning persuaded many of his hearers to starve themselves to death.

In many a guise the gods appear.[b]

But these are like those diseases and morbid states of the soul which drive men from their natural condition, as they themselves testify against themselves. For if a sow tears to pieces her suckling pig, or a bitch her puppy, men grow despondent and disturbed and offer to the gods sacrifices to avert the evil, and consider it a portent on the ground that Nature prescribes to all creatures that they should love and rear their offspring, not destroy them. Moreover, as in mines the gold, though mingled and covered with much earth, yet gleams through, so Nature, even in characters and passions which are themselves perverted, reveals their love for their offspring. For when poor men do not rear their children it is because they fear that if they are educated less well than is befitting[c] they will become servile and boorish and destitute of all the virtues; since they consider poverty the worst of evils, they cannot endure to let their children share it with them, as though it were a kind of disease, serious and grievous. . . .

[b] From the stock lines at the end of the *Alcestis*, *Andromachê*, *Helen*, and *Bacchae* of Euripides; *cf. Moralia*, 58 A.
[c] Contrast *Moralia*, 8 E on the education of poor children.

WHETHER VICE BE SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE UNHAPPINESS

(AN VITIOSITAS AD INFELICITATEM SUFFICIAT)

INTRODUCTION

AGAIN we have a fragment, mutilated at the beginning and the end.[a] The attribution to Plutarch has been questioned by Dübner, Hense,[b] Naber, and Hartman,[c] but on insufficient grounds, which have, in the main, been explained away by Siefert,[d] who has also analysed the structure of the work and the Plutarchean parallels. Wilamowitz,[e] on the other hand, believed this and the following fragment to be scraps of the same dialogue : I follow Pohlenz in rejecting this view.[f]

The text is not good, and the work is not mentioned in the Lamprias catalogue.

[a] There may, in addition, be a lacuna between chapters 1 and 2.

[b] *Teletea*, p. lxxxix., note.

[c] *De Plutarcho*, pp. 249-253.

[d] *Commentationes Ienenses*, 1896, pp. 110-119.

[e] *Hermes*, xl. 161-165.

[f] Similarly Usener, *Fleckeisens Jahrb.*, cxxxix. 381, believed this treatise to be a fragment of the work mentioned in the Lamprias catalogue as No. 84 : *Ἀμμώνιος ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἡδέως τῇ κακίᾳ συνεῖναι.*

ΕΙ ΑΥΤΑΡΚΗΣ Η ΚΑΚΙΑ ΠΡΟΣ ΚΑΚΟΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ

1. . . . . οὐχ[1] ὑπομενεῖ[2]

πεπραμένον τὸ σῶμα[3] τῆς φερνῆς ἔχων,

ὡς Εὐριπίδης φησίν, βραχέα δ' ἔχει τὰ ζηλωτὰ[4] καὶ
B ἀβέβαια. τῷδ'[5] οὐ "πολλῆς διὰ τέφρας," ἀλλὰ "πυρκαιᾶς τινος" βασιλικῆς πορευομένῳ καὶ περιφλεγομένῳ, ἄσθματος καὶ φόβου μεστῷ καὶ ἱδρῶτος διόλλυσθαι,[6] πλοῦτόν τινα προσθείσης[7] Ταντάλειον ἀπολαῦσαι δι' ἀσχολίαν οὐ δυναμένῳ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σικυώνιος ἐκεῖνος ἱπποτρόφος εὖ φρονῶν ἔδωκε

[1] οὐχ added by Capps.
[2] ὑπομενεῖ Capps: ὑπομένει.
[3] πεπραμένον τὸ σῶμα Nauck: τὸ σῶμα πεπραμένον.
[4] δ' ἔχει τὰ ζηλωτὰ Pohlenz; δὲ τὰ ζηλωτὰ Paton: δεδήλωται.
[5] τῷδ' Capps: τῷ δ'.
[6] διόλλυσθαι Capps: διαποντίου or διακοντίου.
[7] προσθείσης Capps: προσθεῖσα.

[a] This passage is tantalizing, not only because so much is lost of the text, and because the text is so corrupt, but chiefly because since the discovery of the Claremont fragments of Euripides' *Phaëthon* we may perceive that this play, of whose ingenious plot we now know a good deal, colours the whole of the opening passage. In the play Phaëthon, declining to

WHETHER VICE BE SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE UNHAPPINESS

1. . . . . [a] He will not submit to (such a marriage) [b]

His body bartered for the dower's sake,

as Euripides [c] says; but he has only a slight and precarious reason for being envied. For this man (it were better) [b] to make his journey, not "through heaps of hot cinders," but "through a royal conflagration," as it were, and surrounded by flames, panting and full of terror and drenched with sweat, and so to perish, though (his mother) [b] had offered to him such a wealth as Tantalus had, which he was too busy to enjoy. For while that Sicyonian horse-breeder was a wise man, who gave to the king

accept marriage with the goddess to whom his mother Clymenê wished to marry him, speaks the first verse quoted; and there are probably further quotations from the play in the second sentence (*πολλῆς διὰ τέφρας, ἀλλὰ πυρκαιᾶς τινος*). It is quite possible that Phaëthon himself swears that he will go through "heaps of cinders" rather than marry the goddess; and in the play there is in fact a "royal conflagration" when the Sun's treasure-house burns (see Nauck, p. 601). But it cannot be too strongly insisted that the text is very corrupt and that the restorations here adopted can claim only an approximation to the truth.

[b] Conjecturally supplied.

[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 606, Frag. 775, from the *Phaëthon*; *cf.* *Moralia*, 13 F; Plautus, *Asinaria*, 87.

(498) τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν θήλειαν ἵππον δρομάδα δῶρον,

ἵνα μή οἱ ἕποιθ' ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσαν
ἀλλὰ[1] τέρποιτο μένων,

εἰς βαθεῖαν εὐπορίαν καὶ σχολὴν ἄλυπον ἀνακλίνας ἑαυτόν· οἱ δὲ νῦν αὐλικοί,[2] πρακτικοὶ δοκοῦντες
C εἶναι, μηδενὸς καλοῦντος ὠθοῦνται δι' αὑτῶν ἐπὶ τράχηλον εἰς αὐλὰς καὶ προπομπὰς καὶ θυραυλίας ἐπιπόνους, ἵν' ἵππου τινὸς ἢ πόρπης ἢ τοιαύτης τινὸς εὐημερίας τύχωσι.

τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀμφιδρυφὴς ἄλοχος Φυλάκῃ ἐλέλειπτο,
καὶ δόμος ἡμιτελής·

σύρεται δὲ καὶ πλανᾶται τριβόμενος ἐλπίσιν ἐξ ἐλπίδων[3] καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος· ἂν δὲ καὶ τύχῃ τινὸς ὧν ποθεῖ, περιενεχθεὶς καὶ σκοτοδινιάσας πρὸς τὸν τῆς τύχης πεταυρισμὸν ἀπόβασιν ζητεῖ καὶ μακαρίζει τοὺς ἀδόξως[4] καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ζῶντας· οἱ δ' ἐκεῖνον πάλιν ἄνω βλέποντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς φερόμενον.

2. Παγκάκως[5] ἡ κακία διατίθησι πάντας
D ἀνθρώπους, αὐτοτελής τις οὖσα τῆς κακοδαιμονίας δημιουργός· οὔτε γὰρ ὀργάνων οὔθ' ὑπηρετῶν ἔχει χρείαν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν[6] τύραννοι σπουδάζοντες οὓς ἂν κολάζωσιν ἀθλίους ποιεῖν δημίους τρέφουσι καὶ βασανιστάς, ἢ καυτήρια καὶ σφῆνας ἐπιμηχα-

[1] ἀλλὰ] ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ Homer.
[2] αὐλικοί Pohlenz, after Amyot: ἄλυποι καὶ.
[3] ἐλπίσιν ἐξ ἐλπίδων Kronenberg: ἔν τισιν ἐλπίζων (ἔντευξιν ἐλπίζων Wyttenbach; ἔν τισιν ἐλπίσιν Reiske).
[4] ἀδόξως] ἀδόξους in all mss. but two.

of the Achaeans, Agamemnon, a swift mare as a gift,

That he might not follow him to wind-swept Troy,
But stay at home and take his pleasure,[a]

surrendering himself to the enjoyment of deep riches and to unmolested ease; yet modern courtiers who are looked upon as men of affairs, though no one summons them, of their own accord push their way headlong into courts and official escorts and toilsome bivouacs that they may get a horse or a brooch or some such piece of good fortune.

His wife, rending both cheeks, was left behind
In Phylacê, and his half-finished home,[b]

while he himself is swept about and wanders afar, worn out by one hope after another and constantly insulted; and even if he obtains any of his desires, yet, whirled about and made giddy by Fortune's rope-dance, he seeks to make his descent and considers happy those who live in obscurity and safety, whereas they so regard him as they look up at him soaring above their heads.

2. Vice makes all men completely miserable, since as a creator of unhappiness it is clothed with absolute power, for it has no need of either instruments or ministers. But whereas despots, when they desire to make miserable those whom they punish, maintain executioners and torturers, or devise branding-irons

[a] Adapted from Homer, *Il.*, xxiii. 297-298; Echepolus is the Sicyonian referred to. *Cf. Moralia*, 32 F.
[b] Homer, *Il.*, ii. 700-701.

[5] παγκάκως Capps: πάντως.
[6] ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν Reiske; ἀλλ' οἵ γε Wyttenbach: ἄλλοι δὲ.

(498) νῶνται, ἡ[1] δὲ κακία δίχα πάσης παρασκευῆς τῇ ψυχῇ συνελθοῦσα συνέτριψε καὶ κατέβαλε, λύπης ἐνέπλησε θρήνων βαρυθυμίας μεταμελείας τὸν ἄνθρωπον. τεκμήριον δέ· τεμνόμενοι πολλοὶ σιωπῶσι καὶ μαστιγούμενοι καρτεροῦσι, καὶ σφηνούμενοι ὑπὸ δεσποτῶν ἢ τυράννων φωνὴν οὐκ ἀφῆκαν, ὅταν ἡ
E ψυχὴ μύσασα τῷ λόγῳ τὸν πόνον[2] ὥσπερ χειρὶ πιέσῃ καὶ κατάσχῃ· θυμῷ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτάξειας ἡσυχίαν οὐδὲ πένθει σιωπήν, οὔτε φοβούμενον στῆναι πείσειας, οὔτε δυσφοροῦντα μετανοίᾳ μὴ βοῆσαι μηδὲ τῶν τριχῶν λαβέσθαι ἢ τὸν μηρὸν ἀλοῆσαι[3]· οὕτω καὶ πυρός ἐστιν ἡ κακία καὶ σιδήρου βιαιοτέρα.

3. Αἱ πόλεις δήπουθεν, ὅταν ἔκδοσιν ναῶν ἢ κολοσσῶν προγράφωσιν, ἀκροῶνται τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἁμιλλωμένων περὶ τῆς ἐργολαβίας καὶ λόγους[4] καὶ παραδείγματα κομιζόντων· εἶθ' αἱροῦνται τὸν ἀπ' ἐλάττονος δαπάνης ταὐτὸ ποιοῦντα καὶ βέλτιον καὶ τάχιον. φέρε δὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἔκδοσίν τινα βίου[5]
F κακοδαίμονος προκηρύσσειν, εἶτα προσιέναι τῇ ἐργολαβίᾳ τὴν Τύχην καὶ τὴν Κακίαν διαφερομένας· τὴν μὲν ὀργάνων τε παντοδαπῶν κατάπλεω καὶ παρασκευῆς πολυτελοῦς εἰς ἀπεργασίαν κακοδαίμονος ζωῆς καὶ οἰκτρᾶς, λῃστήρια δεινὰ καὶ πολέμους καὶ τυράννων μιαιφονίας καὶ χειμῶνας ἐκ

[1] ἀλόγου ψυχῆς before ἡ is corrupt, though probably not a gloss; it was deleted by Bernardakis.
[2] πόνον Reiske: τόνον.
[3] ἀλοῆσαι] κροῦσαι in all mss. but three.
[4] λόγους] λογισμοὺς van Herwerden.
[5] Pohlenz deletes καὶ ἀνθρώπου after βίου.

and wedges[a]; vice, without any apparatus, when it has joined itself to the soul, crushes and overthrows it, and fills the man with grief and lamentation, dejection and remorse. And this is the proof: many are silent under mutilation and endure scourging and being tortured by the wedge at the hands of masters or tyrants without uttering a cry, whenever by the application of reason the soul abates the pain and by main force, as it were, checks and represses it[b]; but you cannot order anger to be quiet nor grief to be silent, nor can you persuade a man possessed by fear to stand his ground, nor one suffering from remorse not to cry out or tear his hair or smite his thigh. So much more violent is vice than either fire or sword.

3. Cities, as we know, when they give public notice of intent to let contracts for the building of temples or colossal statues, listen to the proposals of artists competing for the commission and bringing in their estimates and models,[c] and then choose the man who will do the same work with the least expense and better than the others and more quickly. Come, then, let us suppose that we also give public proclamation of intent to contract for making a life wretched, and that Fortune and Vice come to get the commission in a rival spirit. Fortune is provided with all manner of instruments and costly apparatus to render a life miserable and wretched; she brings in her train frightful robberies and wars, the foul blood-

[a] *Cf.* Aeschylus, *Prometheus*, 64-65:

ἀδαμαντίνου νῦν σφηνὸς αὐθάδη γνάθον
στέρνων διαμπὰξ πασσάλευ' ἐρρωμένως.

[b] *Cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, ii. 22. 53 ff.
[c] *Cf.*, for example, Richter, *Greek Sculptors*, p. 230: "A model of the pediment figures must have preceded the beginning of their execution."

θαλάττης καὶ κεραυνὸν ἐξ ἀέρος ἐφελκομένην καὶ
499 κώνεια τρίβουσαν καὶ ξίφη φέρουσαν καὶ συκοφάντας ξενολογοῦσαν καὶ πυρετοὺς[1] ἐξάπτουσαν καὶ πέδας περικρούουσαν καὶ περιοικοδομοῦσαν εἱρκτάς· καίτοι τούτων τὰ πλεῖστα τῆς Κακίας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς Τύχης ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ πάντ' ἔστω τῆς Τύχης. ἡ δὲ Κακία παρεστῶσα γυμνὴ καὶ μηδενὸς δεομένη τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐρωτάτω τὴν[2] Τύχην πῶς ποιήσει κακοδαίμονα καὶ ἄθυμον τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

"Τύχη,
πενίαν ἀπειλεῖς; καταγελᾷ σου Μητροκλῆς,

ὃς χειμῶνος ἐν τοῖς προβάτοις[3] καθεύδων καὶ
θέρους ἐν τοῖς προπυλαίοις τῶν ἱερῶν τὸν ἐν
B Βαβυλῶνι χειμάζοντα καὶ περὶ Μηδίαν θερίζοντα Περσῶν βασιλέα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας εἰς ἀγῶνα προυκαλεῖτο· δουλείαν καὶ δεσμὰ καὶ πρᾶσιν ἐπάγεις; καταφρονεῖ σου Διογένης, ὃς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν πωλούμενος ἐκήρυττε, 'τίς ὠνήσασθαι βούλεται δεσπότην[4];' κύλικα φαρμάκου παράττεις;[5] οὐχὶ καὶ Σωκράτει ταύτην προὔπιες; ὁ δ' ἵλεως καὶ πρᾶος, οὐ τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε χρώματος οὐδὲν οὔτε[6] σχήματος μάλ' εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν, ἀποθνήσκοντα δ' αὐτὸν ἐμακάριζον οἱ ζῶντες, ὡς οὐδ' ἐν Ἅιδου θείας ἄνευ μοίρας ἐσόμενον. καὶ μὴν τὸ πῦρ σου Δέκιος ὁ Ῥωμαίων[7] στρατηγὸς προέλαβεν

[1] πυρετοὺς] πυρὰς Pohlenz.
[2] τὴν] καὶ τὴν in most MSS.
[3] ἐν τοῖς πριβάτοις Usener, "baths."
[4] δεσπότην added by some inferior MSS.; κύριον Bernardakis.
[5] παράττεις] παράττουσα most MSS.
[6] οὔτε . . . οὔτε] οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ in all the better MSS.
[7] Ῥωμαίων] ῥωμαῖος ὤν most MSS.

thirstiness of tyrants, and storms at sea and thunder from the sky; she compounds hemlock, she carries swords, she levies informers, she kindles fevers, she claps on fetters, and builds prison-enclosures (and yet the greater part of these belong to Vice rather than to Fortune, but let us suppose them all Fortune's). And let Vice stand by quite unarmed, needing no external aid against the man, and let her ask Fortune how she intends to make man wretched and dejected:

"Fortune,
Do you threaten poverty? Metrocles laughs at you,[a]

Metrocles, who in winter slept among the sheep and in summer in the gateways of sacred precincts, yet challenged to vie with him in happiness the king of the Persians who winters in Babylon and summers in Media.[b] Do you bring on slavery and chains and the auction block? Diogenes[c] despises you, for when he was being sold by pirates, he cried out with the voice of an auctioneer, 'Who wants to buy a master?' Do you mix a cup of poison? Did you not present this to Socrates[d] also? And cheerfully and calmly, without trembling or changing either colour or posture, he drained it with great cheerfulness; and as he died the living esteemed him happy,[e] believing that 'not even in Hades would he be without some god-given portion.'[f] And as for your fire, Decius[g] the Roman general anticipated it, when he built a

[a] H. Richards has seen that this is probably a verse from comedy.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 604 C; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, viii. 6. 22.
[c] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vi. 29. 74; Epictetus, iv. 1. 116.
[d] *Cf.* Plato, *Phaedo*, 117 B-C.
[e] *Cf. Moralia*, 607 F.
[f] *Cf.* Plato, *Phaedo*, 58 E; Xenophon, *Apology*, 32.
[g] *Cf. Moralia*, 310 A-B.

C ὅτε τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐν μέσῳ πυρὰν νήσας[1] τῷ
(499) Κρόνῳ κατ' εὐχὴν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐκαλλιέρησεν ὑπὲρ
τῆς ἡγεμονίας. Ἰνδῶν δὲ φίλανδροι καὶ σώφρονες
γυναῖκες ὑπὲρ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐρίζουσι καὶ μάχονται
πρὸς ἀλλήλας, τὴν δὲ νικήσασαν τεθνηκότι τῷ ἀν-
δρὶ συγκαταφλεγῆναι μακαρίαν ᾄδουσιν αἱ λοιπαί.
τῶν δ' ἐκεῖ σοφῶν οὐδεὶς ζηλωτὸς οὐδὲ μακαριστός
ἐστιν, ἂν μὴ ζῶν ἔτι καὶ φρονῶν καὶ ὑγιαίνων τοῦ
σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν πυρὶ διαστήσῃ, καὶ καθαρὸς
ἐκβῇ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκνιψάμενος τὸ θνητόν. ἀλλ' ἐξ
οὐσίας λαμπρᾶς καὶ οἴκου καὶ τραπέζης καὶ πολυ-
τελείας εἰς τρίβωνα καὶ πήραν καὶ προσαίτησιν
D ἐφημέρου τροφῆς κατάξεις; ταῦτ' εὐδαιμονίας
ἀρχαὶ Διογένει, ταῦτ' ἐλευθερίας Κράτητι καὶ
δόξης. ἀλλ' εἰς σταυρὸν καθηλώσεις ἢ σκόλοπι
πήξεις; καὶ τί Θεοδώρῳ μέλει, πότερον ὑπὲρ γῆς ἢ
ὑπὸ γῆς σήπεται; Σκυθῶν εὐδαίμονες ταφαὶ αὗται[2]·
Ὑρκανῶν δὲ κύνες Βακτριανῶν δ' ὄρνιθες νεκροὺς
ἐσθίουσι κατὰ νόμους, ὅταν μακαρίου τέλους
τυγχάνωσιν."

4. Τίνας οὖν ταῦτα κακοδαίμονας ποιεῖ; τοὺς
ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀλογίστους, τοὺς ἀτρίπτους[3] καὶ
ἀγυμνάστους, τοὺς ἐκ νηπίων ἃς ἔχουσι δόξας
φυλάττοντας. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ Τύχη κακοδαι-

[1] πυρὰν νήσας Xylander: τυραννήσας.
[2] ταφαὶ αὗται] αὗται ταφαί Pohlenz.
[3] ἀτρίπτους Wyttenbach: ἀθρέπτους.

[a] This reference to Suttee is of great interest. It is probably derived ultimately from Megasthenes' account of the Maurya Empire of the 3rd century B.C. See, for example, Rawlinson, *India and the Western World* (Cambridge University Press, 1916), p. 59.

funeral pyre between the camps and, to fulfil a vow, sacrificed himself to Saturn on behalf of Rome's supremacy. And among the Indians, loving and chaste wives strive and contend with one another for the fire, and the wife who wins the honour of being consumed together with her dead husband is hymned as happy by the others.[a] And of the wise men in that part of the world, not one is considered enviable or happy, if, while he yet lives and is sane and healthy, he does not separate by fire his soul from his body and emerge pure from the flesh, with the mortal part washed away. Or will you reduce a man from splendid wealth and house and table and lavish living to a threadbare cloak and wallet and begging of his daily bread? These things were the beginning of happiness for Diogenes, of freedom and repute for Crates. But will you nail him to a cross or impale him on a stake? And what does Theodorus[b] care whether he rots above ground or beneath? Among the Scythians[c] such is the manner of happy burial; and among the Hyrcanians[d] dogs, among the Bactrians birds, devour, in accordance with the laws, the bodies of men, when these have met a happy end."

4. Whom, then, do these things make wretched? The unmanly and irrational, the unpracticed and untrained, those who retain from childhood their notions unchanged. Therefore Fortune is not a producer of

[b] The Cyrenaic, called "The Atheist," philosopher of the late 4th century B.C.; *cf.* *Moralia*, 606 B; Teles ed. Hense, p. 31; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, i. 43. 102; Valerius Maximus, vi. 2, Ext. 3; Seneca, *De Tranquillitate*, xiv. 3; *Wien. Stud.*, ix. 204.

[c] *Cf.* Herodotus, iv. 71-72.

[d] *Cf.* Porphyry, *De Abstinentia*, iv. 21; Sextus Empiricus, *Hypotyposes*, iii. 227; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, i. 45. 108.

μονίας τελεσιουργός, ἂν μὴ Κακίαν ἔχῃ συνερ-
E γοῦσαν. ὡς γὰρ ἡ κρόκη τὸ ὀστέον πρίει τέφρᾳ καὶ ὄξει διάβροχον γενόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐλέφαντα τῷ ζύθει μαλακὸν γενόμενον καὶ χαλῶντα κάμπτουσι καὶ διασχηματίζουσιν, ἄλλως δ' οὐ δύνανται, οὕτως ἡ Τύχη τὸ πεπονθὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ μαλακὸν ἐκ κακίας[1] προσπεσοῦσα κοιλαίνει καὶ τιτρώσκει. καὶ καθάπερ ὁ Παρθικὸς[2] ἰὸς[3] τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ βλαβερὸς ὢν οὐδὲ λυπῶν ἁπτομένους καὶ περιφέροντας,[4] ἐὰν τετρωμένοις[5] ἐπεισενεχθῇ μόνον, εὐθὺς ἀπόλλυσι τῷ προπεπονθότι τὴν ἀπορροὴν δεχομένους,[6] οὕτω τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης συντριβήσεσθαι
F μέλλοντα τὴν ψυχὴν ἴδιον ἕλκος ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ κακὸν ἔχειν δεῖ,[7] ὅπως τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἔξωθεν οἰκτρὰ καὶ ὀδυρτὰ ποιήσῃ.

5. Ἆρ' οὖν ἡ κακία τοιοῦτον ὥστε τῆς τύχης δεῖσθαι πρὸς κακοδαιμονίας ἀπεργασίαν; πόθεν; οὐ[8] τραχὺ καὶ δυσχείμερον ἐπαίρει[9] πέλαγος, οὐ λῃστῶν ἐνοδίοις διαζώννυσιν ἐνέδραις ἐρήμους ὑπωρείας, οὐ νέφη χαλαζοβόλα πεδίοις περιρρήγνυσι καρποφόροις, οὐ Μέλητον οὐδ' Ἄνυτον οὐδὲ Καλλίξενον ἐπάγει[10] συκοφάντην, οὐκ ἀφαιρεῖται
500 πλοῦτον, οὐκ ἀπείργει στρατηγίας, ἵνα ποιήσῃ κακοδαίμονας· ἀλλὰ πτοεῖ[11] πλουτοῦντας, εὐροοῦν-

[1] ἐκ κακίας Reiske: κακία (κακίας in three mss).
[2] Παρθικὸς du Soul: πάροικος.
[3] ἰὸς added by Pohlenz; ὀπὸς du Soul.
[4] περιφέροντας] περιχρίοντας Blümner.
[5] τετρωμένοις Reiske: τετρωμένος.
[6] προπεπονθότι τὴν ἀπορροὴν δεχομένους Wilamowitz: προσπεπονθότι καὶ τὴν ἀπορροὴν δεχομένῳ.
[7] After δεῖ Bernardakis deletes ἐντὸς σαρκός.
[8] οὐ] οὖν most mss.
[9] ἐπαίρει Pohlenz: ἐπαίρεται.

perfect unhappiness if she does not have Vice to co-operate with her. For as a thread saws through the bone that has been soaked in ashes and vinegar, and as men bend and fashion ivory when it has been made soft and pliable by beer, but cannot do so otherwise, so Fortune, falling upon that which is of itself ill-affected and soft as the result of Vice, gouges it out and injures it. And just as the Parthian poison,[a] though harmful to no one else nor injurious to those who touch it and carry it about, if it is merely brought into the presence of wounded men, it straightway destroys them, since they receive its effluence because of their previous susceptibility; so he who is liable to have his soul crushed by Fortune must have within himself some festering wound of his own in order that it may make whatever befalls him from without pitiful and lamentable.

5. Is, then, Vice such a thing that it needs Fortune's help to produce unhappiness? How can that be? Vice does not raise up a rough and stormy sea, she does not gird the skirts of lonely mountains with ambushes of robbers along the way, she does not make clouds of hail to burst on fruitful plains, she does not bring in a Meletus or an Anytus [b] or a Callixenus [c] as accusers, she does not take away wealth, she does not debar from the praetorship, in order to make men unhappy. Yet she dismays men

[a] Nothing is known about either a Parthian juice (ὀπός), or a Parthian poison (ἰός).
[b] *Cf.* 475 E, *supra.*
[c] *Cf.* Xenophon, *Hellenica*, i. 7. 8 ff.

[10] ἐπάγει Reiske: ἐπεὶ τί or ἐπεί τι.
[11] πτοεῖ Xylander: ποιεῖ.

(500) τας,[1] κληρονομοῦντας· ἐν γῇ διὰ θαλάττης ἐνδέδυκε, προσπέφυκεν, ἐκτήκουσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, διακαίουσα τοῖς θυμοῖς, συντρίβουσα ταῖς δεισιδαιμονίαις, διασύρουσα τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς[2] . . .

[1] εὐροοῦντας Reiske: εὐφοροῦντας or εὐφρονοῦντας.
[2] ὀφθαλμοῖς] φθόνοις Meziriacus.

who are rich, prosperous, and heirs to fortunes; on land and on sea she insinuates herself into them and clings to them, sinking deep into them through evil lusts, firing them with anger, crushing them with superstitious fears, shattering them with the eyes . . .[a]

[a] The interpretation of this last phrase is quite uncertain: perhaps "tearing them to pieces with envy," or "making them ridiculous with envy."

WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE WORSE THAN THOSE OF THE BODY

(ANIMINE AN CORPORIS AFFECTIONES SINT PEIORES)

INTRODUCTION

This popular oration, or diatribe,[a] was read by Plutarch[b] in some city of Asia Minor: Volkmann[c] thought Sardis, the capital of the province; Haupt[d] thought Halicarnassus; Wilamowitz[e] Ephesus. The occasion is clearly the consul's yearly hearing of lawsuits from the whole province.

The proof that afflictions of the soul are worse than diseases of the body is treated in a popular and, in chapter 4, dramatic manner. The conclusion is lost.

The same subject was treated in his commonplace fashion by Maximus Tyrius,[f] who shows no knowledge of Plutarch's oration, nor any relation to his sources; Cicero, however, at the beginning of the third book of the *Tusculan Disputations*, exhibits some kinship with Plutarch's argument. Siefert[g] has twice elaborated his opinion that some of this work of

[a] So Pohlenz, as I think, correctly: I therefore do not accept Wilamowitz's combination of this and the preceding work as fragments of the same dialogue.

[b] Xylander, practically alone, denies the genuineness—on what grounds he does not say.

[c] *Plutarch*, vol. i. 62 f.

[d] *Opuscula*, iii. 554 (*Hermes*, vi. 258).

[e] *Hermes*, xl. 161 ff.

[f] *Orat.* 7 ed. Hobein, 13 ed. Dübner.

[g] *Comm. Ienenses*, 1896, pp. 106-110; *Plutarchs Schrift* Περὶ εὐθυμίας, pp. 26-28.

Plutarch's was drawn from the ὑπόμνημα (I should prefer to say ὑπομνήματα[a]) which Plutarch used in writing *De Tranquillitate.*

The text is not good. The work is listed as No. 208 in the Lamprias catalogue.

[a] See the introduction to the *De Tranquillitate.*

(500)

B

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ Η ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ ΠΑΘΗ ΧΕΙΡΟΝΑ[1]

1. Ὅμηρος μὲν ἐπιβλέψας τὰ θνητὰ τῶν ζῴων γένη καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίνας κατὰ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς διαιτήσεις, ἐξεφώνησεν ὡς οὐδέν ἐστιν

ὀιζυρώτερον ἀνδρός,
πάντων ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει·

πρωτεῖον οὐκ εὐτυχὲς εἰς κακῶν ὑπεροχὴν ἀποδι-
C δοὺς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἡμεῖς δ' ὥσπερ ἤδη νικῶντα κακοδαιμονίᾳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀθλιώτατον ζῴων ἀνηγορευμένον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ συγκρίνωμεν,[2] εἰς ἰδίων κακῶν ἀγῶνα σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν διαιροῦντες, οὐκ ἀχρήστως ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ δεόντως, ἵνα μάθωμεν πότερον διὰ τὴν τύχην[3] ἢ δι' ἑαυτοὺς ἀθλιώτερον ζῶμεν. νόσος μὲν γὰρ ἐν σώματι φύεται διὰ φύσιν, κακία δὲ καὶ μοχθηρία περὶ ψυχὴν ἔργον ἐστὶ πρῶτον εἶτα πάθος αὐτῆς.[4] οὐ μικρὸν δὲ πρὸς εὐθυμίαν ὄφελος, ἂν ἰάσιμον ᾖ τὸ χεῖρον, καὶ κουφότερον καὶ ἄσφυκτον[5] ὄν.[6]

[1] *περὶ τοῦ πότερον τὰ ψυχῆς ἢ τὰ σώματος πάθη χείρονα* in some MSS., perhaps rightly.
[2] *συγκρίνωμεν* Reiske: *συγκρίνομεν*.
[3] *τύχην*] *ψυχὴν* most MSS.
[4] *αὐτῆς* Reiske, confirmed by G: *αὐτῇ*.
[5] *ἄσφυκτον* Salmasius, confirmed by one MS.: *ἄφυκτον*.

WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE WORSE THAN THOSE OF THE BODY

1. Homer,[a] having contemplated the mortal varieties of animals and having compared them with each other in respect to their lives and habits, cried out that nothing is

More wretched than man,
Of all that breathes and creeps upon the earth,

awarding to man an unfortunate primacy in excess of evils. But as for us, as though acknowledging that man has won the victory in wretchedness and has been proclaimed the most miserable of animals, let us compare him with himself, dividing body and soul for competition of their individual miseries, a task not unprofitable but even quite necessary, to the end that we may learn whether it is through Fortune or through ourselves that we live more wretchedly. For while disease grows in the body through Nature, vice and depravity in the soul are first the soul's own doing, and then its affliction. It will be no slight aid toward tranquillity of mind, if the worse condition be curable, being both lighter to bear and lacking intensity.

[a] *Il.*, xvii. 446-447; *cf.* 496 B, *supra*.

[6] *ὄν* added by Capps.

(500) 2. Ἡ μὲν οὖν Αἰσώπειος ἀλώπηξ περὶ ποικιλίας δικαζομένη πρὸς τὴν πάρδαλιν, ὡς ἐκείνη τὸ σῶμα
D καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν εὐανθῆ καὶ κατάστικτον ἐπεδείξατο, τῆς δ' ἦν τὸ ξανθὸν αὐχμηρὸν καὶ οὐχ ἡδὺ προσιδεῖν, " ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ τοι τὸ ἐντός," ἔφη, " σκοπῶν, ὦ δικαστά, ποικιλωτέραν με τῆσδ' ὄψει," δηλοῦσα τὴν περὶ τὸ ἦθος εὐτροπίαν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ταῖς χρείαις ἀμειβομένην. λέγωμεν[1] οὖν ἐν ἡμῖν ὅτι πολλὰ μέν, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, σοὶ[2] καὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα καὶ πάθη φύσει τ' ἀνίησιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ προσπίπτοντα δέχεται θύραθεν· ἂν δὲ σαυτὸν ἔνδοθεν ἀνοίξῃς, ποικίλον τι καὶ πολυπαθὲς κακῶν ταμιεῖον
E εὑρήσεις καὶ θησαύρισμα, ὥς φησι Δημόκριτος, οὐκ ἔξωθεν ἐπιρρεόντων, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐγγείους καὶ αὐτόχθονας πηγὰς ἐχόντων, ἃς ἀνίησιν ἡ κακία πολύχυτος καὶ δαψιλὴς οὖσα τοῖς πάθεσιν; εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐν σαρκὶ νοσήματα σφυγμοῖς καὶ ὠχραις[3] φωρᾶται καὶ θερμότητες αὐτὰ καὶ πόνοι προπετεῖς ἐλέγχουσι, τὰ δ' ἐν ψυχῇ λανθάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς κακά,[4] διὰ τοῦτ' ἐστι κακίω, προσαφαιρούμενα τὴν αὐτῶν[5] τοῦ πάσχοντος αἴσθησιν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσημάτων ἐρρωμένος ὁ λογισμὸς

[1] λέγωμεν] λέγομεν all MSS. but two.
[2] σοὶ] σοῦ all MSS. but two.
[3] ἐρυθαινόμενα after ὠχραις (χροιαῖς in some MSS.) deleted by Wilamowitz.
[4] ὄντα after κακά deleted by Pohlenz.
[5] αὐτῶν Capps: ἐπ' αὐτοῖς (omitted in a few MSS.).

[a] *Fable* 42 ed. Halm; *cf. Moralia*, 155 B; Babrius, *Fable* 180 ed. Crusius; Siefert, *Plutarchs Schrift* Περὶ εὐθυμίας, pp. 27-28.
[b] ποικιλία when applied to an animal's skin refers to colour

2. The fox in Aesop,[a] disputing at law with the leopard concerning their claims to variety,[b] when the leopard had shown her body with its glossy surface bright and spotted, and the fox's tawny skin was rough and unpleasant to the eye,

" But look at me *within*, sir judge," said she,
" And you will find me fuller far than she
Of fair variety," [c]

making manifest the versatility of her character which changes to many forms as necessity arises. Shall we, then, say in our own case, " Many of your diseases and affections, O man, your body naturally produces of itself, and it receives also many that befall it from without; but if you lay yourself open on the inside, you will find a storehouse and treasury, as Democritus[d] says, of all manner of evils and many abnormal states, which do not flow in from outside, but have, as it were, subterranean and earth-born springs, which Vice, being widely diffused and abundantly supplied with those abnormal states, causes to gush forth "? And if the diseases in the flesh are detected by the pulse and biliousness, and temperatures and sudden pains confirm their presence, but the evils in the soul escape the notice of most men, they are for this reason worse evils, since they also deprive the sufferer of any awareness of themselves. For although the reason,[e] if sound, perceives the diseases

and markings, but when it is applied to the mind it means " subtlety " or " cunning."
[c] *Cf.* Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, xl. p. 164; Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica*, i. p. 304: Plutarch's words are apparently adapted from an unknown choliambic poet. See also Knox, *Choliambica* (L.C.L.), p. 350.
[d] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], vol. ii. p. 172, Frag. 149.
[e] *Cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, iii. 1.

αἰσθάνεται, τοῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς συννοσῶν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει κρίσιν ἐν οἷς πάσχει, πάσχει γὰρ ᾧ κρίνει· καὶ δεῖ τῶν ψυχικῶν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον ἀριθμεῖν τὴν
F ἄγνοιαν,[1] δι' ἧς ἀνήκεστος ἡ κακία τοῖς πολλοῖς συνοικεῖ καὶ συγκαταβιοῖ καὶ συναποθνήσκει. ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἀπαλλαγῆς νόσου μὲν αἴσθησις εἰς χρείαν ἄγουσα τοῦ βοηθοῦντος τὸ πάσχον· ὁ δ' ἀπιστίᾳ τοῦ νοσεῖν οὐκ εἰδὼς ὧν δεῖται, κἂν παρῇ τὸ θεραπεῦον, ἀρνεῖται. καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
501 νοσημάτων τὰ μετ' ἀναισθησίας χείρονα, λήθαργοι κεφαλαλγίαι ἐπιληψίαι ἀποπληξίαι[2] αὐτοί τε πυρετοὶ οἱ[3] συντείναντες[4] εἰς παρακοπὴν τὸ φλεγμαῖνον καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὥσπερ ἐν ὀργάνῳ διαταράξαντες

κινοῦσι χορδὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους φρενῶν.

3. Διὸ παῖδες ἰατρῶν βούλονται μὲν μὴ νοσεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, νοσοῦντα δὲ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι νοσεῖ· ὃ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσι συμβέβηκεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἁφραίνοντες οὔτ' ἀσελγαίνοντες οὔτ' ἀδικοπραγοῦντες ἁμαρτάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι καὶ κατορθοῦν. πυρετὸν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὑγίειαν ὠνόμασεν οὐδὲ φθί-
B σιν εὐεξίαν[5] οὐδὲ ποδάγραν ποδώκειαν οὐδ' ὠχρίασιν ἐρύθημα, θυμὸν δὲ πολλοὶ καλοῦσιν ἀνδρείαν καὶ

[1] ἄγνοιαν Wyttenbach: ἄνοιαν.
[2] ἀποπληξίαι] πυρετοὶ most MSS.
[3] οἱ added by Pohlenz.
[4] συντείναντες] συντείνοντες most MSS.
[5] εὐεξίαν] εὐεξίην three good MSS., as though Plutarch were quoting an Ionic author (Democritus ?).

which affect the body, yet, being itself afflicted with those of the soul, it can form no judgement of its own afflictions, for it is affected in the very part by which it judges; and, of the soul's diseases, one must account as first and greatest ignorance, which causes Vice beyond hope of cure to abide with most men, to cling to them through life, and to die with them. For the beginning of the riddance of disease is awareness which leads the ailing part to the use of what will relieve it; but the man who through disbelief in his ailment does not know what he needs, refuses the remedy, even if it be at hand. For it is true of the diseases of the body also that those are worse which are attended by inability to perceive the body's condition: lethargies, migraine, epilepsies, apoplexies, and those very fevers which, raising inflammation to the pitch of delirium and confounding consciousness, as on a musical instrument,

Will touch the heart-strings never touched before.[a]

3. Therefore professional physicians desire, in the first place that a man should not be ill; and next, if he is ill, that he should not be unaware that he is ill[b]—which is the case with all the maladies which affect the soul. For when men act foolishly[c] or licentiously or unjustly, they do not think that they are doing wrong, but some even think that they are doing right. For although no one has ever called a fever "health," nor consumption "excellent condition," nor gout "swiftness of foot," nor sallowness a "fresh complexion," yet many call hot temper[d]

[a] *Cf.* 456 C, *supra.*
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 102 D; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, iii. 6. 12.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 81 F.
[d] *Cf.* 462 F, *supra.*

(501) ἔρωτα φιλίαν καὶ φθόνον ἅμιλλαν καὶ δειλίαν ἀσφάλειαν. εἶθ' οἱ μὲν καλοῦσι τοὺς ἰατρούς, αἰσθάνονται γὰρ ὧν δέονται πρὸς ἃ νοσοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ φεύγουσι τοὺς φιλοσόφους, οἴονται γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνειν ἐν οἷς διαμαρτάνουσιν. ἐπεὶ[1] τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενοι λέγομεν ὅτι κουφότερόν ἐστιν ὀφθαλμία μανίας καὶ ποδάγρα φρενίτιδος, ὁ μὲν γὰρ[2] αἰσθάνεται καὶ καλεῖ τὸν ἰατρὸν κεκραγώς, καὶ παρόντι τὴν ὄψιν ἀλεῖψαι, τὴν φλέβα τεμεῖν,[3] παραδίδωσιν· τῆς δὲ
C μαινομένης Ἀγαύης ἀκούεις ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τὰ φίλτατ' ἠγνοηκυίας,

ἄγομεν[4] ἐξ ὄρεος[5]
ἔλικα νεότομον ἐπὶ μέλαθρα,
μακάριον θήραμα.[6]

Καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τῷ σώματι νοσῶν εὐθὺς ἐνδοὺς καὶ καθεὶς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ κλινίδιον ἡσυχίαν ἄγει θεραπευόμενος, ἂν δέ που μικρὸν ἐξάξῃ[7] καὶ διασκιρτήσῃ τὸ σῶμα φλεγμονῆς προσπεσούσης, εἰπών τις τῶν παρακαθημένων πράως,

μέν', ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις,

ἐπέστησε καὶ κατέσχεν. οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ψυχικοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες τότε μάλιστα πράττουσι, τόθ' ἥκισθ'

[1] ἐπεὶ Xylander, confirmed by two MSS.; ἔτι Wyttenbach: ἐπὶ.
[2] γὰρ] omitted in all MSS. but one.
[3] After τεμεῖν Pohlenz deleted τὴν κεφαλήν (a gloss on the verses of Euripides).
[4] ἄγομεν] φέρομεν Euripides.
[5] ἐξ ὀρέων Euripides.
[6] μακαρίαν θήραν *Life of Crassus*, xxxiii.
[7] ἐξάξῃ Wyttenbach; ἐξάξῃ.

"manliness," and love "friendship,"[a] and envy "emulation," and cowardice "caution." Again, while men sick in body send for a doctor, since they perceive whom they need to counteract their ailments, yet those that are sick in soul avoid philosophers, for they think that they are doing well in those very matters where they are at fault. The fact is that, if we follow on this line of reasoning, we maintain that defective eyesight is easier to bear than madness, and gout than inflammation of the brain! For a man that is sick in body perceives it and calls loudly for a physician, and when he comes, allows him to anoint the eyes or open the veins; but you hear the maddened Agavê say,[b] not recognizing her dearest by reason of her affliction:

From the mountain we bring
To the palace a fresh-cut tendril,
A fortunate capture.

It is true that one who is sick in body gives in at once and goes to bed and remains quiet while he is being cured, and if, perchance, when the fever comes upon him, he tosses a bit and tumbles his body about, one of those who sit by him will say to him gently,

Lie still, poor wretch, and move not from your bed,[c]

and so checks and restrains him; but those who suffer from diseases of the soul are then most active, then

[a] "Si on juge de l'amour par la plupart de ses effets, il ressemble plus à la haine qu'à l'amitié."—De la Rochefoucauld.
[b] Euripides, *Bacchae*, 1169-1171; *cf. Life of Crassus*, xxxiii. (564 F): Agavê, bearing the head of her son Pentheus, was a commonplace of philosophical rhetoric; see, for example, Horace, *Sermones*, ii. 3. 303.
[c] Euripides, *Orestes*, 258; *cf.* 475 D, *supra*.

(501) ἡσυχάζουσιν· αἱ γὰρ ὁρμαὶ τῶν πράξεων ἀρχή,[1] τὰ
D δὲ πάθη σφοδρότητες ὁρμῶν. διὸ τὴν ψυχὴν
ἠρεμεῖν οὐκ ἐῶσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μάλιστα δεῖται μονῆς
καὶ σιωπῆς καὶ ὑποστολῆς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τότ' αὐτὸν
εἰς ὕπαιθρον ἕλκουσι, τότ' ἀποκαλύπτουσιν οἱ θυ-
μοί, αἱ φιλονεικίαι, οἱ ἔρωτες, αἱ λῦπαι, πολλὰ καὶ
δρᾶν ἄνομα καὶ λαλεῖν ἀνάρμοστα τοῖς καιροῖς
ἀναγκαζόμενον.

4. Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπισφαλέστερος χειμὼν τοῦ πλεῖν
οὐκ ἐῶντος ὁ κωλύων καθορμίσασθαι, οὕτως οἱ
κατὰ ψυχὴν χειμῶνες βαρύτεροι στείλασθαι τὸν
ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἐῶντες οὐδ' ἐπιστῆσαι τεταραγμένον
τὸν λογισμόν· ἀλλ' ἀκυβέρνητος καὶ ἀνερμάτιστος
ἐν ταραχῇ καὶ πλάνῃ δρόμοις λεχρίοις[2] καὶ παρα-
E φόροις διατραχηλιζόμενος εἴς τι ναυάγιον φοβερὸν
ἐξέπεσε καὶ συνέτριψε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον. ὥστε καὶ
ταύτῃ[3] χεῖρον νοσεῖν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ τοῖς σώμασιν·
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πάσχειν μόνον τοῖς δὲ καὶ πάσχειν καὶ
ποιεῖν κακῶς συμβέβηκε.

Καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν τῶν παθῶν; αὐτὸς
ὁ καιρὸς ὑπόμνησίς ἐστιν. ὁρᾶτε τὸν πολὺν καὶ
παμμιγῆ τοῦτον τὸν[4] ἐνταῦθα συνηραγμένον[5] καὶ
κυκώμενον ὄχλον περὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὴν ἀγοράν; οὐ
θύσοντες οὗτοι συνελήλυθασι πατρίοις θεοῖς οὐδ'
ὁμογνίων μεθέξοντες ἱερῶν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ Ἀσκραίῳ

[1] ἀρχή] ἀρχαί in two MSS.
[2] λεχρίοις Paton: ὀλεθρίοις.
[3] ταύτῃ Wyttenbach: τούτοις.
[4] τὸν in a few MSS. only.
[5] συνειργμένον, "close-packed," Capps.

least at rest. For impulses are the beginning of action, and the soul's abnormal states are violent impulses. That is the reason why they do not allow the soul to be at rest, but just at the time when man most needs repose and silence and relaxation, then his fits of temper, of contentiousness, of love, of grief, drag him into the open air and strip him bare, and he is forced both to do many lawless things and to give tongue to many things unsuited to the occasion.

4. As, therefore, the storm that prevents a sailor from putting into port is more dangerous than that which does not allow him to sail, so those storms of the soul are more serious which do not allow a man to compose or to calm his disturbed reason; but pilotless and without ballast, in confusion and aimless wandering, rushing headlong in oblique and reeling courses, he suffers a terrible shipwreck, as it were, and ruins his life. Consequently for this reason also it is worse to be sick in soul than in body; for men afflicted in body only suffer, but those afflicted in soul both suffer and do ill.[a]

But why need I recount the multitude of the soul's maladies? The present occasion of itself brings them to mind. Do you see this vast and promiscuous crowd which jostles and surges in confusion here about the tribunal and the market-place? These persons have come together, not to sacrifice to their country's gods, not to share in each other's family rites, not bringing "to Ascraean Zeus[b] the first-

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, iii. 5. 10.
[b] For the cult of Ascraean Zeus at Halicarnassus *cf.* Apollonius, *Historia Mirabilium*, 13 (Keller, *Rerum Naturalium Scriptores Graeci Minores*, i. p. 47).

F Διὶ Λυδίων καρπῶν ἀπαρχὰς φέροντες οὐδὲ Διονύσῳ βεβακχευμένον θύσθλον ἱεραῖς νυξὶ καὶ κοινοῖς ὀργιάσοντες[1] κώμοις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐτησίοις περιόδοις ἀκμὴ νοσήματος ἐκτραχύνουσα[2] τὴν Ἀσίαν[3] ἐπὶ δίκας καὶ ἀγῶνας ἐμπροθέσμους ἥκουσαν[4] ἐνταῦθα
502 συμβάλλει· καὶ[5] πλῆθος ὥσπερ ῥευμάτων ἀθρόων εἰς μίαν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἀγορὰν καὶ φλεγμαίνει καὶ συνέρρωγεν " ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων." ποίων ταῦτα πυρετῶν ἔργα, ποίων ἠπιάλων; τίνες ἐνστάσεις ἢ παρεμπτώσεις ἢ δυσκρασία θερμῶν ἢ ὑπέρχυσις ὑγρῶν; ἂν ἑκάστην δίκην ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπον ἀνακρίνῃς πόθεν πέφυκε πόθεν ἥκει, τὴν μὲν θυμὸς αὐθάδης γεγέννηκε, τὴν δὲ μανιώδης φιλονεικία, τὴν δ' ἄδικος ἐπιθυμία . . .

[1] ὀργιάσοντες Bernardakis and one MS.: ὀργιάζοντες.
[2] ἐκτραχύνουσα] ἐκτραχύνασα in three MSS.
[3] Ἀσίαν] οὐσίαν most MSS.
[4] ἥκουσαν] ἥκουσιν most MSS.
[5] καὶ] omitted in all MSS. but two.

fruits of Lydian harvests,"[a] nor, in honour of Dionysus, to celebrate his mystic festival on sacred nights with common revellings, but, as it were, a mighty pestilence drives them together here with yearly visitations stirring up Asia, which must come for law-suits and litigation at certain stated times; and the overwhelming multitude, like streams flowing together, has inundated this one market-place and boils with fury and dashes together in a tumult " of destroyers and destroyed."[b] What fevers, what agues, have brought this about? What stoppages, or irruptions of blood,[c] or distemperature of heat, or overflow of humours, have caused this? If you examine every law-suit, as though it were a person, to discover what gave rise to it and whence it came, you will find that obstinate anger begat one, frantic ambition another, unjust desire a third . . .

[a] Probably a quotation from a poet: Reiske thought Pindar; Haupt (*Opuscula*, iii. 554), an anonymous tragic poet (and *cf.* Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, xl. 163, 164, note 1).
[b] Homer, *Il.*, iv. 451.
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 129 D.

CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS
(DE GARRULITATE)

INTRODUCTION

THIS charming essay, by far the best in the volume, suffers from only one defect, its length. Though Plutarch again and again, by his narrative skill and naïve or unconscious humour, will delight even those who have hardened their hearts against him (I mean his editors), he cannot at last resist the temptation to indulge in what he considered scientific analysis and enlightened exhortation. He is then merely dull. But, taken as a whole, the essay is surely a success, and as organic and skilful a performance as any in the *Moralia*.

The work was written after *De Curiositate* and before *De Tranquillitate*, *De Capienda ex Inimicis Utilitate*, and *De Laude Ipsius*.[a] It stands in the Lamprias catalogue as No. 92.[b]

[a] I have thus combined the conclusions of Pohlenz, Brokate, and Hein.

[b] Mr C. B. Robinson's translation, or paraphrase, of this and several other essays in this volume, arrived too late to be of service (see *Plutarch, Selected Essays*, Putnam, New York, 1937).

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ΠΕΡΙ ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΙΑΣ

B 1. Δύσκολον μὲν ἀναλαμβάνει θεράπευμα καὶ χαλεπὸν ἡ φιλοσοφία τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν. τὸ γὰρ φάρμακον αὐτῆς, ὁ λόγος, ἀκουόντων ἐστίν, οἱ δ' C ἀδόλεσχοι οὐδενὸς ἀκούουσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ λαλοῦσι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχει πρῶτον κακὸν ἡ ἀσιγησία, τὴν ἀνηκοΐαν. κωφότης γὰρ αὐθαίρετός ἐστιν, ἀνθρώπων, οἶμαι, μεμφομένων τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι μίαν μὲν γλῶτταν δύο δ' ὦτ' ἔχουσιν. εἴπερ[1] οὖν ὁ Εὐριπίδης καλῶς εἶπε πρὸς τὸν ἀσύνετον ἀκροατήν,

> οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην μὴ στέγοντα πιμπλάναι,
> σοφοὺς ἐπαντλῶν ἀνδρὶ μὴ σοφῷ λόγους·

δικαιότερον ἄν τις εἴποι πρὸς τὸν ἀδόλεσχον, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀδολέσχου,[2]

> οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην μὴ δεχόμενον πιμπλάναι,
> σοφοὺς ἐπαντλῶν ἀνδρὶ μὴ σοφῷ λόγους,[3]

D μᾶλλον δὲ περιαντλῶν λόγους ἀνθρώπῳ λαλοῦντι

[1] εἴπερ] ὅπερ Sieveking.
[2] Stegmann followed by Pohlenz deleted μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀδολέσχου.
[3] Most mss. repeat ἀνδρὶ μὴ σοφῷ λόγους, Pohlenz omits.

[a] It suits Plutarch's humour in this passage, in which he speaks of garrulity as a disease, to invent one, and possibly two, pseudo-medical terms, ἀσιγησία, "inability to keep

CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS

1. It is a troublesome and difficult task that philosophy has in hand when it undertakes to cure garrulousness. For the remedy, words of reason, requires listeners; but the garrulous listen to nobody, for they are always talking. And this is the first symptom of their ailment: looseness of the tongue becomes impotence of the ears.[a] For it is a deliberate deafness, that of men who, I take it, blame Nature because they have only one tongue, but two ears.[b] If, then, Euripides [c] was right when he said with reference to the unintelligent hearer,

> I could not fill a man who will not hold
> My wise words flooding into unwise ears,

it would be more just to say to the garrulous man, or rather about the garrulous man,

> I could not fill a man who will not take
> My wise words flooding into unwise ears,

or rather submerging, a man who talks to those

silent," and ἀνηκοΐα, "inability to listen." The figure is maintained in διαρρέουσι at the end of section D. Rouse suggests: "And here is the first bad symptom in diarrhoea of the tongue—constipation of the ears."

[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 39 B; von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. p. 68, Zeno, Frag. 310.

[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 649, Frag. 899.

(502) μὲν πρὸς τοὺς οὐκ ἀκούοντας, μὴ ἀκούοντι δὲ τῶν λαλούντων. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσῃ τι βραχύ, τῆς ἀδολεσχίας ὥσπερ ἄμπωτιν λαβούσης, τοῦτο παραχρῆμα πολλαπλάσιον ἀνταποδίδωσι.

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ στοὰν ἀπὸ μιᾶς φωνῆς πολλὰς ἀνταπακλάσεις ποιοῦσαν ἑπτάφωνον καλοῦσι· τῆς δ' ἀδολεσχίας ἂν ἐλάχιστος ἅψηται λόγος, εὐθὺς ἀντιπεριηχεῖ

κινοῦσα χορδὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους φρενῶν.

μήποτε γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν γλῶτταν ἡ ἀκοὴ συντέτρηται· διὸ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμμένουσιν οἱ λόγοι, τῶν δ' ἀδολέσχων διαρρέουσιν·
E εἶθ' ὥσπερ ἀγγεῖα κενοὶ φρενῶν ἦχον δὲ μεστοὶ περιΐασιν.

2. Εἰ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ πείρας μηδὲν ἐλλελεῖφθαι, εἴπωμεν πρὸς τὸν ἀδόλεσχον,

ὦ παῖ, σιώπα· πόλλ' ἔχει σιγὴ καλά,

δύο δὲ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα, τὸ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκουσθῆναι· ὧν οὐδετέρου τυχεῖν ἐγγίνεται τοῖς ἀδολέσχοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποδυσπετοῦσι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις νοσήμασι τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον φιλαργυρίᾳ φιλοδοξίᾳ φιληδονίᾳ, τὸ γοῦν τυγχάνειν ὧν ἐφίενται περίεστι, τοῖς δ' ἀδολέσχοις τοῦτο συμβαίνει χαλεπώτατον· ἐπιθυμοῦντες γὰρ ἀκροατῶν οὐ τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶς

[a] A portico on the east side of the Altis; *cf.* Pausanias, v. 21. 17, Pliny, *Natural History*, xxxvi. 15. 100.

[b] *Cf.* 456 c, 501 A, *supra.*

[c] *Cf.* Aristophanes, *Thesm.*, 18: *δίκην δὲ χοάνης ὦτα διετετρήνατο.*

who will not listen, and will not listen when others talk. For even if he does listen for a moment, when his loquacity is, as it were, at ebb, the rising tide immediately makes up for it many times over.

They give the name of Seven-voiced [a] to the portico at Olympia which reverberates many times from a single utterance; and if but the least word sets garrulousness in motion, straightway it echoes round about on all sides,

Touching the heart-strings never touched before.[b]

Indeed one might think that babbler's ears have no passage bored through [c] to the soul, but only to the tongue.[d] Consequently, while others retain what is said, in talkative persons it goes right through in a flux; then they go about like empty vessels,[e] void of sense, but full of noise.

2. But if, however, we are resolved to leave no means untried, let us say to the babbler,

Hush, child: in silence many virtues lie,[f]

and among them the two first and greatest, the merits of hearing and being heard; neither of these can happen to talkative persons, but even in that which they desire especially they fail miserably. For in other diseases of the soul,[g] such as love of money, love of glory, love of pleasure, there is at least the possibility of attaining their desires, but for babblers this is very difficult: they desire listeners and cannot

[d] *Cf.* Philoxenus in *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, 547 (*Wiener Stud.*, xi. 234).

[e] *Cf.* the proverb: "Empty vessels make the loudest noise."

[f] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 147, Sophocles, Frag. 78 (Frag. 81 ed. Pearson, vol. i. p. 50), from the *Aleadae.*

[g] *Cf.* 519 D, *infra.*

F φεύγει προτροπάδην· κἂν ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ τινὶ καθεζόμενοι κἂν περιπατοῦντες ἐν ξυστῷ[1] θεάσωνται προσφοιτῶντα,[2] ταχέως ἀνάζευξιν αὐτοῖς παρεγγυῶσι. καὶ καθάπερ ὅταν ἐν συλλόγῳ τινὶ σιωπὴ γένηται, τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐπεισεληλυθέναι λέγουσιν, οὕτως ὅταν εἰς συμπόσιον ἢ συνέδριον γνωρίμων λάλος εἰσέλθῃ,
503 πάντες ἀποσιωπῶσι μὴ βουλόμενοι λαβὴν παρασχεῖν· ἂν δ' αὐτὸς ἄρξηται διαίρειν τὸ στόμα,

πρὸ χείματος ὥστ' ἀνὰ ποντίαν ἄκραν
βορρᾶ[3] ζαέντος[4]

ὑφορώμενοι σάλον καὶ ναυτίαν ἐξανέστησαν. ὅθεν αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει μήτε παρὰ δεῖπνον συγκλιτῶν[5] μήτε συσκήνων τυγχάνειν προθύμων, ὅταν ὁδοιπορῶσιν ἢ πλέωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαστῶν· πρόσκειται γὰρ ἁπανταχοῦ, τῶν ἱματίων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος, ἁπτόμενος[6] τοῦ γενείου, τὴν πλευρὰν θυροκοπῶν τῇ χειρί.

πόδες δὴ κεῖθι τιμιώτατοι,

κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχίλοχον, καὶ νὴ Δία κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἀριστοτέλην. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐνοχλούμενος ὑπ'
B ἀδολέσχου καὶ κοπτόμενος ἀτόποις τισὶ διηγήμασι, πολλάκις αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, "οὐ θαυμαστόν, Ἀριστότελες;" "οὐ τοῦτο," φησί, "θαυμαστόν, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πόδας ἔχων σὲ ὑπομένει." ἑτέρῳ δέ τινι τοιούτῳ μετὰ πολλοὺς λόγους εἰπόντι, "κατηδολέσχηκά σου, φιλόσοφε"· "μὰ Δί'," εἶπεν, "οὐ

[1] ξυστῷ Pohlenz: ταὐτῷ. [2] προσφοιτῶντας Reiske.
[3] βορρᾶ] βορέου all MSS. but G.
[4] ζαέντος Crusius (*cf.* 129 A): πνέοντος or ζέοντος.
[5] συγκλιτῶν Hutten: συγκλίτων or συγκλήτων.
[6] ἁπτόμενος added by Stegmann.

get them, since every one runs away headlong. If men are sitting in a public lounge or strolling about in a portico, and see a talker coming up, they quickly give each other the counter-sign to break camp. And just as when silence occurs in an assemblage they say that Hermes has joined the company, so when a chatterbox comes into a dinner-party or social gathering, every one grows silent, not wishing to furnish him a hold; and if he begins of his own accord to open his mouth,

As when the North-wind blows along
A sea-beaten headland before the storm,[a]

suspecting that they will be tossed about and sea-sick, they rise up and go out. And so it is a talker's lot when travelling by land or sea, to find volunteer listeners neither as table-companions nor as tent-mates, but only conscripts; for the talker is at you everywhere, catching your cloak, plucking your beard, digging you in the ribs.

Then are your feet of the greatest value,

as Archilochus [b] says, and on my word the wise Aristotle will agree. For when Aristotle himself was annoyed by a chatterer and bored with some silly stories, and the fellow kept repeating, "Isn't it wonderful, Aristotle?" "There's nothing wonderful about that," said Aristotle, "but that anyone with feet endures you." To another man of the same sort, who said after a long rigmarole, "Poor philosopher, I've wearied you with my talk," "Heavens, no!" said Aristotle, "I wasn't listening." In fact,

[a] *Cf.* 455 A, *supra.*
[b] Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, ii. p. 182, Frag. 132.

(503) γὰρ προσεῖχον." καὶ γὰρ ἂν βιάσωνται λαλεῖν[1] οἱ ἀδόλεσχοι, παρέδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὦτα περιαντλεῖν ἔξωθεν, αὐτὴ δ' ἐντὸς ἑτέρας τινὰς ἀναπτύσσει καὶ διέξεισι πρὸς αὑτὴν φροντίδας· ὅθεν οὔτε προσεχόντων οὔτε πιστευόντων ἀκροατῶν εὐποροῦσι. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰς συνουσίας εὐκαταφόρων ἄγονον εἶναι τὸ σπέρμα λέγουσι, τῶν
C δ' ἀδολέσχων ὁ λόγος ἀτελὴς καὶ ἄκαρπός ἐστι.

3. Καίτοι γ' οὐδὲν οὕτως ἡ φύσις εὐερκῶς κεχαράκωκε τῶν ἐν[2] ἡμῖν ὡς τὴν γλῶτταν, βαλομένη φρουρὰν πρὸ αὐτῆς τοὺς ὀδόντας, ἵν', ἐὰν ἐντὸς κατατείνοντος "ἡνία σιγαλόεντα" τοῦ λογισμοῦ μὴ ὑπακούῃ μηδ' ἀνειλῆται, δήγμασιν αὐτῆς κατέχωμεν τὴν ἀκρασίαν αἱμάττοντες. "ἀχαλίνων" γὰρ οὐ ταμιείων οὐδ' οἰκημάτων ἀλλὰ "στομάτων τὸ τέλος δυστυχίαν" ὁ Εὐριπίδης φησίν. οἱ δ' οἰκημάτων μὲν ἀθύρων καὶ βαλλαντίων ἀδέσμων μηδὲν ὄφελος οἰόμενοι τοῖς κεκτημένοις εἶναι, στόμασι δ' ἀκλείστοις καὶ ἀθύροις ὥσπερ[3] τὸ τοῦ
D Πόντου διὰ παντὸς ἔξω ῥέουσι χρώμενοι, πάντων ἀτιμότατον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐοίκασιν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ πίστιν ἔχουσιν ἧς πᾶς λόγος ἐφίεται· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ τέλος τοῦτ' ἔστι, πίστιν ἐνεργάσασθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσιν· ἀπιστοῦνται δ' οἱ λάλοι, κἂν ἀληθεύωσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πυρὸς εἰς ἀγγεῖον κατακλεισθεὶς τῷ μὲν μέτρῳ πλείων εὑρίσκεται τῇ δὲ

[1] λαλεῖν] προσλαλεῖν Hartman.
[2] ἐν] παρ' most mss.
[3] ὥσπερ] καὶ ὥσπερ Stegmann.

[a] *Cf. Life of Lycurgus*, xix. (51 E-F).
[b] *Cf. Commentarii in Hesiodum*, 71 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. pp. 87-88).

if chatterers force their talk upon us, the soul surrenders to them the ears to be flooded from outside, but herself within unrolls thoughts of another sort and follows them out by herself. Therefore talkers do not find it easy to secure listeners who either pay attention or believe what they say; for just as they affirm that the seed of persons too prone to lusts of the flesh is barren, so is the speech of babblers ineffectual and fruitless.[a]

3. And yet Nature has built about none of our parts so stout a stockade as about the tongue,[b] having placed before it as an outpost the teeth, so that when reason within tightens "the reins of silence," [c] if the tongue does not obey or restrain itself, we may check its incontinence by biting it till it bleeds. For Euripides [d] says that "disaster is the end," not of unbolted treasuries or storerooms, but of "unbridled tongues." And those who believe that storerooms without doors and purses without fastenings are of no use to their owners, yet keep their mouths without lock or door, maintaining as perpetual an outflow as the mouth of the Black Sea, appear to regard speech as the least valuable of all things. They do not, therefore, meet with belief,[e] which is the object of all speech. For this is the proper end and aim of speech, to engender belief in the hearer; but chatterers are disbelieved even if they are telling the truth. For as wheat shut up in a jar [f] is found to have increased in quantity, but to have deteriorated

[c] Homer, *Il.*, v. 226; *σιγαλόεντα*, of course, means "glossy" or "shining," but here it is probably used as a playful pun on *σιγή*.
[d] Adapted from *Bacchae*, 386, 388.
[e] *Cf.* 519 D, *infra*.
[f] Or a "pit," perhaps; *cf. Moralia*, 697 D.

(503) χρείᾳ μοχθηρότερος, οὕτω λόγος εἰς ἀδόλεσχον ἐμπεσὼν ἄνθρωπον πολὺ ποιεῖ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐπίμετρον, ᾧ διαφθείρει τὴν πίστιν.

4. Ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μεθύειν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος αἰδήμων καὶ κόσμιος, οἶμαι,[1] φυλάξαιτ' ἄν· μανίᾳ γὰρ ὁμό-
E τοιχος[2] μὲν ἡ ὀργὴ κατ' ἐνίους, ἡ δὲ μέθη σύνοικος· μᾶλλον δὲ μανία τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ ἧττων, τῇ δ' αἰτίᾳ μείζων, ὅτι τὸ αὐθαίρετον αὐτῇ πρόσεστι. τῆς δὲ μέθης οὐθὲν οὕτω κατηγοροῦσιν ὡς τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀκρατὲς καὶ ἀόριστον· οἶνος γάρ, φησίν,[3]

ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ μάλ' ἀείσαι,
καί θ' ἁπαλὸν γελάσαι καί τ' ὀρχήσασθαι ἀνῆκε.

καὶ τί τὸ δεινότατον; ᾠδὴ καὶ γέλως καὶ ὄρχησις; οὐδὲν ἄχρι τούτων·

καί τι ἔπος προέηκεν, ὅπερ τ' ἄρρητον ἄμεινον—

τοῦτ' ἤδη δεινὸν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον. καὶ μήποτε τὸ ζητούμενον παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις λύων ὁ ποιητὴς
F οἰνώσεως καὶ μέθης διαφορὰν εἴρηκεν, οἰνώσεως μὲν ἄνεσιν, μέθης δὲ φλυαρίαν. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῦ νήφοντος ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης ἐστὶ τοῦ μεθύοντος, ὡς οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοί φασιν. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν Βίας ἔν

[1] οἶμαι] omitted in most MSS.
[2] ὁμότοιχος one MS. of Stobaeus: ὁμόστοιχος.
[3] φησίν] omitted in some MSS.

[a] *Cf.* Antiphanes, Frag. 295 (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, ii. p. 128): λύπη μανίας ὁμότοιχος εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ.
[b] *Cf.* Seneca, *Epistulae Morales*, lxxxiii. 18.
[c] Homer, *Od.*, xiv. 463-466; *cf. Moralia*, 645 A; Athenaeus, v. 179 e-f.
[d] *Cf. De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 149 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 421).

in quality, so when a story finds its way to a chatterer, it generates a large addition of falsehood and thereby destroys its credit.

4. Again, every self-respecting and orderly man would, I think, avoid drunkenness. For while, according to some, anger lives next door to madness,[a] drunkenness lives in the same house with it; or rather, drunkenness *is* madness, shorter in duration, but more culpable, because the will also is involved in it.[b] And there is no fault so generally ascribed to drunkenness as that of intemperate and unlimited speech. "For wine," says the Poet,[c]

Urges a man to sing, though he be wise,
And stirs to merry laughter and the dance.

And what is here so very dreadful? Singing and laughing and dancing? Nothing so far—

But it lets slip some word better unsaid[d]:

this is where the dreadful and dangerous part now comes in. And perhaps the Poet has here resolved the question debated by the philosophers,[e] the difference between being under the influence of wine and being drunk, when he speaks of the former as relaxation, but drunkenness as sheer folly. For what is in a man's heart when he is sober is on his tongue when he is drunk, as those who are given to proverbs say.[f] Therefore when Bias[g] kept silent at a

[e] *Cf.* Chrysippus, Frag. Mor. 644, 712 (von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. pp. 163, 179).
[f] Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroemiographi Graeci*, i. p. 313; ii. pp. 219, 687. "Nüchtern gedacht, voll gesagt."
[g] *Cf.* the similar remark attributed to Demaratus in *Moralia*, 220 A-B and to Solon in Stobaeus, vol. iii. pp. 685-686 ed. Hense.

τινι πότῳ σιωπῶν καὶ σκωπτόμενος εἰς ἀβελτερίαν
504 ὑπό τινος ἀδολέσχου, " καὶ τίς ἄν," ἔφη, " δύναιτο μωρὸς ἐν[1] οἴνῳ σιωπᾶν; " Ἀθήνησι δέ τις ἐστιῶν πρέσβεις βασιλικοὺς ἐφιλοτιμήθη σπουδάζουσιν αὐτοῖς συναγαγεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους· χρωμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων κοινολογίᾳ καὶ τὰς συμβολὰς ἀποδιδόντων, τοῦ δὲ Ζήνωνος ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος, φιλοφρονησάμενοι καὶ προπιόντες οἱ ξένοι, " περὶ σοῦ δὲ τί χρὴ λέγειν," ἔφασαν, " ὦ Ζήνων, τῷ βασιλεῖ; " κἀκεῖνος, " ἄλλο μηδέν," εἶπεν, " ἢ ὅτι πρεσβύτης ἐστὶν[2] ἐν Ἀθήναις παρὰ πότον σιωπᾶν δυνάμενος."

Οὕτω τι βαθὺ καὶ μυστηριῶδες ἡ σιγὴ καὶ νηφάλιον, ἡ δὲ μέθη λάλον· ἄνουν γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγόφρον,
B διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πολύφωνον. οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι καὶ ὁριζόμενοι τὴν μέθην λέγουσιν εἶναι λήρησιν πάροινον· οὕτως οὐ ψέγεται τὸ πίνειν, εἰ προσείη τῷ πίνειν τὸ σιωπᾶν· ἀλλ' ἡ μωρολογία μέθην ποιεῖ τὴν οἴνωσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν μεθύων ληρεῖ παρ' οἶνον, ὁ δ' ἀδόλεσχος πανταχοῦ ληρεῖ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν θεάτρῳ ἐν περιπάτῳ ἐν μέθῃ νήφων[3] ἡμέραν νύκτωρ· ἔστι δὲ θεραπεύων τῆς νόσου βαρύτερος, συμπλέων τῆς ναυτίας ἀηδέστερος, ἐπαινῶν τοῦ ψέγοντος ἐπαχθέστερος· ἥδιόν γέ τοι πονηροῖς ὁμιλοῦμεν[4] ἐπιδεξίοις ἢ χρηστοῖς ἀδολέσχαις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σοφοκλέους

[1] ἐν] ὢν ἐν most mss.
[2] ἐστὶν] εἰς ἐστιν Tucker.
[3] νήφων after ἐν μέθῃ added by Capps.
[4] ὁμιλοῦμεν Wilamowitz: ὁμιλοῦσιν.

[a] Either Ptolemy Soter (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 24) or Antigonus (Stobaeus, iii. p. 680 ed. Hense).
[b] Frag. 284 (von Arnim, *op. cit.*, i. p. 64).

drinking-bout and was taunted with stupidity by a chatterer, " What fool," said he, " in his cups can hold his tongue? " And when a certain man at Athens was entertaining envoys from the king,[a] at their earnest request he made every effort to gather the philosophers to meet them; and while the rest took part in the general conversation and made their contributions to it, but Zeno[b] kept silent, the strangers, pledging him courteously, said, " And what are we to tell the king about you, Zeno? " " Nothing," said he, " except that there is an old man at Athens who can hold his tongue at a drinking-party."

Thus silence is something profound and awesome and sober, but drunkenness is a babbler, for it is foolish and witless, and therefore loquacious also. And the philosophers[c] even in their very definition of drunkenness say that it is intoxicated and foolish talking; thus drinking is not blamed if silence attends the drinking, but it is foolish talk which converts the influence of wine into drunkenness. While it is true that the drunken man talks foolishness in his cups, the chatterer talks foolishness on all occasions, in the market-place, in the theatre, out walking, drunk or sober, by day, by night. As your physician, he is worse than the disease; as your ship-mate, more unpleasant than sea-sickness; his praises are more annoying than another's blame: we certainly have greater pleasure in company with clever rascals than with honest chatterboxes. In Sophocles,[d] when Ajax

[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 716 F; Chrysippus, Frag. Mor. 643 (von Arnim, *op. cit.*, iii. p. 163).
[d] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 312, Frag. 771 (Frag. 855 ed. Pearson, vol. iii. p. 63); *cf. Moralia*, 810 B.

(504) Νέστωρ τὸν Αἴαντα τραχυνόμενον τῷ λόγῳ πραΰνων ἠθικῶς τοῦτ' εἴρηκεν,

C οὐ μέμφομαί σε· δρῶν γὰρ εὖ κακῶς λέγεις·

πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀδολέσχην οὐχ οὕτως ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ἔργου χάριν ἡ τῶν λόγων ἀκαιρία διαφθείρει καὶ ἀπόλλυσι.

5. Λυσίας τινὶ δίκην ἔχοντι λόγον συγγράψας ἔδωκεν· ὁ δὲ πολλάκις ἀναγνοὺς ἦκε πρὸς τὸν Λυσίαν ἀθυμῶν καὶ λέγων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτῷ διεξιόντι θαυμαστὸν φανῆναι τὸν λόγον, αὖθις δὲ καὶ τρίτον ἀναλαμβάνοντι παντελῶς ἀμβλὺν καὶ ἄπρακτον· ὁ δὲ Λυσίας γελάσας, "τί οὖν," εἶπεν, "οὐχ ἅπαξ μέλλεις λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστῶν;" καὶ σκόπει τὴν Λυσίου πειθὼ καὶ χάριν· κεῖνον[1] γὰρ ἐγώ

D φαμὶ ἰοπλοκάμων Μοισᾶν εὖ λαχεῖν.

τῶν δὲ περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ λεγομένων ἀληθέστατόν ἐστιν ὅτι μόνος Ὅμηρος τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀψικορίας περιγέγονεν, ἀεὶ καινὸς ὢν καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκμάζων· ἀλλ' ὅμως[2] εἰπὼν καὶ[3] ἀναφωνήσας ἐκεῖνο περὶ αὑτοῦ τὸ

ἐχθρὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν
αὖθις[4] ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεύειν,

φεύγει καὶ φοβεῖται τὸν ἐφεδρεύοντα παντὶ λόγῳ

[1] κεῖνον] κἀκεῖνον some mss.
[2] ὅμως] ἀμωσγέπως Apelt; ὅμως τὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως Tucker.
[3] εἰπὼν καὶ] Stegmann would delete.
[4] αὖθις] αὖτις the mss. of Homer.

An anonymous fragment, attributed to Sappho by

uses boisterous language, Nestor, in soothing him, says in words which show his knowledge of character,

I blame you not: ill your words, but good your deeds.

But these are not our feelings toward the chatterer; on the contrary, the untimeliness of his words destroys and annuls all gratitude for any deed.

5. Lysias once composed a speech for a litigant and gave it to him. The man read it through a number of times and came to Lysias in despair and said that the first time he read it the speech seemed to him wonderfully good, but on taking it up a second and third time it appeared completely dull and ineffectual. "Well," said Lysias laughing, "isn't it only once that you are going to speak it before the jurors?" And consider the persuasiveness and charm of Lysias! For he is one who, for my part,

I say has a fair portion in the violet-tressed Muses.[a]

And of the things said about the Poet this is the truest—that Homer alone has survived the fastidiousness of men,[b] since he is ever new and his charm is ever at its best; yet none the less, he spoke and proclaimed that famous remark about himself,

I scorn to tell
A tale again that's once been clearly told[c];

and he avoids and fears the satiety which lies in

Bergk (*Poet. Lyr. Gr.*, iii. p. 703), to Bacchylides by Diehl (*Anthologia Lyrica*, ii. p. 162); *cf.* Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, iii. p. 429.

[b] *Cf.* Pope's

Those oft are stratagems which error seem,
Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream,

with the judgement of Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 359.

[c] *Od.*, xii. 452-453; *cf. Moralia*, 764 A.

κόρον, εἰς ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων διηγήματα τὴν ἀκοὴν ἄγων καὶ τῇ καινότητι τὴν πλησμονὴν αὐτῆς παραμυθούμενος. οἱ δ' ἀποκναίουσι δήπου τὰ ὦτα ταῖς ταυτολογίαις ὥσπερ παλίμψηστα διαμολύνοντες.

6. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ὑπομιμνήσκωμεν αὐτούς,
E ὅτι, καθάπερ τὸν οἶνον ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ φιλοφροσύνης εὑρημένον οἱ προσβιαζόμενοι πολὺν πίνειν καὶ ἄκρατον ἐνίους εἰς ἀηδίαν καὶ παροινίαν τρέπουσιν, οὕτω τὸν λόγον ἥδιστον ὄντα καὶ φιλανθρωπότατον συμβόλαιον οἱ χρώμενοι κακῶς καὶ προχείρως ἀπάνθρωπον ποιοῦσι καὶ ἄμικτον, οἷς οἴονται χαρίζεσθαι λυποῦντες καὶ ἀφ' ὧν θαυμάζεσθαι καταγελώμενοι καὶ δι' ὧν φιλεῖσθαι δυσχεραινόμενοι. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ τῷ κεστῷ τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας ἀποστρέφων καὶ ἀπελαύνων ἀναφρόδιτος, οὕτως ὁ τῷ λόγῳ λυπῶν καὶ ἀπεχθανόμενος ἄμουσός τις καὶ ἄτεχνός ἐστι.

7. Τῶν δ' ἄλλων παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων τὰ μέν
F ἐστιν ἐπικίνδυνα τὰ δὲ μισητὰ τὰ δὲ καταγέλαστα, τῇ δ' ἀδολεσχίᾳ πάντα συμβέβηκε· χλευάζονται μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς διηγήσεσι, μισοῦνται δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν κακῶν προσαγγελίας, κινδυνεύουσι δὲ τῶν ἀπορρήτων μὴ κρατοῦντες. ὅθεν Ἀνάχαρσις ἑστια-
505 θεὶς παρὰ Σόλωνι καὶ κοιμώμενος ὤφθη τὴν μὲν ἀριστερὰν χεῖρα τοῖς μορίοις τὴν δὲ δεξιὰν τῷ στό-

[a] Plutarch probably means that talkers wear out our ears by the repetitions of stale news, just as palimpsests are worn out by constant erasure. But not all points of the comparison are clear; *cf. Moralia*, 779 c; Cicero, *ad Fam.*, vii. 18. 2.

[b] Probably referring to the συμποσίαρχος (*cf.*, for example, *Moralia*, 620 A ff.), or *magister bibendi*.

ambush for every tale, leading his hearers from one narrative to another and soothing away the ear's surfeit by constant novelty. But babblers actually wear out our ears by their repetitions, just as though they were smudging palimpsests.[a]

6. Let this, then, be the first thing of which we remind them—that just as wine, discovered for the promotion of pleasure and good fellowship, is sometimes misused to produce discomfort and intoxication by those[b] who compel others to drink it undiluted in large quantities, so speech, which is the most pleasant and human of social ties, is made inhuman and unsocial by those who use it badly and wantonly, because they offend those whom they think they please, are ridiculed for their attempts at gaining admiration, and are disliked because of the very means they employ to gain affection. As, then, he can have no share in Aphroditê who uses her girdle to drive away and alienate those who seek his company, so he who arouses annoyance and hostility with his speech is no friend of the Muses and a stranger to art.

7. Now of the other affections and maladies some are dangerous, some detestable, some ridiculous; but garrulousness has all these qualities at once; for babblers are derided for telling what everyone knows, they are hated for bearing bad news, they run into danger since they cannot refrain from revealing secrets. So it is that Anacharsis,[c] when he had been entertained and feasted at Solon's house and lay down to sleep, was seen to have his left hand placed

[c] A Scythian of high rank, who travelled widely in the pursuit of knowledge, and visited Athens in the time of Solon, *circa* 597 B.C.

(505) *ματι προσκειμένην ἔχων· ἐγκρατεστέρου γὰρ ᾤετο χαλινοῦ δεῖσθαι τὴν γλῶτταν, ὀρθῶς οἰόμενος. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἐξαριθμήσαιτο ῥᾳδίως ἄνδρας τοσούτους ἀφροδισίων ἀκρασίᾳ πεπτωκότας, ὅσας πόλεις καὶ ἡγεμονίας λόγος ἐξενεχθεὶς ἀπόρρητος ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε. Σύλλας ἐπολιόρκει τὰς Ἀθήνας, οὐκ ἔχων σχολὴν ἐνδιατρῖψαι χρόνον πολύν,*

ἐπεὶ πόνος ἄλλος ἔπειγεν,

ἡρπακότος μὲν Ἀσίαν Μιθριδάτου, τῶν δὲ περὶ
B *Μάριον αὖθις ἐν Ῥώμῃ κρατούντων· ἀλλὰ πρεσβυτῶν τινων ἐπὶ κουρείου διαλεγομένων ὡς οὐ φυλάττεται τὸ Ἑπτάχαλκον καὶ κινδυνεύει τὸ ἄστυ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ληφθῆναι τὸ μέρος, ἀκούσαντες οἱ κατάσκοποι πρὸς τὸν Σύλλαν ἐξήγγειλαν. ὁ δ' εὐθὺς τὴν δύναμιν προσαγαγὼν περὶ μέσας νύκτας εἰσήγαγε τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ μικροῦ μὲν κατέσκαψε τὴν πόλιν[1] ἐνέπλησε δὲ φόνου καὶ νεκρῶν, ὥστε τὸν Κεραμεικὸν αἵματι ῥυῆναι. χαλεπῶς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔσχε διὰ τοὺς λόγους μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ τὰ ἔργα· κακῶς γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔλεγον καὶ τὴν Μέτελλαν[2] ἀναπηδῶντες ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ σκώπτοντες,*

συκάμινον ἔσθ' ὁ Σύλλας ἀλφίτῳ πεπασμένον,

C *καὶ τοιαῦτα πολλὰ φλυαροῦντες ἐπεσπάσαντο "κουφοτάτου πράγματος λόγων," ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, "βαρυτάτην ζημίαν."*

[1] *τὴν πόλιν* added by early editors.
[2] Μέτελλαν Hatzidakis: Μετέλλαν.

[a] *Cf. Life of Sulla*, xiv. (460 c ff.). Athens was captured in 86 B.C.
[b] Homer, *Od.*, xi. 54.
[c] The position of the Heptachalcon is thought to be near the Peiraeic Gate, near which was also the heroön of Chalcodon; see Judeich, *Topographie von Athen*[2], p. 368, note 8.
[d] *Cf. Life of Sulla*, xiii. (459 F—460 A).
[e] Sulla's wife.
[f] Referring to his complexion: blotches of red interspersed with white; *cf. Life of Sulla*, ii. (451 F).
[g] *Laws*, 935 A and 717 D; *cf.* the note on 456 D, *supra*.

upon his private parts, but his right hand upon his mouth; for he believed, quite rightly, that the tongue needs the stronger restraint. It would not be easy, for example, to enumerate as many men who have been ruined by incontinent lust as is the number of cities and empires which a secret revealed has brought to destruction. When Sulla [a] was besieging Athens, he had very little time to waste in the operations

Since other labour was pressing,[b]

Mithridates having ravaged Asia, and the party of Marius being again masters in Rome. But spies heard some old men in a barber's shop remarking to each other that the Heptachalcon [c] was unguarded and that the city was in danger of being captured at that point; and the spies brought word of this to Sulla, who at once brought up his forces at midnight, led in his army, and almost razed the city to the ground, filling it with carnage and corpses so that the Cerameicus ran with blood. And Sulla's anger with the Athenians was due more to their words than to their deeds; for they used to revile him [d] and Metella,[e] leaping upon the walls and jesting,

Sulla is a mulberry sprinkled with meal [f];

and with much similar idle banter they drew upon themselves, as Plato [g] says, "a very heavy penalty for the lightest of things, words."

(505) Τὴν δὲ Ῥωμαίων πόλιν ἐκώλυσεν ἐλευθέραν γενέσθαι Νέρωνος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἀδολεσχία. μία γὰρ ἦν νύξ, μεθ' ἣν ἔδει τὸν τύραννον ἀπολωλέναι, παρεσκευασμένων ἁπάντων· ὁ δὲ μέλλων αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι πορευόμενος εἰς τὸ[1] θέατρον ἰδών τινα τῶν δεδεμένων ἐπὶ θύραις μέλλοντα προσάγεσθαι τῷ[2] Νέρωνι καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ τύχην ἀποδυρόμενον, ἐγγὺς προσῆλθεν αὐτῷ καὶ προσψιθυρίσας, " εὔχου," φησίν, " ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τὴν
D σήμερον ἡμέραν παρελθεῖν μόνον, αὔριον δέ μοι εὐχαριστήσεις." ἁρπάσας οὖν τὸ αἰνιχθὲν ἐκεῖνος καὶ νοήσας, οἶμαι, ὅτι

νήπιος, ὃς τὰ[3] ἕτοιμα λιπὼν ἀνέτοιμα διώκει,

τὴν βεβαιοτέραν εἵλετο σωτηρίαν πρὸ τῆς δικαιοτέρας. ἐμήνυσε γὰρ τῷ Νέρωνι τὴν φωνὴν τἀνθρώπου· κἀκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἀνήρπαστο, καὶ βάσανοι καὶ πῦρ καὶ μάστιγες ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἀρνούμενον πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην ἃ χωρὶς ἀνάγκης ἐμήνυσε.

8. Ζήνων δ' ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἵνα μηδ' ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ πρόηταί τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἐκβιαζόμενον τὸ σῶμα ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, διαφαγὼν τὴν γλῶτταν προσέπτυσε τῷ τυράννῳ. καλὸν δὲ καὶ Λέαινα τῆς ἐγκρατείας
E ἔχει γέρας. ἑταίρα τῶν περὶ Ἁρμόδιον ἦν καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς τυράννους συνω-

[1] τὸ] omitted in most MSS.
[2] τῷ] omitted in most MSS.
[3] ὃς τὰ] ὅστις Gaisford.

[a] This account differs in every way from the standard version in Tacitus, *Annals*, xv. 54 ff.
[b] Perhaps Subrius Flavus is meant (*Annals*, xv. 50).
[c] Hesiod, Frag. 219 (Frag. 18, p. 278 ed. Evelyn-White in

The loquacity of one man, again, prevented Rome from becoming free by the removal of Nero.[a] For but one night remained, after which the tyrant was to die, and all preparations had been made; but the man[b] who was to kill him saw at the palace gates when on his way to the theatre a prisoner about to be led before Nero and lamenting his evil fortune. He approached the prisoner and whispered to him, " Only pray, my good man, that to-day may pass by and to-morrow you will be thankful to me." So the prisoner grasped the intended meaning, and reflecting, I suppose, that

> He is a fool who leaves things close at hand
> To follow what is out of reach,[c]

chose the surer rather than the more just way of safety. For he revealed to Nero what had been said to him by the man, who was immediately seized, and tortures and fire and the lash were applied to the conspirator as he denied, in the face of constraint, what he had revealed without constraint.

8. Zeno[d] the philosopher, in order that even against his will no secret should be betrayed by his body when under torture, bit his tongue through and spat it out at the despot.[e] And Leaena[f] also has a splendid reward for her self-control. She was a courtesan belonging to the group led by Harmodius and Aristogeiton and shared in the conspiracy against

L.C.L.; Frag. 234 ed. Kinkel) from the *Eoae* according to von Blumenthal, *Hermes*, xlix. 319.
[d] Of Elea: *cf. Moralia*, 1126 D, 1051 C; Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokrat.*[5], i. p. 249, A 7; and Dougan's note on Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, ii. 22. 52.
[e] Called by Plutarch Demylos of Carystus.
[f] *Cf.* Pausanias, i. 23. 1; Athenaeus, 596 f; Leaena means " lioness." She was Aristogeiton's mistress.

μοσίας ἐκοινώνει ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ὡς γυνή· καὶ γὰρ
αὕτη περὶ τὸν καλὸν ἐκεῖνον ἐβάκχευσε κρατῆρα
τοῦ Ἔρωτος, καὶ κατωργίαστο διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς
ἀπορρήτοις. ὡς οὖν ἐκεῖνοι πταίσαντες ἀνῃρέθησαν,
ἀνακρινομένη καὶ κελευομένη[1] φράσαι τοὺς ἔτι
λανθάνοντας οὐκ ἔφρασεν, ἀλλ' ἐνεκαρτέρησεν, ἐπι-
δείξασα τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ἑαυτῶν παθόν-
τας, εἰ τοιαύτην ἠγάπησαν. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ χαλκῆν
ποιησάμενοι λέαιναν ἄγλωσσον ἐν πύλαις τῆς
ἀκροπόλεως ἀνέθηκαν, τῷ μὲν θυμοειδεῖ τοῦ ζῴου
F τὸ ἀήττητον αὐτῆς τῷ δ' ἀγλώσσῳ τὸ σιωπηρὸν
καὶ μυστηριῶδες ἐμφαίνοντες.

Οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω λόγος ὠφέλησε ῥηθεὶς ὡς πολλοὶ
σιωπηθέντες· ἔστι γὰρ εἰπεῖν ποτε τὸ σιγηθέν, οὐ
μὴν σιωπῆσαί γε τὸ λεχθέν, ἀλλ' ἐκκέχυται καὶ
διαπεφοίτηκεν. ὅθεν, οἶμαι, τοῦ μὲν λέγειν ἀνθρώ-
πους τοῦ δὲ σιωπᾶν θεοὺς διδασκάλους ἔχομεν, ἐν
τελεταῖς καὶ μυστηρίοις σιωπὴν παραλαμβάνοντες.
506 ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς τὸν λογιώτατον Ὀδυσσέα σιωπηλό-
τατον πεποίηκε, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα
καὶ τὴν τροφόν· ἀκούεις γὰρ λεγούσης,

ἔξω δ' ἠύτε περ κρατερὴ δρῦς[2] ἠὲ σίδηρος.

[1] κελευομένη] κολαζομένη several MSS.
[2] ἠύτε . . . δρῦς] ὡς ὅτε τις στερεὴ λίθος MSS. of Homer.

[a] Hippias and Hipparchus; *cf.* Thucydides, vi. 54-59; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, xviii. 2.

[b] The motive of Love runs through the entire story: Thettalus and Harmodius's sister, Aristogeiton and Har-

the tyrants[a]—with her hopes, all a woman could do; for she also had joined in the revels about that noble mixing-bowl of Eros[b] and through the god had been initiated into the secrets which might not be revealed. When, therefore, the conspirators failed and were put to death, she was questioned and commanded to reveal those who still escaped detection; but she would not do so and continued steadfast, proving that those men had experienced a passion not unworthy of themselves in loving a woman like her. And the Athenians caused a bronze lioness[c] without a tongue to be made and set it up in the gates of the Acropolis, representing by the spirited courage of the animal Leaena's invincible character, and by its tonguelessness her power of silence in keeping a holy secret.

No spoken word, it is true, has ever done such service as have in many instances words unspoken[d]; for it is possible at some later time to tell what you have kept silent, but never to keep silent what once has been spoken—*that* has been spilled, and has made its way abroad.[e] Hence, I think, in speaking we have men as teachers, but in keeping silent we have gods, and we receive from them this lesson of silence at initiations into the Mysteries. And the Poet[f] has made the most eloquent Odysseus the most reticent, and also his son and his wife and his nurse; for you hear the nurse saying,[g]

I'll hold it safe like sturdy oak or iron.

modius, Leaena and Aristogeiton. This was Eros's mixing-bowl.

[c] See Judeich, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 10 E-F, 125 D; 515 A, *infra*.

[e] *Cf.* Horace, *Ars Poet.*, 390: nescit vox missa reverti.

[f] *Cf.* 442 D, 475 A, *supra*.

[g] Eurycleia; adapted from *Od.*, xix. 494.

(506) αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ Πηνελόπῃ παρακαθήμενος

θυμῷ μὲν γοόωσαν ἐὴν ἐλέαιρε γυναῖκα,
ὀφθαλμοὶ δ' ὡς εἰ κέρα ἔστασαν ἠὲ σίδηρος,
ἀτρέμας ἐν βλεφάροισιν.

οὕτω τὸ σῶμα μεστὸν ἦν αὐτῷ πανταχόθεν ἐγκρατείας, καὶ πάντ' ἔχων ὁ λόγος εὐπειθῆ καὶ ὑποχείρια προσέταττε τοῖς ὄμμασι μὴ δακρύειν, τῇ
B γλώττῃ μὴ φθέγγεσθαι, τῇ καρδίᾳ μὴ τρέμειν μηδ' ὑλακτεῖν.

τῷ δ' αὖτ'[1] ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη μένε τετληυῖα,

μέχρι τῶν ἀλόγων κινημάτων διήκοντος τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα πεποιημένου κατήκοον ἑαυτῷ καὶ χειρόηθες. τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἑταίρων· τὸ γὰρ ἑλκομένους καὶ προσουδιζομένους ὑπὸ τοῦ Κύκλωπος μὴ κατειπεῖν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως μηδὲ δεῖξαι τὸ πεπυρακτωμένον ἐκεῖνο καὶ παρεσκευασμένον ὄργανον ἐπὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἀλλ' ὠμοὺς ἐσθίεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φράσαι τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων ὑπερβολὴν ἐγκρατείας καὶ πίστεως οὐκ
C ἀπολέλοιπεν.[2] ὅθεν ὁ Πιττακὸς οὐ κακῶς, τοῦ Αἰγυπτίων βασιλέως πέμψαντος ἱερεῖον αὐτῷ καὶ κελεύσαντος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ[3] χείριστον ἐξελεῖν κρέας, ἔπεμψεν[4] ἐξελὼν τὴν γλῶτταν ὡς ὄργανον μὲν ἀγαθῶν ὄργανον δὲ κακῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὖσαν.

[1] δ' αὖτ'] δὲ μάλ' Homer.
[2] ἀπολέλοιπεν Reiske: ἐκλέλοιπεν; λέλοιπεν G.
[3] καὶ] καὶ τὸ most mss.

And Odysseus himself, as he sat beside Penelopê,

Did pity in his heart his wife in tears,
But kept his eyes firm-fixed within their lids
Like horn or iron.[a]

So full of self-control was his body in every limb, and Reason, with all parts in perfect obedience and submission, ordered his eyes not to weep, his tongue not to utter a sound, his heart not to tremble or bark [b]:

His heart remained enduring in obedience,[c]

since his reason extended even to his irrational or involuntary movements and made amenable and subservient to itself[d] both his breath and his blood. Of such character were also most of his companions; for even when they were dragged about and dashed upon the ground by the Cyclops,[e] they would not denounce Odysseus nor show that fire-sharpened instrument prepared against the monster's eye, but preferred to be eaten raw rather than to tell a single word of the secret—an example of self-control and loyalty which cannot be surpassed. Therefore Pittacus[f] did not do badly, when the king of Egypt sent him a sacrificial animal and bade him cut out the fairest and foulest meat, when he cut out and sent him the tongue, as being the instrument of both the greatest good and the greatest evil.

[a] *Od.*, xix. 210-212; *cf.* 442 D-E, *supra.*
[b] *Cf. Od.*, xx. 13, 16.
[c] *Od.*, xx. 23; *cf.* 453 D, *supra.*
[d] *Cf.* 442 F, *supra.*
[e] *Cf. Od.*, ix. 289.
[f] *Cf. Commentarii in Hesiodum*, 71 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 88); told also of Bias in *Moralia*, 38 B and 146 F.

[4] ἔπεμψεν] ἐξέπεμψεν most mss.

(506) 9. Ἡ δ' Εὐριπίδειος Ἰνὼ παρρησίαν ἄγουσα περὶ αὑτῆς εἰδέναι φησί,

σιγᾶν θ' ὅπου[1] δεῖ καὶ λέγειν ἵν' ἀσφαλές.

οἱ γὰρ εὐγενοῦς καὶ βασιλικῆς τῷ ὄντι παιδείας τυχόντες πρῶτον σιγᾶν εἶτα λαλεῖν μανθάνουσιν. Ἀντίγονος γοῦν[2] ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐκεῖνος, ἐρωτήσαντος αὐτὸν τοῦ υἱοῦ πηνίκα μέλλουσιν ἀναζευγνύειν, D "τί δέδοικας;" εἶπε, "μὴ μόνος οὐκ ἀκούσῃς τῆς σάλπιγγος;" οὐκ ἄρα φωνὴν ἐπίστευεν ἀπόρρητον ᾧ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀπολείπειν ἔμελλεν; ἐδίδασκε μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πεφυλαγμένως. Μέτελλος δ' ὁ γέρων ἕτερόν τι τοιοῦτον ἐπερωτώμενος ἐπὶ στρατείας, "εἰ," φησίν, "ᾤμην τὸν χιτῶνά μοι συνειδέναι τοῦτο τἀπόρρητον,[3] ἀποδυσάμενος ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ[4] πῦρ ἔθηκα." Εὐμένης δ' ἀκούσας ἐπέρχεσθαι Κρατερὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν φίλων ἔφρασεν, ἀλλ' ἐψεύσατο Νεοπτόλεμον εἶναι· τούτου γὰρ οἱ στρατιῶται κατεφρόνουν, ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐθαύμαζον καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἠγάπων. ἔγνω δ' οὐδεὶς ἄλ- E λος, ἀλλὰ συμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἀπέκτειναν αὐτὸν ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ νεκρὸν ἐπέγνωσαν. οὕτως ἐστρατήγησεν ἡ σιωπὴ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τηλικοῦτον ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀπέκρυψεν· ὥστ' αὐτὸν τοὺς φίλους μὴ προειπόντα θαυμάζειν μᾶλλον ἢ μέμφεσθαι· κἂν μέμφηταί δέ τις, ἐγκαλεῖσθαι βέλτιόν ἐστι σω-

[1] ὅπου *Moralia*, 606 A and Stobaeus: ὅποι.
[2] γοῦν] οὖν most MSS.
[3] τἀπόρρητον] Pohlenz would delete.
[4] τὸ added from 202 A.

9. And Ino in Euripides,[a] speaking out boldly concerning herself, says that she knows how to be

Silent in season, to speak where speech is safe.

For those who have received a noble and truly royal education learn first to be silent, and then to speak. For example, that famous king Antigonus,[b] when his son asked him at what hour they were to break camp, said, "What are you afraid of? That you alone may not hear the trumpet?" This was not, surely, because he would not entrust a secret to the man to whom he intended to leave his kingdom? No, he was teaching his son to be self-controlled and guarded about such matters. And the old Metellus,[c] when on a campaign he was asked some such question, said, "If I thought my shirt was privy to that secret, I would have stripped it off and put it in the fire." And Eumenes,[d] when he heard that Craterus was advancing, told none of his friends, but pretended that it was Neoptolemus. For his soldiers despised Neoptolemus, but both respected the reputation of Craterus and admired his valour. No one else knew the truth, and they joined battle, won the victory, killed Craterus without knowing it, and only recognized him when he was dead. So successfully did silence manoeuvre the contest and keep hidden so formidable an opponent that his friends admired Eumenes for not forewarning them rather than blamed him. And even if some do blame you, it is better that men should criticize you when they are already saved through mistrust than

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 486, Frag. 413. 2; *cf. Moralia*, 606 A.
[b] The One-eyed; *cf. Moralia*, 182 B; *Life of Demetrius*, XXVIII. (902 B-C).
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 202 A.
[d] *Cf. Life of Eumenes*, VI., VII. (586 B ff.).

θέντας[1] δι' ἀπιστίαν ἢ κατηγορεῖν ἀπολλυμένους[2] διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι.

10. Τίς δ' ὅλως[3] ἑαυτῷ παρρησίαν ἀπολέλοιπε κατὰ τοῦ μὴ σιωπήσαντος; εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον ἔδει, κακῶς ἐλέχθη πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δ' ἀφεὶς ἐκ σεαυτοῦ κατέχεις ἐν ἑτέρῳ τἀπόρρητον, εἰς
F ἀλλοτρίαν πίστιν καταπέφευγας τὴν σεαυτοῦ προέμενος. κἂν μὲν ἐκεῖνος[4] ὅμοιός σοι γένηται, δικαίως ἀπόλωλας· ἂν δὲ βελτίων, σώζῃ παραλόγως ἕτερον εὑρὼν σοῦ[5] ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ[6] πιστότερον. "ἀλλὰ φίλος οὗτος ἐμοί." τούτῳ δ' ἕτερός τις, ᾧ πιστεύσει καὶ[7] οὗτος ὡς ἐγὼ τούτῳ· κἀκεῖνος ἄλλῳ πάλιν· εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπιγονὴν λαμβάνει καὶ πολλαπλασιασμόν, εἰρομένης τῆς ἀκρασίας, ὁ λόγος. ὡς γὰρ
507 ἡ μονὰς οὐκ ἐκβαίνει τὸν ἑαυτῆς ὅρον ἀλλ' ἅπαξ τὸ ἓν μένει, διὸ κέκληται μονάς· ἡ δὲ δυὰς ἀρχὴ διαφορᾶς ἀόριστος· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἑαυτὴν ἐξίστησι τῷ διπλασιασμῷ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τρεπομένη· οὕτω λόγος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ καταμένων ἀπόρρητος ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστιν· ἂν δ' εἰς ἕτερον ἐκβῇ φήμης ἔσχε τάξιν. "ἔπεα" γὰρ "πτερόεντα," φησὶν ὁ ποιητής· οὔτε γὰρ πτηνὸν ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν ἀφέντα ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν

[1] σωθέντας] σωθέντα most MSS.
[2] ἀπολλυμένους] ἀπολλύμενον some MSS.
[3] ὅλως] ἄλλος most MSS.; ἄλλως C.
[4] ἐκεῖνος] omitted in most MSS.
[5] σοῦ added by Capps.
[6] σεαυτοῦ] σεαυτὸν most MSS.
[7] καὶ] omitted in most MSS.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 429 A, 1012 D-F. For the indeterminate dyad, see Aristotle, *Met.*, 987 b 26 and 1081 a 14; A. E.

that they should accuse you when they are being destroyed because you did trust them.

10. Yet, speaking generally, who has left himself the right to speak out boldly against one who has not kept silent? If the story ought not to have been known, it was wrong for it to be told to another; and if you have let the secret slip from yourself and yet seek to confine it to another, you have taken refuge in another's good faith when you have already abandoned your own. And if he turns out to be no better than yourself, you are deservedly ruined; if better, you are saved beyond all expectation, since you have found another more faithful on your own behalf than you yourself are. "But this man is my friend." Yet he has another friend, whom he will likewise trust as I trust him; and his friend, again, will trust another friend. Thus, then, the story goes on increasing and multiplying by link after link of incontinent betrayal. For just as the monad[a] does not pass out of its own boundaries, but remains once and for all one (for which reason it is called a monad), and as the dyad is the indeterminate beginning of difference (for by doubling it at once shifts from unity to plurality), so a story confined to its first possessor is truly secret; but if it passes to another, it has acquired the status of rumour. The Poet,[b] in fact, says that "words" are "winged": neither when you let go from your hands a winged thing is it easy to get

Taylor, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 130 ff.; and for Plutarch's understanding of the dyad see L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres*, pp. 648-651 (Notopoulos and Fobes).

[b] Homer, *passim*; on the formula, see the most recent discussions in *Classical Philology*, xxx. 215 ff., xxxii. 59 ff., *Classical Quart.*, xxx. 1-3.

(507) αὖθις κατασχεῖν, οὔτε λόγον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος προέμενον συλλαβεῖν καὶ κρατῆσαι δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ φέρεται

λαιψηρὰ κυκλώσας πτερὰ

δι' ἄλλων[1] ἐπ' ἄλλους σκιδνάμενος. νεὼς μὲν γὰρ ἁρπαγείσης ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἐπιλαμβάνονται, σπειB ραις καὶ ἀγκύραις τὸ τάχος ἀμβλύνοντες· λόγου δ'[2] ὥσπερ ἐκ λιμένων ἐκδραμόντος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅρμος οὐδ' ἀγκυροβόλιον, ἀλλὰ ψόφῳ πολλῷ καὶ ἤχῳ φερόμενος προσέρρηξε καὶ κατέδυσεν εἰς μέγαν τινὰ καὶ δεινὸν τὸν φθεγξάμενον κίνδυνον.

μικροῦ γὰρ ἐκ λαμπτῆρος Ἰδαῖον λέπας
πρήσειεν ἄν τις· καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρ' εἰπὼν ἕνα,
πύθοιντ' ἂν ἀστοὶ πάντες.

11. Ἡ Ῥωμαίων σύγκλητος ἀπόρρητόν τινα βουλὴν ἐβουλεύετο καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας· ἀσάφειαν δὲ πολλὴν καὶ ὑπόνοιαν ἔχοντος τοῦ πράγματος, γυνὴ τἄλλα σώφρων, γυνὴ δέ, προσέκειτο C τῷ ἑαυτῆς ἀνδρὶ λιπαρῶς δεομένη πυθέσθαι τἀπόρρητον· ὅρκοι δὲ καὶ κατάραι περὶ σιωπῆς ἐγίνοντο καὶ δάκρυα ποτνιωμένης αὐτῆς, ὡς πίστιν οὐκ ἐχούσης. ὁ δὲ Ῥωμαῖος ἐξελέγξαι βουλόμενος αὐτῆς τὴν ἀβελτερίαν, "νικᾷς, ὦ γύναι," εἶπεν, "ἀλλ' ἄκουε φοβερὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ τεράστιον· προσήγγελται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱερέων κόρυδον ὤφθαι πετόμενον κράνος ἔχοντα χρυσοῦν καὶ δόρυ· σκεπτό-

[1] δι' ἄλλων] δι' ἄμενων D, whence Bernardakis would correct δι' ἀνέμων.
[2] λόγου δ'] τοῦ δὲ λόγου most mss.

[a] *Cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 691, Euripides, Frag. 1044.

it back again,[a] nor when a word is let slip from the mouth is it possible to arrest and control it, but it is borne away

Circling on swift wings,[b]

and is scattered abroad from one to another. So when a ship has been caught by a wind, they try to check it, deadening its speed with cables and anchors, but if a story runs out of harbour, so to speak, there is no roadstead or anchorage for it, but, carried away with a great noise and reverberation, it dashes upon the man who uttered it and submerges him in some great and terrible danger.

With but a little torch one might set fire
To Ida's rock ; and tell one man a tale,
Soon all the town will know.[c]

11. The Roman Senate[d] was once for many days debating in strict privacy a certain secret policy ; and since the matter gave rise to much uncertainty and suspicion, a woman prudent in other respects, but yet a woman, kept pestering her husband and persistently begging to learn the secret. She vowed with imprecations upon herself that she would keep silent, and wept and moaned because she was not trusted. And the Roman, wishing to bring home her folly by proof, said, "Wife, you have won ; listen to a terrible and portentous matter. We have been informed by the priests that a lark has been seen flying about with a golden helmet and a spear ; we

[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 750 B ; probably from the *Epodes* of Archilochus, *cf.* Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, xv. 4. 5 ; Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, ii. p. 142.
[c] Nauck, *op. cit.*, p. 486, Euripides, Frag. 411, vv. 2-4, from the *Ino* ; *cf.* St. James, iii. 5, 6.
[d] *Cf.* the tale of Papirius Praetextatus, Aulus Gellius, i. 23.

(507) μεθα δὴ τὸ τέρας εἴτε χρηστὸν εἴτε φαῦλόν ἐστι, καὶ συνδιαποροῦμεν τοῖς μάντεσιν· ἀλλὰ σιώπα." ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ᾤχετ' εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν· ἡ δὲ τῶν θεραπαινίδων εὐθὺς ἐφελκυσαμένη τὴν πρώτην εἰσ-
D ελθοῦσαν, ἔπαιε τὸ στῆθος αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς τρίχας ἐσπάραττεν, "οἴμοι," λέγουσα, "τἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πατρίδος· τί πεισόμεθα;" βουλομένη καὶ διδάσκουσα τὴν θεράπαιναν εἰπεῖν, "τί γὰρ γέγονεν;" ὡς δ' οὖν πυθομένης διηγήσατο καὶ προσέθηκε τὸν κοινὸν ἁπάσης ἀδολεσχίας ἐπῳδόν, τὸ "ταῦτα μηδενὶ φράσῃς ἀλλὰ σιώπα," οὐ φθάνει τὸ θεραπαινίδιον ἀποχωρῆσαν αὐτῆς, καὶ τῶν ὁμοδούλων εὐθὺς ἦν μάλιστ' εἶδε σχολάζουσαν ἐμβάλλει τὸν λόγον· ἐκείνη δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ παραγενομένῳ πρὸς
E αὐτὴν ἔφρασεν. οὕτω δ' εἰς ἀγορὰν τοῦ διηγήματος ἐκκυλισθέντος ὥστε προδραμεῖν τὸν πλασάμενον τὴν φήμην, ἀπαντήσας τις αὐτῷ τῶν γνωρίμων, "ἀρτίως," εἶπεν, "οἴκοθεν εἰς ἀγορὰν καταβαίνεις;" "ἀρτίως," ἔφη ἐκεῖνος. "οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν ἀκήκοας;" "γέγονε γάρ τι καινόν;" "ἀλλὰ[1] κόρυδος ὤπται πετόμενος κράνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν καὶ δόρυ, καὶ μέλλουσι περὶ τούτου σύγκλητον ἔχειν οἱ ἄρχοντες." κἀκεῖνος γελάσας, "εὖ[2] τοῦ τάχους," εἶπεν, "ὦ γύναι, τὸ καὶ φθάσαι με τὸν λόγον εἰς ἀγορὰν προελθόντα." τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄρχοντας ἐντυχὼν ἀπήλλαξε τῆς ταραχῆς· τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα τιμωρούμενος, ὡς οἴκαδ' εἰσῆλθεν,
F "ἀπώλεσάς μ'," εἶπεν, "ὦ γύναι· τὸ γὰρ ἀπόρρητον ἐκ τῆς ἐμῆς οἰκίας πεφώραται δεδημοσιωμένον· ὥστε μοι φευκτέον ἐστὶ τὴν πατρίδα διὰ τὴν σὴν ἀκρασίαν." τρεπομένης δὲ πρὸς ἄρνησιν αὐτῆς

[1] καινόν; ἀλλὰ Reiske: καινὸν ἄλλο. [2] εὖ] φεῦ Cobet.

are therefore examining the portent whether it be good or bad, and are in constant consultation with the augurs. But do you hold your tongue." So saying he went off to the Forum. But his wife at once seized the first maid to come into the room and beat her own breast and tore her hair. "Alas," she cried, "for my husband and my country! What will become of us?" wishing, and in fact instructing, the maid to ask, "Why, what has happened?" So when the maid asked the question, she told the tale and added that refrain common to every babbler, "Keep this quiet and tell it to no one!" The little maid had scarcely left her when she herself tells the tale to that fellow servant who, she saw, had least to do; and this servant, in turn, told it to her lover who was paying a visit. With such speed was the story rolled out[a] into the Forum that it preceded its inventor: he was met by an acquaintance who said, "Have you just now come down to the Forum from home?" "This very moment," said he. "Then you have heard nothing?" "Why, is there any news?" "A lark has been seen flying about with a gold helmet and a spear and the magistrates are going to convene the senate about the matter." And the husband laughed and said, "All praise to your speed, my wife! The story has even reached the Forum before me!" So he interviewed the magistrates and relieved them of their anxiety; but, by way of punishing his wife, as soon as he entered home, he said, "Wife, you have ruined me! The secret has been discovered to have been made public from my house; consequently I am to be exiled from my native land because you lack self-control." When she denied it

[a] As by the *eccyclema* on the Greek stage.

καὶ λεγούσης, " οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα μετὰ τριακοσίων ἤκουσας;" " ποίων," ἔφη, " τριακοσίων; σοῦ βιαζομένης ἐπλασάμην ἀποπειρώμενος." οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀσφαλῶς πάνυ καὶ μετ' εὐλαβείας, ὥσπερ εἰς ἀγγεῖον σαθρὸν οὐκ οἶνον οὐκ ἔλαιον ἀλλ'
508 ὕδωρ ἐγχέας, ἐπείρασε τὴν γυναῖκα.

Φούλβιος[1] δ' ὁ Καίσαρος ἑταῖρος τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ γέροντος ἤδη γεγονότος ἀκούσας ὀδυρομένου τὴν περὶ τὸν οἶκον ἐρημίαν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν μὲν δυεῖν αὐτῷ[2] θυγατριδῶν ἀπολωλότων Ποστουμίου[3] δ' ὃς ἔτι λοιπός ἐστιν ἐκ διαβολῆς τινος ἐν φυγῇ ὄντος ἀναγκάζεται τὸν τῆς γυναικὸς υἱὸν ἐπεισάγειν τῇ διαδοχῇ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, καίπερ οἰκτίρων καὶ βουλευόμενος ἐκ τῆς ὑπερορίας ἀνακαλεῖσθαι τὸν θυγατριδοῦν· ταῦτ' ὁ Φούλβιος ἀκούσας ἐξήνεγκε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, πρὸς δὲ Λιβίαν ἐκείνη,
B Λιβία δὲ καθήψατο πικρῶς Καίσαρος, εἰ πάλαι ταῦτ' ἐγνωκὼς οὐ μεταπέμπεται τὸν θυγατριδοῦν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ πόλεμον αὐτὴν τῷ διαδόχῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς καθίστησιν. ἐλθόντος οὖν ἕωθεν, ὡς εἰώθει, τοῦ Φουλβίου πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ εἰπόντος, " χαῖρε, Καῖσαρ," " ὑγίαιν'," εἶπε, " Φούλβιε." κἀκεῖνος νοήσας ᾤχετ' εὐθὺς ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε, καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα μεταπεμψάμενος, " ἔγνωκεν," ἔφη, " Καῖσαρ, ὅτι τἀπόρρητον οὐκ ἐσιώπησα· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μέλλω

[1] Φούλβιος] Φάβιος Meziriacus.
[2] αὐτῷ D: αὐτοῦ.
[3] Ποστούμου Wilamowitz.

and said, " What, didn't you hear it in company with three hundred others?" " Three hundred, nonsense!" said he. " You made such a fuss that I had to invent the whole story to try you out." Thus this man made trial of his wife cautiously and in complete safety, pouring, as it were into a leaky vessel, not wine or oil, but water.[a]

But Fulvius,[b] the friend of Caesar Augustus, heard the emperor, now an old man, lamenting the desolation of his house: two of his grandsons[c] were dead, and Postumius,[d] the only one surviving, was in exile because of some false accusation, and thus he was forced to import his wife's son[e] into the imperial succession; yet he pitied his grandson and was planning to recall him from abroad. Fulvius divulged what he had heard to his own wife, and she to Livia; and Livia bitterly rebuked Caesar: if he had formed this design long ago, why did he not send for his grandson, instead of making her an object of enmity and strife to the successor to the empire. Accordingly, when Fulvius came to him in the morning, as was his custom, and said, " Hail, Caesar," Caesar replied, " Farewell, Fulvius."[f] And Fulvius took his meaning and went away; going home at once, he sent for his wife, " Caesar has found out," he said, " that I have not kept his secret, and there-

[a] Plutarch is probably quoting a verse, as Wilamowitz has seen:

εἰς ἀγγεῖον σαθρὸν
οὐκ οἶνον οὐδ' ἔλαιον ἀλλ' ὕδωρ χέας.

[b] Fabius Maximus in Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 5, who relates the story quite differently.
[c] Gaius and Lucius Caesar.
[d] Postumus Agrippa; *cf.* Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 3.
[e] Tiberius.
[f] " Ave, Caesar "; " Vale, Fulvi."

(508) ἀναιρεῖν ἐμαυτόν"· ἡ δὲ γυνή, "δικαίως," εἶπεν, "ὅτι μοι τοσοῦτον συνοικῶν χρόνον οὐκ ἔγνως οὐδ' ἐφυλάξω τὴν ἀκρασίαν· ἀλλ' ἔασον ἐμὲ προτέραν." καὶ λαβοῦσα τὸ ξίφος ἑαυτὴν προανεῖλε τἀνδρός.

C 12. Ὀρθῶς οὖν Φιλιππίδης ὁ κωμῳδιοποιὸς[1] φιλοφρονουμένου τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτὸν Λυσιμάχου καὶ[2] λέγοντος, "τίνος σοι μεταδῶ τῶν ἐμῶν;" "οὗ βούλει," φησί, "βασιλεῦ, πλὴν τῶν ἀπορρήτων." τῇ δ' ἀδολεσχίᾳ καὶ ἡ περιεργία κακὸν οὐκ ἔλαττον πρόσεστι· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀκούειν θέλουσιν, ἵνα πολλὰ λέγειν ἔχωσι· καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἀπορρήτους καὶ κεκρυμμένους τῶν λόγων περιιόντες ἐξιχνεύουσι καὶ ἀνερευνῶσιν, ὥσπερ ὕλην παλαιάν[3] τινα φορτίων[4] τῇ φλυαρίᾳ παρατιθέμενοι, εἶθ' ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες τὸν κρύσταλλον οὔτε δύνανται[5] κατέχειν οὔτ'

D ἀφεῖναι θέλουσι· μᾶλλον δ' ὥσπερ ἑρπετὰ τοὺς ἀπορρήτους λόγους ἐγκολπισάμενοι καὶ συλλαβόντες οὐ κρατοῦσιν[6] ἀλλὰ διαβιβρώσκονται ὑπ' αὐτῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ βελόνας φασὶ ῥήγνυσθαι τικτούσας καὶ τὰς ἐχίδνας, οἱ δ' ἀπόρρητοι λόγοι τοὺς μὴ στέγοντας ἐκπίπτοντες ἀπολλύουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσι.

Σέλευκος ὁ Καλλίνικος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Γαλάτας μάχῃ πᾶν ἀποβαλὼν τὸ στράτευμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν,

[1] κωμῳδιοποιὸς Bernardakis: κωμῳδοποιὸς.
[2] καὶ] πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ most MSS.
[3] παλαιάν] πυλαίαν Bernardakis.
[4] φορτίων] φορυτῶν Wyttenbach.
[5] δύνανται added by W.C.H. after Reiske.
[6] κρατοῦσιν] συγκρατοῦσιν all MSS. but two.

[a] *Cf.* 517 B, *infra*; *Moralia*, 183 E; *Life of Demetrius*, xii. (894 D).

fore I intend to kill myself." "It is right that you should," said his wife, "since, after living with me for so long a time, you have not learned to guard against my incontinent tongue. But let me die first." And, taking the sword, she dispatched herself before her husband.

12. Philippides,[a] the comic poet, therefore, made the right answer when King Lysimachus courteously asked him, "What is there of mine that I may share with you?" and he replied, "Anything you like, Sire, except your secrets." And to garrulousness is attached also a vice no less serious than itself, inquisitiveness.[b] For babblers wish to hear many things so that they may have many things to tell. And they go about tracking down and searching out especially those stories that have been kept hidden and are not to be revealed, storing up for their foolish gossip, as it were, a second-hand stock of hucksters' wares; then, like children with a piece of ice,[c] they are neither able to hold it nor willing to let it go. Or rather, the secrets are like reptiles[d] which they catch and place in their bosoms, yet cannot confine them there, but are devoured by them; for pipefish[e] and vipers, they say, burst in giving birth, and secrets, when they escape, destroy and ruin those who cannot keep them.

Seleucus[f] the Victorious lost his entire army and power in the battle against the Gauls; he tore off his

[b] *Cf.* 519 C, *infra*.
[c] *Proverbia Alexandr.*, i. 19 (*Paroemiographi Graeci*, i. p. 324); *cf.* Pearson on Sophocles, Frag. 149 (153 ed. Nauck).
[d] *Cf.* Aesop, *Fable* 97 ed. Halm.
[e] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Historia Animalium*, vi. 13 (567 b 23); *De Generatione Animalium*, iii. 4 (755 a 33).
[f] *Cf.* 489 A, *supra*.

(508) αὐτὸς δὲ[1] περισπάσας τὸ διάδημα καὶ φυγὼν ἵππῳ μετὰ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἀνοδίαις καὶ πλάναις πολὺν δρόμον, ἤδη δι' ἔνδειαν ἀπαγορεύων ἐπαυλίῳ τινὶ προσῆλθε, καὶ τὸν δεσπότην αὐτὸν εὑρὼν κατὰ τύχην ἄρτον καὶ ὕδωρ ᾔτησεν. ὁ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ
E τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα παρῆν ἐν ἀγρῷ δαψιλῶς ἐπιδιδοὺς καὶ φιλοφρονούμενος ἐγνώρισε τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος τῇ συντυχίᾳ τῆς χρείας οὐ κατέσχεν οὐδὲ συνεψεύσατο βουλομένῳ λανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἄχρι τῆς ὁδοῦ προπέμψας καὶ ἀπολυόμενος, "ὑγίαιν'," εἶπεν, "ὦ βασιλεῦ Σέλευκε." κἀκεῖνος ἐκτείνας τὴν δεξιὰν αὐτῷ καὶ προσελκόμενος ὡς φιλήσων, ἔνευσεν ἑνὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ ξίφει τὸν τράχηλον ἀποκόψαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου·

φθεγγομένου δ' ἄρα τοῦ γε κάρη κονίῃσιν ἐμίχθη.

εἰ δ' ἐσίγησε τότε καρτερήσας ὀλίγον χρόνον,
F εὐτυχήσαντος ὕστερον τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ μεγάλου γενομένου μείζονας ἄν, οἶμαι, χάριτας ἐκομίσατ' ἀντὶ τῆς σιωπῆς ἢ τῆς φιλοξενίας.

Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀμωσγέπως ἔσχε πρόφασιν τῆς ἀκρασίας τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ τὴν φιλοφροσύνην, (13) οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀδολέσχων οὐδ' αἰτίαν ἔχοντες ἀπολλύουσιν αὑτούς. οἷον ἐν κουρείῳ τινὶ λόγων γινομένων περὶ τῆς Διονυσίου τυραννίδος, ὡς ἀδαμαντίνη καὶ ἄρρηκτός ἐστι, γελάσας ὁ κουρεύς, "ταῦθ' ὑμᾶς," ἔφη, "περὶ Διονυσίου λέγειν, οὗ

[1] αὐτὸς δὲ Pohlenz: αὐτὸς or αὐτοῦ δὲ.

[a] Homer, *Il.*, x. 457.

crown with his own hands and fled on horseback with three or four companions. When he had travelled a long journey through winding ways and trackless wilds, at length becoming desperate from lack of food he approached a certain farmhouse. By chance he found the master himself and begged bread and water from him. And the farmer gave him lavishly both these and whatever else there was in a farmstead, and, while entertaining him hospitably, recognized the face of the king. In his joy at the fortunate chance of rendering service he could not restrain himself or dissemble as did the king, who wished to remain unknown, but he escorted the king to the highway and, on taking leave, said, "Fare well, King Seleucus." And Seleucus, stretching out his right hand to him and drawing him towards himself as though to kiss him, gave a sign to one of his companions to cut off the man's head with a sword:

Still speaking his head was mingled with the dust.[a]

But if the man had remained silent at that time and had mastered himself for a little while, when the king later won success and regained power, he would have earned, I fancy, an even larger reward for his silence than for his hospitality.

This man, it is true, had as something of an excuse for his incontinence his hopes and the friendly service he had rendered; (13) but most talkers do not even have a reason for destroying themselves. For example, people were once talking in a barber's shop about how adamantine[b] and unbreakable the despotism of Dionysius was. The barber laughed and said, "Fancy your saying that about Dionysius, when I

[b] *Cf. Life of Dion*, vii. (961 A), x. (962 B); Aelian, *Varia Historia*, vi. 12.

ἐγὼ παρ' ἡμέρας ὀλίγας ἐπὶ τοῦ τραχήλου τὸ ξυρὸν
509 ἔχω." ταῦτ' ἀκούσας ὁ Διονύσιος ἀνεσταύρωσεν αὐτόν.

Ἐπιεικῶς δὲ λάλον ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν κουρέων γένος· οἱ γὰρ ἀδολεσχότατοι προσρέουσι καὶ προσκαθίζουσιν, ὥστ' αὐτοὺς ἀναπίμπλασθαι τῆς συνηθείας. χαριέντως γοῦν ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀρχέλαος ἀδολέσχου κουρέως περιβαλόντος αὐτῷ τὸ ὠμόλινον καὶ πυθομένου, "πῶς σε κείρω, βασιλεῦ;" "σιωπῶν," ἔφη. κουρεὺς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μεγάλην κακοπραγίαν ἀπήγγειλε πρῶτος, ἐν Πειραιεῖ πυθόμενος οἰκέτου τινὸς τῶν ἀποδεδρακότων ἐκεῖθεν. εἶτ' ἀφεὶς τὸ ἐργαστήριον εἰς ἄστυ συνέτεινε δρόμῳ

μή τις κῦδος ἄροιτο

B τὸν λόγον εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐμβαλών,

ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἔλθοι.

γενομένης δὲ ταραχῆς, οἷον εἰκός, εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἀθροισθεὶς ὁ δῆμος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐβάδιζε τῆς φήμης. ἤγετ' οὖν ὁ κουρεὺς καὶ ἀνεκρίνετο, μηδὲ τοὔνομα τοῦ φράσαντος εἰδὼς ἀλλ' εἰς ἀνώνυμον καὶ ἄγνωστον ἀναφέρων τὴν ἀρχὴν πρόσωπον. ὀργὴ δὴ[1] καὶ βοὴ τοῦ θεάτρου· "βασάνιζε καὶ στρέβλου τὸν ἀλάστορα· πέπλασται ταῦτα καὶ συντέθεικε[2]· τίς δ' ἄλλος ἤκουσε; τίς δ' ἐπίστευσεν;" ἐκομίσθη τροχός, κατετάθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
C ἐν τούτῳ παρῆσαν οἱ τὴν συμφορὰν ἀπαγγέλλοντες,

[1] δὴ Pohlenz: δὲ or οὖν (omitted in most mss.).
[2] συντέθεικε] συντέθειται or συντέθηκε most mss.

have my razor at his throat every few days or so!" When Dionysius heard this, he crucified the barber.

It is not strange that barbers are a talkative clan, for the greatest chatterboxes stream in and sit in their chairs, so that they are themselves infected with the habit. It was a witty answer, for instance, that King Archelaüs[a] gave to a loquacious barber, who, as he wrapped his towel around him, asked, "How shall I cut your hair, Sire?" "In silence," said Archelaüs. And it was a barber[b] also who first announced the great disaster of the Athenians in Sicily, having learned it in the Peiraeus from a slave, one of those who had escaped from the island. Then the barber left his shop and hurried at full speed to the city,

Lest another might win the glory

of imparting the news to the city,

and he come second.[c]

A panic naturally arose and the people gathered in assembly and tried to come at the origin of the rumour. So the barber was brought forward and questioned; yet he did not even know the name of his informant, but referred the origin to a nameless and unknown person. The assembly was enraged and cried out, "Torture the cursèd fellow! Put him on the rack! He has fabricated and concocted this tale! Who else heard it? Who believed it?" The wheel was brought and the man was stretched upon it. Meanwhile there arrived bearers of the disas-

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 177 A.
[b] *Cf. Life of Nicias*, xxx. (542 D-E).
[c] Homer, *Il.*, xxii. 207.

(509) ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγότες. ἐσκεδάσθησαν οὖν πάντες ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα πένθη, καταλιπόντες ἐν τῷ τροχῷ τὸν ἄθλιον ἐνδεδεμένον. ὀψὲ δὲ λυθεὶς ἤδη πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἠρώτα τὸν δημόσιον[1] εἰ καὶ περὶ Νικίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃν τρόπον ἀπόλωλεν, ἀκηκόασιν. οὕτως ἄμαχόν τι κακὸν καὶ ἀνουθέτητον ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν.

14. Καίτοι γ' ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ πικρὰ καὶ τὰ δυσώδη φάρμακα πιόντες δυσχεραίνουσι καὶ τὰς κύλικας, οὕτως οἱ τὰ κακὰ προσαγγέλλοντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκουόντων δυσχεραίνονται καὶ μισοῦνται. ὅθεν[2] χαριέντως ὁ Σοφοκλῆς διηπόρηκεν,

Φ. ἐν τοῖσιν ὠσὶν ἢ 'πὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δάκνῃ;
D Κ. τί δὲ ῥυθμίζεις τὴν ἐμὴν λύπην ὅπου;[3]
Φ. ὁ δρῶν σ' ἀνιᾷ τὰς φρένας, τὰ δ' ὦτ' ἐγώ.

λυποῦσι δ' οὖν ὥσπερ οἱ δρῶντες καὶ οἱ λέγοντες, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἔστι γλώσσης ῥεούσης ἐπίσχεσις οὐδὲ κολασμός.

Ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τῆς Χαλκιοίκου τὸ ἱερὸν ὤφθη σεσυλημένον, καὶ κειμένη ἔνδον κενὴ λάγυνος. ἦν οὖν ἀπορία πολλῶν συνδεδραμηκότων, καί τις τῶν παρόντων, "εἰ βούλεσθ', ἐγὼ φράσω ὑμῖν ὅ μοι παρίσταται περὶ τῆς λαγύνου· νομίζω γάρ," ἔφη, "τοὺς ἱεροσύλους ἐπὶ τηλικοῦτον ἐλθεῖν κίνδυνον
E κώνειον ἐμπιόντας καὶ κομίζοντας οἶνον, ἵν' εἰ μὲν αὐτοῖς λαθεῖν ἐγγένοιτο, τῷ ἀκράτῳ ποθέντι σβέσαντες καὶ διαλύσαντες τὸ φάρμακον ἀπέλθοιεν ἀσφαλῶς· εἰ δ' ἁλίσκοιντο, πρὸ τῶν βασάνων ὑπὸ

[1] δήμιον G.
[2] ὅθεν] καίτοι (γε) most MSS.
[3] ὅπου] ὅτι or ὅπη most MSS.

trous news, men who had escaped from the slaughter itself. All, therefore, dispersed, each to his private mourning, leaving the wretched fellow bound on the wheel. But when he was set free late in the day when it was already nearly evening, he asked the executioner if they had also heard "how the general, Nicias, had died." Such an unconquerable and incorrigible evil does habit make garrulity.

14. And yet, just as those who have drunk bitter and evil-smelling drugs are disgusted with the cups as well, so those who bear ill tidings cause disgust and hatred in those who hear them. Therefore Sophocles[a] has very neatly raised the question:

Gu. Is it in ear or soul that you are stung?—
Cr. But why seek to define where lies my pain?—
Gu. The doer grieves your heart, I but your ears.

Be that as it may, speakers also cause pain, just as doers do, but none the less there is no checking or chastening a loose tongue.

The temple of Athena of the Brazen House at Sparta was discovered to have been plundered, and an empty flask was found lying inside. The large crowd which had quickly formed was quite at a loss, when one of the bystanders said, "If you wish, I shall tell you what occurs to me about that flask. I think that the robbers, before undertaking so dangerous a task, drank hemlock and brought along wine, so that, if they should escape detection, by drinking the unmixed wine they might quench the poison and rid themselves of its evil effects,[b] and so might get away safely; but if they should be caught, that they might

[a] *Antigonê*, 317-319: Creon and the Guard who brings news of the attempted burial of Polyneices are the speakers.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 61 B, 653 A.

τοῦ φαρμάκου ῥᾳδίως καὶ ἀνωδύνως ἀποθάνοιεν." ταῦτ' εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα πλοκὴν ἔχον καὶ περινόησιν τοσαύτην οὐχ ὑπονοοῦντος ἀλλ' εἰδότος ἐφαίνετο. καὶ περιστάντες αὐτὸν ἀνέκριναν ἀλλαχόθεν[1] ἄλλος, "τίς εἶ;" καὶ "τίς σ' οἶδε;" καὶ "πόθεν ἐπίστασαι ταῦτα;" καὶ τὸ πέρας ἐλεγχόμενος οὕτως ὡμολόγησεν εἷς εἶναι τῶν ἱεροσύλων.

Οἱ δ' Ἴβυκον ἀποκτείναντες οὐχ οὕτως ἐάλωσαν,
F ἐν θεάτρῳ καθήμενοι[2] καὶ γεράνων παραφανεισῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα γέλωτι ψιθυρίζοντες, ὡς αἱ Ἰβύκου ἔκδικοι πάρεισιν; ἀκούσαντες γὰρ οἱ καθεζόμενοι πλησίον, ἤδη τοῦ Ἰβύκου πολὺν χρόνον ὄντος ἀφανοῦς καὶ ζητουμένου, ἐπελάβοντο τῆς φωνῆς καὶ προσήγγειλαν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. ἐλεγχθέντες δ' οὕτως ἀπήχθησαν, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν γεράνων
510 κολασθέντες ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς αὑτῶν γλωσσαλγίας ὥσπερ Ἐρινύος ἢ Ποινῆς βιασθέντες ἐξαγορεῦσαι τὸν φόνον. ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὰ πεπονθότα μέρη καὶ ἀλγοῦντα γίνεται φορὰ καὶ ὁλκὴ τῶν πλησίον, οὕτως ἡ γλῶττα τῶν ἀδολέσχων ἀεὶ φλεγμονὴν ἔχουσα καὶ σφυγμὸν ἕλκει τι καὶ συνάγει τῶν ἀπορρήτων καὶ κεκρυμμένων ἐφ' ἑαυτήν. διὸ δεῖ πεφράχθαι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ὡς πρόβολον ἐμποδὼν ἀεὶ τῇ γλώττῃ κείμενον ἐπισχεῖν τὸ ῥεῦμα καὶ τὸν ὄλισθον αὐτῆς, ἵνα μὴ τῶν χηνῶν ἀφρονέστεροι εἶναι δοκῶμεν, οὓς φασιν, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλω-

[1] ἀλλαχόθεν] ἄλλοθεν a few MSS.
[2] καθεζόμενοι most MSS.

die an easy and painless death from the poison before they should be put to the torture." When he had said this, the explanation appeared so very complicated and subtle that it did not seem to come from fancy, but from knowledge; and the people surrounded him and questioned him one after another, "Who are you?" "Who knows you?" "How did you come to know this?" and at last he was put through so thorough an examination that he confessed to being one of the robbers.

Were not the murderers of Ibycus [a] caught in the same way? They were sitting in a theatre, and when cranes came in sight, they laughed and whispered to each other that the avengers of Ibycus were come. Persons sitting near overheard them, and since Ibycus had disappeared and now for a long time had been sought, they caught at this remark and reported it to the magistrates. And thus the slayers were convicted and led off to prison, not punished by the cranes, but compelled to confess the murder by the infirmity of their own tongues, as it were some Fury or spirit of vengeance. For as in the body the neighbouring parts are borne by attraction toward diseased and suffering parts, so the tongue of babblers, ever inflamed and throbbing, draws and gathers to itself some portion of what has been kept concealed and should not be revealed. Therefore the tongue must be fenced in, and reason must ever lie, like a barrier, in the tongue's way, checking its flow and keeping it from slipping, in order that we may not be thought to be less sensible than geese,[b] of whom they relate that when from

[a] The parallel accounts are collected by Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, ii. pp. 78 ff.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 967 B.

(510) σιν ἐκ Κιλικίας τὸν Ταῦρον ἀετῶν ὄντα μεστόν, εἰς
B τὸ στόμα λαμβάνειν εὐμεγέθη λίθον ὥσπερ κλεῖθρον
ἢ χαλινὸν ἐμβάλλοντας[1] τῇ φωνῇ, καὶ νυκτὸς οὕτως
ὑπερφέρεσθαι λανθάνοντας.

15. Εἰ τοίνυν ἔροιτό τις,

τὸν κάκιστον ὅστις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸν ἐξωλέστατον,

οὐδεὶς ἂν ἄλλον εἴποι τὸν[2] προδότην παρελθών. Εὐθυκράτης μὲν οὖν "ἤρεψε τὴν οἰκίαν τοῖς ἐκ Μακεδονίας ξύλοις," ὥς φησι Δημοσθένης· Φιλοκράτης δὲ χρυσίον πολὺ λαβὼν "πόρνας καὶ ἰχθῦς ἠγόραζεν"· Εὐφόρβῳ δὲ καὶ Φιλάγρῳ τοῖς Ἐρέτριαν προδοῦσι χώραν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔδωκεν. ὁ δ' ἀδόλεσχος ἄμισθός ἐστι προδότης καὶ αὐτεπάγ-
C γελτος, οὐχ ἵππους οὐδὲ τείχη προδιδούς, ἀλλὰ λόγους ἐκφέρων ἀπορρήτους ἐν δίκαις ἐν στάσεσιν ἐν διαπολιτείαις, μηδενὸς αὐτῷ χάριν ἔχοντος ἀλλ' αὐτός, ἂν[3] ἀκούηται, προσοφείλων χάριν. ὥστε τὸ λελεγμένον πρὸς τὸν εἰκῇ καὶ ἀκρίτως ἐκχέοντα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ καταχαριζόμενον

οὐ φιλάνθρωπος σύ γ'[4] ἐσσ'· ἔχεις νόσον, χαίρεις διδοὺς

ἐναρμόττει καὶ πρὸς τὸν φλύαρον· "οὐ φίλος εἶ σὺ

[1] ἐμβάλλοντας] ἐμβαλόντας most MSS.
[2] τὸν] ἢ τὸν most MSS.
[3] αὐτός, ἂν Pohlenz: ἂν αὐτός.
[4] σύ γ'] τύ γ' *Life of Publicola*, xv.

Cilicia they cross Mt. Taurus, which is full of eagles, they take a great stone in their mouths to serve as a bolt or bridle for their scream, and pass over at night unobserved.

15. Now if anyone were to ask,

Who is the most wicked and the most abandoned man,[a]

no one would pass the traitor by and name anyone else. So Euthycrates[b] "roofed his house with the timber he got from Macedon," [c] as Demosthenes[d] says, and Philocrates[e] received much money and "bought strumpets and fish"; and to Euphorbus and Philagrus, who betrayed Eretria, the king[f] gave land. But the babbler is a traitor who volunteers his services without pay: he does not betray horses[g] or city-walls, but divulges secrets connected with lawsuits, party strife, and political manoeuvres. No one thanks him, but he himself, if he can win a hearing, must owe thanks. The result is that the verse directed at the man who recklessly and injudiciously pours forth and squanders his own possessions,

You are not generous: it's your disease,
You love to give,[h]

fits the foolish talker also: "You are no friend or

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 544, ades. 774.
[b] An error for Lasthenes; Plutarch mentions both traitors together in *Moralia*, 97 D.
[c] For Macedonia as the source of timber supply, *cf. Inscr. Graec.*, i². 105.
[d] *De Falsa Legatione*, 265.
[e] *Ibid.* 229; *cf. Moralia*, 668 A, 97 D.
[f] Darius I; *cf.* Herodotus, vi. 101; Pausanias, vii. 10. 2.
[g] Perhaps an allusion to Dolon's betrayal of the horses of Rhesus; *cf. Il.*, x. 436 ff.
[h] Epicharmus, Frag. 274: Kaibel, *Com. Graec. Frag.*, i. p. 142.

(510) ταῦτα μηνύων οὐδ' εὔνους· ἔχεις νόσον, χαίρεις λαλῶν καὶ φλυαρῶν."

16. Ταῦτα δ' οὐ κατηγορίαν ἡγητέον ἀλλ' ἰατρείαν τῆς ἀδολεσχίας· τῶν γὰρ παθῶν κρίσει καὶ ἀσκήσει περιγινόμεθα, προτέρα[1] δ' ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν· D οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐθίζεται φεύγειν καὶ ἀποτρίβεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ μὴ δυσχεραίνει, δυσχεραίνομεν δὲ τὰ πάθη, ὅταν τὰς βλάβας καὶ τὰς αἰσχύνας τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ κατανοήσωμεν. ὥσπερ νῦν κατανοοῦμεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδολέσχων, ὅτι φιλεῖσθαι βουλόμενοι μισοῦνται, χαρίζεσθαι θέλοντες ἐνοχλοῦσι, θαυμάζεσθαι δοκοῦντες καταγελῶνται, κερδαίνοντες οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσιν, ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς φίλους, ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς ἐχθρούς, ἑαυτοὺς ἀπολλύουσιν. ὥστε τοῦτο πρῶτον ἴαμα καὶ φάρμακόν ἐστι τοῦ πάθους, ὁ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινομένων αἰσχρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν ἐπιλογισμός.

17. Δευτέρῳ δὲ χρηστέον ἐπιλογισμῷ τῷ τῶν E ἐναντίων, ἀκούοντας ἀεὶ καὶ μεμνημένους καὶ πρόχειρ' ἔχοντας τὰ τῆς ἐχεμυθίας ἐγκώμια, καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον καὶ τὸ μυστηριῶδες τῆς σιωπῆς, καὶ ὅτι θαυμάζονται μᾶλλον καὶ ἀγαπῶνται καὶ σοφώτεροι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐξηνίων τούτων καὶ ἐκφερομένων[2] οἱ στρογγύλοι καὶ βραχυλόγοι, καὶ ὧν πολὺς νοῦς ἐν ὀλίγῃ λέξει συνέσταλται. καὶ γὰρ Πλάτων τοὺς τοιούτους ἐπαινεῖ, δεινοῖς ἀκον-

[1] προτέρα D: πρότερον.
[2] ἐκφερομένων Pohlenz: φερομένων.

[a] *Cf.* 504 E, *supra.*

well-wisher in revealing this: it's your disease, you love to be babbling and prating."

16. But these remarks are not to be regarded as an accusation against garrulity, but an attempt to cure it; for we get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our ailments, but the diagnosis must come first; since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate from his soul what does not distress him, and we only grow distressed with our ailments when we have perceived, by the exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them. Thus, in the present instance, we perceive in the case of babblers that they are hated when they wish to be liked, that they cause annoyance when they wish to please,[a] that they are laughed at when they think they are admired, that they spend their money without any gain, that they wrong their friends, help their enemies, and destroy themselves. Consequently this is the first step in curing the disease—by the application of reason to discover the shameful and painful effects that result from it.

17. And the second is that we must apply our reasoning powers to the effects of the opposite behaviour, always hearing and remembering and keeping close at hand the praises bestowed on reticence, and the solemn, holy, and mysterious[b] character of silence, remembering also that terse and pithy speakers and those who can pack much sense into a short speech are more admired and loved. and are considered to be wiser, than these unbridled and headstrong talkers. Plato,[c] in fact, commends such pithy men, declaring that they are like skilful throwers

[b] *Cf.* 504 A, 505 F, *supra.*
[c] *Cf. Protagoras,* 342 E.

τισταῖς ἐοικέναι λέγων, οὗλα καὶ πυκνὰ καὶ συνεστραμμένα φθεγγομένους. καὶ ὁ Λυκοῦργος εἰς ταύτην τὴν δεινότητα τοὺς πολίτας εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων
F τῇ σιωπῇ πιέζων συνῆγε καὶ κατεπύκνου. καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ Κελτίβηρες ἐκ τοῦ σιδήρου τὸ στόμωμα ποιοῦσιν, ὅταν κατορύξαντες εἰς τὴν γῆν τὸ πολὺ καὶ γεώδες ἀποκαθάρωσιν, οὕτως ὁ Λακωνικὸς λόγος οὐκ ἔχει φλοιόν, ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ δραστήριον ἀφαιρέσει τοῦ περιττοῦ διοικούμενος[1] στομοῦται· τὸ γὰρ ἀποφθεγματικὸν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο καὶ τὸ μετ'
511 εὐστροφίας ὀξὺ πρὸς τὰς ἀπαντήσεις ἐκ τῆς πολλῆς περιγίνεται σιωπῆς.

Καὶ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα μάλιστα τοῖς ἀδολέσχοις προβάλλειν[2] ὅσην χάριν ἔχει καὶ δύναμιν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ "Λακεδαιμόνιοι Φιλίππῳ· Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ." καὶ πάλιν γράψαντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ Φιλίππου, "ἂν ἐμβάλω εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἀναστάτους ὑμᾶς ποιήσω," ἀντέγραψαν, "αἴκα." Δημητρίου δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀγανακτοῦντος καὶ βοῶντος, "ἕνα πρὸς ἐμὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρεσβευτὴν ἔπεμψαν;" οὐ καταπλαγεὶς ὁ πρεσβευτής, "ἕν'," εἶπε, "ποτὶ ἕνα."

Θαυμάζονται δὲ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ βραχυλόγοι, καὶ τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Πυθίου Ἀπόλλωνος οὐ τὴν Ἰλιάδα
B καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν οὐδὲ τοὺς Πινδάρου παιᾶνας ἐπέγραψαν οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες, ἀλλὰ τὸ "γνῶθι σαυ-

[1] διοικούμενος Capps: διωκόμενος.
[2] προβάλλειν] προσβάλλειν most MSS.

[a] That is, they speak, as the acontist throws, with the sure aim which puts the adversary to rout with a single cast.
[b] *Cf. Life of Lycurgus*, xix. (51 D-E).

of the javelin, for what they say is crisp, solid, and compact.[a] And Lycurgus,[b] constraining his fellow-citizens from their earliest childhood to acquire this clever habit by means of silence, made them concise and terse in speech. For just as the Celtiberians[c] make steel from iron by burying it in the earth and then cleaning off the large earthy accumulation, so the speech of Spartans has no dross, but being disciplined by the removal of all superfluities, it is tempered to complete efficiency; for this capacity of theirs for aphoristic speech and for quickness and the ability to turn out a neat phrase in repartee is the fruit of much silence.

And we must be careful to offer to chatterers examples of this terseness, so that they may see how charming and how effective they are. For example: "The Spartans to Philip: Dionysius in Corinth."[d] And again, when Philip wrote to them, "If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out," they wrote back, "If." And when King Demetrius[e] was annoyed and shouted, "Have the Spartans sent only one envoy to *me*?" the envoy replied undismayed, "One to one."

And among the men of old also sententious speakers are admired, and upon the temple of the Pythian Apollo the Amphictyons inscribed, not the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* or the paeans of Pindar, but "Know thy-

[c] *Cf.* Diodorus, v. 33. 4.
[d] *Cf.* Tryphon *apud* Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, iii. p. 202; Quintilian, viii. 6. 52; Dionysius the Younger upon being expelled from Syracuse (*cf. Moralia*, 783 D) kept a school in Corinth. The expression is somewhat like saying, "Remember St. Helena."
[e] *Cf. Life of Demetrius*, xlii. (909 C); *Moralia*, 233 E. In *Moralia*, 216 B, Agis (the Younger?) makes the remark to Philip.

(511) τόν" καὶ τὸ "μηδὲν ἄγαν" καὶ τὸ "ἐγγύα πάρα δ' ἄτα," θαυμάσαντες τῆς λέξεως τὸ εὔογκον καὶ τὸ λιτόν, ἐν βραχεῖ σφυρήλατον νοῦν περιεχούσης. αὐτὸς δ' ὁ θεὸς οὐ φιλοσύντομός ἐστι καὶ βραχυλόγος ἐν τοῖς χρησμοῖς, καὶ Λοξίας καλεῖται διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀσάφειαν; οἱ δὲ συμβολικῶς ἄνευ φωνῆς ἃ δεῖ φράζοντες οὐκ ἐπαινοῦνται καὶ θαυμάζονται διαφερόντως; ὡς Ἡράκλειτος, ἀξιούντων αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτῶν γνώμην
C τιν' εἰπεῖν περὶ ὁμονοίας, ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ λαβὼν ψυχροῦ κύλικα καὶ τῶν ἀλφίτων ἐπιπάσας καὶ τῷ γλήχωνι κινήσας, ἐκπιὼν ἀπῆλθεν, ἐπιδειξάμενος αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἀρκεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ δεῖσθαι τῶν πολυτελῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ διατηρεῖ τὰς πόλεις. Σκίλουρος δὲ καταλιπὼν ὀγδοήκοντα παῖδας, ὁ Σκυθῶν βασιλεύς, ἤτησε δέσμην δορατίων, ὅτ' ἀπέθνησκε, καὶ λαβόντας ἐκέλευσε καταθραῦσαι καὶ κατᾶξαι συνδεδεμένην καὶ ἀθρόαν· ὡς δ' ἀπεῖπον, αὐτὸς ἕλκων ἓν καθ' ἓν ἅπαντα
D ῥᾳδίως διέκλασε, τὴν συμφωνίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν ἰσχυρὸν ἀποφαίνων καὶ δυσκαθαίρετον, ἀσθενὲς δὲ τὴν διάλυσιν καὶ οὐ μόνιμον.

18. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα συνεχῶς τις ἐπίοι[1] καὶ ἀναλαμβάνοι, παύσαιτ' ἂν ἴσως ἡδόμενος τῷ φλυαρεῖν. ἐμὲ δὲ κἀκεῖνος ὁ οἰκέτης εὖ μάλα δυσωπεῖ, τὸ προσέχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κρατεῖν προαι-

[1] ἐπίοι Stegmann, confirmed by G: εἴποι or σκοπεῖ.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 408 E, 385 D, 164 B; Pausanias, x. 24. 1; Tryphon, *l.c.*; Plato, *Charmides*, 165 A.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 164 B.
[c] As though derived from λοξός, "slanting," "ambiguous"; and see Roscher, *s.v.*

self"[a] and "Avoid extremes" and "Give a pledge and mischief is at hand,"[b] admiring, as they did, the compactness and simplicity of the expression which contains within a small compass a well-forged sentiment. And is not the god himself fond of conciseness and brevity in his oracles, and is he not called Loxias[c] because he avoids prolixity rather than obscurity? And are not those who indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done,[d] praised and admired exceedingly? So Heracleitus,[e] when his fellow-citizens asked him to propose some opinion about concord, mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-meal, stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and departed, thus demonstrating to them that to be satisfied with whatever they happen upon and not to want expensive things is to keep cities in peace and concord. And Scilurus,[f] king of the Scythians, left behind him eighty sons; when he was dying, he asked for a bundle of spear-shafts and bade his sons take it and break it in pieces, tied closely together as the shafts were. When they gave up the task, he himself drew all the spears out one by one and easily broke them in two, thus revealing that the harmony and concord of his sons was a strong and invincible thing, but that their disunion would be weak and unstable.

18. If anyone will but review and recollect constantly these and similar instances, he may conceivably stop taking pleasure in foolish chatter. But as for me, that famous case of the slave puts me utterly to shame when I reflect what immense importance it

[d] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vii. 66.
[e] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], i. p. 144, A 3 b.
[f] *Cf. Moralia*, 174 F and Nachstädt's note *ad loc.*

(511) ῥέσεως ἡλίκον ἐστὶν ἐνθυμούμενον. Πούπιος Πείσων ὁ ῥήτωρ μὴ βουλόμενος ἐνοχλεῖσθαι προσέταξε τοῖς οἰκέταις πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λαλεῖν καὶ μηδὲν πλέον. εἶτα Κλώδιον ἄρχοντα δεξιώσασθαι βουλόμενος ἐκέλευσε κληθῆναι, καὶ παρεσκευάσατο λαμπρὰν ὡς εἰκὸς ἑστίασιν. ἐνστάσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι παρῆσαν ὁ δὲ Κλώδιος προσεδοκᾶτο· E καὶ πολλάκις ἔπεμπε τὸν εἰωθότα καλεῖν οἰκέτην ἐποψόμενον εἰ πρόσεισιν. ὡς δ' ἦν ἑσπέρα καὶ ἀπέγνωστο, "τί δ';" ἔφη πρὸς τὸν οἰκέτην, "ἐκάλεσας αὐτόν;" "ἔγωγ'," εἶπε. "διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀφῖκται;" κἀκεῖνος, "ὅτι ἠρνήσατο." "πῶς οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἔφρασας;" "ὅτι τοῦτό μ' οὐκ ἠρώτησας." οὕτως[1] μὲν Ῥωμαϊκὸς οἰκέτης, ὁ δ' Ἀττικὸς ἐρεῖ τῷ δεσπότῃ σκάπτων

ἐφ' οἷς γεγόνασιν αἱ διαλύσεις.

οὕτως μέγα πρὸς πάνθ' ὁ ἐθισμός ἐστι, καὶ περὶ τούτου γ' ἤδη λέγωμεν.

19. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὡς χαλινῶν ἐφαψαμένους ἐπισχεῖν τὸν ἀδολέσχην, ἀλλ' ἔθει δεῖ κρατῆσαι τοῦ νοσήματος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τῶν πέλας F ἐρωτήσεσιν ἑαυτὸν ἐθιζέτω[2] σιωπᾶν μέχρι οὗ πάντες ἀπείπωνται τὴν ἀπόκρισιν·

οὐ γάρ τι βουλῆς ταὐτὸ καὶ δρόμου τέλος,

ὥς φησι Σοφοκλῆς, οὐδέ γε φωνῆς καὶ ἀποκρίσεως·

[1] οὕτως G: οὗτος.
[2] ἔθιζε σαυτὸν in some MSS.

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 473, ades. 347; *cf.* 518 F—519 A, *infra*.

is to pay attention to what is said and to be master of our purpose. Pupius Piso, the orator, not wishing to be troubled, ordered his slaves to speak only in answer to questions and not a word more. Subsequently, wishing to pay honour to Clodius when he was a magistrate, Piso gave orders that he be invited to dinner and prepared what was, we may suppose, a sumptuous banquet. When the hour came, the other guests were present, but Clodius was still expected, and Piso repeatedly sent the slave who regularly carried invitations to see if Clodius was approaching. And when evening came and he was finally despaired of, Piso said to the slave, "See here, did you give him the invitation?" "I did," said the slave. "Why hasn't he come then?" "Because he declined." "Then why didn't you tell me at once?" "Because you didn't ask me that." So a Roman slave, but the Athenian slave while digging will tell his master

On what terms the truce is made,[a]

so great in all things is the force of habit. And of this let us now speak.

19. For it is impossible to check the babbler by gripping the reins, as it were; his disease must be mastered by habituation. In the first place, then, when questions are asked of neighbours, let him accustom himself to remaining silent until all have refused a response:

For counsel's aim is not that of a race,[b]

as Sophocles[c] says, nor, indeed, is this the aim of

[b] To see who can get to the goal first.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 312, Frag. 772 (Frag. 856 ed. Pearson, vol. iii. p. 63).

ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν ἡ νίκη τοῦ φθάσαντός ἐστιν, ἐνταῦθα δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ἱκανῶς ἕτερος ἀποκρίνηται, καλῶς ἔχει συνεπαινέσαντα καὶ συνεπιφήσαντα δόξαν εὐμενοῦς
512 ἀνθρώπου λαβεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ μή, τότε καὶ διδάξαι τὸ ἠγνοημένον καὶ ἀναπληρῶσαι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ἀνεπίφθονον καὶ οὐκ ἄκαιρόν ἐστι. μάλιστα δὲ φυλάττωμεν ἑαυτούς, ὅπως μὴ ἑτέρου τινὸς ἐρωτηθέντος αὐτοὶ προλαμβάνωμεν ὑποφθάνοντες τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. ἴσως μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' ἄλλοτε[1] καλῶς ἔχον ἐστίν, αἰτηθέντος ἑτέρου, παρωσαμένους ἐκεῖνον αὐτοὺς ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι· δόξομεν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ τοῦτον ὡς παρασχεῖν ὃ αἰτεῖται μὴ δυνάμενον, κἀκεῖνον ὡς αἰτεῖν παρ' ὧν δύναται λαβεῖν οὐκ ἐπιστάμενον ὀνειδίζειν· μάλιστα δ' ὕβριν φέρει περὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις ἡ τοιαύτη προπέτεια καὶ θρασύτης. συν-
B εμφαίνει γὰρ ὁ φθάνων ἐν τῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν ἐρωτώμενον τὸ "τί τούτου δέῃ;" καὶ "τί οὗτος οἶδε;" καὶ "ἐμοῦ παρόντος, περὶ τούτων οὐδένα δεῖ ἄλλον ἐρωτᾶν." καίτοι πολλάκις τινὰς ἐρωτῶμεν οὐ τοῦ λόγου δεόμενοι, φωνὴν δέ τινα καὶ φιλοφροσύνην ἐκκαλούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ προαγαγεῖν εἰς ὁμιλίαν ἐθέλοντες, ὡς Σωκράτης Θεαίτητον καὶ Χαρμίδην. ὅμοιον οὖν τῷ τὸν ὑφ' ἑτέρου βουλόμενον φιληθῆναι προσδραμόντα[2] φιλεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ τὸν ἑτέρῳ προσβλέποντα μεταστρέφειν εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὸ προλαμβάνειν τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ τὰ ὦτα μετάγειν, καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕλκειν καὶ ἀποστρέφειν
C πρὸς ἑαυτόν· ὅπου, κἂν ἀπείπηται τὸν λόγον ὁ

[1] ἄλλοτε Pohlenz: ἄλλό (*sic*) τι.
[2] προσδραμόντα Reiske, confirmed by MSS.: προδραμόντα.

speaking and answering. For in a race the victory is his who comes in first; but here, if another makes a sufficient answer, it is proper to join in the approval and assent and so acquire the reputation of being a friendly fellow. But if such an answer is not made, then it is not invidious or inopportune both to point out the answer others have not known and thus to fill in the gap. And, in particular, let us be on our guard, when someone else has been asked a question, that we do not forestall him by taking the answer out of his mouth. For perhaps there are other times also when it is not seemly, another having been asked, to shoulder him aside and volunteer ourselves, since we shall seem to be casting a slur both on the man asked, as being unable to furnish what is demanded of him, and on the asker, as being ignorant of the source from which he can get help; and, in particular, such precipitancy and boldness in answering questions smacks of insolence. For one who tries to get in the answer ahead of the man who is questioned suggests, "What do you need *him* for?" or "What does *he* know?" or "When I am present, no one else should be asked about these matters." And yet we often ask people questions, not because we need an answer, but to elicit some friendly word from them, and because we wish to draw them on to friendly converse, as Socrates did with Theaetetus and Charmides.[a] So to take the answer out of another's mouth, to divert another's hearing and attract his attention and wrest it from some other, is as bad as to run up and kiss someone who wished to be kissed by somebody else, or to turn toward yourself someone who was looking at another; since, even if he who has been asked cannot give the

[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Theaetetus*, 143 D, *Charmides*, 154 E ff.

(512) αἰτηθείς, ἐπισχόντα καλῶς ἔχει καὶ πρὸς τὸ βουλόμενον τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος ἁρμοσάμενον ὡς ἐπὶ κλῆσιν ἀλλοτρίαν[1] αἰδημόνως καὶ κοσμίως ἀπαντᾶν. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐρωτηθέντες, ἂν σφαλῶσιν ἐν τῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι, συγγνώμης δικαίας τυγχάνουσιν· ὁ δ' αὐθαιρέτως ὑφιστάμενος καὶ προλαμβάνων τὸν λόγον ἀηδὴς μέν ἐστι καὶ κατορθῶν, διαμαρτάνων δὲ παντάπασιν ἐπίχαρτος γίνεται καὶ καταγέλαστος.

20. Δεύτερον τοίνυν ἄσκημα πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἀποκρίσεις ἐστίν, αἷς οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ προσέχειν τὸν
D ἀδόλεσχον· πρῶτον μέν, ἵνα μὴ λάθῃ τοῖς ἐπὶ γέλωτι καὶ ὕβρει προκαλουμένοις εἰς λόγους αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος μετὰ σπουδῆς. ἔνιοι γὰρ οὐδὲν δεόμενοι διατριβῆς δὲ καὶ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα συνθέντες τινὰς ἐρωτήσεις προβάλλουσι[2] τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ἀνακινοῦσιν αὐτῶν[3] τὸν λῆρον· ὃ δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ μὴ ταχὺ τῷ λόγῳ μηδ' ὥσπερ χάριν ἔχοντας ἐπιπηδᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πυνθανομένου σκοπεῖν καὶ τὴν χρείαν. ὅταν δὲ φαίνηται τῷ ὄντι βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐθιστέον ἐφιστάναι καὶ ποιεῖν τι διάλειμμα μεταξὺ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἐν ᾧ προσθεῖναι μὲν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, εἴ τι
E βούλεται, δύναται, σκέψασθαι δ' αὐτὸς περὶ ὧν ἀποκρινεῖται, καὶ μὴ κατατρέχειν μηδὲ καταχωνύναι τὴν ἐρώτησιν, ἔτι πυνθανομένοις πολλάκις ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἄλλας ἀντ' ἄλλων ἀποκρίσεις διδόντα.[4] ἡ μὲν γὰρ Πυθία καὶ πρὸ ἐρωτήσεως αὐθωρὶ

[1] τὴν ἀπόκρισιν after ἀλλοτρίαν deleted by Pohlenz.
[2] προβάλλουσι] προσβάλλουσι most MSS.
[3] αὐτῶν] αὐτῷ or αὐτοῖς most MSS.
[4] διδόντα Reiske: διδόντας.

information, it is proper to practise restraint and conform oneself to the wish of the asker and thus to encounter with modesty and decorum the situation, an invitation, as it were, given to another. And it is also true that if persons who are asked questions make mistakes in their answers, they meet with just indulgence; but he who voluntarily undertakes an answer and anticipates another is unpleasant even if he corrects a mistake, and if he makes a mistake himself, he affords a malicious joy to one and all, and becomes an object of ridicule.

20. Then the second matter for diligent practice concerns our own answers; to these the chatterer must pay very close attention: in the first place, that he may not inadvertently give a serious answer to those who provoke him to talk merely that they may insolently ridicule him.[a] For some persons who require no information, but merely to divert and amuse themselves, devise questions and put them to men of this sort to set going their foolish twaddle. Against this talkers should be on their guard and not leap upon a subject quickly, or as though grateful that it is offered to them, but should first consider both the character of the questioner and the necessity for the question. And when it appears that the questioner is really anxious to learn, the babbler must accustom himself to stop and leave between the question and the answer an interval, in which the asker may add anything he wishes and he himself may reflect upon his reply instead of overrunning and obscuring the question by giving a long string of answers in a hurry while the question is still being asked. For although the Pythian priestess is accustomed to

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 547 c.

χρησμοὺς εἴωθέ τινας ἐκφέρειν ὁ γὰρ θεός, ᾧ λατρεύει,

καὶ κωφοῦ ξυνίησι καὶ οὐ λαλέοντος[1] ἀκούει,

τὸν δὲ βουλόμενον ἐμμελῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι δεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀναμεῖναι καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀκριβῶς καταμαθεῖν τοῦ πυνθανομένου, μὴ γένηται τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

ἄμας[2] ἀπῄτουν, οἱ δ' ἀπηρνοῦντο σκάφας.

F ἄλλως δὲ τὸ λάβρον τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ὀξύπεινον ἀνακρουστέον, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ καθάπερ ῥεῦμα τῇ γλώττῃ πάλαι προσιστάμενον ἀσμένως ὑπὸ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἐξερᾶσθαι.[3] καὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως ἐκόλουε τὴν δίψαν, οὐκ ἐφιεὶς ἑαυτῷ πιεῖν μετὰ γυμνάσιον, εἰ μὴ τὸν πρῶτον ἐκχέαι κάδον ἀνιμήσας ὅπως ἐθίζηται τὸν τοῦ λόγου καιρὸν ἀναμένειν τὸ ἄλογον.

513 21. Ἔστι τοίνυν τρία γένη τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ἀποκρίσεων, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ φιλάνθρωπον τὸ δὲ περισσόν. οἷον πυθομένου τινὸς εἰ Σωκράτης ἔνδον, ὁ μὲν ὥσπερ ἄκων καὶ ἀπροθύμως ἀποκρίνεται τὸ "οὐκ ἔνδον"· ἐὰν δὲ βούληται λακωνίζειν, καὶ τὸ "ἔνδον" ἀφελὼν αὐτὴν μόνην φθέγξεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν· ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, Φιλίππου γράψαντος εἰ δέξονται[4] τῇ πόλει αὐτόν, εἰς τὴν[5] χάρτην ΟΥ μέγα γράψαντες ἀπέστειλαν. ὁ δὲ φιλανθρωπότερον ἀποκρίνεται, "οὐκ ἔνδον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις"· κἂν βούληται προσεπιμετρῆ-

[1] λαλέοντος] φωνεῦντος Herodotus, i. 47, and *C.I.G.*, i. 1724.
[2] ἄμας] ἄλλας most mss., and they omit οἱ . . . σκάφας.
[3] ἐξερᾶσθαι Emperius, confirmed by mss.: ἐξορᾶσθαι and ἐξαίρεσθαι.
[4] δέξονται Richards: δέχονται.

deliver some oracles on the instant, even before the question is put—for the god whom she serves

Understands the dumb and hears when no man speaks[a]—

yet the man who wishes to make a careful answer must wait to apprehend exactly the sense and the intent of him who asks the question, lest it befall, as the proverb[b] has it,

They asked for buckets, but tubs were refused.

In any case this ravenous hunger for talking must be checked so that it may not seem as though a stream which has long been pressing hard upon the tongue were being gladly discharged at the instance of the question. Socrates, in fact, used to control his thirst in this manner—he would not allow himself to drink after exercise until he had drawn up and poured out the first bucketful, so that his irrational part might be trained to await the time dictated by reason.

21. Furthermore, there are three kinds of answers to questions: the barely necessary, the polite, and the superfluous. For example, if someone asks, "Is Socrates at home?" one person may reply, as it were unwillingly and grudgingly, "Not at home." And if he wishes to adopt the Laconic style, he may omit the "At home" and only utter the bare negative. So the Spartans, when Philip wrote to ask if they would receive him into their city, wrote a large "No" on the paper and sent it back. Another will answer more politely, "He is not at home, but at the bank," and if he wants to give fuller measure may

[a] *Cf.* Herodotus, i. 47.
[b] *Paroemiographi Graeci*, i. p. 28; Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 494, ades. 454.

[5] τὴν added by Capps; χάρτην τὴν αὐτὴν Tucker.

(513) σαι, " ξένους τινὰς ἐκεῖ περιμένων." ὁ δὲ περιττὸς
B καὶ ἀδολέσχης, ἄν γε δὴ τύχῃ καὶ τὸν Κολοφώνιον ἀνεγνωκὼς Ἀντίμαχον, " οὐκ ἔνδον," φησίν, " ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις, ξένους ἀναμένων Ἴωνας, ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτῷ γέγραφεν Ἀλκιβιάδης περὶ Μίλητον ὢν καὶ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνει διατρίβων, τῷ τοῦ μεγάλου σατράπῃ βασιλέως, ὃς πάλαι μὲν ἐβοήθει Λακεδαιμονίοις, νῦν δὲ προστίθεται δι' Ἀλκιβιάδην Ἀθηναίοις· ὁ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπιθυμῶν κατελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τὸν Τισσαφέρνην μετατίθησι." καὶ ὅλως τὴν ὀγδόην Θουκυδίδου κατατεινάμενος ἐρεῖ καὶ κατακλύσει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἕως φθάσει[1] καὶ
C Μίλητος ἐκπολεμωθεῖσα καὶ φυγαδευθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον Ἀλκιβιάδης.

Μάλιστα δὴ περὶ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν συνέχειν ὥσπερ εἰς ἴχνος ἐμβιβάζοντα τὴν ἐρώτησιν καὶ κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι τῇ χρείᾳ τοῦ πυνθανομένου περιγράψαντα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. Καρνεάδην μὲν γὰρ οὔπω μεγάλην ἔχοντα δόξαν ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ διαλεγόμενον πέμψας ὁ γυμνασίαρχος ἐκέλευσεν ὑφεῖναι[2] τὸ μέγεθος[3] τῆς φωνῆς (ἦν γὰρ μεγαλοφωνότατος)· εἰπόντος δ' ἐκείνου, " δός μοι μέτρον φωνῆς," οὐ φαύλως ὑπέτυχε,[4] " δίδωμι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον." τῷ δ' ἀποκρινομένῳ μέτρον ἔστω ἡ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος βούλησις.

[1] *φθάσει*] *φθάσῃ* most MSS.
[2] *ὑφεῖναι*] *ἀφεῖναι* all MSS. but two.
[3] *τὸ μέγεθος*] *τοῦ μεγέθους* Reiske and two MSS.
[4] *ὑπέτυχε*] *ἐπέτυχε* most MSS.

add, " waiting there for some guests." But your over-officious and garrulous man, particularly if he happens to have read Antimachus [a] of Colophon, will say, " He is not at home, but at the bank, waiting for some Ionian guests on whose behalf he has had a letter from Alcibiades who is near Miletus staying with Tissaphernes,[b] the satrap of the Great King, who formerly used to help the Spartans, but now is attaching himself to the Athenians because of Alcibiades. For Alcibiades desires to be restored to his native country and therefore is causing Tissaphernes to change sides." And he will run on, reciting at full stretch the whole eighth book of Thucydides, and deluge the questioner until, before he has done, Miletus is at war again and Alcibiades exiled for the second time.

Regarding this tendency especially, one must keep talkativeness within bounds by following the question step by step and circumscribing the answer within a circle to which the questioner's need gives the centre and the radius.[c] So when Carneades,[d] who had not yet acquired a great reputation, was disputing in a gymnasium, the director sent and bade him lower his voice, which was a very loud one. And when Carneades said, " Give me something to regulate my voice," the director aptly rejoined, " I am giving you the person conversing with you." So, in making an answer, let the wishes of the questioner provide the regulation.

[a] The epic poet, a by-word for longwindedness: thus Catullus (95. 10) calls him " tumidus."
[b] *Cf. Life of Alcibiades*, xxiv. (204 B-C).
[c] *Cf. Moralia*, 524 E, 603 E, 776 F, 822 D, 1098 D.
[d] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, iv. 63; for Carneades' noisiness *cf. Moralia*, 791 A-B.

(513) 22. Καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκέλευε φυλάτ-
D τεσθαι τῶν σιτίων ὅσα μὴ πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν ἀνα-
πείθει[1] καὶ τῶν πομάτων ὅσα πίνειν μὴ διψῶντας,
οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τῶν λόγων τὸν ἀδολέσχην, οἷς ἥδεται
μάλιστα καὶ κέχρηται κατακόρως, τούτους φοβεῖ-
σθαι καὶ πρὸς τούτους ἐπιρρέοντας ἀντιβαίνειν.
οἷον οἱ στρατιωτικοὶ πολέμων εἰσὶ διηγηματικοί·
καὶ τὸν Νέστορα τοιοῦτον ὁ ποιητὴς εἰσάγει, τὰς
αὑτοῦ πολλάκις ἀριστείας καὶ πράξεις διηγούμενον.
ἐπιεικῶς δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ δίκας εὐστοχήσασιν ἢ
παρ' ἡγεμόσι καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἀπροσδοκήτως εὐημ-
ερήσασιν ὥσπερ νόσημά τι προσπίπτει καὶ παρ-
E ακολουθεῖ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ διηγεῖσθαι πολλάκις, ὃν
τρόπον εἰσῆλθον προσήχθησαν ἠγωνίσαντο διελέχ-
θησαν, ἐξήλεγξαν ἀντιδίκους τινὰς ἢ κατηγόρους,
ἐπηνέθησαν. πολλῷ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ χαρὰ τῆς κωμικῆς
ἐκείνης ἀγρυπνίας λαλίστερον, ἀναρριπίζουσα πολ-
λάκις ἑαυτὴν καὶ πρόσφατον ποιοῦσα τοῖς διηγή-
μασιν. ὅθεν ὀλισθηροὶ πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν
λόγων εἰσὶν ἐκ πάσης προφάσεως· οὐ γὰρ μόνον

ὅπου τις ἀλγεῖ, κεῖθι καὶ τὴν χεῖρ'[2] ἔχει,

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἕλκει τὴν φωνὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ[3]
καὶ περιάγει τὴν γλῶτταν ἐπερείδειν ἀεὶ τῇ μνήμῃ
βουλόμενον. οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς ἡ πλείστη

[1] ἐσθίειν ἀναπείθει Bernardakis from *Mor.*, 521 F, *infra*, 661 F: ἀναπείθει ἐσθίειν.
[2] τὴν χεῖρ'] τὸν νοῦν Stobaeus.
[3] ἐφ' ἑαυτό] ἐν ἑαυτῷ all MSS. except GD.

[a] *Cf.* Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, i. 3. 6; *Moralia*, 124 D, 521 F, *infra*, 661 F. [b] *Cf. Moralia*, 546 D, 630 F ff.
[c] For example, Homer, *Il.*, i. 269 ff.
[d] *Cf.* Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 48, Menander, Frag.

22. Moreover, just as Socrates[a] used to urge men to be on their guard against those foods which induce us to eat when we are not hungry, and against those liquids which induce us to drink when we are not thirsty, so it is with the babbler as regards subjects for talk: those in which he takes most delight and employs *ad nauseam* he should fear and stoutly resist when they stream in upon him. For example, military men[b] are great tellers of war-stories, and the Poet introduces Nestor[c] in that character, often narrating his own deeds of prowess. Again, as one might expect, those who have scored a victory in the law-courts or have had some unexpected success at the courts of governors or kings are attacked, as it were, by a malady which never leaves them, by the desire to call to mind and tell over and over again how they made their entrance, how they were presented, how they argued, how they held forth, how they confuted some opponents or accusers, how they were applauded. For their delight is far more loquacious than that well-known insomnia in the comedy[d]: it often fans itself into new flame and makes itself ever fresh with each successive telling. They are, therefore, ready to slip into such subjects on any pretext. For not only

Where one feels pain, there will he keep his hand,[e]

but also what causes pleasure draws the voice toward itself and twists the tongue from a desire to dwell perpetually on the joys of remembrance. So also with lovers, who chiefly occupy themselves with con-

164 (p. 353 ed. Allinson): "Surely of all things insomnia is the most loquacious. At any rate, it has roused me and brings me here to tell my whole life from the very beginning."
[e] A proverb, according to Stobaeus, vol. v. p. 860 ed. Hense, where see the note. "Ubi dolor, ibi digitus."

διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους μνήμην τινὰ τῶν ἐρωμένων ἀναδιδόντας· οἵ γε κἂν μὴ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, πρὸς ἄψυχα περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγονται·

ὦ φιλτάτη κλίνη

καὶ

Βακχὶς θεόν σ' ἐνόμισεν, εὔδαιμον[1] λύχνε·
καὶ τῶν θεῶν μέγιστος, εἰ[2] ταύτῃ δοκεῖς.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἀτεχνῶς ἡ λευκὴ στάθμη πρὸς
514 τοὺς λόγους ὁ ἀδόλεσχος, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁ[3] μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ἑτέροις προσπεπονθὼς ὀφείλει τούτους φυλάττεσθαι καὶ ἀνέχειν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ ἀνακρούειν ὡς πορρωτάτω προάγειν καὶ ἀπομηκύνειν[4] ἀεὶ δι' ἡδονὴν δυναμένων. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἐκείνους πεπόνθασιν, ἐν οἷς κατ' ἐμπειρίαν ἢ ἕξιν τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρειν νομίζουσι. φίλαυτος γὰρ ὢν καὶ φιλόδοξος ὁ τοιοῦτος

νέμει τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει κράτιστος ὤν·

ἐν ἱστορίαις ὁ ἀναγνωστικός, ἐν τεχνολογίαις ὁ
B γραμματικός, ἐν διηγήμασι ξενικοῖς ὁ πολλὴν χώραν ἐπεληλυθὼς καὶ πεπλανημένος. ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι· δελεαζομένη γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἡ ἀδολεσχία καθάπερ ζῷον ἐπὶ νομὰς συνήθεις

[1] εὔδαιμον Kock: εὐδαῖμον.
[2] εἰ] ἢ or ἤ some MSS.
[3] ἀλλ' ὁ Reiske: ἀλλὰ.
[4] προαγαγεῖν καὶ ἀπομηκῦναι most MSS.

versation that recalls some memory of the objects of their love; and if they cannot talk to human beings, they will speak of their passion to inanimate things:

O dearest bed!

and

O blessèd lamp, Bacchis thought you a god,
And greatest god you are if she thinks so.[a]

There is, however, really not a pin's difference[b] to the chatterer what subjects may arise; nevertheless he that has a greater weakness for one class of subjects than for the other should be on his guard against these subjects and force himself to hold back and withdraw as far as possible from them, since they are always able, because of the pleasure they give, to lure him on to dilate upon them. And talkers have this same difficulty with those subjects in which they think that they surpass all others because of some experience or acquired habit. For such a person, being self-centred and vain,

Will give the chief part of the day to that
In which he chances to surpass himself[c]:

the great reader will spend it in narrating tales, the literary expert in technical discussions, the wide traveller and wanderer over the face of the earth in stories of foreign parts. We must, therefore, be on our guard against these subjects also, since garrulity is enticed by them, like a beast making for familiar

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 438, ades. 151, 152.
[b] Literally "a white line" on a white stone: *cf.* Sophocles, Frag. 330 ed. Pearson (307 ed. Nauck) with the note; Plato, *Charmides*, 154 B: *Paroemiographi Graeci*, i. pp. 109, 327.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 413, Euripides, Frag. 183. 2-3, from the *Antiopê*; *cf. Moralia*, 43 B, 622 A, 630 B.

(514) πρόεισι. θαυμαστὸς δ' ὁ Κῦρος, ὅτι καὶ τὰς ἀμίλλας ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τοὺς ἥλικας, οὐκ ἐν οἷς κρείττων ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἀπειρότερος ἦν ἐκείνων, εἰς ταῦτα προκαλούμενος, ἵνα μήτε λυπῇ παρευδοκιμῶν καὶ μανθάνων ὠφελῆται. ὁ δ' ἀδολέσχης τοὐναντίον, ἂν μέν τις ἐμπέσῃ λόγος, ἐξ οὗ μαθεῖν τι δύναται καὶ πυθέσθαι τῶν ἀγνοουμένων, τοῦτον ἐξωθεῖ καὶ ἐκκρούει, μισθὸν οὕτω[1] βραχὺν δοῦναι τὸ[2] σιωπῆσαι μὴ δυνάμενος· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἑώλους καὶ πολυπατήτους κύκλῳ περιὼν εἰσελαύνει ῥαψῳδίας τὸν λόγον. ὡς τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν τις κατὰ τύχην ἀνεγνωκὼς δύο τῶν Ἐφόρου βιβλίων ἢ τρία, πάντας ἀνθρώπους κατέτριβε καὶ πᾶν ἀνάστατον ἐποίει συμπόσιον, ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχην καὶ τὰ συνεχῆ διηγούμενος· ὅθεν Ἐπαμεινώνδας παρωνύμιον ἔσχεν.

23. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε τῶν κακῶν ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ παρατρέπειν εἰς ταῦτα τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ἧττον γὰρ ἀηδὲς ἔσται τὸ λάλον ἐν τῷ φιλολόγῳ πλεονάζον. ἐθιστέον δὲ καὶ γράφειν τι τοὺς τοιού-
D τους καὶ διαλέγεσθαι κατ' ἰδίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Στωικὸς Ἀντίπατρος, ὡς ἔοικε, μὴ δυνάμενος μηδὲ βουλόμενος ὁμόσε χωρεῖν τῷ Καρνεάδῃ μετὰ πολλοῦ ῥεύματος εἰς τὴν Στοὰν φερομένῳ, γράφων δὲ καὶ πληρῶν τὰ βιβλία τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντιλογιῶν, "καλαμοβόας" ἐπεκλήθη· τὸν δ' ἀδολέσχην ἴσως

[1] οὕτω] αὐτῷ most MSS.
[2] τὸ Emperius, confirmed by MSS.: τῷ.

[a] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, i. 4. 4; *cf. Moralia*, 632 c.
[b] With this chapter *cf.* chapters 18 and 19 of *De Laude*

haunts. And Cyrus's[a] conduct was admirable, because he challenged his mates to match themselves with him, not in those contests in which he was superior, but in those in which he was less skilled than they, so that he might cause no pain by surpassing them and might also have the advantage of learning something. But the chatterer, on the contrary, if some topic comes up from which he can learn and find out something he does not know, thrusts it aside and diverts it, being unable to give even so small a fee as silence, but he works steadily around until he drives the conversation into the stale and well-worn paths of twaddle. Just so, in my native town, there was a man who chanced to have read two or three books of Ephorus, and would always bore everybody to death and put every dinner-party to rout by invariably narrating the battle of Leuctra and its sequel; so he got the nickname of "Epameinondas."[b]

23. Nevertheless, this is the least of the evils, and we should turn garrulity into these channels; for talkativeness will be less unpleasant when its excesses are in some learned subject. Yet such persons must accustom themselves to do some writing and so argue all by themselves. So Antipater[c] the Stoic, since, as it seems, he could not and would not come to close quarters with Carneades[d] and his violent attacks upon the Stoa, used to fill whole books with written disputations against him, and so earned the sobriquet of "Pen-valiant." But with the talker, such shadow-

Ipsius (*Moralia*, 546 B-E) and the first part of *Quaestiones Conviv.*, ii. 1 (*Moralia*, 629 E—632 c).
[c] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, iii. p. 244, Frag. 5.
[d] *Cf.* Aulus Gellius, xvii. 15. 1.

ἂν ἡ πρὸς τὸ γραφεῖον[1] σκιαμαχία καὶ βοὴ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπερύκουσα καθ' ἡμέραν ἐλαφρότερον παρασκευάσειε τοῖς συνοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ κύνες εἰς λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὸν θυμὸν ἀφέντες ἧττόν εἰσι χαλεποὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἁρμόσει δ' αὐτοῖς σφόδρα καὶ τὸ μετὰ κρειττόνων ἀεὶ καὶ πρεσβυτέρων
E ὁμιλεῖν· αἰσχυνόμενοι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὴν δόξαν ἐν ἔθει γενήσονται τοῦ σιωπᾶν.

Τούτοις δ' ἀεὶ δεῖ καταμεμῖχθαι καὶ συμπεπλέχθαι τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς τὴν προσοχὴν ἐκείνην καὶ τὸν ἐπιλογισμόν, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν λαλεῖν καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τῷ στόματι προστρέχῃ, " τίς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐφεστὼς καὶ καταβιαζόμενος; ἐπὶ τί δ' ἡ γλῶσσ' ἀσπαίρει;[2] τί δ' εἰπόντι περιγίνεται καλὸν ἢ τί σιωπήσαντι δυσχερές; " οὐ γὰρ ὡς βάρος τι δεῖ πιέζον[3] ἀποθέσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἐπεὶ παραμένει γε καὶ ῥηθεὶς ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἢ δι' αὑτοὺς ἄνθρωποι δεόμενοί τινος λαλοῦσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὠφελοῦντες ἢ
F χάριν τινὰ παρασκευάζοντες ἀλλήλοις ὥσπερ ἁλσὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἐφηδύνουσι τὴν διατριβὴν καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐν ᾗ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες. εἰ δὲ μήτε[4] τῷ λέγοντι χρήσιμον μήτ' ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὸ λεγόμενον ἡδονὴ δὲ[5] καὶ χάρις οὐ πρόσεστι, διὰ τί λέγεται; τὸ γὰρ μάτην καὶ διακενῆς οὐχ ἧττον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις ἔστιν.

Ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ πρό-
515 χειρον ἔχειν καὶ μνημονεύειν τὸ Σιμωνίδειον ὅτι λαλήσας μὲν πολλάκις μετενόησε, σιωπήσας δ'

[1] γραφεῖον G: γράφειν.
[2] ἀσπαίρει] ἀπαίρει most MSS.
[3] πιέζον Reiske, confirmed by G: πιέζοντα.
[4] μήτε Reiske: οὔτε. [5] δὲ Wilamowitz: τε.

boxing[a] with the pen and such alarums, by keeping him away from the multitude, may perhaps make him less of a daily burden to his associates, just as dogs that vent their anger on sticks and stones are less savage to men. And it will also be very advantageous for chatterers to frequent invariably the company of their superiors and elders, out of respect for whose opinion they will become accustomed to silence.

And with these exercises in habituation it is proper to intermix and entwine that well-known vigilance and habit of reflection, at the very moment when we are about to speak and the words are hurrying to our lips, " What is this remark that is so pressing and importunate? What object is my tongue panting for? What good will come of its being said or what ill of its being suppressed? " For it is not as though the remark were some oppressive weight which one ought to get rid of, since it stays by you all the same even if it is spoken; when men talk, it is either for their own sake, because they need something, or to benefit their hearers, or they seek to ingratiate themselves with each other by seasoning with the salt of conversation the pastime or business in which they happen to be engaged. But if a remark is neither useful to the speaker nor of serious importance to the hearers, and if pleasure or charm is not in it, why is it made? For the futile and purposeless can exist in speech as well as in deeds.

And over and above all else we must keep at hand and in our minds the saying of Simonides,[b] that he had often repented of speaking, but never of holding

[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Laws*, 830 A-C.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 10 F, 125 D; 505 F, *supra*.

(515) οὐδέποτε· καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν, ὅτι πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ ἰσχυρότερόν[1] ἐστιν· ὅπου καὶ λυγμὸν καὶ βῆχ' ἄνθρωποι τῷ προσέχειν ἀποβιαζόμενοι, μετὰ πόνου καὶ ἀλγηδόνος ἐξεκρούσαντο. σιγὴ δ' οὐ μόνον ἄδιψον, ὥς φησιν Ἱπποκράτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλυπον καὶ ἀνώδυνον.

[1] *ἰσχυρότερον* Pohlenz: *ἰσχυρόν.*

his tongue. We must remember also that practice is master of all things and stronger than anything else; since people can even get rid of hiccoughs and coughs by resisting them resolutely and with much pain and trouble. But silence, as Hippocrates[a] says, not only prevents thirst, but also never causes sorrow and suffering.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 90 C-D.

ON BEING A BUSYBODY
(DE CURIOSITATE)

INTRODUCTION

THIS essay, which was apparently written only a short time before *De Garrulitate*,[a] has much the same interest and charm as that pleasant work. The essays are akin in many ways ; portions of the later treatise are merely a reshaping of ideas and commonplaces which the earlier had adumbrated.

The source of much of this work has been traced to Ariston of Chios by O. Hense (*Rhein. Mus.*, xlv. 541 ff.); and F. Krauss [b] has shown with some success the relation to diatribe literature.

The essay was already known to Aulus Gellius (xi. 16), who speaks with feeling of the difficulty of rendering πολυπραγμοσύνη in Latin [c] ; nor has it been unknown to English moralists. Jeremy Taylor has again borrowed largely from it in his *Holy Living*, ii. 5.

In the translation of this and the preceding essay I am greatly indebted to Mr. Tucker's [d] spirited version, from which I have taken numerous phrases and sometimes whole sentences.

The work is No. 97 in the Lamprias catalogue.

[a] And no doubt also before *De Tranquillitate* (so rightly Brokate).

[b] *Die Rhetorischen Schriften Plutarchs*, Munich Diss., Nürnberg, 1912, pp. 67 ff. See also the interesting table (p. 87) of rhetorical figures which places our essay in the very centre of Plutarch's literary activity.

[c] It is hard to render it in English also. The translator uses the word " curiosity "—ED.

[d] *Select Essays of Plutarch*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1913.

(515) B

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΥΠΡΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗΣ

1. Ἄπνουν ἢ σκοτεινὴν ἢ δυσχείμερον οἰκίαν ἢ νοσώδη φυγεῖν μὲν ἴσως ἄριστον· ἂν δὲ φιλοχωρῇ τις ὑπὸ συνηθείας, ἔστι καὶ φῶτα μεταθέντα καὶ κλίμακα μεταβαλόντα καὶ θύρας τινὰς ἀνοίξαντα τὰς δὲ κλείσαντα λαμπροτέραν εὐπνουστέραν ὑγιεινοτέραν μηχανήσασθαι.[1] καὶ πόλεις τινὲς οὕτω C μεταθέντες ὠφέλησαν· ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ζέφυρον ἄνεμον κεκλιμένην καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐρείδοντα δείλης ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρνασσοῦ δεχομένην ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπῆναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαίρωνος. ὁ δὲ φυσικὸς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὄρους τινὰ διασφάγα βαρὺν καὶ νοσώδη κατὰ τῶν πεδίων τὸν νότον ἐμπνέουσαν[2] ἐμφράξας, λοιμὸν ἔδοξεν ἐκκλεῖσαι τῆς χώρας.

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἔστι τινὰ πάθη νοσώδη καὶ βλαβερὰ καὶ χειμῶνα παρέχοντα τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ σκότος, ἄριστον μὲν ἐξωθεῖν ταῦτα καὶ καταλύειν εἰς ἔδαφος, αἰθρίαν καὶ φῶς καὶ πνεῦμα καθαρὸν διδόντας D ἑαυτοῖς· εἰ δὲ μή, μεταλαμβάνειν γε καὶ μεθαρμόττειν ἁμωσγέπως[3] περιάγοντας ἢ στρέφοντας.

[1] μηχανήσασθαι] ἐργάσασθαι most MSS.
[2] ἐμπνέουσιν] ἐκπνέουσαν Reiske.
[3] ἁμωσγέπως Reiske: ἄλλως γέ πως.

[a] Chaeroneia.

ON BEING A BUSYBODY

1. It is perhaps best to avoid a house which has no ventilation, or is gloomy, or cold in winter, or unhealthy; yet if familiarity has made you fond of the place, it is possible to make it brighter, better ventilated, and healthier by altering the lights, shifting the stairs, and opening some doors and closing others. Even some cities have gained by such changes. So in the case of my own town,[a] which used to face the west and receive the full force of the sun in the late afternoon from Parnassus, they say that it was turned by Chaeron to face the east. And Empedocles,[b] the natural philosopher, by blocking up a certain mountain gorge, which permitted the south wind to blow a dire and pestilential draught down upon the plains, was thought to have shut plague out of his country.

Since, then, there are certain unhealthy and injurious states of mind which allow winter and darkness to enter the soul, it is better to thrust these out and to make a clean sweep to the foundations, thus giving to ourselves a clear sky and light and pure air; but if that is impossible, it is best at least to interchange and readjust them in some way or other, turning or shifting them about.

[b] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[3], i. p. 284. A 14; *cf.* *Moralia*, 1126 B.

(515) Οἷον εὐθὺς ἡ πολυπραγμοσύνη φιλομάθειά τίς ἐστιν ἀλλοτρίων κακῶν, οὔτε φθόνου δοκοῦσα καθαρεύειν νόσος οὔτε κακοηθείας·

τί τἀλλότριον, ἄνθρωπε βασκανώτατε,
κακὸν ὀξυδορκεῖς τὸ δ' ἴδιον παραβλέπεις;

μετάθες ἔξωθεν καὶ μετάστρεψον εἴσω τὴν πολυπραγμοσύνην· εἰ χαίρεις κακῶν μεταχειριζόμενος ἱστορίαν, ἔχεις οἴκοι πολλὴν διατριβήν·

ὅσσον ὕδωρ κατ' Ἀλιζόνος ἢ δρυὸς ἀμφὶ πέτηλα,[1]

τοσοῦτον πλῆθος εὑρήσεις ἁμαρτημάτων ἐν τῷ βίῳ
E καὶ παθῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ παροραμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσιν.

Ὡς γὰρ ὁ Ξενοφῶν λέγει τοῖς οἰκονομικοῖς ἴδιον εἶναι τῶν ἀμφὶ θυσίαν σκευῶν, ἴδιον τῶν ἀμφὶ δεῖπνα τόπον, ἀλλαχοῦ κεῖσθαι τὰ γεωργικά, χωρὶς τὰ πρὸς πόλεμον, οὕτω σοι τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀπὸ φθόνου κακὰ κείμενα, τὰ δ' ἀπὸ ζηλοτυπίας, τὰ δ' ἀπὸ δειλίας, τὰ δ' ἀπὸ μικρολογίας· ταῦτ' ἔπελθε, ταῦτ' ἀναθεώρησον· τὰς εἰς γειτόνων θυρίδας καὶ τὰς παρόδους τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης ἔμφραξον, ἑτέρας δ' ἄνοιξον εἰς τὴν ἀνδρωνῖτιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ φερούσας, εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν, εἰς τὰς τῶν θεραπόν-
F των διαίτας· ἐνταῦθ' ἔχει διατριβὰς οὐκ ἀχρήστους

[1] ὅσσος ὕδωρ καθ' ἁλὸς στόνος ἢ δρ. ἀμφὶ πέτ. Madvig.

[a] *Cf.* Menander's typical curious slave, a πολυπράγμων, 474

Such a malady of the mind, to take the first instance, is curiosity, which is a desire to learn the troubles of others,[a] a disease which is thought to be free from neither envy nor malice :

Why do you look so sharp on others' ills,
Malignant man, yet overlook your own ? [b]

Shift your curiosity from things without and turn it inwards ; if you enjoy dealing with the recital of troubles, you have much occupation at home :

Great as the water flowing down Alizon,
Many as the leaves around the oak,[c]

so great a quantity of transgressions will you find in your own life, of afflictions in your own soul, of oversights in the performance of your own obligations.

For as Xenophon [d] says that good householders have a special place for sacrificial utensils, and a special place for dinner-ware, and that farming implements should be stored elsewhere, and apart from them the weapons of war ; even so in your own case you have one store of faults arising from envy, another from jealousy, another from cowardice, another from pettiness. Assault these, examine these ! Block up the windows and the side-doors of your curiosity that open on your neighbours' property, and open up others leading to your own—to the men's quarters, to the women's quarters, to the living-rooms of your servants ! Here this curiosity and meddlesomeness of yours will have an occupation not unhelpful or

who says (Frag. 850 Kock) : οὐδὲν γλυκύτερόν ἐστιν ἢ πάντ' εἰδέναι.

[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 476, ades. 359 ; *cf.* 469 B, *supra*.

[c] A verse of unknown origin ; the text is probably corrupt.

[d] *Oeconomicus*, viii. 19, 20.

οὐδὲ κακοήθεις ἀλλ' ὠφελίμους καὶ σωτηρίους τὸ φιλοπευθὲς τοῦτο καὶ φιλόπραγμον, ἑκάστου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν λέγοντος,

πῆ τραπόμην;[1] τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;

2. Νῦν δ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ τὴν Λάμιαν λέγουσιν οἴκοι μὲν εὕδειν[2] τυφλήν, ἐν ἀγγείῳ τινὶ
516 τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχουσαν ἀποκειμένους, ἔξω δὲ προϊοῦσαν ἐντίθεσθαι[3] καὶ βλέπειν, οὕτως ἡμῶν ἕκαστος ἔξω καὶ πρὸς ἑτέρους τῇ κακονοίᾳ τὴν περιεργίαν ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸν ἐντίθησι, τοῖς δ' ἑαυτῶν ἁμαρτήμασι καὶ κακοῖς πολλάκις περιπταίομεν ὑπ' ἀγνοίας, ὄψιν ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ φῶς οὐποριζόμενοι. διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὠφελιμώτερός ἐστιν ὁ πολυπράγμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐκείνων ἐλέγχει καὶ προφέρεται καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐτοῖς ἃ δεῖ φυλάξασθαι καὶ διορθῶσαι, τῶν δ' οἴκοι τὰ πλεῖστα παροραῖ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἔξω πτόησιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς οὐδὲ τῇ μητρὶ διαλεχθῆναι πρότερον ὑπέμεινεν ἢ πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ μάντεως, ὧν ἕνεκ' ἦλθεν εἰς Ἅιδου·
B πυθόμενος δὲ τοῦτο πρός τε ταύτην ἔτρεψεν αὐτόν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας γυναῖκας ἀνέκρινε, τίς ἡ Τυρὼ καὶ τίς ἡ καλὴ Χλωρὶς καὶ διὰ τί ἡ[4] Ἐπικάστη ἀπέθανεν

ἁψαμένη βρόχον αἰπὺν ἀφ' ὑψηλοῖο μελάθρου.[5]

[1] τραπόμην] παρέβην *Mor.*, 168 B.
[2] εὕδειν Xylander: ἄδειν.
[3] ἐντίθεσθαι Pohlenz: ἀποτίθεσθαι or περιτίθεσθαι.
[4] τί ἡ] τίν' all MSS. but two.
[5] μελάθρου] omitted in all MSS. except two.

malicious, but useful and salutary if each one will but say to himself,

Where did I err? And what deed have I done?
What duty neglected?[a]

2. But as it is, like the Lamia in the fable, who, they say, when at home sleeps in blindness with her eyes stored away in a jar, but when she goes abroad puts in her eyes and can see, so each one of us, in our dealings with others abroad, puts his meddlesomeness, like an eye, into his maliciousness; but we are often tripped up by our own faults and vices by reason of our ignorance of them, since we provide ourselves with no sight or light by which to inspect them. Therefore the busybody is also more useful to his enemies than to himself,[b] for he rebukes and drags out their faults and demonstrates to them what they should avoid or correct, but he neglects the greater part of his own domestic errors through his passionate interest in those abroad. So Odysseus[c] refused to converse even with his mother until he had learned from the seer[d] the matters by reason of which he had come to the House of Hades; and when he had his answer, he both turned to his mother and also made inquiries of the other women,[e] asking who was Tyro, who the beautiful Chloris, why Epicastê met her death

Tying a noose, sheer-hung, from the high roof.[f]

[a] "Pythagoras," *Carmina Aurea*, 42; *cf. Moralia*, 168 B.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 87 B-C.
[c] *Cf.* Homer, *Od.*, xi. 88 ff.; Ps.-Lucian, *De Astrologia*, 24.
[d] Teiresias.
[e] *Od.*, xi. 229 ff.
[f] *Ibid.* 278; Epicastê is better known as Jocasta, the mother of Oedipus.

(516) ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ καθ' αὑτοὺς ἐν πολλῇ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ θέμενοι καὶ ἀμελήσαντες ἑτέρους γενεαλογοῦμεν ὅτι τοῦ γείτονος ὁ πάππος ἦν Σύρος, Θρᾷττα δ' ἡ τήθη,[1] ὁ δεῖνα δ' ὀφείλει τάλαντα τρία καὶ τοὺς τόκους οὐκ ἀποδέδωκεν.[2] ἐξετάζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, πόθεν ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ δεῖνος ἐπανήρχετο,
C τί δ' ὁ δεῖνα καὶ ὁ δεῖνα καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ διελέγοντο. Σωκράτης δὲ περιῄει διαπορῶν τί Πυθαγόρας λέγων ἔπειθε· καὶ Ἀρίστιππος Ὀλυμπίασιν Ἰσχομάχῳ συμβαλὼν ἠρώτα τί Σωκράτης διαλεγόμενος οὕτω τοὺς νέους[3] διατίθησι· καὶ μίκρ' ἄττα τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ σπέρματα καὶ δείγματα λαβὼν οὕτως ἐμπαθῶς ἔσχεν ὥστε τῷ σώματι συμπεσεῖν καὶ γενέσθαι παντάπασιν ὠχρὸς καὶ ἰσχνός· ἄχρις οὗ πλεύσας Ἀθήναζε διψῶν καὶ διακεκαυμένος ἠρύσατο τῆς πηγῆς, καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἱστόρησεν, ἧς ἦν τέλος ἐπιγνῶναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κακὰ καὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι.

3. Ἀλλ' ἔνιοι τὸν ἴδιον βίον ὡς ἀτερπέστατον
D θέαμα προσιδεῖν οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν οὐδ' ἀνακλάσαι τὸν λογισμὸν ὡς φῶς ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς καὶ περιαγαγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ γέμουσα κακῶν παντοδαπῶν καὶ φρίττουσα καὶ φοβουμένη τὰ ἔνδον ἐκπηδᾷ θύραζε καὶ πλανᾶται περὶ τἀλλότρια, βόσκουσα καὶ πιαίνουσα τὸ κακόηθες. ὡς γὰρ ὄρνις ἐν οἰκίᾳ[4] πολλάκις τροφῆς παρακειμένης εἰς γωνίαν καταδῦσα σκαλεύει

[1] τήθη] τίτθη most MSS.
[2] ἀποδέδωκεν] ἀπέδωκεν some MSS.
[3] νέους] θεοὺς, or Ἀθηναίους, or θεατὰς various MSS.
[4] οἰκίᾳ] οἰκίσκῳ Valckenaer.

But we, while treating our own affairs with considerable laxity and ignorance and neglect, pry into the pedigrees of the rest of the world: our neighbour's grandfather was a Syrian and his grandmother a Thracian [a]; so-and-so owes three talents and has not paid the interest. We inquire also into such matters as where so-and-so's wife was coming back from,[b] and what A and B's private conversation in the corner was about. Yet Socrates went about seeking to solve the question of what arguments Pythagoras used to carry conviction; and Aristippus, when he met Ischomachus at Olympia, asked him by what manner of conversation Socrates succeeded in so affecting the young men. And when Aristippus had gleaned a few odd seeds and samples of Socrates' talk, he was so moved that he suffered a physical collapse and became quite pale and thin. Finally he sailed for Athens and slaked his burning thirst with draughts from the fountain-head, and engaged in a study of the man and his words and his philosophy, of which the end and aim was to come to recognize one's own vices and so rid oneself of them.

3. Yet there are some who cannot bear to face their own lives, regarding these as a most unlovely spectacle, or to reflect and revolve upon themselves, like a light, the power of reason, but their souls, being full of all manner of vices, shuddering and frightened at what is within, leap outwards and prowl about other people's concerns and there batten and make fat their own malice. For as a domestic fowl will often, though its own food lies near at hand, slip into a corner and there scratch

[a] That is, both were probably slaves.
[b] *i.e.*, where she had been.

(516) *ἔνθα γέ που*[1] *διαφαίνεθ' ἅτ' ἐν κοπρίῃ*[2] *μία κριθή*

παραπλησίως οἱ πολυπράγμονες, ὑπερβάντες τοὺς ἐν μέσῳ λόγους καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς κωλύει πυνθάνεσθαι μηδ' ἄχθεται πυνθανομένοις, τὰ κρυπ-
E *τόμενα καὶ λανθάνοντα κακὰ πάσης οἰκίας ἐκλέγουσι. καίτοι τό γε*[3] *τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου χαρίεν πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τί φέρει συγκεκαλυμμένον, "διὰ τοῦτο συγκεκάλυπται." καὶ σὺ δὴ τί πολυπραγμονεῖς τὸ ἀποκρυπτόμενον; εἰ μή τι κακὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἀπεκρύπτετο. καίτοι μὴ κόψαντά γε θύραν εἰς οἰκίαν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ νομίζεται παρελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν εἰσὶ θυρωροί, πάλαι δὲ ῥόπτρα ἃ*[4] *κρουόμενα πρὸς ταῖς θύραις αἴσθησιν παρεῖχεν, ἵνα μὴ τὴν οἰκοδέσποιναν ἐν μέσῳ καταλάβῃ ὁ ἀλλότριος ἢ τὴν*
F *παρθένον ἢ κολαζόμενον οἰκέτην ἢ κεκραγυίας τὰς θεραπαινίδας· ὁ δὲ πολυπράγμων ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα παραδύεται· σώφρονος μὲν οἰκίας καὶ καθεστώσης οὐδ' ἂν παρακαλῇ τις ἡδέως γινόμενος θεατής· ὧν δ' ἕνεκα κλεὶς καὶ μοχλὸς καὶ αὔλειος, ταῦτ' ἀνακαλύπτων καὶ φέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον ἑτέροις. καίτοι καὶ "τῶν ἀνέμων μάλιστα δυσχεραίνομεν," ὡς Ἀρίστων φησίν, "ὅσοι τὰς περιβολὰς ἀναστέλλουσιν ἡμῶν"· ὁ δὲ πολυπράγμων οὐ τὰ ἱμάτια τῶν πέλας οὐδὲ τοὺς χιτῶνας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοίχους ἀπαμφιέννυσι, τὰς θύρας ἀναπετάννυσι, καὶ "διὰ*

[1] *ἐνθάδε καὶ* most MSS.
[2] *κοπρίῃ*] *κοπρίᾳ* all MSS. but G.
[3] *τό γε*] *γε τὸ* most MSS.
[4] *ἃ* added by Capps.

Where one sole barley grain perhaps appears
In the dung-heap,[a]

in the same way busybodies, passing over topics and narratives which are in plain view and matters concerning which no one prevents their inquiring or is vexed if inquiry is made, pick out the hidden and obscure troubles of every household. And yet it was surely a clever answer that the Egyptian gave to the man who asked him what he was carrying wrapped up: "That's why it *is* wrapped up." And why, if you please, are *you* inquisitive about what is concealed? If it were not something bad, it would not be concealed. Yet it is not customary to walk into the house of someone else without at least first knocking on the door; but nowadays there are doormen and formerly there were knockers to be struck at the door and give warning, so that the stranger might not catch the mistress of the house or the unmarried daughter unawares, or a slave being punished or the maid-servants screaming. But it is for these very things that the busybody slips in. A sober and respectable household he would not willingly enter as a spectator even if he were invited to come; but the matters to conceal which keys and bolts and street-doors are used—these are what he uncovers and communicates to outsiders. And yet "the winds with which we are most vexed," as Ariston[b] says, "are those which pull up our garments," but the busybody strips off not only the mantles and tunics of those near him, but also their very walls; he flings the doors wide open and makes his way, like

[a] Perhaps a verse of Callimachus (Frag. anon. 374 ed. Schneider).
[b] Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, i. pp. 89-90, Frag. 401.

παρθενικῆς ἁπαλόχροος" ὡς πνεῦμα διαδύεται
517 καὶ διέρπει, βακχεῖα καὶ χοροὺς καὶ παννυχίδας
ἐξετάζων καὶ συκοφαντῶν.

4. Καὶ καθάπερ τοῦ κωμῳδουμένου Κλέωνος

τὼ χεῖρ' ἐν Αἰτωλοῖς, ὁ νοῦς δ'[1] ἐν Κλωπιδῶν,

οὕτω τοῦ πολυπράγμονος ὁ νοῦς ἅμ' ἐν πλουσίων οἴκοις ἐστίν, ἐν δωματίοις πενήτων, ἐν αὐλαῖς βασιλέων, ἐν θαλάμοις νεογάμων· πάντα[2] πράγματα ζητεῖ, τὰ ξένων, τὰ ἡγεμόνων, οὐδ' ἀκινδύνως ταῦτα ζητῶν· ἀλλ' οἷον, εἴ τις ἀκονίτου γεύοιτο πολυπραγμονῶν τὴν ποιότητα, φθάσειεν ἂν[3] τῆς αἰσθήσεως προανελὼν τὸν αἰσθανόμενον,[4] οὕτως οἱ τὰ τῶν μειζόνων κακὰ ζητοῦντες προαναλίσκουσι
B τῆς γνώσεως ἑαυτούς. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν ἄφθονόν γε ταύτην καὶ κατακεχυμένην ἅπασιν ἀκτῖνα παρορῶντες, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον ἀναιδῶς καταβλέπειν καὶ διαστέλλειν τὸ φῶς εἴσω βιαζόμενοι καὶ τολμῶντες ἀποτυφλοῦνται. διὸ καλῶς Φιλιππίδης ὁ κωμῳδιοποιός, εἰπόντος αὐτῷ ποτε Λυσιμάχου τοῦ βασιλέως, "τίνος σοι τῶν ἐμῶν μεταδῶ;" "μόνον," εἶπεν, "ὦ βασιλεῦ, μὴ τῶν ἀπορρήτων." τὰ γὰρ ἥδιστα καὶ κάλλιστα τῶν βασιλέων ἔξω πρόκειται, τὰ δεῖπνα, οἱ πλοῦτοι, αἱ πανηγύρεις, αἱ χάριτες· εἰ δέ τι ἀπόρρητον ἔστι,

[1] νοῦς δ'] δὲ νοῦς most mss. of Plutarch and Aristophanes.
[2] πάντα] παντοῖα Reiske.
[3] φθάσειεν ἄν W.C.H.: φθάσει.
[4] τὸν αἰσθανόμενον W.C.H. after Madvig (who read τὸ): τὸν or τὸ προαισθανόμενον.

[a] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 519; *cf.* 465 D, *supra*.

a piercing wind, "through the maiden of tender skin,"[a] and creeps in, searching out with slanderous intent drunken revels and dances and all-night festivals.

4. And like Cleon in the comedy,[b]

His hands in Beggar-town, his mind on Thefton,[c]

so the mind of the busybody is at the same time in mansions of the rich, in hovels of the poor, in royal courts, and in bridal chambers of the newly-wed. He searches out everybody's business, that of strangers and that of rulers, nor is this search of his without danger; but just as though a man should taste aconite[d] through curiosity about its properties, he would find that he had killed the taster before he had got his taste, so those who search out the vices of those more powerful than themselves destroy themselves before they acquire their knowledge. For instance those who scarcely glance[e] at these sunbeams which have been poured down so lavishly upon us all, but recklessly dare to gaze upon the orb itself and to rend its radiance apart, striving to force their way within, are blinded. This is the reason why Philippides,[f] the comic poet, made an excellent reply when King Lysimachus once said to him, "Which one of my possessions may I share with you?" "Anything, Sire," said Philippides, "except your secrets." For only the most pleasant and most decorous attributes of kings are displayed openly—their banquets and wealth and festivals and favours; but if there is any-

[b] Aristophanes, *Knights*, 79; *Klopidai* (Thief-deme) is a play upon the actual deme *Kropidai*.
[c] Or better, Theevingen.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 49 E.
[e] *Cf.* Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iv. 3. 14.
[f] *Cf.* 508 C, *supra*.

(517) μὴ προσέλθῃς μηδὲ κινήσῃς. οὐ κρύπτεται χαρὰ
C βασιλέως εὐτυχοῦντος οὐδὲ γέλως παίζοντος οὐδὲ φιλανθρωπίας παρασκευὴ καὶ χάριτος· φοβερόν ἐστι τὸ κρυπτόμενον, σκυθρωπὸν ἀγέλαστον δυσπρόσιτον, ὀργῆς τινος ὑπούλου θησαυρὸς ἢ τιμωρίας βαρυθύμου σκέψις ἢ ζηλοτυπία γυναικὸς ἢ πρὸς υἱὸν ὑποψία τις ἢ πρὸς φίλον ἀπιστία. φεῦγε τὸ μελαῖνον[1] τοῦτο καὶ συνιστάμενον νέφος· οὐ λήσεταί σε βροντῆσαν οὐδ' ἀστράψαν ὅταν ἐκραγῇ τὸ νῦν κρυπτόμενον.

5. Τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; περισπασμός, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ μεθολκὴ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης μάλιστα μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ ἡδίω τρέψαντι τὴν ψυχήν. τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ πολυπραγμόνει, τὰ ἐν γῇ, τὰ ἐν ἀέρι, τὰ ἐν
D θαλάττῃ. μικρῶν πέφυκας ἢ μεγάλων φιλοθεάμων; εἰ μεγάλων, ἥλιον πολυπραγμόνει ποῦ[2] κάτεισι καὶ πόθεν ἄνεισι· ζήτει τὰς ἐν σελήνῃ καθάπερ ἐν[3] ἀνθρώπῳ μεταβολάς, ποῦ τοσοῦτον κατανήλωσε φῶς, πόθεν αὖθις ἐκτήσατο, πῶς

ἐξ ἀδήλου πρῶτον ἔρχεται νέα
πρόσωπα καλλύνουσα καὶ πληρουμένη·
χὥταν περ αὐτῆς εὐγανεστάτη[4] φανῇ,
πάλιν διαρρεῖ κἀπὶ μηδὲν ἔρχεται.

καὶ ταῦτ' ἀπόρρητ' ἐστὶ φύσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄχθεται τοῖς ἐλέγχουσιν. ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων ἀπέγνωκας; πολυπραγμόνει τὰ μικρότερα, πῶς τῶν φυτῶν τὰ

[1] μελαῖνον] μελανὸν most MSS.
[2] ποῦ] ποῖ Bernardakis.
[3] ἐν] omitted in most MSS.
[4] εὐγανεστάτη Pohlenz; εὐγενεστάτη or εὐπρεπεστάτη.

[a] In 515 D, *supra*.

thing secret, do not approach it, but let it be! The joy of a prosperous king is not concealed, nor is his laughter when he is amused, nor his outlay on entertainment and favours; but it is time for alarm when something is hidden, something dark, unsmiling, unapproachable, a storehouse of festering wrath, or the meditation of a punishment indicative of sullen anger, or jealousy of a wife, or some suspicion against a son, or distrust of a friend. Beware of this darkening and gathering cloud! That which is now hidden will be disclosed to you when the cloud bursts forth amid crashes of thunder and bolts of lightning!

5. What escape is there, then, from this vice? By a process of shifting and diverting our inquisitiveness, as has been said,[a] and, if possible, by turning the soul to better and more pleasant subjects. Direct your curiosity to heavenly things and things on earth, in the air, in the sea. Are you by nature fond of small or of great spectacles? If of great ones, apply your curiosity to the sun: where does it set and whence does it rise? Inquire into the changes in the moon, as you would into those of a human being: what becomes of all the light she has spent and from what source did she regain it, how does it happen that

When out of darkness first she comes anew,
She shows her face increasing fair and full:
And when she reaches once her brightest sheen,
Again she wastes away and comes to naught?[b]

And these are secrets of Nature, yet Nature is not vexed with those who find them out. Or suppose you have renounced great things. Then turn your

[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 315, Sophocles, Frag. 787 (871 ed. Pearson); the full quotation may be found in *Life of Demetrius*, xlv. (911 C-D). *Cf.* also *Moralia*, 282 B.

μὲν ἀεὶ τέθηλε καὶ χλοάζει καὶ ἀγάλλεται παντὶ
E καιρῷ τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιδεικνύμενα πλοῦτον, τὰ δὲ νῦν μέν ἐστιν ὅμοια τούτοις, νῦν δ' ὥσπερ ἀνοικονόμητος ἄνθρωπος ἐκχέαντ' ἀθρόως τὴν περιουσίαν γυμνὰ καὶ πτωχὰ καταλείπεται· διὰ τί δὲ τὰ μὲν προμήκεις τὰ δὲ γωνιώδεις τὰ δὲ στρογγύλους καὶ περιφερεῖς ἐκδίδωσι καρπούς.

Ἴσως δὲ ταῦτ' οὐ πολυπραγμονήσεις, ὅτι τούτοις οὐδὲν κακὸν ἔνεστιν.[1] ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ πάντως τὸ περίεργον ἐν φαύλοις τισίν, ὥσπερ ἕρπετὸν ἐν θανασίμοις ὕλαις, ἀεὶ νέμεσθαι καὶ διατρίβειν, ἐπὶ τὰς ἱστορίας ἀγάγωμεν αὐτὸ καὶ παραβάλωμεν ἀφθονίαν κακῶν καὶ περιουσίαν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἔνεισι

πεσήματ' ἀνδρῶν κἀπολακτισμοὶ[2] βίων,[3]

F φθοραὶ γυναικῶν, ἐπιθέσεις οἰκετῶν, διαβολαὶ φίλων, παρασκευαὶ φαρμάκων, φθόνοι, ζηλοτυπίαι, ναυάγι' οἴκων, ἐκπτώσεις ἡγεμονιῶν[4]· ἐμπίπλασο καὶ τέρπε σαυτόν, ἐνοχλῶν μηδενὶ τῶν συνόντων μηδὲ λυπῶν.

6. Ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ πολυπραγμοσύνη μὴ χαίρειν ἑώλοις κακοῖς ἀλλὰ θερμοῖς καὶ προσφάτοις· καὶ
518 καινὰς τραγῳδίας ἡδέως θεᾶσθαι, τοῖς δὲ κωμικοῖς καὶ ἱλαρωτέροις πράγμασιν οὐ μάλα προθύμως ὁμιλεῖν. διὸ γάμον μέν τινος ἢ θυσίαν ἢ προπομπὴν διεξιόντος ἀμελὴς ὁ πολυπράγμων καὶ ῥᾴθυμος ἀκροατής ἐστι, καὶ προακηκοέναι τὰ πλεῖστά φησι καὶ κελεύει ταῦτα συντέμνειν καὶ παρέρχεσθαι τὸν

[1] ἔνεστιν Pohlenz: ἔστιν.
[2] πεσήματ' . . . κἀπολακτισμοὶ Dübner: πεσήματα . . . καὶ ἀπολακτισμοί.

curiosity to smaller ones: how are some plants always blooming and green and rejoicing in the display of their wealth at every season, while others are sometimes like these, but at other times, like a human spendthrift, they squander all at once their abundance and are left bare and beggared? Why, again, do some plants produce elongated fruits, others angular, and still others round and globular?

But perhaps you will have no curiosity about these subjects since there is nothing evil in them. Yet if your zest for meddling must by all means be for ever feeding and dwelling on depraved things, like a maggot on dead matter, let us escort it to history and supply it with an unstinted abundance of evils. For there you will find

The deaths of men, the shufflings off of life,[a]

seductions of women, assaults of slaves, slanders of friends, compounding of poisons, envies, jealousies, shipwrecks of households, overthrow of empires. Glut and enjoy yourself and cause no trouble or pain to any of your associates!

6. But curiosity apparently takes no pleasure in stale calamities, but wants them hot and fresh; it enjoys the spectacle of novel tragedies and has not much zest for association with the comic and more cheerful side of life. Consequently when anyone tells the tale of a wedding or a sacrifice or a complimentary escort, the busybody is a careless and inattentive listener, and declares that he has already heard most of the details and urges the narrator to

[a] Aeschylus, *Suppliants*, 937; *cf. Moralia*, 937 F.

[3] βίου Aeschylus.
[4] ἡγεμόνων most mss.

(518) διηγούμενον· ἂν δ' ἢ φθοράν τις παρθένου παρακαθήμενος ἢ μοιχείαν γυναικὸς ἢ δίκης παρασκευὴν ἢ στάσιν ἀδελφῶν διηγῆται, οὔτε νυστάζει οὔτ' ἀσχολεῖται,

ἄλλα τε δίζηται ἐπέων παρά τ' οὔατα βάλλει.

καὶ τὸ

οἴμοι, τὸ κακὸν τῆς εὐτυχίας
ὡς μᾶλλον ἐς οὓς φέρεται θνητῶν

ἐπὶ τῶν πολυπραγμόνων ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς εἰρημένον. B ὡς γὰρ αἱ σικύαι τὸ χείριστον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἕλκουσιν, οὕτω τὰ τῶν πολυπραγμόνων ὦτα τοὺς φαυλοτάτους λόγους ἐπισπᾶται. μᾶλλον δ', ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἔχουσί τινας πύλας ἀποφράδας καὶ σκυθρωπάς, δι' ὧν ἐξάγουσι τοὺς θανατουμένους καὶ τὰ λύματα καὶ τοὺς καθαρμοὺς ἐκβάλλουσιν, εὐαγὲς δ' οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἱερὸν εἴσεισι οὐδ' ἔξεισι δι' αὐτῶν· οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν πολυπραγμόνων ὦτα χρηστὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀστεῖον ἀλλ' οἱ φονικοὶ λόγοι διέρχονται καὶ τρίβουσιν, ἐκθύσιμα καὶ μιαρὰ διηγήματα παρακομίζοντες.

ἀεὶ δ' ἀοιδῶν[1] μοῦνος ἐν στέγαις ἐμαῖς
κωκυτὸς ἐμπέπτωκεν·

C αὕτη τοῖς πολυπράγμοσι μοῦσα καὶ σειρὴν μία, τοῦθ' ἥδιστον ἀκουσμάτων αὐτοῖς.

Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολυπραγμοσύνη[2] φιλοπευστία τῶν ἐν ἀποκρύψει καὶ λανθανόντων· οὐδεὶς δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀποκρύπτει κεκτημένος, ὅπου καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα

[1] ἀοιδῶν] ἀείδων most mss.: ἀηδὼν Lumb.
[2] φιλοπραγμοσύνη most mss.

cut them short or skip them. But if someone sitting near at hand narrates the seduction of a maiden or the adultery of a wife or the framing of a law-suit or a quarrel of brothers, the busybody neither dozes off to sleep nor pleads an engagement,

But asks more speech and proffers both his ears [a];

and that saying,[b]

Alas!
How much more readily than glad events
Is mischance carried to the ears of men!

is spoken truly when applied to busybodies. For as cupping-glasses [c] draw from the flesh what is worst in it, so the ears of busybodies attract the most evil stories. Or rather, as cities have certain unlucky and dismal gates through which they lead out condemned criminals and cast out the refuse [d] and the scapegoats, while nothing undefiled or sacred either goes in or out through them, so also the ears of busybodies give passage and thoroughfare to nothing good or decent, but only to gruesome tales, serving, as they do, as conveyance for foul and polluted narratives.

The only song that's heard within my house
Is wailing cries.[e]

This is the one Muse and Siren for busybodies, this is the sweetest of all music to their ears.

For curiosity is really a passion for finding out whatever is hidden and concealed, and no one conceals a good thing when he has it; why, people even pretend to have good things when they have them

[a] Callimachus, Frag. anon. 375 ed. Schneider.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 913, ades. 386.
[c] *Cf.* 469 B, *supra*, and *Moralia*, 600 C.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 271 A.
[e] *Cf.* 463 B, *supra*.

(518) προσποιοῦνται. κακῶν οὖν ἱστορίας ὁ πολυπράγμων ὀρεγόμενος, ἐπιχαιρεκακίας συνέχεται πάθει, φθόνου καὶ βασκανίας ἀδελφῷ. φθόνος μὲν γάρ ἐστι λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ἐπιχαιρεκακία δ' ἡδονὴ ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· ἀμφότερα δ' ἐκ πάθους ἀνημέρου καὶ θηριώδους γεγένηται τῆς κακοηθείας.

7. Οὕτω δ' ἑκάστῳ λυπηρόν ἐστιν ἡ τῶν περὶ D αὐτὸν κακῶν ἀνακάλυψις, ὥστε πολλοὺς ἀποθανεῖν πρότερον ἢ δεῖξαί τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων νοσημάτων ἰατροῖς. φέρε γὰρ Ἡρόφιλον ἢ Ἐρασίστρατον ἢ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν αὐτόν, ὅτ' ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἔχοντα τὰ φάρμακα καὶ τὰ ὄργανα, κατ' οἰκίαν προσιστάμενον[1] ἀνακρίνειν μή τις ἔχει σύριγγα παρὰ δακτύλιον[2] ἢ γυνὴ καρκίνον ἐν ὑστέρᾳ· καίτοι σωτήριόν ἐστι τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τὸ πολύπραγμον· ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἄν τις, οἶμαι, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀπήλασεν, ὅτι τὴν χρείαν οὐ περιμένων ἄκλητος ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων κακῶν ἔρχεται κατανόησιν. οἱ δὲ πολυπράγμονες αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ E τὰ τούτων ἔτι χείρονα ζητοῦσιν, οὐ θεραπεύοντες ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀνακαλύπτοντες· ὅθεν μισοῦνται δικαίως. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς τελώνας βαρυνόμεθα καὶ δυσχεραίνομεν, οὐχ ὅταν τὰ ἐμφανῆ τῶν εἰσαγομένων ἐκλέγωσιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν τὰ κεκρυμμένα ζητοῦντες ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις σκεύεσι καὶ φορτίοις ἀναστρέφωνται· καίτοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὁ νόμος δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ βλάπτονται μὴ ποιοῦντες. οἱ δὲ πολυπράγμονες

[1] παριστάμενον some mss. [2] περὶ δακτύλιον most mss.

[a] A term better expressed by the German *Schadenfreude*.
[b] *Cf. Moralia*, 1046 B.
[c] Of Chalcedon, a great anatomist of the Alexandrian age (*flor. circa* 300 B.C.).

not. Since, then, it is the searching out of troubles that the busybody desires, he is possessed by the affliction called "malignancy,"[a] brother to envy and spite. For envy is pain at another's good, while malignancy is joy at another's evil[b]; and both spring from a savage and bestial affliction, a vicious nature.

7. So painful for all of us is the revelation of our own troubles that many die rather than reveal to physicians some hidden malady. Just imagine Herophilus[c] or Erasistratus[d] or Asclepius himself, when he was a mortal man,[e] carrying about their drugs and instruments, calling at one house after another, and inquiring whether a man had an abscess in the anus or a woman a cancer in the womb! And yet the inquisitiveness of this profession is a salutary thing. Yet everyone, I imagine, would have driven such a man away, because he does not wait to be sent for, but comes unsummoned to investigate others' infirmities. And busybodies search out these very matters and others still worse, not to cure, but merely to expose them. For this reason they are hated deservedly. For example, we are annoyed and displeased with customs-officials, not when they pick up those articles which we are importing openly, but when in the search for concealed goods they pry into baggage and merchandize which are another's property. And yet the law allows them to do this and they would lose[f] by not doing so. But busybodies ruin and abandon

[d] Of Ceos, worked in Alexandria at the height of his fame (258 B.C.).
[e] Asclepius, the son of Apollo, was deified after death as the god of medicine.
[f] Since the collection of taxes and duties was farmed out to individuals, they would be the losers in failing to make a minute search for dutiable articles.

ἀπολλύουσι καὶ προΐενται τὰ αὑτῶν ἀσχολούμενοι περὶ τἀλλότρια καὶ σπανίως μὲν εἰς ἀγρὸν βαδίζουσι, τὸ ἥσυχον καὶ σιωπηρὸν τῆς ἐρημίας οὐ
F φέροντες· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ παραβάλωσι διὰ χρόνου, ταῖς τῶν γειτόνων ἀμπέλοις ἐμβλέπουσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς ἰδίαις· καὶ πυνθάνονται πόσοι βόες τοῦ γείτονος ἀποτεθνήκασιν ἢ πόσος οἶνος ὀξίνης γέγονε· ταχὺ δὲ τούτων ἐμπλησθέντες ἀποτρέχουσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθινὸς ἐκεῖνος γεωργὸς οὐδὲ τὸν αὐτομάτως ἐρχόμενον ἐκ πόλεως λόγον ἡδέως προσδέχεται, λέγων,

519 εἶτά μοι σκάπτων ἐρεῖ
ἐφ' οἷς γεγόνασιν αἱ διαλύσεις· ταῦτα γὰρ
πολυπραγμονῶν νῦν[1] ὁ κατάρατος περιπατεῖ.

8. Οἱ δὲ πολυπράγμονες ὡς ἕωλόν τι πρᾶγμα καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἀτράγῳδον φεύγοντες τὴν ἀγροικίαν, εἰς τὸ δεῖγμα καὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας ὠθοῦνται· "μή τι καινόν;" "οὐ γὰρ ἦς πρωΐ κατ' ἀγοράν; τί οὖν; ἐν ὥραις τρισὶν οἴει τὴν πόλιν μετακεκοσμῆσθαι[2];" οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἂν μέν τις ἔχῃ τι τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, καταβὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵππου δεξιωσάμενος καταφιλήσας ἕστηκεν ἀκροώ-
B μενος. ἐὰν δ' ἀπαντήσας εἴπῃ τις ὅτι οὐθὲν καινόν, ὥσπερ ἀχθόμενος, "τί λέγεις;" φησίν, "οὐ γέγονας κατ' ἀγοράν; οὐ παρελήλυθας τὸ στρατήγιον; οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἥκουσιν ἐντετύχηκας;" διὸ καλῶς οἱ τῶν Λοκρῶν ἄρχοντες· ἐπεὶ γάρ τις

[1] πολυπραγμονῶν νῦν Emperius, confirmed by MSS.: νῦν πολυπραγμονῶν.
[2] μετακεκομίσθαι many MSS.

their own interests in their excessive occupation with those of others. Only rarely do they visit the farm, for they cannot endure the quiet and silence of being alone. But if, after a long absence, they do chance to put in there, they have more of an eye for their neighbours' vines than for their own, and they ask how many of their neighbours' cattle have died, or how much of his wine has turned sour. But they are soon sated with such news and run away. Yet the true and genuine farmer does not care to hear even news that makes its own way from the city; he says [a]

Then he will tell me while he digs
On what terms peace was made. The cursèd scamp
Now strolls around and meddles with these things.

8. And the busybody, shunning the country as something stale and uninteresting and undramatic, pushes into the bazaar and the market-place and the harbours: "Is there any news?" "Weren't you at market early this morning? Well then, do you suppose the city has changed its constitution in three hours?" If, however, someone really does have something of that nature to tell him, he dismounts from his horse, grasps his informant's hand, kisses him, and stands there listening. But if someone meets him and tells him that there is no news, he exclaims as though he were annoyed, "What do you mean? Haven't you been at market? Didn't you pass the War Office? Didn't you interview the new arrivals from Italy either?" It is for this reason that the legislation of the Locrian magistrates was excellent. For if anyone who had been out of town came

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 473, ades. 347; *cf.* 511 E, *supra*, where it is the typical Athenian slave of whom his farmer-master complains.

(519) ἐξ ἀποδημίας προσιὼν ἠρώτησε, "μή τι καινόν," ἐζημίωσαν αὐτόν. ὡς γὰρ οἱ μάγειροι φορὰν εὔχονται βοσκημάτων οἱ δ' ἁλιεῖς ἰχθύων, οὕτως οἱ πολυπράγμονες εὔχονται φορὰν κακῶν καὶ πλῆθος πραγμάτων καὶ καινότητας καὶ μεταβολάς, ἵν' ἀεί τι θηρεύειν καὶ κατακόπτειν ἔχωσιν.

Εὖ δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν Θουρίων νομοθέτης· κωμῳδεῖσθαι γὰρ ἐκώλυσε τοὺς πολίτας πλὴν μοιχοὺς καὶ πολυπράγμονας. ἔοικε γάρ ἥ τε μοιχεία πολυπραγ-
C μοσύνη τις[1] ἀλλοτρίας ἡδονῆς εἶναι καὶ ζήτησις καὶ ἔρευνα τῶν φυλαττομένων καὶ λανθανόντων τοὺς πολλούς· ἥ τε πολυπραγμοσύνη παράδυσίς[2] ἐστι καὶ φθορὰ καὶ ἀπογύμνωσις τῶν ἀπορρήτων.

9. Τῇ μὲν οὖν πολυμαθείᾳ τὴν πολυλογίαν ἕπεσθαι συμβαίνει (διὸ καὶ Πυθαγόρας ἔταξε τοῖς νέοις πενταετῆ σιωπήν, ἐχεμυθίαν προσαγορεύσας), τῇ δὲ περιεργίᾳ τὴν κακολογίαν ἀνάγκη συνακολουθεῖν· ἃ γὰρ ἡδέως ἀκούουσιν ἡδέως λαλοῦσι, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων σπουδῇ συλλέγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους μετὰ χαρᾶς ἐκφέρουσιν. ὅθεν αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τὸ
D νόσημα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐμποδών ἐστι. πάντες γὰρ αὐτοὺς φυλάττονται καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, καὶ οὔτε πρᾶξαί τι πολυπράγμονος ὁρῶντος οὔτ' εἰπεῖν ἀκούοντος ἡδέως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ βουλὰς ἀνατίθενται καὶ σκέψεις πραγμάτων ὑπερβάλλονται, μέχρι ἂν ἐκποδὼν ὁ τοιοῦτος γένηται· κἂν

[1] τις] τῆς most mss.
[2] παράδυσις] παράλυσις all mss. except G.

[a] The professional cook was also a butcher.
[b] Charondas.

up and asked, "Is there any news?" they fined him. Just as cooks [a] pray for a good crop of young animals and fishermen for a good haul of fish, in the same way busybodies pray for a good crop of calamities, a good haul of difficulties, for novelties, and changes, that they, like cooks and fishermen, may always have something to fish out or butcher.

Another good law was that of the legislator of Thurii,[b] for he forbade the lampooning on the comic stage of all citizens except adulterers and busybodies. And indeed adultery does seem to be a sort of curiosity about another's pleasure and a searching out and examination of matters which are closely guarded and escape general observation, while curiosity is an encroaching, a debauching and denuding of secret things.

9. Since a natural consequence of much learning is to have much to say (and for this reason Pythagoras [c] enjoined upon the young a five years' silence which he called a "Truce to Speech"), a necessary concomitant of inquisitiveness is to speak evil.[d] For what the curious delight to hear they delight to tell, and what they zealously collect from others they joyously reveal to everyone else. Consequently, in addition to its other evils, their disease actually impedes the fulfilment of their desires.[e] For everyone is on his guard to hide things from them and is reluctant to do anything while a busybody is looking, or to say anything while one is listening, but defers consultation and postpones the consideration of business until such an inquisitive person is out of

[c] *Cf. Life of Numa*, viii. (65 B); *De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 149 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 420); Lucian, *Vitarum Auctio*, 3.
[d] *Cf.* 508 C, *supra*.
[e] *Cf.* 502 E-F, *supra*.

(519) ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀπορρήτου παρόντος ἢ πράξεως σπουδαίας περαινομένης ἀνὴρ πολυπράγμων ἐπιφανῇ, καθάπερ ὄψον γαλῆς παραδραμούσης αἴρουσιν ἐκ μέσου καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσιν· ὥστε πολλάκις τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥητὰ καὶ θεατὰ τούτοις μόνοις ἄρρητα καὶ ἀθέατα γίνεσθαι.

Διὸ καὶ πίστεως ἁπάσης ἔρημος ὁ πολυπράγμων
E ἐστίν· οἰκέταις γοῦν καὶ ξένοις πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον ἐπιστολὰς καὶ γράμματα καὶ σφραγῖδας ἢ φίλοις καὶ οἰκείοις πολυπράγμοσιν. ὁ δὲ Βελλεροφόντης ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ γράμματα κομίζων ἔλυσεν, ἀλλ' ἀπέσχετο τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς τῆς γυναικὸς διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐγκράτειαν. ἀκρασίας γὰρ τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν ὡς καὶ τὸ μοιχεύειν, καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ δεινῆς ἀνοίας καὶ ἀφροσύνης· τὸ γὰρ τοσαύτας παρελθόντα κοινὰς καὶ δεδημοσιωμένας[1] γυναῖκας ἐπὶ τὴν κατάκλειστον ὠθεῖσθαι καὶ πολυτελῆ, πολλάκις ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ καὶ ἄμορφον οὖσαν,
F ὑπερβολὴ μανίας καὶ παραφροσύνης. ταὐτὸν δ' οἱ πολυπράγμονες ποιοῦσι· πολλὰ[2] καὶ καλὰ θεάματα καὶ ἀκούσματα καὶ σχολὰς καὶ διατριβὰς παρελθόντες, ἐπιστόλια διορύττουσιν ἀλλότρια καὶ παραβάλλουσι γειτόνων τοίχοις τὰ ὦτα καὶ συμψιθυρίζουσιν οἰκέταις καὶ γυναίοις, πολλάκις μὲν οὐδ' ἀκινδύνως ἀεὶ δ' ἀδόξως.

10. Διὸ καὶ χρήσιμον ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν[3] ἀποτροπὴν τοῖς πολυπράγμοσιν ἡ τῶν προεγνωσμέ-

[1] δημοσιωμένας many mss.
[2] πολλὰ] πολλὰ γὰρ Stegmann.
[3] τὴν] τὴν τοῦ πάθους Reiske.

[a] *Cf.* 503 c-D, *supra*.

the way. And if, when either some secret matter is under discussion or some important business is being transacted, a busybody comes on the scene, men drop the matter from the discussion and conceal it, as one does a tidbit when a cat runs by. Consequently these persons are often the only ones to whom those matters are not told or shown which everyone else may hear and see.

For the same reason the busybody is deprived of everybody's confidence [a]: we should prefer, on any account, to entrust our letters and papers and seals to slaves and strangers rather than to inquisitive friends and relatives. That noble Bellerophon [b] did not break the seal even on a letter accusing himself which he was carrying, but kept his hands from the king's letter by reason of that same continence which kept him from the king's wife. Inquisitiveness, in fact, is indicative of incontinence no less than is adultery, and in addition, it is indicative of terrible folly and fatuity. For to pass by so many women who are public property open to all and then to be drawn toward a woman who is kept under lock and key and is expensive, and often, if it so happens, quite ugly, is the very height of madness and insanity. And it is this same thing which busybodies do: they pass by much that is beautiful to see and to hear, many matters excellent for relaxation and amusement, and spend their time digging into other men's trifling correspondence, gluing their ears to their neighbours' walls, whispering with slaves and women of the streets, and often incurring danger, and always infamy.

10. For this reason the most useful means possible for turning the busybody from his vice is for him to

[b] *Cf. Il.*, vi. 168.

520 νων ἀνάμνησις. ἂν γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἔλεγε τὰς κιβωτοὺς ἀνοίγων διὰ χρόνου τὴν μὲν τῶν μισθῶν ἀεὶ μεστὴν τὴν δὲ τῶν χαρίτων εὑρίσκειν κενήν, οὕτως[1] τις[2] τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης τὴν ἀποθήκην ἀνοίγῃ διὰ χρόνου καὶ κατασκέπτηται πολλῶν ἀχρήστων καὶ ματαίων καὶ ἀτερπῶν γέμουσαν, ἴσως ἂν αὐτῷ τὸ πρᾶγμα[3] προσταίη, φανὲν ἀηδὲς παντάπασι καὶ φλυαρῶδες. φέρε γάρ, εἴ τις ἐπιὼν τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν παλαιῶν ἐκλαμβάνοι τὰ κάκιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ βιβλίον ἔχοι συντεταγμένον, οἷον Ὁμηρικῶν στίχων ἀκεφάλων καὶ τραγικῶν σολοικισμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπ' Ἀρχιλόχου
B πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπρεπῶς καὶ ἀκολάστως εἰρημένων, ἑαυτὸν παραδειγματίζοντος, ἆρ' οὐκ ἔστι τῆς τραγικῆς κατάρας ἄξιος,

ὄλοιο θνητῶν ἐκλέγων τὰς συμφοράς;

καὶ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς κατάρας ἀπρεπὴς καὶ ἀνωφελὴς ὁ θησαυρισμὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἁμαρτημάτων· ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις, ἣν ἐκ τῶν κακίστων καὶ ἀναγωγοτάτων κτίσας ὁ Φίλιππος Πονηρόπολιν προσηγόρευσεν.

Οἱ τοίνυν πολυπράγμονες, οὐ στίχων οὐδὲ ποιημάτων, ἀλλὰ βίων ἀστοχήματα καὶ πλημμελήματα καὶ σολοικισμοὺς ἀναλεγόμενοι καὶ συνάγοντες, ἀμουσότατον καὶ ἀτερπέστατον κακῶν γραμματο-

[1] All MSS. but two add ἄν after οὕτως.
[2] τις added by Hutten.
[3] πρᾶγμα] πρᾶγμ' αὐτὸ W.C.H.

[a] With this chapter may be compared chapter 19 of *De Vitioso Pudore* (*Moralia*, 536 C-D).
[b] *Cf.* the same story, illustrating the avarice of Simonides,

remember what he has previously learned.[a] For, as Simonides[b] used to say that when he opened his boxes after some time, he always found the fee-box full, but the thanks-box empty, so if one opens from time to time the deposit-box of inquisitiveness and examines it, full as it is of many useless, futile, and unlovely things, perhaps this procedure would give sufficient offence, so completely disagreeable and silly would it appear. Suppose a man should run over the works of the ancients and pick out the worst passages in them and keep a book compiled from such things as "headless lines" in Homer[c] and solecisms in the tragedians and the unbecoming and licentious language applied to women by which Archilochus[d] makes a sorry spectacle of himself, would he not deserve that curse in the tragedy,

Be damned, compiler of men's miseries?[e]

And even without this curse, such a man's treasure-house of other people's faults is unbecoming and useless. It is like the city populated by the vilest and most intractable of men which Philip founded and called Roguesborough.[f]

Busybodies, however, by gleaning and gathering the blunders and errors and solecisms, not of lines or poems, but of lives, carry about with them a most

in *Moralia*, 555 F; there the box containing his fees is full of silver.
[c] Lines which begin with a short syllable instead of the long one demanded by the metre: *cf. Moralia*, 397 D, 611 B; Athenaeus, xiv. 632 D.
[d] *Cf. Moralia*, 45 A.
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 913, ades. 388; *cf. Moralia*, 855 B.
[f] *Cf.* Jacoby, *Frag. d. gr. Historiker*, ii. B, p. 561, Theopompus, Frag. 110.

(520) φυλακεῖον τὴν ἑαυτῶν μνήμην περιφέρουσιν. ὥσπερ
C οὖν ἐν Ῥώμῃ τινὲς τὰς γραφὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδριάντας καὶ νὴ Δία τὰ κάλλη τῶν ὠνίων παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ τιθέμενοι περὶ τὴν τῶν τεράτων ἀγορὰν ἀναστρέφονται, τοὺς ἀκνήμους καὶ τοὺς γαλεάγκωνας καὶ τοὺς τριοφθάλμους καὶ τοὺς στρουθοκεφάλους καταμανθάνοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες εἴ τι γεγένηται

σύμμικτον εἶδος καὶ ἀποφώλιον τέρας,[1]

ἀλλ' ἐὰν συνεχῶς τις ἐπαγάγῃ τοῖς τοιούτοις αὐτοὺς θεάμασι, ταχὺ πλησμονὴν καὶ ναυτίαν τὸ πρᾶγμα παρέξει, οὕτως οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀστοχήματα καὶ γενῶν αἴσχη καὶ διαστροφάς τινας ἐν οἴκοις ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ πλημμελείας πολυπραγμονοῦντες τῶν
D πρώτων[2] ἀναμιμνησκέτωσαν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν οὐδεμίαν ἤνεγκε.

11. Μέγιστον μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀποτροπὴν ὁ ἐθισμός, ἐὰν πόρρωθεν ἀρξάμενοι γυμνάζωμεν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ διδάσκωμεν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐγκράτειαν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ αὔξησις ἔθει γέγονε τοῦ νοσήματος κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ πρόσω χωροῦντος. ὃν δὲ τρόπον, εἰσόμεθα περὶ τῆς ἀσκήσεως ὁμοῦ διαλεγόμενοι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν βραχυτάτων καὶ φαυλοτάτων ἀρξώμεθα. τί γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τάφων ἐπιγραφὰς μὴ ἀναγινώσκειν, ἢ τί δυσχερὲς ἐν τοῖς περιπάτοις
E τὰ κατὰ τῶν τοίχων γράμματα[3] τῇ ὄψει παρατρέχειν, ὑποβάλλοντας αὐτοῖς ὅτι χρήσιμον οὐθὲν

[1] τέρας] βρέφος *Life of Theseus*, xv.
[2] πρώτων] προτέρων Hartman.
[3] γράμματα] ἐπιγράμματα Reiske.

inelegant and unlovely record-box of evils, their own memory. Therefore just as at Rome there are some who take no account of paintings or statues or even, by Heaven, of the beauty of the boys and women for sale, but haunt the monster-market, examining those who have no calves, or are weasel-armed,[a] or have three eyes, or ostrich-heads, and searching to learn whether there has been born some

Commingled shape and misformed prodigy,[b]

yet if one continually conduct them to such sights, they will soon experience satiety and nausea ; so let those who are curious about life's failures, the blots on the scutcheon, the delinquencies and errors in other people's homes, remind themselves that their former discoveries have brought them no favour or profit.

11. The greatest factor, however, in ridding ourselves of this affliction is the habit of beginning early to train and teach ourselves to acquire this self-control. It is, in fact, by habituation that the disease has come to increase, advancing, as it does, little by little. How this habit is acquired, we shall learn when we discuss the proper training. So first let us begin with the most trifling and unimportant matters. What difficulty is there about refraining from reading the inscriptions on tombs as we journey along the roads ? Or what is there arduous in just glancing at the writing on walls when we take our walks ? We have only to remind ourselves that

[a] That is, with exceptionally short arms.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 680, Euripides, Frag. 996; *cf. Life of Theseus*, xv. (6 D).

οὐδ' ἐπιτερπὲς ἐν τούτοις γέγραπται· ἀλλ' "ἐμνήσθη" ὁ δεῖνα τοῦ δεῖνος "ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ" καὶ "φίλων ἄριστος" ὅδε τις, καὶ πολλὰ τοιαύτης γέμοντα φλυαρίας; ἃ δοκεῖ μὲν οὐ βλάπτειν ἀναγινωσκόμενα, βλάπτει δὲ λεληθότως τῷ μελέτην παρεμποιεῖν τοῦ ζητεῖν τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα. καὶ καθάπερ οἱ κυνηγοὶ τοὺς σκύλακας οὐκ ἐῶσιν ἐκτρέπεσθαι καὶ διώκειν πᾶσαν ὀδμήν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ῥυτῆρσιν ἕλκουσι καὶ ἀνακρούουσι, καθαρὸν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκρατον φυλάττοντες τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον, ἵν' εὐτονώτερον ἐμφύηται τοῖς ἴχνεσι

F πέλματα[1] θηρείων μελέων μυκτῆρσιν ἐρευνῶν·

οὕτω δεῖ τὰς ἐπὶ πᾶν θέαμα καὶ πᾶν ἄκουσμα τοῦ πολυπράγμονος ἐκδρομὰς καὶ περιπλανήσεις ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ ἀντισπᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ χρήσιμα φυλάττοντας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ἀετοὶ[2] καὶ οἱ λέοντες ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν συστρέφουσιν εἴσω τοὺς ὄνυχας, ἵνα μὴ τὴν ἀκμὴν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὀξύτητα κατατρίβωσιν, οὕτω τὸ
521 πολύπραγμον τοῦ φιλομαθοῦς ἀκμήν τινα καὶ στόμωμα νομίζοντες ἔχειν μὴ καταναλίσκωμεν μηδ' ἀπαμβλύνωμεν ἐν τοῖς ἀχρήστοις.[3]

12. Δεύτερον τοίνυν ἐθιζώμεθα θύραν παριόντες ἀλλοτρίαν μὴ βλέπειν εἴσω μηδὲ τῶν ἐντὸς ἐπιδράττεσθαι τῇ ὄψει[4] καθάπερ χειρὶ τῆς περιεργίας,[5] ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοκράτους ἔχωμεν πρόχειρον, ὃς ἔφη

[1] πέλματα Emperius, confirmed by one MS.: τέρματα.
[2] ἀετοὶ] αἴλουροι Pohlenz.
[3] ἀχρήστοις] χειρίστοις most MSS.
[4] Reiske would delete τῇ ὄψει.
[5] τῆς περιεργίας Babbitt: τῇ περιεργίᾳ.

nothing useful or pleasant has been written there: merely so-and-so "commemorates" so-and-so "wishing him well," and someone else is the "best of friends," and much twaddle of this sort.[a] It may seem that no harm will come from reading these, but harm you it does by imperceptibly instilling the practice of searching out matters which do not concern you. And as hunters do not allow young hounds to turn aside and follow every scent, but pull them up and check them with the leash, keeping their sense of smell pure and untainted for their proper task in order that it may keep more keenly to the trail,

With nostrils tracking down the paths of beasts[b];

so one should be careful to do away with or divert to useful ends the sallies and wanderings of the busybody, directed as they are to everything that one may see and hear. For as eagles and lions[c] draw in their claws when they walk so that they may not wear off the sharpness of the tips, so, if we consider that curiosity for learning has also a sharp and keen edge, let us not waste or blunt it upon matters of no value.

12. In the second place, then, let us accustom ourselves not to look inside when we pass another's door, nor with our curious gaze to clutch, as it were by main force, at what is happening within, but let us ever keep ready for use the saying of Xenocrates,

[a] I quote Shilleto's note: "Plutarch rather reminds one, in his evident contempt for *Epitaphs*, of the cynic who asked, 'Where are all the bad people buried?' 'Where indeed?'"
[b] From an unknown poet: Empedocles? (*cf.* Diels, *Hermes*, xv. 176).
[c] *Cf.* *Moralia*, 966 c. "Eagles" is probably corrupt. Pohlenz suggests "cats."

(521) μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ[1] τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὔτε καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἡδὺ τὸ θέαμα·

δύσμορφα μέντοι τἄνδον εἰσιδεῖν, ξένε·

τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις, σκευάρια
B κείμενα καὶ θεραπαινίδια καθεζόμενα καὶ[2] σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐπιτερπές. ἡ δὲ συνδιαστρέφουσα τὴν ψυχὴν παράβλεψις αὕτη καὶ παρατόξευσις αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὸ ἔθος μοχθηρόν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Διογένης θεασάμενος εἰσελαύνοντα τὸν ὀλυμπιονίκην Διώξιππον ἐφ' ἅρματος, καὶ γυναικὸς εὐμόρφου θεωμένης τὴν πομπὴν ἀποσπάσαι τὰς ὄψεις μὴ δυνάμενον ἀλλ' ὑποβλέποντα καὶ παρεπιστρεφόμενον, "ὁρᾶτ'," εἶπε, "τὸν ἀθλητὴν ὑπὸ παιδισκαρίου τραχηλιζόμενον;" τοὺς δὲ πολυπράγμονας ἴδοις ἂν ὑπὸ παντὸς ὁμοίως θεάματος τραχηλιζομένους καὶ περιαγομένους ὅταν ἔθος καὶ μελέτη
C γένηται τῆς ὄψεως αὐτοῖς πανταχοῦ διαφορουμένης. δεῖ δ', ὡς οἶμαι, μὴ καθάπερ θεράπαιναν ἀνάγωγον ἔξω ῥέμβεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ' ἀποπεμπομένην ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα συντυγχάνειν αὐτοῖς ταχὺ καὶ διαγγέλλειν· εἶτα πάλιν κοσμίως ἐντὸς εἶναι τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ προσέχειν αὐτῷ. νῦν δὲ συμβαίνει τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους·

[1] ἢ omitted by some mss., but confirmed by Aelian.
[2] καὶ] καίτοι W.C.H.

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*², p. 617, Euripides, Frag. 790, probably from the *Philoctetes*.

that it makes no difference whether it is the feet or the eyes that we set within another's house; for what the eyes behold is neither just nor honourable, and not even pleasant.

Unsightly, stranger, are the things within,[a]

since the greater part of what we see inside is of this sort—kitchen utensils lying about and servant-girls sitting in idleness, and nothing important or pleasurable. And this practice of throwing sidelong and furtive glances, distorting the soul as it does, is shameful, and the habit it implants is depraved. For instance, when Diogenes [b] saw the Olympic victor Dioxippus making his triumphal entry in his chariot and unable to tear his eyes away from a beautiful woman who was among the spectators of the procession, but continually turning around and throwing side-glances in her direction, "Do you see," said the Cynic, "how a slip of a girl gets a strangle-hold on our athlete?" And you may observe how every kind of spectacle alike gets a strangle-hold on busybodies and twists their necks round when they once acquire a habit and practice of scattering their glances in all directions. But, as I think, the faculty of vision should not be spinning about outside of us,[c] like an ill-trained servant girl, but when it is sent on an errand by the soul it should quickly reach its destination and deliver its message, then return again in good order within the governance of the reason and heed its command. But as it is, the words of Sophocles [d] come true:

[b] *Cf.* Aelian, *Varia Historia*, xii. 58.
[c] That is, outside of the control of reason.
[d] *Electra*, 724-725.

(521) ἔπειτα δ' Αἰνιᾶνος ἀνδρὸς ἄστομοι
πῶλοι βίᾳ φοροῦσιν[1]·

αἱ μὴ τυχοῦσαι παιδαγωγίας ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν[2] ὀρθῆς μηδ' ἀσκήσεως αἰσθήσεις προεκτρέχουσαι καὶ συνεφελκόμεναι πολλάκις εἰς ἃ μὴ δεῖ καταβάλλουσι τὴν διάνοιαν. ὅθεν ἐκεῖνο μὲν ψεῦδός ἐστι,
D τὸ Δημόκριτον ἑκουσίως σβέσαι τὰς ὄψεις ἀπερεισάμενον εἰς ἔσοπτρον πυρωθὲν καὶ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ[3] ἀνάκλασιν δεξάμενον, ὅπως μὴ παρέχωσι θόρυβον τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξω καλοῦσαι πολλάκις, ἀλλ' ἐῶσιν ἔνδον οἰκουρεῖν καὶ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς, ὥσπερ παρόδιοι θυρίδες ἐμφραγεῖσαι· τοῦτο μέντοι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀλίγιστα[4] κινοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστα τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενοι. καὶ γὰρ τὰ μουσεῖα πορρωτάτω τῶν πόλεων ἱδρύσαντο, καὶ τὴν νύκτα προσεῖπον "εὐφρόνην" μέγα πρὸς εὕρεσιν τῶν ζητουμένων καὶ σκέψιν ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὸ ἀπερίσπαστον.

E 13. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο χαλεπὸν καὶ δύσκολον, ἀνθρώπων λοιδορουμένων ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ κακῶς λεγόντων ἀλλήλους μὴ προσελθεῖν, ἢ συνδρομῆς ἐπί τι πλειόνων γενομένης μεῖναι καθήμενον· ἐὰν δ' ἀκρατῶς ἔχῃς, ἀπελθεῖν ἀναστάντα. χρηστοῦ μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς τοῖς πολυπραγμονοῦσιν ἀναμίξας σεαυ-

[1] φέρουσιν Sophocles.
[2] ἐλέγομεν Reiske: λέγομεν.
[3] αὐτοῦ] αὐτῶν most MSS.
[4] ὀλίγιστα Kronenberg: ὀλίγα.

[a] Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[5], ii. p. 89, A 27.

Then the Aenianian's hard-mouthed yearlings break
From his control and bolt;

that is, the senses which have not received what we called above right instruction and training run away, dragging the intellect with them, and often plunge it into deep disaster. Consequently, though that story about Democritus[a] is false, that he deliberately destroyed his sight by fixing his eyes on a red-hot mirror and allowing its heat to be reflected on his sight, in order that his eyes might not repeatedly summon his intellect outside and disturb it, but might allow his mind to remain inside at home and occupy itself with pure thinking, blocking up as it were windows which open on the street; yet nothing is more true than this, that those who make most use of the intellect make fewest calls upon the senses.[b] We observe, for instance, that men have built their sanctuaries of the Muses[c] far from cities and that they have called night "kindly"[d] from a belief that its quiet and absence of distraction is greatly conducive to the investigation and solution of the problems in hand.

13. Yet truly, neither is this[e] a difficult nor arduous task: when men are reviling and abusing each other in the market-place, not to approach them, or when a crowd is running to see something or other, to remain seated, or, if you are without self-control, to get up and go away. For you will reap no advantage from mixing yourself with busybodies, whereas you will

[b] Plutarch is thinking of some such passage as Plato, *Phaedo*, 66 A.
[c] That is, halls devoted to learning, such as the Museion at Alexandria and the Academy at Athens.
[d] *Cf.* Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 265.
[e] *Cf.* 520 D, *supra*.

τὸν ἀπολαύσεις, μεγάλα δ' ὠφεληθήσῃ τὸ πολύπραγμον ἀποστρέψας βίᾳ καὶ κολούσας ὑπακούειν τῷ λογισμῷ συνεθιζόμενον.

Ἐκ δὲ τούτου μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνοντα τὴν ἄσκησιν ὀρθῶς ἔχει καὶ θέατρον ἀκροάματος εὐημεροῦντος παρελθεῖν, καὶ φίλους ἐπ' ὀρχηστοῦ τινος ἢ κωμῳ-
F δοῦ θέαν παραλαμβάνοντας διώσασθαι καὶ βοῆς ἐν σταδίῳ γινομένης ἢ ἱπποδρόμῳ μὴ ἐπιστραφῆναι. καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης παρήνει φυλάττεσθαι τῶν βρωμάτων ὅσα μὴ πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν ἀναπείθει καὶ τῶν πομάτων ὅσα πίνειν μὴ διψῶντας, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς τῶν θεαμάτων καὶ ἀκουσμάτων φυλάττεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν ὅσα κρατεῖ καὶ προσάγεται τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους. ὁ γοῦν[1] Κῦρος οὐκ ἐβούλετο τὴν Πάνθειαν ἰδεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀράσπου λέγοντος ὡς ἄξιον θέας εἴη τὸ τῆς γυναικὸς εἶδος, "οὐκοῦν,"
522 ἔφη, "διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον αὐτῆς ἀφεκτέον· εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοῦ πεισθεὶς ἀφικοίμην πρὸς αὐτήν, ἴσως ἄν με πάλιν ἀναπείσειεν αὐτὴ καὶ μὴ σχολάζοντα φοιτᾶν καὶ θεᾶσθαί[2] καὶ παρακαθῆσθαι προέμενον πολλὰ τῶν σπουδῆς ἀξίων." ὁμοίως οὐδ' ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς ὄψιν ἦλθε τῆς Δαρείου γυναικὸς ἐκπρεπεστάτης εἶναι λεγομένης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φοιτῶν αὐτῆς πρεσβῦτιν οὖσαν, οὐχ ὑπέμεινε τὴν νέαν καὶ καλὴν ἰδεῖν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς φορείοις τῶν γυναικῶν ὑποβάλλοντες τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τῶν θυρίδων ἐκκρεμαννύντες οὐδὲν ἁμαρτάνειν δοκοῦμεν οὕτως
B ὀλισθηρὰν καὶ ῥευστὴν εἰς ἅπαντα τὴν πολυπραγμοσύνην ποιοῦντες.

[1] γοῦν] δὲ all MSS. except G.
[2] καὶ θεᾶσθαι] θεᾶσθαί τε most MSS.

obtain great benefit from forcibly turning aside your curiosity and curtailing it and training it to obey reason.

And after this it is well to make our training more intensive and pass by a theatre where a successful performance is in progress; and, when our friends urge us to see a certain dancer or comedian, to thrust them aside; and, when shouts are heard on the race-course or in the circus, not to turn round. For as Socrates[a] used to advise the avoidance of such foods as tempt us to eat when we are not hungry and such drinks as tempt us to imbibe when we are not thirsty, so we also should avoid and guard against such sights and sounds as master and attract us without fulfilling any need of ours. Thus Cyrus[b] was unwilling to see Pantheia; and when Araspes declared that the woman's beauty was worth seeing, Cyrus said, "Then this is all the more reason for keeping away from her. For if, persuaded by you, I should go to her, perhaps she herself might tempt me, when I couldn't spare the time, to go to see her again and sit by her, to the neglect of many important matters." So too Alexander[c] would not go to see Darius's wife who was said to be very beautiful, but although he visited her mother, an elderly woman, he could not bring himself to see the young and beautiful daughter. Yet we peep into women's litters and hang about their windows, and think we are doing nothing wrong in thus making our curiosity prone to slip and slide into all kinds of vice.

[a] *Cf.* 513 D, *supra.*
[b] *Cf.* Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, v. 1. 8; *Moralia*, 31 C.
[c] *Cf. Life of Alexander*, xxii. (677 B); *Moralia*, 97 D, 338 E.

(522) 14. Ἔστι τοίνυν καὶ πρὸς δικαιοσύνης ἄσκησιν ὑπερβῆναί ποτε λῆμμα δίκαιον ἵνα πόρρω τῶν ἀδίκων ἐθίσῃς σεαυτὸν εἶναι, καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνης ὁμοίως ἀποσχέσθαι ποτὲ γυναικὸς ἰδίας ἵνα μηδέποτε κινηθῇς ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίας. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἔθος ἐπάγων τῇ πολυπραγμοσύνῃ πειρῶ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἔνια παρακοῦσαί ποτε καὶ παριδεῖν καὶ βουλομένου τινὸς ἀγγεῖλαί τι τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας ὑπερβαλέσθαι, καὶ λόγους περὶ σοῦ λελέχθαι δοκοῦντας ἀπώσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Οἰδίποδα τοῖς μεγίστοις κακοῖς ἡ περιεργία περιέβαλε· ζητῶν γὰρ
C ἑαυτὸν ὡς οὐκ ὄντα Κορίνθιον ἀλλὰ ξένον, ἀπήντησε τῷ Λαΐῳ, καὶ τοῦτον ἀνελὼν καὶ τὴν μητέρα λαβὼν ἐπὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ γυναῖκα καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι μακάριος πάλιν ἑαυτὸν ἐζήτει. καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς οὐκ ἐώσης, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἤλεγχε τὸν συνειδότα γέροντα, πᾶσαν προσφέρων ἀνάγκην. τέλος δὲ τοῦ πράγματος ἤδη περιφέροντος αὐτὸν τῇ ὑπονοίᾳ καὶ τοῦ γέροντος ἀναβοήσαντος,

οἴμοι πρὸς αὐτῷ γ' εἰμὶ τῷ δεινῷ λέγειν,

ὅμως ἐξημμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους καὶ σφαδάζων ἀποκρίνεται,

κἄγωγ' ἀκούειν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀκουστέον.

οὕτω τίς ἐστι γλυκύπικρος καὶ ἀκατάσχετος ὁ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης γαργαλισμός, ὥσπερ ἕλκος, αἱ-
D μάσσων ἑαυτόν, ὅταν ἀμύσσηται. ὁ δ' ἀπηλλαγ-

[a] The herdsman who had saved Oedipus on Cithaeron.
[b] Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*, 1169.

14. Since, therefore, for the attainment of justice you may sometimes forgo an honest gain that you may accustom yourself to keep clear of dishonest profit, so likewise, for the attainment of continence, you may sometimes keep aloof from your own wife in order that you may never be stirred by another's. Then apply this habit to inquisitiveness and endeavour sometimes not to hear or see some of the things that concern you, and when someone wishes to tell you something that has happened in your house, put him off and refuse to hear words that are supposed to have been spoken about you. It was, in fact, curiosity which involved Oedipus in the greatest calamities. Believing that he was no Corinthian, but a foreigner, and seeking to discover his identity, he encountered Laïus; and when he had killed Laïus and had taken, in addition to the throne, his own mother to wife, though seeming to all to be blessed by fortune, he began again to try to discover his identity. And although his wife attempted to prevent him, all the more vigorously did he cross-examine the old man who knew the truth, bringing every form of compulsion to bear. And at last, when circumstances were already bringing him to suspect the truth and the old man [a] cried out,

Alas! I stand on the dread brink of speech,[b]

Oedipus was none the less so inflamed and maddened by his affliction [c] that he replied,

And I of hearing, and yet hear I must [d];

so bitter-sweet, so uncontrollable is the itching of curiosity, like the itching of a sore which gets bloody whenever we scratch it. But the man who has got

[c] Curiosity.
[d] Sophocles, *l.c.*, 1170.

(522) μένος τῆς νόσου ταύτης καὶ φύσει πρᾶος ἀγνοήσας τι τῶν δυσχερῶν εἴποι ἄν,

ὦ πότνια λήθη τῶν κακῶν, ὡς εἶ σοφή.

15. Διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα συνεθιστέον αὑτούς, ἐπιστολὴν κομισθεῖσαν μὴ ταχὺ μηδὲ κατεσπευσμένως λῦσαι, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, ἂν αἱ χεῖρες βραδύνωσι, τοῖς ὀδοῦσι τοὺς δεσμοὺς διαβιβρώσκοντες, ἀγγέλου ποθὲν ἥκοντος μὴ προσδραμεῖν μηδ' ἐξαναστῆναι, φίλου τινὸς εἰπόντος, "ἔχω σοί τι καινὸν εἰπεῖν πρᾶγμα," "μᾶλλον," εἰπεῖν[1] "εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἔχεις ἢ ὠφέλιμον."

Ἐμοῦ ποτ' ἐν Ῥώμῃ διαλεγομένου, Ῥούστικος
E ἐκεῖνος, ὃν ὕστερον ἀπέκτεινε Δομετιανὸς τῇ δόξῃ φθονήσας, ἠκροᾶτο, καὶ διὰ μέσου στρατιώτης παρελθὼν ἐπιστολὴν αὐτῷ Καίσαρος ἀπέδωκε[2]· γενομένης δὲ σιωπῆς κἀμοῦ διαλιπόντος, ὅπως ἀναγνῷ τὴν ἐπιστολήν, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν οὐδ' ἔλυσε πρότερον ἢ διεξελθεῖν ἐμὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ διαλυθῆναι τὸ ἀκροατήριον· ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἐθαύμασαν τὸ βάρος τἀνδρός.

Ὅταν δέ τις οἷς ἔξεστι τρέφων τὸ πολύπραγμον ἰσχυρὸν ἀπεργάσηται καὶ βίαιον, οὐκέτι ῥᾳδίως πρὸς ἃ κεκώλυται φερομένου διὰ συνήθειαν κρατεῖν δυνατός ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ἐπιστόλια παραλύουσιν οὗτοι φίλων, συνεδρίοις ἀπορρήτοις ἑαυτοὺς παρεμβάλ-
F λουσιν,[3] ἱερῶν ἃ μὴ θέμις ὁρᾶν γίνονται θεαταί,

[1] εἰπεῖν added by Bernardakis.
[2] ἐπέδωκε most MSS.
[3] παραβάλλουσιν most MSS.

[a] Euripides, *Orestes*, 213.

rid of this disease and is gentle by nature will say, if he is ignorant of something unpleasant,

Forgetfulness of evil, sovereign queen,
How wise you are ![a]

15. We must, therefore, also habituate ourselves to things like these: when a letter is brought to us, not to open it quickly or in a hurry, as most people do, who go so far as to bite through the fastenings with their teeth if their hands are too slow; when a messenger arrives from somewhere or other, not to rush up, or even to rise to our feet; when a friend says, "I have something new to tell you," to say, "I should prefer that you had something useful or profitable."

When I was once lecturing in Rome, that famous Rusticus,[b] whom Domitian later killed through envy at his repute, was among my hearers, and a soldier came through the audience and delivered to him a letter from the emperor. There was a silence and I, too, made a pause, that he might read his letter; but he refused and did not break the seal until I had finished my lecture and the audience had dispersed. Because of this incident everyone admired the dignity of the man.

But when one nourishes his curiosity upon permissible material until he renders it vigorous and violent, he is no longer able to master it easily, since it is borne, by force of habit, toward forbidden things. And such persons pry into their friends' correspondence, thrust themselves into secret meetings, become spectators of sacred rites which it is an impiety

[b] Probably Arulenus Rusticus, put to death in or after 93 A.D. for having in his biography of Paetus Thrasea called his subject *sanctus* (Dio, lxvii. 13. 2, *cf.* also Tacitus, *Agricola*, 2).

τόπους ἀβάτους πατοῦσι, πράγματα καὶ λόγους βασιλικοὺς ἀνερευνῶσι.

16. Καίτοι τούς γε τυράννους, οἷς ἀνάγκη πάντα γινώσκειν, ἐπαχθεστάτους ποιεῖ τὸ τῶν λεγομένων ὤτων καὶ προσαγωγέων γένος. ὠτακουστὰς μὲν οὖν πρῶτος ἔσχεν ὁ νόθος[1] Δαρεῖος ἀπιστῶν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πάντας ὑφορώμενος καὶ δεδοικώς, τοὺς δὲ
523 προσαγωγίδας οἱ Διονύσιοι τοῖς Συρακοσίοις[2] κατέμιξαν· ὅθεν ἐν τῇ μεταβολῇ τῶν πραγμάτων τούτους πρώτους οἱ Συρακόσιοι συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπετυμπάνιζον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν γένος ἐκ τῆς τῶν πολυπραγμόνων φρατρίας καὶ ἑστίας ἐστίν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν συκοφάνται ζητοῦσιν, εἴ τις[3] ἢ βεβούλευται κακὸν ἢ πεποίηκεν· οἱ δὲ πολυπράγμονες καὶ τὰς ἀβουλήτους ἀτυχίας τῶν πέλας ἐλέγχοντες εἰς μέσον ἐκφέρουσι. λέγεται δὲ[4] καὶ τὸν ἀλιτήριον ἐκ φιλοπραγμοσύνης κατονομασθῆναι τὸ πρῶτον· λιμοῦ γὰρ ὡς ἔοικεν Ἀθηναίοις ἰσχυροῦ
B γενομένου, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων πυρὸν εἰς μέσον οὐ φερόντων ἀλλὰ κρύφα καὶ νύκτωρ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις ἀλούντων, περιιόντες ἐτήρουν τῶν μύλων τὸν ψόφον, εἶτ' "ἀλιτήριοι" προσηγορεύθησαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ συκοφάντῃ τοὔνομα γενέσθαι[5]· κεκωλυμένου γὰρ ἐκφέρειν τὰ σῦκα, μηνύοντες καὶ φαίνοντες

[1] νόθος G] νέος or πρῶτος.
[2] Συρακοσίοις Bernardakis, confirmed by G: συρακουσίοις.
[3] τις] τί τις Bernardakis.
[4] δὲ omitted in most MSS.
[5] γενέσθαι] γεγενῆσθαι most MSS.

[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Politics*, v. (viii.) 9. 3 (1313 b 12 ff.).

for them to see, tread consecrated ground, investigate the deeds and words of kings.

16. And yet surely in the case of despots,[a] who have to know everything, it is the tribe of so-called "Ears" and "Jackals" that makes them most detested. It was Darius Nothus, who had no confidence in himself and regarded everyone with fear and suspicion, who first instituted "Listeners"; and "Jackals" were distributed by the Dionysii[b] among the people of Syracuse. Consequently when the revolution came, these were the first persons whom the Syracusans arrested and crushed to death. And in fact the tribe of informers is from the same clan and family as busybodies. But while informers search to see whether anyone has planned or committed a misdemeanour, busybodies investigate and make public even the involuntary mischances of their neighbours. And it is said that the person called *aliterios*[c] first acquired his name from being a busybody. For it appears that when there was a severe famine at Athens and those who possessed wheat would not contribute it to the common stock, but ground[d] it in their houses secretly by night, some persons went about listening for the noise of the mills, and so acquired the name *aliterioi*. It was in the same way, they say, that the *sycophant*[e] won his name. Since the export of figs[f] was prohibited, men who revealed[g] and gave information against those

[b] *Cf. Life of Dion*, xxviii. (970 B-C).
[c] Transgressor, or outlaw; Plutarch rejects this explanation in *Moralia*, 297 A.
[d] The verb ἀλεῖν, from which ἀλιτήριος is here derived.
[e] Informer; *cf. Life of Solon*, xxiv. (91 E); Athenaeus, 74 E-F.
[f] σῦκα.
[g] φαίνειν, from which the noun -φάντης.

(523) τοὺς ἐξάγοντας ἐκλήθησαν "συκοφάνται." καὶ τοῦτ' οὖν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν ἐννοεῖν τοὺς πολυπράγμονας, ὅπως αἰσχύνωνται τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μισουμένους μάλιστα καὶ δυσχεραινομένους ὁμοιότητα καὶ συγγένειαν τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος.

who did export them were called *sycophants*. So it is well worth the while of busybodies to consider this fact also, that they may be ashamed of the resemblance and relationship of their own practice to that of persons who are very cordially hated and loathed.

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